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This thesis explores the idea and praxis of “law and order” as an opposing 
principle of government to the rule of law, through study of the criminal juridical 
system of Myanmar. It finds that this system alludes routinely to the rule of law 
while enabling practices that contradict it. It explains this contradiction by 
arguing that the system is animated by politics that conflate law and order with 
the rule of law. 
 
The origins of the criminal juridical system in Myanmar lie in the authoritarian 
imperatives of the British colonial regime. These imperatives the regime 
expressed legalistically. A formalistic rule-of-law idea took hold and carried over 
into the postcolony. It expanded to encompass notions of substantive rights; 
however, after a military takeover of the state apparatus in 1962 it lost credence. 
When the rule of law re-emerged strongly in political and juridical language 
during the 1990s, under a new military junta, it was as a synonym for law and 
order. Yet, semantically “law and order” in Burmese does not refer to “law” at all. 
It describes an ideal society that is subdued administratively, not one governed 
juridically.  
 
Reading records of 340 court cases, accompanied by findings from research 
among legal professionals and extensive study of published and unpublished 
government documents, I argue that law and order has subsumed the rule of law 
in Myanmar both as an idea and in practice. I advance the argument by exploring 
some of the system’s key features, including its pursuit of public enemies, and the 
role of the policeman as bearer of sovereign authority. I show how the criminal 
juridical system operates as a marketplace for the buying and selling of case 
outcomes, and how this feature of the system is consonant with the maintenance 
of order. I examine how the making of complaints against officials is possible 
within the system’s pragmatic frame, and to an extent is encouraged. And I reveal 
how in response to protests during 2007 courts in Myanmar, rather than 
sanctioning police officers and other officials for violating law instead functioned 
as gatekeepers on a juridical threshold, across which people could be taken at will, 
but from which they could also be returned, through trial and sentencing.  
 
 viii 
The thesis constitutes an empirical response to conceptual debate about the rule 
of law. It argues that this debate can be enriched through more effort to construct 
and critique opposing concepts, and through research of systems animated by 
principles of government other than the rule of law or its likenesses. By positing 
law and order as one opposing concept, the thesis queries the seeming ubiquity of 
rule-of-law discourse. It also illuminates the contradictory qualities of “law and 
order” itself, alerting us to the persistent difficulty of attempting to reconcile the 
normative and general properties of law with the pragmatic and particular 







When I began preparing to write this thesis during March 2008, I envisaged it as 
a study of the criminal juridical system in Myanmar under military rule in the 
present. By the time I finished it four years later, Myanmar had entered a period 
of political change. The military had stepped back from its frontal role in 
government, although former army officers took most key positions in the 
nominally civilian administration formed in 2011. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
symbol and leader of a prolonged and oftentimes painful democratic struggle, was 
campaigning for a seat in the new legislature, which she subsequently won. 
Authorities had released hundreds of political prisoners, including prominent 
participants in the 2007 monk-led protests. Exiled media and political groups had 
begun travelling and reporting from within the country. Foreign dignitaries were 
flocking to the capital, Naypyitaw, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
had promised Myanmar its chairmanship in 2014. Many promising things were 
happening. At the same time, uncertainty about political compromises, ongoing 
civil war, the growing gulf between rich and poor, and the quietly entrenched 
presence of the armed forces in practically all of Myanmar’s political, economic 
and social affairs continued to make the future unpredictable.  
 
This thesis contains no predictions. It is an empirical study of what animated the 
criminal juridical system in Myanmar up until the time of these events. Given that 
most of its contents concern the ideas and practices of the system under 
authoritarian rule, I would like no more than to say that what I began as a study 
of the present was by its completion a study of the past. But, experience shows 
that ideas and practices once habituated in an institutionalised apparatus of 
courts, prosecutorial agencies and police forces can prove remarkably resilient. 
Things done at one time to serve the specific objectives of a power elite or 
dominant corporate group can have lasting and unforeseen consequences. Power 
adapts to serve new interests, and systemic behaviour continues after those who 
initiated it have passed from the scene. Within Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and 
the Philippines the residue of authoritarianism is still felt keenly by people who 
encounter juridical institutions, years after the end of dictatorship. Judges in 
Indonesia still take bribes. Police officers in the Philippines still torture. Although 
 x 
shifts in political power can be dramatic and exciting, shifts in institutional 
behaviour are far more protracted and wearisome.  
 
In Myanmar itself, many of the ideas and practices described herein have their 
origins in earlier periods. Use of torture to obtain confession, use of bail to obtain 
money: these practices and others find parallels in the work of police and courts 
in Bangladesh, and across many parts of India, which share with Myanmar a body 
of statutory law inherited from British colonisers. At the same time, the highly 
intrusive style of military rule in Myanmar over the last half century obliges us to 
distinguish the country’s juridical system today from its counterparts in South 
Asia, where dictators have generally sought to control and contain rather than to 
occupy and supervise courts and police forces.  
 
Inasmuch as this is a study about Myanmar, it is also a study about the rule of 
law, and about the meanings that adhere to this concept in different settings, in 
different languages and different practices. In the coming period, the rule of law 
will be much discussed in Myanmar. This discussion is necessary, indeed critical, 
for the country’s future. Yet if it is to be beneficial, the discussion needs to be 
situated. It requires some familiarity with the rule of law’s biography in Myanmar, 
and with its relation to other political ideas and practices, old and new. 
 
I hope this study can help to inform some of that discussion, and contribute to 
thinking about the long-term challenges that people in Myanmar face as they 
confront the legacy of authoritarianism in their criminal juridical institutions. 
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Late in 1958, army officers forced U Nu, the civilian prime minister of Myanmar, 
then Burma, to surrender his government to an interim military-headed 
administration. Two years later, the interim administration published a book 
declaring its successes. The book, issued separately in Burmese and in English, 
includes among its appendices a 1959 paper entitled “The National Ideology and 
the Role of the Defence Services”. Part one of the paper addresses problems of 
peace and the rule of law. It begins as follows: “The words ‘Peace’ and ‘Rule of 
Law’, which are readily understood by 100 per cent of the population, are as 
difficult to implement as they are easy to understand.”1  
 
As if to demonstrate that “rule of law” is not so readily understood, a few 
paragraphs earlier, the same expression used in the Burmese version to designate 
rule of law has been rendered in English as “law and order”.2 Perhaps this 
mistranslation can be attributed to sloppiness, and in itself does not signify much. 
Indeed, in English, as in some other European languages, one cause for semantic 
slippage between the rule of law and law and order is the reference in both to 
“law”. But a translator working in Burmese cannot be so readily excused. Whereas 
“rule of law”, taya-ubade-somoye, is a literal translation from its English 
equivalent, “law and order”, ngyeinwut-pibyaye, contains no reference to law, 
taya-ubade, at all.3 Rather, it is a compound of words for “stillness” and 
“flattening”. In this order, law is nowhere to be found.  
 
The slippage from the rule of law to law and order in “The National Ideology and 
the Role of the Defence Services” is, I will argue in this study, emblematic of how 
                                                        
1 Government of the Union of Burma, Is Trust Vindicated? (Rangoon: Director of Information, 
1960) 537. In the Burmese version: “တိုင္းရင္းသား လူတရာတြင္ လူတရာလံုးနားလည္သေဘာေပါက္ေသာ “ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းေရး” 
ဆိုေသာစကားႏွင့္ “တရားဥပေဒအုပ္စိုးေရး” ဆိုေသာ စကားသည္ အဓိပၸါယ္ ရွင္းသေလာက္၊ လုပ္ေဆာင္ရာတြင္ ခက္ခဲနက္ခဲ က်ယ္ဝန္း 
လွေပသည္။” ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ ျပည္ေရးရြာမႈ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ျပန္ၾကားေရးဌာန ညႊန္ၾကားေရးဝန္၊ ၁၉၆၀?) စာ ၅၅၈။ 
[Government of the Union of Burma National Affairs (Rangoon: Director of Information, 1960?) 
558.] 
2 On the same page of text in the Burmese version, “တိုင္းျပည္၏ ယခုခ်က္ျခင္းလက္ငင္း အလိုလားအပ္ဆံုး ပထမအေျခခံ 
အဂၤါရပ္မွာ ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းေရးႏွင့္ တရားဥပေဒအုပ္စိုးေရးပင္ ျဖစ္သည”္ is on the preceding page in the English version, 
“The most pressing fundamental need of the Union is law and order.” 
3 For consistency I will use taya-ubade-somoye (တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး) to designate rule of law, and 
ngyeinwut-pibyaye (ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားေရး) for law and order, although in Burmese both have grammatical 
variants, including the word used for rule of law in the text cited here.  
 2 
taya-ubade-somoye has through official discourse in Myanmar taken on the 
meaning of “law and order”, both as an idea and as a set of practices. This 
convergence of rule of law and law and order, or rather, the subsuming of rule of 
law to law and order, the semantic occupancy of the former by the latter, is not a 
meeting of two analogous concepts, but of two antithetical ones.  
 
In this opening chapter, my aim is to explain why the slippage of rule of law into 
law and order is both problematic and significant, and how it relates to the 
remainder of the study. In the first section, I set out the problem, distinguish the 
rule of law from law and order, situate the study with reference to relevant 
literature, and explain my research orientation. In the second, I sketch the study’s 
contents, and in the third, I comment on the sources I have used, and indicate 
how I have used them.  
A rule-of-law problem 
Government officials in Myanmar, and official documents, have for the last 
couple of decades claimed with conspicuous regularity that they are animated by 
concern for “the rule of law”. A speech delivered to judges in 2002 by the then-
intelligence chief Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, published in the Supreme 
Court’s journal, is typical: 
We all know that in 1988 as the country descended into anarchy the people were in a 
state of alarm, and so the Defence Services government stepped into the disturbed 
situation and with difficulty restored state stability, community peace, and the rule of 
law. With the Union of Myanmar at peace and the State Peace and Development 
Council laying down and implementing political, economic and social aims for a 
modern, developed country that can stand proud on the world stage and having 
implemented its first aim, “State stability, community peace, and the rule of law”, now 
the state is stable and peaceful as before, and is on the path to modern development. In 
these favourable circumstances, for the continual flourishing of state stability, peace 
and the rule of law, which is the basis for national development, the responsible judges 
and prosecutors across the state’s judicial sector, Myanmar Police Force, Bureau of 
Special Investigation, and all civil servants in each department must endeavour to 
perform their duties with a clear national view, truthfully, effectively, and uprightly. 
Therefore, with the state stable and peaceful, the aim is for the steadfastness of the rule 
of law’s mainstay, the legal pillar….4 
                                                        
4 “၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္ကာလက ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္မွာ မင္းမဲ့စ႐ိုက္ဆိုးေတြျဖစ္ေပၚခဲ့လို႔ ျပည္သူေတြ က်ီးလန္႔ စာစားျဖစ္ခဲ့ရၿပီး၊ တည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းမႈ ပ်က္ျပားေနတဲ့ 
အေျခအေနမွာ တပ္မေတာ္အစိုးရအေနန႔ဲ ႏိငု္ငံေတာ္တည္ၿငိမ္ေရး၊ ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးန႔ဲ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးကို ခက္ခက္ခဲခဲျပန္လည္ 
တည္ေဆာက္ခဲ့ရတယ္ဆိုတာ အားလံုးအသိပဲျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ ဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီအေနန႔ဲ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ကို ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာၿပီး ေခတ္မီဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးတိုးတက္တဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အျဖစ္ ကမာၻ႔အလယ္မွာ ဝံ့ဝံ့ထည္ထည္ ရပ္တည္ႏိုင္ေစဖို႔ ႏိုင္ငံေရး၊ စီးပြားေရး၊ 
လူမႈေရး ဦးတည္ခ်က္ေတြ ခ်မွတ္အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ ေဆာင္ရြက္လ်က္ရွိရမွာ “ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ တည္ၿငိမ္ေရး၊ ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးန႔ဲ တရား 
ဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး” ကို ပထမဦးတည္ခ်က္အျဖစ္ ခ်မွတ္အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ခဲ့လို႔ ယခုဆိုရင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ႀကီးဟာ ပကတိတည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းၿပီး ေခတ္မီ 
ဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးတိုးတက္ေရးကို ေရွး႐ႈေနၿပီျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒီလိုအေျခအေန အခ်ိန္အခါေကာင္းမွာ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးတိုးတက္ေရးရဲ႕ အေျခခံျဖစ္တဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ 
တည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးန႔ဲ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး အစဥ္အျမဲျဖစ္ထြန္းေနေအာင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ရဲ႕ တရားစီရင္ေရးက႑မွာ တာဝန္ယူလုပ္ကိုင္ 
ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနၾကတဲ့ အဆင့္ဆင့္ေသာ တရားသူႀကီးေတြ၊ ဥပေဒအရာရွိေတြ၊ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲ၊ အထူးစံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးေရးဦးစီးဌာနစတဲ့ ဌာန 
အသီးသီးက ႏိုင္ငံ့ဝန္ထမ္းအားလံုးဟာ မိမိတို႔ရဲ႕ လုပ္ငန္းတာဝန္ေတြကို ၾကည္လင္တဲ့ အမ်ဳိးသားေရးအျမင္န႔ဲ မွန္မွန္ကန္ကန္ ထက္ထက္ျမက္ျမက္ 
တည့္တည့္မတ္မတ္ ႀကိဳးပမ္းေဆာင္ရြက္ၾကဖို႔ လုိမွာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါေၾကာင့္လည္း ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းၿပီး တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးမွာ အဓိက 
က်တဲ့ တရားေရးမ႑ိဳင္ တည့္မတ္ခိုင္မာေရးကို ဦးတည္ xxx ” ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ (၉) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ သူနာျပဳတကၠသိုလ္၌ က်င္းပေသာ 
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Reference to the rule of law, taya-ubade-somoye, as a trope for law and order is 
not restricted to the public speechifying of government officials.5 It penetrates the 
day-to-day work of courts in Myanmar, sometimes explicitly. Under the 2004 
Electronic Transactions Law, for instance, it is an offence to use electronic 
communications—in official English translation—to do “any act detrimental to the 
security of the State or prevalence of law and order [taya-ubade-somoye] or 
community peace and tranquillity or national solidarity or national economy or 
national culture”.6 Cases brought under the law cite causing damage to the rule of 
law as an element in the offence, such as one against an accused person involved 
in antigovernment protests of 2007, the topic of chapter seven, for having 
“damaged state security, the rule of law and community peace and tranquillity by 
sending [news and] photographs of a demonstration march concerning rising 
engine fuel prices, the arrests of 88 Generation Students [political activists in the 
march], and of the September 2007 unrest through phone, email, Internet and 
other electronic means to the DVD [sic] news agency”.7  
                                                                                                                                                        
တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရုံးႏွင့္ ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ား၊ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ားမွ တရားစီရင္ေရးဆိုင္ရာ ၾသဝါဒခံယူျခငး္ အခမ္းအနားတြင္ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီ အတြင္းေရးမွဴး (၁) ဒုတိယဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ ေျပာၾကားသည့္ မိန္႔ခြန္း၊ တရားေရးဂ်ာနယ၊္ 
အတြဲ (၁) အမွတ္ (၁၄) (၂၀၀၂) ၊ စာ ၈။ [“State Peace and Development Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant General 
Khin Nyunt’s Address on 9 July 2002 at the Institute of Nursing to Supreme Court, Office of the 
Attorney General and State, Division and District Judges and Law Officers Assembled for Receipt of 
Advice on Judicial Affairs,” Judicial Journal 1.14 (2002): 8.] All translations from Burmese in this 
study are my own unless otherwise indicated. The Defence Services is the official title of the armed 
forces, or Tatmadaw. Where translating a text directly I use the official name. Otherwise I use 
“armed forces”, which captures the meaning of the title in Burmese better than the official 
translation.  
5 The trope is manifest in persistent slippage between “rule of law” and “law and order” in English 
translations of official speeches, as in Khin Nyunt’s cited above. Compare my translation with what 
was published in the English-language section of the Supreme Court’s journal: “Anarchistic 
incidents took place in 1988 and peace and tranquillity did not prevail and the people had to live in 
anxiety. The Tatmadaw Government had to restore the rule of law [taya-ubade-somoye] 
strenuously. The State Peace and Development Council has laid down political, economic and social 
objects and [has] been implementing them with a view to enabling the country to stand in dignity as 
a peaceful, modern and developed nation among the world’s nations. In so doing, “Stability of the 
state, community peace and tranquillity, prevalence of law and order [taya-ubade-somoye]” was 
laid down as the first political objective and the Government has been implementing it. Now, the 
nation is leading towards peace, modernization and development. In this circumstance, national 
stability and the rule of law and order [taya-ubade-somoye] are the basic requirements for national 
development. To ensure stability and the prevalence of law and order, all those engaging in the 
judicial sector, such as judges, law officers, Police Force members and personnel of [the] Bureau of 
Special Investigation, etc., are to uprightly strive with clear-cut national outlook in discharging their 
respective duties. Regarding the rule of law and order [taya-ubade-somoye], the judicial sector is 
the main pillar.” “All Service Personnel Concerning Administration of Justice Are to Uprightly 
Strive for Successful Implementation of National Policy and State’s Objectives,” Judicial Journal 
1.14 (2002): 3 (English section).  
6 Electronic Transactions Law, No. 5/2004, section 33(a), official English translation. In Burmese: 
“ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၏ လံုျခံဳေရး၊ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးႏွင့္ နယ္ေျမေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရး၊ တိုင္းရင္းသားစည္းလံုးညီညြတ္ေရး၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၏ စီးပြားေရး 
သို႔မဟုတ္ အမ်ဳိးသားယဥ္ေက်းမႈကို ထိခိုက္ေစသည့္ ျပဳသည့္ ျပဳလုပ္မႈတစ္ရပ္ရပ္ကို ျပဳလုပ္ျခင္း”။ 
7 “စက္သံုးဆီေစ်းႏႈန္းျမင့္တက္ျခင္းအားအေၾကာင္းျပဳ၍ ဆႏၵျပလမ္းေလွ်ာက္ခ်ီတက္ျခင္း၊ ၈၈ မ်ဳိးဆက္ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားဖမ္းဆီးခံရျခင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ ္
စက္တင္ဘာလဆူပူလႈပ္ရွားမႈႏွင့္ ဓာတ္ပံုမ်ားကိ ုဒီဗြီဒီသတင္းဌာနသို႔ ဖုန္း၊ အီေမး(လ္) ၊ အင္တာနက္စေသာအီလက္ထေရာနစ္ဆိုင္ရာနည္းပညာ 
အသံုးျပဳ၍ ေပးပို႔ခဲ့သျဖင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာလ္ံုျခံဳေရး၊ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး၊ နယ္ေျမေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးကိ ုထိခိုက္”။ ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင္ ့ဝင္းေမာ ္(ခ) ေမာ္ႀကီး 
(ခ) ဂ်ပန္ႀကီး၊  ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၀၊ ရန္ကုန္အေရွ႕ပိုင္းခရိုင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၅ ရက္၊ ဒုတိယခ႐ိုင္တရားသူႀကီး သန္းေထြး၊   
စာ ၁။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Win Maw (a) Mawgyi (a) Japangyi, 2009 Criminal Case No. 30, 
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The police and courts likewise characterise cases brought under other laws for 
similar acts as undermining the rule of law. Police officers accused fourteen 
people of having endangered life over their roles in the 2007 monk-led protests in 
part because they upset state security and the rule of law, even though neither was 
an element of their alleged offences.8 A court convicted another man involved in 
the same events for having allegedly exhorted demonstrators to upset the rule of 
law, community peace, and the state administrative machinery.9 The law under 
which he was jailed does not refer to rule of law but does list among its offences 
disruption of law and order, ngyeinwut-pibyaye.10 In other words, the officials 
handling this case read taya-ubade-somoye as ngyeinwut-pibyaye and 
transposed the two. A restraining order brought against another demonstrator 
stipulates that she was involved in activities to “destabilise community peace and 
the rule of law”.11  
 
Unauthorised demonstrators are not the only alleged offenders against the rule of 
law. Assorted troublemakers can come within its ambit. For example, a 2009 
court order against an elderly man who had repeatedly telephoned and gone in 
person to government offices to complain about poor electricity supply and other 
unsatisfactory public services held that his constant complaints could lead to 
unruliness in the local populace that would disturb the rule of law.12 An appellate 
court ruling against two men convicted in 2010 of having had contact with 
insurgents described them as having acted with a view to undermine state 
security and the rule of law.13 The colonial-era statute under which they were 
convicted specifies that an offence is committed where an accused assists an 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yangon Eastern District Court, 5 Mar. 2009, Deputy District Judge Than Htwe: 1.] “DVD” should be 
DVB, Democratic Voice of Burma radio. Throughout this study where “(a)” appears between names 
in criminal cases, it stands for “alias” (in Burmese (ခ) for ေခၚ).  
8 ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေအာင ္ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ဝင္း ပါ ၁၄၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၆၅၊ ရန္ကင္းၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၄ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဌးေဌး။ [Police Captain Myint Aung v. Kyaw Win & 13, 2008 Criminal 
Case No. 265, Yankin Township Court, 24 Nov. 2008, Township Judge (Special Power) Htay Htay.] 
9 ဒုရဲအုပ္စံေရႊသိန္း ႏွင့္ မင္းေအာင၊္ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၉၊ သံတြဲခရိုင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၇ ရက္၊ ခရိုင္ 
တရားသူႀကီး ေသာင္းတင။္ (Sub Inspector San Shwe Thein v. Min Aung, 2007 Criminal Case No. 29, 
Thandwe District Court, 17 Oct. 2007, District Judge Thaung Tin.) 
10 အသင္းအဖြဲ႕မ်ားဖြဲ႕စည္းျခင္းဆိုင္ရာ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၆/၈၈၊ ပုဒ္မ ၅(ခ)(ဂ) ။ [Organisation Law, No. 6/88, section 5(b)(c).]  
11 “ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင္ ့တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးကို မတည္မၿငိမ္ျဖစ္ေအာင”္။ ရဲအုပ္ဝင္းလြင္ ႏွင့္ ေနာ္အုန္းလ၊ွ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈေသး မႈအမွတ္ 
၁၅၇၊ ေမွာ္ဘီၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၂ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေအးေအးမူ၊ စာ ၁။ [Inspector 
Win Lwin v. Naw Ohn Hla, 2007 Misdemeanour Case No. 157, Hmawbi Township Court, 12 Oct. 
2007, Township Judge (Special Power) Aye Aye Mu: 1.] 
12 ရဲအုပ္ထြန္းထြန္းဝင္း ႏွင့္ ခင္ေမာင္ၾကည၊္ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈအေထြေထြမႈအမွတ္ ၁၄၃၊ လိႈင္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၃ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး ဝင္းေဆြ၊ စာ ၂။ (Inspector Htun Htun Win v. Khin Maung Kyi, 2009 Miscellaneous 
Criminal Case No. 143, Hlaing Township Court, 3 Nov. 2009, Township Judge Win Swe: 2.) 
13 ဦးေမာင္သိန္း ပါ ၂ ႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအယူခံမႈအမွတ္ ၁၀၊ သထံုခ႐ိုင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၅ ရက္၊ ဒုတိယ 
ခ႐ိုင္တရားသူႀကီး ဝင္းျမင္။့ (U Maung Thein & Another v. The State, 2010 Criminal Appeal Case No. 10, 
Thaton District Court, 15 Nov. 2010, Deputy District Judge Win Myint.) 
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association designated as unlawful because “it has for its object interference… 
with the maintenance of law and order, or that it constitutes a danger to the 
public peace”.14 In other words, the court in this case also read law and order, 
ngyeinwut-pibyaye, as a synonym for the rule of law.  
 
Judges who fail to take the official narrative on the rule of law seriously can 
themselves be made subjects of reproach. Some are chastised for failing to uphold 
rule of law where they do not impose sufficiently harsh sentences. For instance, 
an appellate judge in 2008 who reduced a three-year prison sentence for a 
defendant found guilty of causing grievous hurt to eight months received a 
reprimand that his lenient verdict could undermine the rule of law.15 Another 
received a warning for an 18-month sentence in a robbery case, with a rebuke that 
he had turned a blind eye to instructions from the Supreme Court for deterrent 
sentencing in cases that can damage the rule of law and community tranquillity.16  
 
Evidently, the rule of law is lexically present in a range of official texts that are 
both part of and referential to the juridical system of Myanmar—a system for the 
administration of law overseen for around half a century by a succession of 
military-run or military-backed authoritarian governments.17 Perhaps we should 
not find this surprising. Scholars have for some years pointed to both the ubiquity 
and the ambiguity of the rule of law in contemporary political discourse.18 In a 
study on the concept’s history and modern relevance, Brian Tamanaha asserts 
that the rule of law has become “the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the 
world today, without agreement on precisely what it means”.19 This remark 
intrigues me, because although apparently stating the obvious—that everyone 
talks about the rule of law but nobody agrees what it is—contained in it is an 
implicit assumption that everyone is still talking about basically the same thing. 
The rule of law might be a contested concept, Tamanaha implies, but it is the 
concept with which we are all concerned.  
                                                        
14 Unlawful Associations Act, No. 14/08, section 16.  
15 တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၈/၂၀၀၈၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 48/2008, 16 Sept. 
2008.) 
16 တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၃၂/၉၄၊ ၁၉၉၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 32/94, 27 Apr. 1994.) 
17 Throughout the study I use “juridical system” to refer to the apparatus of ideas and practices 
pertaining to how law is administered, as explained in this chapter. The juridical differs from the 
judicial in that whereas the former refers broadly to the administration of law, the latter pertains 
specifically to the work of the judiciary.  
18 See for example, Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, “The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the ‘Rule 
of Law’,” Michigan Law Review 101.7 (2003): 2275-340. Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law 
Revival,” Foreign Affairs 77.2 (1998): 95-106. Olufemi Taiwo, “The Rule of Law: The New 
Leviathan?” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 22.1 (1999): 151-68.  
19 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 4.  
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The rule of law’s conceptual ambiguity has generated long-running debate over 
competing definitions, criteria and parameters.20 Broadly speaking, the lines of 
debate are drawn between formal versus substantive conceptions. In its formal 
conception, the rule of law consists of positive legality. It rests on strict 
compliance with law as prescribed, not on law’s contents. In its substantive 
conception, the rule of law consists of more than the rules of law. It obtains 
meaning additionally through persons exercising rights in a political community. 
So as to discuss the rule of law’s relationship to law and order, and its relevance to 
the problem for this study, I will first sketch these two opposing conceptions.21  
 
Among the best-known summations of formal rule of law is Friedrich Hayek’s 
“government in all its actions [which] is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”.22 This rule of law is minimal. It 
consists of little other than a guarantee against arbitrariness. For Hayek “it is 
more important that there should be a rule applied always without exceptions 
than what this rule is”.23 Joseph Raz, working from Hayek’s definition to a more 
expanded formal notion of the rule of law agrees that the rule of law is not “the 
rule of the good law”.24 To Hayek and Raz, the contents of law matter not. How it 
is applied is what counts.  
 
But it is in its application that the formal rule of law goes from Hayek’s 
straightforward formulation to more complicated sets of criteria, like those that 
Raz proposes—that laws be prospective, open and clear, and relatively stable; that 
lawmaking be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; that judicial 
independence be maintained and principles of natural justice observed; that the 
courts have powers of review, be easily accessible, and that the discretion of 
                                                        
20 See for example, N. W. Barber, “Must Legalistic Conceptions of the Rule of Law Have a Social 
Dimension?” Ratio Juris 17.4 (2004): 474-88. Adriaan Bedner, “An Elementary Approach to the 
Rule of Law,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law.2 (2010): 48-74. Andrei Marmor, “The Rule of Law 
and Its Limits,” Law and Philosophy 23.1 (2004): 1-43. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law 
Matters,” Journal of Democracy 15.4 (2004): 32-46. Cameron Stewart, “The Rule of Law and the 
Tinkerbell Effect: Theoretical Considerations, Criticisms and Justifications for the Rule of Law,” 
Macquarie Law Journal 7 (2004), 8 July 2008 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MqLJ/ 
2004/7.html>. 
21 For more detailed outlines see, Paul P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of 
Law: An Analytical Framework,” Public Law (1997): 467-87. Tamanaha, ch. 7, 8. 
22 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) 80.  
23 Hayek 88.  
24 Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 211.  
 7 
crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.25 Another 
oft-cited set of formal criteria for the rule of law is Lon Fuller’s eight requirements 
for a system of legal rules: that rules be achieved, publicised, understandable, 
realisable, stable, not retroactive, not contradictory, and implemented as 
announced.26 These criteria set a high bar for the performance of a legal system, 
even if they say nothing about the contents of its laws.  
 
Ronald Dworkin is a prominent proponent of a substantive conception of the rule 
of law. He has described the formal conception as the “rule-book” conception, as 
against the “rights” conception that he expounds. He explains that in the rights 
conception citizens have moral rights and duties to one another, and political 
rights against the state that are recognised in positive law and are enforceable 
upon demand of individual citizens through judicial institutions.27 This rule of law 
is invested with a range of philosophical and moral contents. David Dyzenhaus 
argues that the importance of Dworkin’s approach is “in the way in which he has 
illuminated the justificatory character of the rule of law—law is not only about 
setting clear goals but also about argument as to what those goals should be”.28 In 
other words, this rule of law has an essential public participatory element. It is 
not a rule of law that can be measured simply as a social output against a list of 
formal criteria. It is as much about input as output.  
 
In the conclusion of this study I will advocate a rule of law that if classed 
according to these two general conceptions would be substantive. However, 
throughout the study I do not stress the differences between one conception and 
the other, since my purpose is not to explore the ground lying between competing 
conceptions but to argue for a basic distinction between the rule of law and 
another concept, law and order. I will pursue my argument through the question 
of what animates the criminal juridical system of Myanmar. In answering this 
question, I will argue that a system of law and order is animated by fundamentally 
different ideas from a rule-of-law system, even though in some of its practices it 
may have superficial resemblances. But before proceeding to my argument, I need 
to preface it with some explanatory remarks on my reasons for this approach, and 
on how it differs from other contemporary research on the rule of law.  
                                                        
25 Raz 214-19. For an assessment of Myanmar according to these criteria see, Nick Cheesman, “Thin 
Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?” Pacific Affairs 82.4 (2009): 597-613. 
26 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1964) 39. 
27 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 
1985) 11.  
28 David Dyzenhaus, “Recrafting the Rule of Law,” Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal 
Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 1999) 9. 
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Raz observes that one commonality among differing conceptions of the rule of law 
is that the “rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or may 
possess to a greater or lesser degree”.29 This observation is perfectly reasonable, 
since in reality no legal system fulfills the requirements of any conception of the 
rule of law absolutely, and nor is any system entirely absent of contents that could 
perhaps be attributed to a minimalist conception of the rule of law. But it also 
brings to the fore another problem with the rule of law for persons concerned 
with identifying, defining and classifying the concept, and that is: at what point 
on the scale from greater to lesser degree can the rule of law be said not to exist? 
And then what do we have? Is it something conceptually similar to the rule of 
law? Is it some kind of pauperised rule of law? Or is it something else entirely? 
 
Although the approach to the rule of law by degree is prudent, it encourages 
empirical research in which every system is described and measured in terms of 
how much or how little rule of law it possesses. As Frank Upham has put it with 
some chagrin, “the processes and practices of societies as different as those of 
Nigeria and Nebraska” can be made mutually comprehensible if examined in 
terms of the rule of law.30 Questions of the degree to which processes and 
practices do or do not meet rule-of-law criteria subsume questions about whether 
or not such processes and practices are indicative of the rule of law at all. Rule-of-
law typologies overwhelm and exclude other possible ways of describing and 
understanding complicated political and juridical phenomena. Introducing a 
comparative volume on the rule of law in Asia, for example, Randall Peerenboom 
distinguishes rule of law in consolidating democratic states from rule of law in 
non-democratic or authoritarian states.31 The rule of law somehow applies 
everywhere, or almost everywhere, since he classes Vietnam separately, not as a 
rule-of-law state but as perhaps going “towards rule of law”.32 Rather than suggest 
an alternative concept with which to characterise Vietnam, Peerenboom situates 
                                                        
29 Raz 211.  
30 Frank K. Upham, “The Illusory Promise of the Rule of Law,” Human Rights with Modesty: The 
Problem of Universalism, ed. András Sajó (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 
280. 
31 Randall Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion,” 
Introduction, Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in 
Twelve Asian Countries, France and the US, ed. Randall Peerenboom, RoutledgeCurzon Law in Asia 
Ser. (London & New York: Routledge, 2004): 16-34. The former he lists as the Philippines, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and India, the latter, China, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong 
Kong.  
32 Peerenboom 15. 
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it somewhere on the rule-of-law scale, but at a point where the rule of law has 
apparently ceased to exist.33  
  
Some scholars moving along the scale from greater towards lesser rule of law 
distinguish it from “rule by law”. According to Stephen Holmes, reading 
Rousseau, rule by law as against rule of law is a difference of degree rather than 
kind.34 He argues that rule by law prevails when a few privileged groups control 
the discretionary power in legislative, adjudicative and law enforcement 
processes, whereas rule of law can exist when political power and wealth are 
dispersed.35 In a volume of essays around the topic of rule by law, Tom Ginsburg 
and Tamir Moustafa associate the concept with authoritarian regimes that 
provide courts with latitude so as to help maintain social control, obtain 
legitimacy, manage administrative agents and agencies, advance their economic 
interests, and delegate controversial decisions to the judiciary.36  
 
Other writers reject rule by law precisely because it associates the rule-of-law idea 
with practices they consider are conceptually hostile to the rule of law. Dyzenhaus 
argues that, “as one approaches the rule-by-law end of the continuum not only 
does the rule of law disappear entirely but even the claim that there is rule by law 
starts to seem implausible”.37 This argument implies that we have reached a point 
of conceptual difference from the rule of law; that it is invalid to use the rule of 
law by analogy to describe phenomena that do not fit within its parameters. We 
have moved from rule of law to something else at the other end of the continuum, 
although again, what this point represents conceptually, other than the absence of 
the rule of law, is unclear.  
 
Carl Schmitt once wrote that the rule-of-law idea is “an empty manner of 
speaking if it does not receive its actual sense through a certain opposition”.38 In 
                                                        
33 Peerenboom does acknowledge the limitations of the rule-of-law discourse but argues that 
because people will continue to use the concept, it is better that some clarity be brought to its 
different conceptions than “to insist futilely that the term be avoided”. Peerenboom 12-13. 
34 Stephen Holmes, “Lineages of the Rule of Law,” Democracy and the Rule of Law, eds. José María 
Maravall and Adam Przeworski, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy Ser. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 49. 
35 Holmes 51. 
36 Tamir Moustafa and Tom Ginsburg, “The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics,” 
Introduction, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, eds. Tom Ginsburg and 
Tamir Moustafa (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 1-22. 
37 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 7. 
38 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2008) 181. Here Schmitt is referring specifically to the continental rechtsstaat concept of the 
rule of law. For a classic exposition on the distinctions between continental and English rule of law 
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other words, the rule of law needs to be juxtaposed with some other principle or 
principles of government to have a meaning of its own. I think that in this respect 
Schmitt was correct, and that his observation points to a lacuna in contemporary 
work on the rule of law, namely, the relative lack of debate around opposing 
concepts relevant to modern states: not concepts on the same scale of ideas and 
practices, different in degree, but related concepts that are fundamentally 
different from, and perhaps opposed to, the rule of law. Rather than situate the 
rule of law on a conceptual sliding scale, I prefer to resituate it in a semantic field 
of independently standing concepts, some near, others far, each giving meaning 
to one another. 
 
Therefore, in agreeing with Schmitt on this point about the rule of law obtaining 
its actual sense through a “certain opposition”, I want to be clear from the 
beginning that I am not being so crude as to imply that a wide range of ideas and 
practices do not exist that can be classed as rule of law, nor that only through 
opposing concepts can the rule of law be made intelligible. As I have already 
indicated, analysis of the rule of law through its degrees and varieties has 
practical usefulness and conceptual merit, as does the literature on rule by law. 
However, to my mind the terrain of opposing concepts to the rule of law, concepts 
of equal relevance to the modern state, has not been mapped out well when 
compared with other parts. For this reason, and with these caveats, I propose to 
interrogate the rule of law by way of an opposing principle, namely, law and 
order.  
 
Historically, the “certain opposition” to rule of law was the rule of persons—or 
rule of men, since the rule of persons for the most part signified the rule of 
males—as Schmitt himself pointed out.39 These two concepts relate to one 
another differently, Rueban Balasubramaniam observes, from the rule-of-law or 
rule-by-law distinction.40 Rule of men is not some point at the other end of a 
continuum from the rule of law. It is not something further along the same path 
                                                                                                                                                        
see, Otto Kirchheimer, “The Rechtsstaat as Magic Wall,” Politics, Law, and Social Change: Selected 
Essays of Otto Kirchheimer, eds. Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell (New York & London: 
Columbia University Press, 1969) 428-52. See also N. W. Barber, “The Rechtsstaat and the Rule of 
Law,” University of Toronto Law Journal 53.4 (2003): 443-54. Michel Troper, “Obedience and 
Obligation in the Rechtsstaat,” Democracy and the Rule of Law, eds. José María Maravall and Adam 
Przeworski, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy Ser. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 94-108. 
39 Schmitt 181. 
40 R. Reuban Balasubramaniam, “Indefinite Detention: Rule by Law or Rule of Law?” Emergencies 
and the Limits of Legality, ed. Victor V. Ramraj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
133. 
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from rule by law. It is a different concept, or concepts, in the semantic field. 
Balasubramaniam calls it tyranny, although to oppose the rule of law with tyranny 
is perhaps to oppose a principle of government with a form of government, or as 
Hobbes referred to it, a form of government disliked.41 Hayek, drawing on Henry 
Maine, described the rule of law’s opposite as the rule of status. In his conception, 
absent from the rule of law are special legal privileges for the people who rule.42 
Other contemporary scholars similarly refer to the rule of men versus rule of law 
as a shorthand distinction between arbitrary government as against government 
of known rules.43 In this way, they establish a “certain opposition” that is 
rhetorically useful but underdeveloped—for the purposes of debate about complex 
modern states—conceptually and empirically.44 
 
Schmitt, who held the rule of law in contempt, set up his own opposition to the 
rule of law as follows. The distinction between the rule of law and its other is the 
distinction between the norm and the command. Whereas the rule of law has a 
general, normative character, another concept exists that is a political concept of 
law, which consists of concrete will, of sovereign command.45 By making this 
distinction Schmitt did two things relevant to this study: relevant too to broader 
debate about the rule of law. First, he correctly underscored the essentially 
normative quality of the rule of law: that it is generally applicable, binding on all 
and determined in advance.46 Second, by insisting that the rule of law represses 
politics—which is to say, that the rechtsstaat conception of the rule of law with 
which he was concerned aspires to limit political behaviour through normative 
frameworks—he concluded that the political quality of law must exist 
independently from the rule-of-law idea, although he added somewhat opaquely 
that in practice the political form of law is always bound up with its rule-of-law 
component.47 And, since the form of the state rested on the political concept of 
law, through this artifice he could assert that this concept of law was superior to 
                                                        
41 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968) 240. 
42 Hayek 87. 
43 As for example in Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Franz Neumann on the Rule of Law and Capitalism: The 
East Asian Case,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 2.3 (2007): 361, 70. Margaret Jane Radin, 
“Reconsidering the Rule of Law,” Boston University Law Review 69.4 (1989): 781-2.  
44 By contrast, for an example of a deep empirical study juxtaposing and intertwining the rule of law 
with the rule of men, see Jonathan K. Ocko and David Gilmartin, “State, Sovereignty, and the 
People: A Comparison of the ‘Rule of Law’ in China and India,” Journal of Asian Studies 68.1 
(2009): 55-133. 
45 Schmitt 187. 
46 Schmitt 181-84. 
47 Schmitt 93, 235. Constitutional Theory appeared in print in 1928. In 1932, Schmitt in Legality and 
Legitimacy broke down the conceptual distinction between norm and command, as John 
McCormick discusses in his introduction to the English translation: John P. McCormick, 
“Identifying or Exploiting the Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy?” Introduction, Legality and 
Legitimacy by Carl Schmitt (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2004) xxv-xxvi. 
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the rule of law.48 I will return to the problem of the political quality of law later. 
For now, I want to concentrate on the first of these two points: that the difference 
between the rule of law and its opposite is normative, since it brings us back to 
the conspicuous references to the rule of law in official Burmese texts with which 
this chapter began, and so to the empirical contents of this study. 
 
The rule of law in Burmese, taya-ubade-somoye, needs to be understood, as I 
have already suggested, in relation to ngyeinwut-pibyaye, law and order. Unlike 
in English, the lexical contrast between taya-ubade-somoye and ngyeinwut-
pibyaye, which I mentioned at the start of the chapter, establishes an imperative 
to conflate the two concepts if law and order is to inhere—as it does throughout 
the contents of official discourse in Myanmar—in law, taya-ubade. In Burmese, 
“law” only secures its place in a system of “law and order” when amalgamated 
with “rule of law”. The opposite is the case when we talk of “law and order” in 
English: law already co-exists with order, and serves as a lexical link to the rule of 
law. English-language writers seeking to extricate one concept from the other 
must do so explicitly. Stanley Diamond is one who has argued precisely that law is 
an antonym of order: law and order an historical illusion; law versus order, 
historical reality.49 Diamond is interested to distinguish between the rule of law 
and customary order, and although his initial idea resonates with my study, his 
juxtaposing of the two concepts takes him in a different direction from that in 
which I intend to go. However, some years after Diamond wrote, Michel Foucault 
also highlighted the oxymoronic quality of “law and order”, describing the term as 
a “hybridized monster”, and proposing that we ought to talk of “law or order”.50 
Foucault’s contrasting of the two concepts is firmly within the domain of this 
study: 
Law by definition is always referred to a juridical system, and order is referred to an 
administrative system, to a state’s specific order, which was exactly the idea of all those 
utopians of the beginning of the seventeenth century and was also the idea of those 
very real administrators of the eighteenth century. I think that the conciliation between 
law and order, which [had] been the dream of those men, must remain a dream. It is 
impossible to reconcile law and order because when you try to do so it is only in the 
form of an integration of law into the state’s order.51  
                                                        
48 Schmitt 238-39. For a critique of Schmitt’s argument, see David Dyzenhaus, Legality and 
Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997) 51-70. 
49 Stanley Diamond, “The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom,” Social Research 38.1 (1971): 71. 
50 In Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (Oxon.: Routledge, 2009) 82. 
51 Michel Foucault, “The Political Technology of Individuals,” Technologies of the Self, eds. Luther 
H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988) 
162. This statement echoes another in 1953 by Franz Neumann, who observed that it had been the 
impossible utopian dream of liberals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that 
power could be dissolved in legal relationships. Franz Neumann, “The Concept of Political 
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What interests me here is Foucault’s associating of order, which is to say, “a 
state’s specific order”, with the administrative, as against what he elsewhere 
describes as the “general and permanent prescriptions” of law, which he 
associates with the juridical.52 The point is, I think, analogous to one that Jürgen 
Habermas has made that “juristic discourses serve to apply norms, whereas… 
administrative activity is secured mainly through pragmatic discourses”.53 
Juridical forms and discourses are distinguished by their essentially normative 
and general properties, whereas administrative forms and discourses are 
associated with order, which is pragmatic and particular.  
  
In a rejoinder to critics of his argument about the inner morality of law, Fuller has 
made a similar distinction between two forms of social ordering that tend to be 
confused, partly for reasons of shared vocabulary, partly because of analogous 
practices: one he called law, the other, managerial direction.54 Fuller 
acknowledges that rules issued in a managerial context have a number of 
characteristics that superficially are alike legal rules, including that they be 
publicly communicated, be reasonably clear, not be contradictory, not require 
conduct of people to whom they are addressed that is impossible for them, and 
not be changed so often as to frustrate efforts of addressees to comply.55 But, 
Fuller explains, rules in a managerial context depart from law in two key 
respects.56 First, they are not general in a normative sense. Their application is a 
matter of expediency. Rules matter to managers because without them they 
cannot manage, or at least, not manage effectively. No deeper significance 
attaches them. Therefore, if a manager orders a subordinate to depart from 
general instructions in a specific case, the subordinate has no inherent basis for 
complaint. Rules exist for reasons of convenience, and can be broken where 
inconvenient. Second, because rules in a managerial context matter for reasons of 
expediency, since departures from them are acceptable and justified according to 
circumstances, superior officials are not themselves obligated to follow the rules. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Freedom,” The Rule of Law under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto 
Kirchheimer, ed. William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California 
Press, 1996) 203. 
52 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-1979, trans. 
Graham Burchell, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2008) 168. 
53 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 186. 
54 Fuller 207. 
55 Fuller 208.  
56 A third departure from law in managerial contexts that is not relevant to this discussion concerns 
non-retrospective rule making. Fuller 209. 
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No principle necessitates congruence between rules as announced and rules as 
acted upon. Officials may violate rules if it is efficacious to do so. Here we have 
the essence of the opposition between the rule of law and law and order. 
Irrespective of whether we adopt a formal or substantive conception, the rule of 
law is demarcated from its opposite by an idea of normative generality.  
 
My study constitutes an empirical response to this basic conceptual difference 
between law and order and the rule of law, a response to the relation between the 
pragmatic and the normative, the particular and the general, the administrative 
and the juridical. In it, I explore the opposition between law and order and the 
rule of law through the question of what animates the criminal juridical system of 
Myanmar, as I have already indicated. My argument, in brief, is that what 
animates this system is a political idea of the rule of law as its concrete opposite, 
law and order. As I will show in the coming chapters, consistent with this 
principle, the system while alluding to the rule-of-law idea in fact exhibits the 
characteristics of an essentially discretionary system, one in which incongruence 
between stated rules and actual practices is not merely a matter of reality but is an 
essential element in how the system is conceived, and in how it operates. 
 
The absence of normative generality means that a system organised for the 
maintenance of law and order rejects the ideal of legal equality among the persons 
who are subject to its rules. The essentially normative generality of law obliges, 
ideally, equal treatment of equal cases in a political community bound by law, 
even if equality as a principle is nowhere realised in practice. The particularity of 
order, by contrast, contains no such element, even where a system professes 
otherwise. It may lay claim to factual equality—such as in Schmitt’s ominous 
presupposition that a democratic state rests on the will of a homogenous people.57 
But this account of equality is at best a partial description of reality and at worst a 
sheer fabrication—one that in Schmitt’s Germany anticipated crimes against 
humanity. Such claims are not only factually false. They obfuscate the absence of 
the principle of equality, to which an essentially pragmatic system is necessarily 
opposed, because it must always allow for the possibility of the exceptional case. 
 
The pragmatic rather than normative character of a system for the maintenance 
of law and order also betrays itself in a wide range of practices which I 
                                                        
57 Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2004) 24. 
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characterise, following Foucault in adopting an early modern continental 
European term, as “police”: not the police, not police as a specific organisation or 
a policing concept of the sort associated with the uniformed constabularies of the 
present day, but police as a concern to maintain order, or rather, to abolish 
disorder, through good use of the state’s forces.58 In its philosophy, police is 
concerned with the means to oversee and administer all aspects of civil life, 
including internal administration, public welfare and surveillance.59 But police is 
not justice.60 When a criminal juridical system operates increasingly as police, it 
loses its essentially juridical quality. Its juridical forms, to the extent that they 
remain part of the system, take on the same kind of coercive value irrespective of 
whether they are general or particular in character, since they serve essentially 
pragmatic purposes.  
 
Having summed up the essence of my argument, before outlining the study 
chapter by chapter, I want to return in the last part of this section to the political 
quality of the rule of law, and explain how this aspect of the problem has oriented 
my research on the topic.  
 
Contrary to what Schmitt suggests, the normative contents of the rule of law do 
not exclude a political quality, because its normative contents are shaped by 
political action, as Schmitt himself acknowledged when he wrote that awareness 
of the rule-of-law concept “became stronger in the struggle against [the] 
absolutist concept of law”.61 Therefore, to ask a question of what animates a 
juridical system, and to situate that question in terms of the rule of law, is to ask 
an essentially political question. Although legal theory is relevant to the question, 
it is of limited usefulness, since as Habermas has pointed out, legal theory is 
above all theory of adjudication.62 The emphasis of legal theory on adjudication 
has led legal researchers of countries with politically repressive governments to 
privilege the role of judges, and treat them as constrained adjudicators. Some, like 
Dyzenhaus in his critique of positivist jurisprudence in South Africa under 
apartheid, or Tayyab Mahmud in his study of judicial responses to coups in 
common law settings have examined how judges may find in legal doctrine 
                                                        
58 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978, 
trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2007) 314. 
59 Mark Neocleous, “Policing and Pin-Making: Adam Smith, Police and the State of Prosperity,” 
Policing and Society 8.4 (1998): 431-32. See also Mark Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: 
A Critical Theory of Police Power (London: Pluto Press, 2000) ch. 1. 
60 Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, “Polizei,” Economy and Society 9.2 (1980): 179. 
61 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory 182. 
62 Habermas 197. 
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grounds to justify support for repressive regimes and their policies.63 Mark Osiel 
has looked at how in certain cases judges may also find in legal theory 
justifications to resist military dictatorships.64 Gretchen Helmke has used a game 
theoretical model to account for judicial defection from the executive as a form of 
strategic behaviour.65 Others like Lisa Hilbink have argued that an admixture of 
legal theoretical grounds and institutional factors may better explain judicial 
complaisance with despotic government.66  
 
Although studies of this sort can account for factors that contribute to judicial 
decision-making, the question of what animates a juridical system as an 
apparatus of ideas and practices goes further into the system’s fundaments, into 
its political foundations. Fuller recognised this much in his debate with Herbert 
Hart over legal positivism and the morality of law, when he wrote that Hart 
seemed to assume, wrongly, that the difference between the law of England and 
that of the Nazis was merely that the latter used their laws for ends that were 
odious to the former.67 No theory of adjudication could apply in study of Nazi 
Germany because the legal system had ceased to have a normative grounding, as 
Frankfurt School scholars Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann argued 
cogently. In his essay on “The Legal Order of National Socialism”, Kirchheimer, 
although still referring to a “legal” order, makes clear that he is talking about a 
specific order in which power is exercised as a matter of political prerogative 
through legal forms, a system in which “a legal rule can have only a purely 
provisional character”.68 This factual observation corresponds with Schmitt’s 
axiom that “all law is situational law”.69 Kirchheimer’s work shows that the axiom 
taken to its logical conclusion collapses any distinction between law and other 
forms of rulemaking, and with it, any distinction between the judge and the 
                                                        
63 David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of 
Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Tayyab Mahmud, “Jurisprudence of Successful 
Treason: Coup D’etat and Common Law,” Cornell International Law Journal 27.1 (1994): 49-140. 
64 Mark J. Osiel, “Dialogue with Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil,” Law and 
Social Inquiry 20 (1995): 481-560. 
65 Gretchen Helmke, Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, 
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Ser., ed. Margaret Levi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
66 Lisa Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile, 
Cambridge Studies in Law and Society Ser., eds. Chris Arup, et al. (Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
67 Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review 
71.4 (1957): 650-52. 
68 Otto Kirchheimer, “The Legal Order of National Socialism,” Politics, Law, and Social Change: 
Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer, eds. Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell (New York & London: 
Columbia University Press, 1969) 100. 
69 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1985) 13.  
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administrator.70 Neumann for his part objected to the idea that what existed in 
Germany constituted a legal system at all, because the political character of the 
state prohibited the possibility of legality.71  
 
Since Kirchheimer and Neumann’s time, a growing body of literature has treated 
courts as essentially political institutions, or as institutions deeply embedded in 
political systems. C. Neal Tate has argued that authoritarian “crisis regimes” in 
Asia tend to restrict judges’ scope and depth of decision-making, although 
maintaining superficial respect for constitutionality.72 Kanishka Jayasuriya has 
argued that in East Asia a type of authoritarian legalism prevails as a strategy for 
expanded state power.73 Anthony Pereira has examined the divergence of 
strategies for dealing with the courts among comparable military regimes in 
South America.74 Paula Newberg has looked at how the state in Pakistan has been 
structured so as to enable the superior judiciary to play an integral political role, 
sometimes for and sometimes against authoritarian rulers.75 Nathan Brown has 
asked why Arab elites have seemed willing to adopt legal reforms that would 
apparently work against their interests.76 Tamir Moustafa has raised similar 
questions in his study of the constitutional court in Egypt.77 A growing number of 
studies have likewise concentrated on the “judicialisation” of politics across 
Asia.78  
 
                                                        
70 Otto Kirchheimer, “Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany,” The Rule of Law under Siege: 
Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, ed. William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1996) 185. 
71 Franz Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society 
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Although increased concern with regimes’ use of courts has made us more 
attentive to the political aspects of judicial behaviour, for me this approach has 
certain weaknesses. For one, historians Jonathan Ocko and David Gilmartin have 
rightly criticised it as missing the many ways in which a juridical system may 
carry meanings that transcend its instrumental qualities.79 For another, studies 
that are particularly concerned with how political regimes use judiciaries often 
concentrate on apex courts.80 Studies of apex courts, although necessary, can give 
an impression of institutional solidity that a judiciary may not deserve. For 
example, whereas Sebastiaan Pompe’s comprehensive research on the Supreme 
Court of Indonesia promises a “study of institutional collapse” the reader is on the 
opening pages greeted with a photograph of the grand new court building in 
Jakarta.81 The image does not suggest collapse. On the contrary, it gives a sense of 
integrity and authority. It is an image that impresses upon the reader that the 
institution with which the author is concerned is very much intact. 
 
This impression is, of course, precisely the impression that the Supreme Court 
building is supposed to convey, be it in Jakarta or Naypyitaw. It is an impression 
that urges scholars to reinforce an institutional claim to exist by imputing in the 
court’s activities a sense of purpose and coherence that its edifice demands. As 
Philip Abrams explains in his notes on the difficulty of studying the state, 
research based on ideas of institutional solidity “gives an account of political 
institutions in terms of cohesion, purpose, independence, common interest and 
morality without necessarily telling us anything about the actual nature, meaning 
or functions of political institutions”.82 Tyrell Haberkorn applies Abrams’ ideas to 
“disaggregate” the state in Thailand, describing it “as a collection of competing 
actors and agencies and their actions, as well as the ideas and actions that 
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citizens, critics, and those actors and agencies attribute to it”.83 Building on this 
characterisation, Craig Reynolds has with a team of researchers argued that, 
Most models of the state imagine a clear line of management, an organizational chart 
that puts the head of government (president, prime minister, junta general) at the 
apex, with deputies, the cabinet and ministerial portfolios, and subordinate officials 
arrayed below…. This way of thinking about the state, insofar as it applies to Thailand 
as well as to other Southeast Asian nation-states, is misleading. Yes, there is a prime 
minister, however elected or appointed; his/her deputies; a cabinet; and various arms 
of what Gramsci called political society—the army, the police, the institutions of force 
and violence. But the organizational chart that displays the line management of the 
Thai state conceals more than it reveals. Power… is dispersed, disaggregated in 
clumps.84 
 
The argument could perhaps be made that empirically, power in Thailand is more 
dispersed and clumpier than in many other countries of Southeast Asia, including 
Myanmar, but this would, I think, be missing the point. What I am grasping at 
here is not a point of comparison but one with which to orient this research. By 
concentrating upon institutional schema and edifices, researchers of Myanmar 
have tended to “overstate the logic, unity, and integrity”—as historian Mary 
Callahan has put it—of the state.85 In agreement with Callahan, my concern is 
instead with the criminal juridical system of Myanmar as an ensemble of ideas 
and practices, with the thinking and behaviour that animates it.  
 
A final reason for this orientation is that, going back to Ocko and Gilmartin’s 
point, I want to free the question of what animates the criminal juridical system 
of Myanmar from instrumentalist approaches that foreground questions of 
political legitimacy. Once questions of legitimacy come to the front, many other 
interesting problems associated with what animates a system get relegated behind 
the larger problem of how the state legitimates itself through legal forms. I am not 
being so bold as to imply that political legitimacy is irrelevant to study of legal 
forms and institutions. Rather, I agree with Abrams that legitimacy ought to be 
deciphered through study of how the ideas embedded in institutions are used to 
legitimate the exercise of power, by letting issues of legitimacy emerge through 
study of those ideas and practices, rather than putting them ahead of other 
questions. I also agree with Abrams that for this purpose we need to distinguish 
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between the state-system and the state-idea as two distinct objects of study.86 But 
I disagree with his proposition, if I understand it correctly, that we should 
abandon study of the former in favour of the latter.87 Abrams is right that we 
ought to recognise the cogency of the state idea without believing in the state, but 
disbelief ought not lead to disregard of the very specific and real effects that ideas 
have on practices, which in turn have specific and real consequences, acted out on 
specific and real people, and these together I think can and must be described, 
and studied, as a system.  
The study outlined  
To recap, I propose to study what animates the criminal juridical system of 
Myanmar. My argument is that the system is animated by the concept of law and 
order, which is an opposing concept to the rule of law but one that semantically 
and in practice is conflated with rule of law. The chapters that follow examine 
how the two concepts became conflated, and explore the lexicon and practices of 
law and order as rule of law in Myanmar. The study is organised thematically into 
three parts. Each part consists of two chapters, beginning with the origins of the 
criminal juridical system in Myanmar, then Burma, and its reconfiguring under 
protracted military rule; then with its law-and-order characteristics in the 
contemporary period; and last, its specific behaviour in response to challenges to 
authority from inside and outside the system’s perimeter.88 
 
Chapter two traces the historically specific process whereby the British imperial 
regime brought to Burma a juridical system that would serve its economic and 
political interests. The chapter sketches the Benthamite ideological origins of the 
system, as well as the importing of the criminal codes and paraphernalia of 
criminal law from colonial India. It examines the early dispersal of policing and 
investigative tasks among administrative personnel, and the militarisation of 
certain security functions, all of which were to have lasting consequences on how 
the system continued to operate in the postcolonial period. Although the colonial 
regime laid the institutional foundations for a law-and-order system, it 
articulated a formal conception of the rule of law, and gave it some credence 
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through measures to afford parties in criminal cases procedural guarantees. Over 
time, the rule-of-law idea began to be realised in a wider range of practices, which 
took the form of a nascent rights-based system after independence. The last 
section of this chapter examines the contradictions and complexities of the 
politics of law and order versus the rule of law in the postcolony, up to the 
definitive seizure of power by the military in 1962.  
 
Chapter three tracks how following the military’s takeover, the new regime 
reconfigured criminal juridical institutions, along with other parts of the state 
apparatus, to meet its pragmatic goals. The rule-of-law idea dropped out of the 
official narrative. Certain doctrines associated with it fell into disuse or were 
pushed from the system. A new apparatus of special tribunals under executive 
control routed cases out of the ordinary courts and undermined the authority of 
the professional judiciary. Eventually, panels of lay jurists and executive officers 
replaced judges at all levels. Simultaneously, the military government eliminated 
the nascent rights-based regime of the 1950s. It reconfigured rights as forms of 
entitlement, privileges paternalistically bestowed on subjects. Unlike rights, 
which are essentially normative and general in character, entitlements can be 
qualified or withdrawn without reference to any larger principle. In other words, 
the eliminating of the nascent rights-based system and substituting of it with a 
system based on entitlements constitutes a precise expression of the shift in this 
period from rule of law to law and order.  
 
The remainder of the study concerns what animates the criminal juridical system 
in the contemporary period. When a new regime took power in 1988, it restored a 
professional judiciary out of the ranks of judicial bureaucrats, and re-established 
a hierarchical court structure, with an apex court under army command. Absent 
any ideological basis for its seizure of power, it justified its rule as necessary to 
restore rule of law, taya-ubade-somoye, which it equated with its opposite, 
ngyeinwut-pibyaye.  
 
Chapter four concentrates on what I argue are two paradigmatic aspects of the 
system as police, which is to say, a system for the maintenance of good order 
through administration. The first is the pursuit and prosecution of public 
enemies. The second is the role of the policeman as bearer of sovereign authority. 
In a system for the maintenance of law and order the question of who poses an 
explicit threat to law and order and how they may be contained is the most 
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significant question for the system to address. Yet paradoxically, the system in 
Myanmar does not have any specific process for the identifying and declaring of 
enemies. The public enemy is on the one hand anyone charged with anything, and 
on the other, a special category of wrongdoer. This chapter explores the public 
enemy paradox and considers how it is consistent with the functioning of the 
system in Myanmar as police. And, utilising an idea from the work of Giorgio 
Agamben, it examines how within the system as police, the policeman occupies a 
particular zone in which power and violence intersect, symmetrical to that of 
sovereignty. The chapter concentrates upon how the policeman exercises 
sovereign authority through the use of torture to extract confession: an expression 
of power that at once serves legal and political purposes. 
 
Chapter five moves from police to the marketplace. Since the system is concerned 
with the maintenance of the state’s specific order, the functioning of the criminal 
juridical system as a market for the buying and selling of cases is tolerated and, to 
the extent that it ensures state stability, necessary. The system does not set out 
written procedures for the buying and selling of cases. But, because its goals are 
pragmatic, it concedes to the interests of personnel, contingent upon them 
performing their tasks in an orderly and compliant fashion. Drawing on the work 
of James Scott, the first and second sections of this chapter compare the public 
and hidden discourses on moneymaking through the system, and consider how 
they enable its continuance and growth. The remaining section looks at a range of 
specific practices associated with this function. The chapter’s contents illustrate 
how the marketplace consists of a complicated array of deliberately imprecise 
public and hidden signals that inform its participants of what they can and cannot 
do, of how money can and cannot be made, and how to reconcile what I 
characterise as the business of criminal “justice” with the requirements of the 
system as police.  
 
Chapter six has as its subject the making of complaints against state personnel. 
Complainants work inside the system. They approach it and to one degree or 
another adopt its language and formalities so as to seek redress. But the manner 
in which they do so varies considerably. Taking up a distinction made by Sheila 
Fitzpatrick in her study of letter writing to the authorities in Russia, this chapter 
divides complainants into two broad categories. The first category consists of 
supplicants, who approach the system within its lexical framework, to request the 
granting of entitlements. The second category consists of citizen-complainants, 
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who approach it to demand rights, irrespective of whether or not the system 
recognises and enables the making of such claims. The third section of the 
chapter explores the forms that reprisals against complainants and sometimes 
their lawyers take. The chapter reveals how within a pragmatic system 
complainants still have opportunities to obtain redress, but that these 
opportunities take particular forms that are consistent with the system’s 
essentially administrative character. 
 
Chapter seven is concerned with how in contrast to the making of complaint, 
which is authorised and therefore tacitly accepted, public assembly—other than 
that which the state itself organises—has in Myanmar for five decades been 
unauthorised and unacceptable. The chapter concentrates on the demonstrations 
of 2007, comparing the response of the state apparatus to these events with 
responses to earlier large-scale protests in 1988 and 1974. It considers the 
policing and security response, and the subsequent work of the courts in the cases 
brought against participants. The control, confinement and charging of protestors 
in 2007 was ambiguous. State agencies deployed civilian gangs to break up the 
protests and transport arrested persons to sites on the threshold of the juridical 
system which were evocative of Agamben’s notion of the “camp”, in the creating 
of a space in which juridical rule becomes indistinct. But because in the system as 
police the courts could function as gateways on the threshold of the juridical and 
the extrajuridical, those persons abducted into the camp could be restored to the 
system through hearings and sentencing, sparing them the prospect of permanent 
disappearance into an entirely extrajuridical zone of the sort found in some other 
Asian countries during times of crisis.  
 
Chapter eight returns to some of the themes contained in the introduction, 
specifically, the need for debate about the rule of law to be located with reference 
to an opposing principle of government. I argue for situated, informed debate 
around the rule of law that acknowledges the concept’s political and juridical 
parts, and that recognises how the normative contents of the rule of law 
contribute to political struggles locally, and are in turn shaped and altered by 
these political struggles. It is this admixture of local and universal qualities that 
gives the rule of law its vitality and durability, I suggest, and that makes it a 
concept worth defending.  
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A note on sources  
Daniel Lev, a pioneer of research on the legal system of Indonesia, once wondered 
aloud about how seriously to take the study of law in the postcolonial states of 
Asia, remarking that its role seemed “awkwardly peripheral to politics and the 
exercise of authority”.89 It is by now clear that the topic is not at all peripheral, as 
Lev’s research on Indonesia over a number of decades testified. Yet, remarkably, 
this thesis is the first significant piece of work in the last quarter-century to study 
the politics of law and order in Myanmar, and to do so drawing largely on 
Burmese-language sources. For this reason, I want to add a note on these sources 
in this introduction, to give a sense of the materials upon which the arguments in 
the chapters that follow are based, and how I have used them.  
 
Much research on Myanmar has struggled from a deficit of reliable and original 
information. Much of what has been written in English has relied heavily upon 
secondary sources, also in English, and over the last decade increasingly on 
interviews conducted with government officials and members of the political or 
economic elite, again usually in English. Because of the small pool of material 
from which researchers have drawn habitually, the contents of many articles and 
reports have tended to be repetitive and often speculative. Historian Andrew 
Selth has lamented that research on the country continues to suffer from “a 
serious dearth of hard data, little verifiable documentary evidence and relatively 
few well-informed sources of information about current developments”.90 
 
In contrast to these problems, when conducting this research I obtained an 
abundance of material with which to explore the question of what animates the 
criminal juridical system of Myanmar. The abundance of material flowed 
naturally from the institutions studied. Criminal juridical systems keep records. 
At each moment in a criminal case there is a document or form to be completed. 
These forms are the materials of procedure, the records of sequential events. 
Therefore, when undertaking this research I set out to collect and read as much of 
this material as possible. In total, I managed to examine copies of records 
pertaining to 340 criminal cases in sixty-five courts at all levels, from around the 
country. I assembled this body of material piece-by-piece, over the course of 
research, through contacts with legal professionals in Myanmar and former 
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professionals now living abroad.91 It constitutes the empirical core of my study, 
and the findings based upon it are contained in chapters four through seven. The 
cases documented span a little over a decade, from 2000 to 2011, but most are 
concentrated in the five years from 2006 onwards. The records include letters to 
initiate criminal cases by police officers; letters of complaint lodged by private 
citizens; first information reports about alleged offences; search and seizure 
forms; arrest sheets; charge sheets; court daily diaries, in which judges sign off on 
details of proceedings; trial testimonies; trial verdicts, and appeal submissions.  
 
I have also had access to various supplementary sources with which to amplify, 
confirm, or cast doubt upon the contents of case records. Those sources include 
notes from lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders and others familiar with 
cases, and media reports from inside and outside the country. I have been able to 
speak with persons knowledgeable about particular cases, or particular types of 
cases. The one thing that I regret I have not been able to do is to go and sit in 
courtrooms or police stations and listen to the conduct of any of the cases in this 
thesis in person. Perhaps the opportunity to undertake that type of research in 
Myanmar will come in the not-too-distant future.  
 
With every performance of record keeping, even if flawed, incomplete or falsified, 
some activities of the criminal juridical system can be traced and a story built up 
by careful reading through what Ranajit Guha has aptly called a “distorting 
mirror”.92 Guha used this term to describe how he sought to obtain the discourse 
of insurgency in colonial India from within the discourse of counterinsurgency. 
James Scott has remarked on Guha’s technique that  
Every political and cultural order is, in effect, a daily ritual performance that serves to 
both illustrate and reinforce power relations; each performance may potentially be 
spoiled or desacralized by the insubordination of those whose inferiority is being acted 
out. By reading the official accounts, the court records, the interrogations of insurgency 
in the light of the juxtapositions of two mutually antagonistic cognitions, Guha can 
artfully read subordinate intentions through the veil of official rhetoric.93 
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I have attempted to read and use the materials for the current study in a similar 
fashion, albeit with some differences from how Scott has characterised Guha’s 
approach. To identify “juxtapositions of two mutually antagonistic cognitions” 
seems to me to set up perhaps too sharp a dichotomy between the discourse of the 
power-holder and that of the subordinate. Although in some cases and in some 
types of documentation this characterisation is accurate, in many other readings I 
sensed multiple layers of power and many types of antagonism incessantly 
bubbling away on, and just below, the surface. Sometimes the antagonism bursts 
violently onto the record, as in cases where a defendant recounts in detail how the 
police tortured him to obtain a confession. But, more commonly, antagonism 
seeps through the records, permeating and colouring them, such as when an 
appellant’s complaint about the procedure of arrest and charge is recorded 
without revealing fully the circumstances that have caused the complaint.  
  
Many interesting stories, anecdotes, details and insights I have omitted from the 
coming pages. Of the 340 cases read, I have cited less than half. Some I have not 
cited out of sensitivity to specific aspects of the cases, others because their 
contents did not lend anything more to what I have already said. These omissions 
I have intended. Other omissions I will not have intended. Some unintended 
omissions will have been due to my not being a native user of the language in 
which the materials were recorded. In the course of reading thousands of pages of 
Burmese-language documents, and in hundreds of hours of conversations with 
informed persons, I inevitably have passed over meanings that a native user 
would not have missed. This possibility of omission or misinterpretation is one 
reason that I have included in this study, wherever possible, the original text of 
material that I have translated, for the benefit of readers of Burmese.  
 
Partly because of the manner in which I collected, compiled, read and used the 
criminal case records in this study, I want to underscore that my findings are 
interpretive of available facts. I make no pretence to have obtained a sweeping 
clarity of vision over my subject matter. I also have not tried to obtain such vision, 
preferring instead to peer into places from where I could obtain some deeper 
insight, rather than gaze down on the system from overhead. Therefore, although 
my interpretations are evidence-based, they are not comprehensive. To give that 
impression would be to misrepresent my findings. But also it would be to 
misrepresent the system itself. The records of Myanmar’s criminal juridical 
system are obscured because it is in the nature of this system to obscure. It is a 
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system that is resistant to study, that encourages documentation only of a shallow 
public transcript—its official histories, stated objectives, successful prosecution of 
government policies, and so on. Consequently, much of what is contained herein 
deliberately invites as many questions as it suggests answers, in the hope of 
stimulating more critical, in-depth research of both empirical and conceptual 
value on this hitherto neglected annexe of the state apparatus in Myanmar.  
 
Aside from the case records and supplementary materials on specific cases that I 
have drawn together for the purposes of this study, I have also used an abundance 
of primary and secondary materials from published and classified documentary 
sources, most of which have rarely been used, or never used, by authors writing in 
English. Perhaps the greatest largely overlooked resource of special relevance to 
this study is the compilation of annual law reports, which in the 1950s were 
published in both English and Burmese but from the mid-1960s exclusively in 
Burmese. Only expatriate legal expert Myint Zan has, to my knowledge, 
systematically used these reports in academic work during the last couple of 
decades, if not longer.94 On top of the law reports, I have also had frequent and 
extensive recourse to the annual volumes of laws, rules and official notifications; 
the fortnightly Supreme Court gazette; the weekly government gazette; and, 
irregularly published volumes of important notifications, directives and circulars. 
Among periodicals, I have read most editions of the journals published since the 
1990s by the Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney General respectively, 
as well as the civil service journal, and academic legal journals from the 1980s 
and earlier, which are no longer published.  
 
Reference books on my shelf throughout the four years of work on this thesis 
include bilingual editions of the core criminal codes, the Penal Code, Criminal 
Procedure Code and Evidence Act; volumes of collected miscellaneous laws; the 
first two volumes of the four-volume Police Manual, which set out the structure 
and routine operations of the police force, both the revised Burmese-language 
edition of 2000 as well as the superseded version of 1985, originally published in 
English during the colonial period; the bilingual Courts Manual, 1999 edition; 
and Burmese-language handbooks for discipline of the civil service and the legal 
profession and a useful guide to legislation and amendments from the colonial era 
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up to 1998, published by the Office of the Attorney General. I have included 
details of these publications among the works cited at the end of the study.  
 
Apart from the above, I have had recourse to a range of monographs and 
periodicals from current and earlier periods with which most researchers of 
Myanmar’s politics will be familiar, including records of seminars and congresses 
of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, and volumes of collected articles on 
party ideology and policy, most of which were given to me for nothing by people 
only too keen to get rid of them; handbooks for courts and offices in various 
periods; the semi-official histories written by academics of the now-defunct 
Universities Historical Research Department; the official armed forces history; a 
variety of books on law in Burma, most written by lawyers; and some biographies. 
I have also looked extensively through state-run newspapers from the 1960s to 
the present day, mostly the Working People’s Daily, and the New Light of 
Myanmar and its Burmese-language counterpart, Myanma Alin. Through the 
National Library of Australia I have had the opportunity to keep abreast of 
relevant news stories in the domestic private print media, in news and crime 
serials. As for broadcast media, thanks to the invention of podcasting I listen 
almost daily to the Burmese-language broadcasts of the BBC and VOA.  
 
None of these sources contained the information that I needed to write chapter 
five, on the criminal juridical system as marketplace, without which I do not think 
that the question of what animates the system could be answered adequately. For 
this chapter, I made a number of research trips during which I was able to meet 
with legal professionals and draw upon their input to track aspects of the system 
concerned with its moneymaking function. As in other parts of the research, the 
interpretation given to the information they provided is my own. Nonetheless, 
owing to the fact that these persons continue to earn their livelihoods 
professionally in Myanmar, and noting the ease with which they could be 
sanctioned for any perceived wrongdoing as a consequence of their cooperating 
with me in conducting the research for this study, I regret that none of them can 
be named, and the details of the cases they provided me also cannot be recorded 
on these pages. While drafting this thesis I also conferred with these professionals 
and other informed persons to ensure that I have not included details that for 
whatever reason ought to be excluded. Needless to say, full responsibility for what 




CONFIGURING THE CRIMINAL JURIDICAL SYSTEM 
 
My study begins with two chapters on the background to the present-day criminal 
juridical system in Myanmar, or for the purpose of these two chapters, Burma. As 
the system is fundamentally a product of British colonial rule, in this chapter I 
trace its origins in that period, sketch some of its features, and examine some 
developments after national independence. In the next, I examine the 
reconfiguring of the system from the advent of persistent military government in 
1962 onwards. 
 
Law, John Furnivall wrote in his Fashioning of Leviathan, on the beginnings of 
colonial rule in Burma, was “the essential fabric of the Indian Empire”.1 Criminal 
law was integral to the imperial enterprise, but the characteristics of law in 
Britain itself could not be those of law in the colonies. The empire was premised 
on a belief in the innate superiority of colonisers over colonised. It could no more 
treat colonial subjects as equals than it could cede them sovereignty over their 
governments. The rights that British people themselves were coming to expect 
would not be extended to millions in Asia or Africa. The law of empire was 
necessarily the law of order, not rule of law.  
 
But if the empire was not one of equals, it was also not one merely of vassals. An 
empire that was at its centre a parliamentary democracy was an empire of limits, 
even if many of the empire-builders would have had it otherwise. The leviathan 
that is the authoritarian state, Franz Neumann once observed, may swallow 
society, but it does not swallow it whole. Leviathan—in contrast to the Behemoth, 
the other Biblical creature that Neumann drew from Hobbes to designate the 
totalitarian state—does leave remnants of the rule of law, he argued.2 How true 
this argument is for the British leviathan in Burma, and with what consequences 
for the contemporary period, is the subject of this chapter.  
 
                                                        
1 John S. Furnivall, The Fashioning of Leviathan: The Beginnings of British Rule in Burma, ed. 
Gehan Wijeyewardene (Canberra: Australian National University, 1991) 19. 
2 Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (Toronto, New York 
& London: Oxford University Press, 1942) 459-60. 
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The first section of the chapter starts by tracing the origins of the criminal 
juridical system, its radical ideological bases, and the highly militarised 
transplanting of colonial law into Burma after 1885. It examines the process of 
codification and the introducing of statutes into the newly occupied territory, and 
it sketches the origins of the police force as an institution for the maintenance of 
law and order.  
 
The second section explores how the criminal juridical system once established 
had as its spirit procedural certainty. The system’s procedures protected the 
interests of empire, but also gave opportunities for people to talk back to power 
through an institution of power, if they could master its language and rituals. In 
this section, I explore a little of how people used the procedural interstices of the 
system to their advantage, and how through them a formal conception of the rule 
of law emerged in the colonial period. But, I emphasise that the room available to 
move through the interstices was limited by the imperatives of law and order, and 
whenever threatened the colonial regime could fall back on the use of 
extraordinary measures to deal with exigencies.  
 
The third and final section in the chapter explores some aspects of the juridical 
system in the tumultuous early years after independence in 1948, concentrating 
on the institutional and intellectual continuities with the colonial period, but also 
on the ideological flourishing of the system in a time of intense political and social 
unrest. The courts began to promote a nascent regime of rights that had hitherto 
not been a part of the colonial system, formulating a substantive conception of the 
rule of law that rested on notions of broadly defined citizenship and substantive 
equality. But the political and economic uncertainties of the period threw this new 
conception into doubt. The rule-of-law idea fell into pitched battle with the 
imperative for law and order. In 1958, the latter won out when a constitutional 
coup brought the military to power for the first time, enabling it to curtail the 
nascent regime of rights and reimpose a colonial-style law-and-order frame for 
government, albeit one couched in rule-of-law language and formal respect for 
the institutions of law.  
 
To be clear, the chapter does not constitute a history of the criminal juridical 
system in Burma, because my purpose is not to write a history. Rather, my 
purpose in this chapter and the next is to illuminate specific aspects of the system 
relevant to the problem of what animates the criminal juridical system in the 
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contemporary period. So far as this chapter is concerned, because colonial-era 
codes feature in the cases discussed in subsequent chapters, we need understand 
something of their ideological origins to grasp their place in the contemporary 
system. We also ought to be familiar with the role of procedure in the original 
design of the system so as to appreciate why procedural issues continue to play a 
large part in the work of the criminal juridical system today, albeit in different 
ways than in the past. And, we need to locate contemporary rule-of-law and 
rights-based discourses in the country’s history, lest we misunderstand them 
simply as latter-day innovations that had no prior role in the language and 
practices of government in colonial and early postcolonial periods.  
Ideology and invasion 
On the first page of the Penal Code in force and available for purchase in 
Myanmar today is the English subtitle, “India Act XLV, 1860; 1st May, 1861”. This 
statute is the Indian Penal Code, imposed on Burma, amended up to 1974, and 
renamed that of “Myanmar”.3 It remains the backbone of the criminal juridical 
system, with the Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act as its legs. 
 
The code’s ideological origins were utilitarian. Specifically, they were rooted in 
the thought and efforts of Jeremy Bentham. India presented opportunities for the 
utilitarians to experiment with notions of universally applicable legal techniques 
in places and cultures far removed from their own.4 Bentham found in Bengal—to 
which the British later administratively attached Burma—a territory where the 
transplanting of law could be profitably discussed both because the place was in 
every respect so different from England and also because the issues of 
transplanting law were not hypothetical. But his concern was not with some 
remote colony of which he had no direct experience or special interest; it was not 
in a faraway place but in the possibilities that lay in it for his own people, such 
that “a system might be devised, which, while it would be better for Bengal, would 
also be even better for England”.5 Interest in legal reform for the colony was part 
                                                        
3 The published code has not been updated since 1974, despite subsequent amendments, and a copy 
that I purchased in 2008 still refers to the country in English as “Burma”. By contrast, the Criminal 
Procedure Code has been altered so that every reference to Burma past and present has been 
replaced with “Myanmar”. 
4 Jennifer Pitts has argued that later authors overstated the extent to which Bentham was interested 
in legal and political change in India. She points to his antipathy towards European colonial rule 
and his decided ambivalence towards some of Mill’s work on the colony. Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to 
Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005) ch. 4. 
5 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 1843, vol. 4 (Edinburgh & London: William 
Tait; Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1968) 185.  
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of a movement for the same in the metropole.6 But whereas the utilitarian project 
for codified law at home ultimately failed, in the colony it predominated. And by 
the time that the British invaded upper Burma, it was at its zenith.7 The invasion 
coincided with the high point of British interest and effectiveness in imposing a 
preconceived model of authority on colonised societies.8 Therefore, the unusually 
direct form of control that the British placed over the newly occupied territory 
needs to be understood in terms of this larger ideological and administrative 
trajectory of conquest, and not simply as a response to the specific circumstances 
encountered in the rural districts beyond Mandalay.  
 
While Bentham remained preoccupied with devising and disseminating legal 
designs, the man sometimes described as his most important disciple, James Mill, 
led the utilitarian charge eastwards.9 Mill denigrated the attempt in Bengal to 
codify indigenous law and custom, instead arguing for a single comprehensive set 
of legal codes under the management of skilful, disinterested officials, freed from 
what the utilitarians saw as the “unintelligible, tedious, and expensive” common 
law of England.10 He started working as an administrator of India in London and 
in 1832 spoke before the committee that led to the setting up of a law commission 
for the whole of India. With other Benthamites he succeeded in getting a small, 
expert commission established for the drafting of the subcontinent’s new laws, 
with Thomas Macaulay as chairman.11  
 
Macaulay disagreed with many aspects of utilitarianism, but he had strong 
respect for Bentham and his scholarship. He had criticised Mill’s work, but on 
India he shared his sense of cultural and racial superiority, and agreed that to 
introduce the law of England would not work. He had spoken in favour of codified 
                                                        
6 Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
71. 
7 Andrew Huxley, “Postivists and Buddhists: The Rise and Fall of Anglo-Burmese Ecclesiastical 
Law,” Law and Social Inquiry 26.1 (2001): 121. 
8 Sandria B. Freitag, “Collective Crime and Authority in North India,” Crime and Criminality in 
British India, ed. Anand A. Yang, Monographs for the Association of Asian Studies (Tuscon, AZ.: 
University of Arizona Press, 1985) 143. 
9 Mill’s work, Bentham himself wrote, was “to provide for British India, in the room of the 
abominable existing system, a good system of judicial procedure, with a judicial establishment 
adequate to the administration of it; and for the composition of it his reliance has all along been, 
and continues to be, on me”. Bentham, vol. 10, 590. However, elsewhere Bentham expressed strong 
misgivings about Mill and indicated that he found many of the latter’s views on Indians offensive. 
Bentham, vol. 10, 450. 
10 Cited in Javed Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill’s the History of British India and 
Orientalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 132. 
11 In his ‘Codification Proposal’, Bentham argues that ideally a code should have a single drafter, for 
consistency, coherency and to avoid it being prejudiced by various parties’ interests. Bentham,     
vol. 4, 559. Failing that, a small body would be better than a large one. The law commission 
originally consisted of five members, later four, but Macaulay was the principal drafter. 
 33 
law for India before parliament, and in 1836 wrote that, “We know that India 
cannot have a free Government, but she may have the next best thing—a firm and 
impartial despotism.”12 Macaulay’s interest in the utilitarian model for India lay 
in what it offered for a type of paternalistic, cheap absolutism, which would give 
the legislative council authority to “reserve to ourselves the power in great 
emergencies of legislating with the utmost promptitude, and yet to put this power 
under such checks as may render it very difficult for ourselves or our successors 
to abuse it”.13 A more precise statement of the colonial vision for an empire 
founded on law would be difficult to find.  
 
Macaulay’s task may have been modest in comparison to many of Bentham’s 
ideas, but it was still breathtaking in its audacity. In effect, one person took the 
lead in writing law with which the English proposed to govern 200 million others 
and their descendants into the foreseeable future. Macaulay also claimed not to 
be consolidating or rearranging existing law but to be writing something new.14 
The code was not supposed to be a digest of what was already in existence: it was 
to be drawn from the universality of jurisprudential science. Researchers have 
since argued that such claims as to the originality of the code were exaggerated.15 
Nevertheless, the drafting and introducing of the Penal Code to India was a more 
radical undertaking than anything that could have been attempted in England. 
Macaulay recognised as much when he argued that codified law was “almost the 
only blessing—perhaps it is the only blessing—which absolute governments are 
better fitted to confer on a nation than popular governments”.16  
 
As the question of codified law passed from theory into practice Macaulay became 
bogged down in the politics and bureaucracy of empire. He succeeded after two 
years in writing only the Penal Code; however, he stayed true to some basic 
principles of the draft. He wrote a statute that was throughout preoccupied with 
the maintenance of order, or “public tranquillity”, which was later translated into 
the Burmese version of the code as ngyeinwut-ye: the first half of the compound 
denoting “law and order”. He also drew heavily on Bentham stylistically, such as 
                                                        
12 C. D. Dharker, ed., Lord Macaulay’s Legislative Minutes (London: Oxford University Press, 1946) 
180. 
13 Dharker, ed. 150. 
14 Dharker, ed. 260.  
15 David Skuy, “Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862: The Myth of the Inherent Superiority 
and Modernity of the English Legal System Compared to India’s Legal System in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Modern Asian Studies 32.3 (1998): 539-44. See also Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence 
of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law, Law, Meaning and Violence Ser., eds. Martha 
Minow, Elaine Scarry and Austin Sarat (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003) 63. 
16 Cited in Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) 219.  
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in his use of illustrations to amplify definitions of offences. But by the time he was 
done, legal reform was no longer the top priority in India. The draft code was not 
enacted until a quarter-century later, with some changes. Macaulay’s successors 
had in the meantime synthesised a uniform Criminal Procedure Code out of 
existing law.17 This code went through further amendments before finally 
becoming the version that is used currently in Myanmar, Act No. 5 of 1898.  
 
Another man strongly influenced by Mill and Bentham, James Stephen, drafted 
Act No. 1 of 1872, the Evidence Act, which is the other key statute in the 
compendium of colonial law still used in Myanmar today. Like Macaulay, Stephen 
was keen to promote the value of an empire based on utilitarian law. But whereas 
Macaulay aimed for a despotism that, in his own mind at least, would be the next 
best thing to free government, Stephen’s concern was unashamedly with the 
maintenance of despotism and the enforcement of order as cheaply, clearly and 
efficiently as possible. He pointed out matter-of-factly that the British 
government in India was “essentially an absolute government, founded, not on 
consent, but on conquest… implying at every point the superiority of the 
conquering race, of their ideas, their institutions, their opinions, and their 
principles, and having no justification for its existence except that of 
superiority”.18 Stephen admired the Penal Code and its accessories because it was 
“eminently well-calculated to protect peaceable men and to beat down 
wrongdoers, to extort respect, and to enforce obedience”.19 He wrote the Evidence 
Act in this spirit, and it was in the same spirit and in the same era that the empire 
brought its codes fully to Burma, with the decisive defeat of the last major 
indigenous kingdom in the territory in a short conflict at the end of 1885.  
 
The British had invaded lower Burma in two wars of the early and mid-nineteenth 
century of the Christian era, and in those parts of the territory had introduced the 
codes contiguously with India. So when the empire marched its troops on the 
flagging kingdom at Mandalay, its bureaucrats had ready on paper a criminal 
juridical system with which to beat down wrongdoers and enforce the obedience 
of its newest subjects. Having some decades of experience in lower Burma behind 
                                                        
17 The latter code lacked the radical ideological flavour of the former and contained measures to 
mollify reactionaries among the British in India whom Macaulay had had up in arms over his 
suggestions that Indians and Europeans alike be subject to the same law. Kolsky 78-86.  
18 Letter to the Times of 1 Mar. 1883, cited in Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, The New 
Cambridge History of India, ed. Gordon Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
210. 
19 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan & 
Co., 1883) 345.  
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them, they perhaps had reason to believe that these goals could be achieved 
within a relatively short time. Yet although the invaders occupied the capital 
quickly, they were met with a protracted insurgency that spread across not only 
the north of the territory but also into regions that the British had occupied in 
previous decades.  
 
Stephen had written just a few years earlier that the two piers on which British 
rule in India stood were military power and justice.20 Shortly after the invasion of 
upper Burma, a senior army officer put this assertion into more precise terms 
when he said that the newly occupied territory would need “a rain of district 
officers all over the country, civilians whose courts must be hedged in by British 
bayonets for a long time to come”.21 But if in India military power was to be 
subordinated to the power of the discourse of justice, as Mithi Mukherjee has 
argued, in Burma—at least initially—the opposite had to be the case.22 Charles 
Crosthwaite, the chief commissioner of Burma for over three years from 1887, 
decided that he had little use for the justice discourse, or at least that part of it 
contained in “the elaborate Statute law of India”, which implied “the existence of 
a hierarchy of educated and trained officials, with police and gaols and all the 
machinery of organized administration”.23 What Crosthwaite needed was a 
calculated, provisional reign of terror. “If the people would have given us 
information,” he wrote later, “the dacoit system”—i.e. armed resistance to British 
invasion, cast as brigandage, or dacoity—“could have been broken up in a very 
short time. As they would not, the only course open was to make them fear us 
more than the dacoits.”24 Fear, not extorted respect, was to be the method of 
British rule across much of Burma for a number of years.  
 
The colonial authorities moved to exempt the newly occupied territory—apart 
from the Shan States bordering modern-day China, Laos and Thailand, which 
were administratively separated from the rest of the region—from the ordinary 
law of the empire.25 The secretary of state designated upper Burma an “excepted” 
district, enabling Crosthwaite to request and obtain authority “to arm the 
                                                        
20 Mithi Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire: A Legal and Political History, 1774-1950 (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010) 72. 
21 Brigadier General George White, cited in Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 196. 
22 Mukherjee 73. 
23 Charles Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1912) 9. 
24 Crosthwaite 10-11. 
25 Crosthwaite 103-04. Aung Myo, “Police Administration in Myanmar (1885-1945),” PhD diss., 
University of Mandalay, 2007, 93. 
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Government with sufficient powers of dealing with the universal disorder which 
prevailed and could not be suppressed by the ordinary law even when backed by 
overwhelming military force”, as he put it.26 The British claimed to be expanding 
an empire according to a system of law that preceded the physical act of invasion, 
a system that presupposed the manner in which civil administration was 
established and run. However, in the case of upper Burma, the empire declined to 
adhere to its pre-existing juridical framework for the establishing of its authority, 
stripping law from the force through which it imposed order, and rendering 
conquest an act of naked violence.  
 
But sovereign power claiming to be based on law that perpetrates naked violence 
still wishes to appear clothed. The controversy over slaughter that the governor of 
Jamaica had ordered in response to a small uprising in that colony during 1865 
was still rippling through the empire. Much of the argument that followed those 
events concerned the legal frame for the use of oppressive military measures in 
colonies.27 Executions of prisoners and displays of corpses in Burma during 1885-
86 had already attracted news reports in London and had prompted questions 
from at least one parliamentarian, leading to the removal of the military 
expedition commander.28 Crosthwaite needed a juridical instrument for 
pacification—an instrument through which he could explain in legalistic language 
a method of obtaining order that would protect him and his officers against any 
subsequent allegations of arbitrary wrongdoing. This instrument, which he wrote 
in India, he called, somewhat quaintly, the Village Regulation. It took effect in 
1887. In 1889 it was made into a statute and in 1890 extended by a further law to 
lower Burma, giving it a legal status across the territory comparable to the 
compendium of Anglo-Indian codes that it was designed to keep in abeyance.29  
 
In his monograph on Burma, Crosthwaite described the Village Regulation’s use: 
A great obstacle in our way was... the refusal of the villagers to assist us. But an equal 
obstacle was their zeal in giving assistance and information to the brigands.... It was 
proposed, therefore, to issue a proclamation to all villages believed to be in league with 
the dacoits, informing them that unless the men belonging to the village who were out 
dacoiting surrendered within a fixed time, all their relations and sympathisers would be 
                                                        
26 Minute of 6 Oct. 1890, cited in Alleyne Ireland, The Province of Burma, Colonial Administration 
in the Far East Ser., vol. 1 (Boston & New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1907) 713. 
27 Discussed at length in R. W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
28 Ni Ni Myint, Burma’s Struggle against British Imperialism, 1885-1895, 2nd ed. (Rangoon: The 
Universities Press, 1985) 88-90. The flurry of telegraphic correspondence over news reports and 
photographs of summary executions between army commanders in Burma, the viceroy in India and 
the secretary of state in London is contained in Terence R. Blackburn, Executions by the Half-
Dozen: The Pacification of Burma (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2008) 32-37. 
29 Redrafted in 1907, the law, as amended in 1914, remains in effect today.  
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ordered to leave the village.... Concurrently with this action the dacoit gangs were 
hunted incessantly from jungle to jungle and village to village, and severe fines were 
imposed on villages which harboured the outlaws or withheld information regarding 
their movements.30 
 
This excerpt contains a number of elements in the pacification programme with 
lasting consequences relevant to the contents of this study. First, it equated 
resistance to invasion with crime. Second, policing was directed towards control 
of general populaces. Third, because this type of policing entailed the establishing 
and maintaining of order through coercive force, it was militarised. In the 
remainder of this section, I remark briefly on these three characteristics.  
 
The colonial regime associated insurgency with criminality, specifically, with 
banditry, or ‘dacoity’—an anglicised Hindi word for a gang robber.31 In his study 
of rebellion narratives in India, Guha has attributed the colonial administration’s 
homogenising of crime and resistance, the amalgamating of one type of activity 
with another, to “a perception impaled on a single stereotype of rural violence. 
Unable to distinguish between rebellion and dacoity it tended to classify ‘rebels’ 
as ‘dacoits’, as if the two words meant the same thing.”32 Although sympathetic to 
Guha’s argument, I think that he oversimplifies the problem. The records of 
administrators in Burma, while at times expressing confusion about violent 
resistance to British rule, also suggest deliberate misuse of the two concepts. 
Army commanders who led the invasion of upper Burma had no illusions that in 
1886 they were confronted with a reorganising and rearming enemy, not 
criminality. General Prendergast, the commander of the invading force, later 
complained that, “It seemed absurd and unjust to class whole divisions of troops 
in the field as dacoits, and to speak of 10,000 gang robbers being assembled in a 
district”.33 Whereas the army officer had a characteristic respect for his foe met on 
the battlefield, Crosthwaite, the civilian official armed with juridical instruments 
and military police, had as his strategy the conceptualising of the political enemy 
as criminal.  
 
                                                        
30 Crosthwaite 105. 
31 Under sections 390-91 of the Penal Code, dacoity is described as an act of robbery involving five 
or more persons, where robbery is the attempt to carry away property by theft and in so doing to 
cause or attempt to cause or create fear of death or injury. On the British “discovery” of a 
comparable criminal phenomenon in Egypt, and how the problem of collective crime related to the 
politics of building the colonial state, see Nathan Brown, “Brigands and State Building: The 
Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 32.2 (1990): 
258-81. 
32 Guha 101. 
33 Cited in Blackburn 38. 
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In the same way that postcolonial military regimes have disingenuously declined 
to recognise the political demands of opponents, preferring to dismiss them as 
terrorists, saboteurs and malcontents who cannot bear to see their compatriots 
prosper, the colonial government could ignore the grievances and claims of 
dissidents if they were reduced to common bandits, or could be persuaded to act 
like bandits. As Scott has observed, by denying rebels status in public discourse, 
authorities can assimilate their acts into a category that minimises their political 
challenge to the state.34 The assigning of opponents to criminal categories also 
affords administrators more alternatives for how to deal with them. Because no 
clearly demarcated line exists across which someone steps from ordinary criminal 
to political enemy, a defendant can one day be one, and the next day the other—a 
topic to which I will return in chapter four.  
 
Because the Village Regulation was aimed at the criminalisation of collective 
resistance, it was preoccupied with a notion of crime as collective action. 
Crosthwaite was explicit about this intention, writing in 1890 that order had been 
achieved “only by refusing to look at the individual and by enforcing the joint 
responsibility of the village community”.35 The onus lay upon villagers to prove 
jointly that they had not committed alleged offences, as explained in the district 
officers’ order book from 1887, which specified that “when the tracks of any dacoit 
or thief leads into any village, the people of that village will be held responsible for 
the crime, unless they can show they are innocent of having committed it and 
indicate the real offenders”.36 Not only were villagers criminally liable for offences 
that others had committed, but they were also obligated to investigate and report 
alleged crimes or be punished. Punishment too was meted out collectively. 
Officials could impose fines on communities, and situate ‘punitive police’ in a 
village—for which villagers themselves had to bear the costs.37 Where deemed 
                                                        
34 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1990) 206. 
35 Minute of 6 Oct. 1890, cited in Ireland 713. 
36 Appended to Ma Kyan, “Village Administration in Upper Burma During 1886-7,” Researches in 
Burmese History No. 2 (Rangoon: Historical Research Department, Ministry of Culture, Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma, 1978) 186. 
37 Under section 13 of the Burma Village Act, 1907 (as amended 1914), the deputy commissioner of a 
district was authorised to impose fines “on all or any residents of a village-tract” if he found them to 
have colluded with or prevented the escape of a criminal; to have concealed evidence, or hidden 
stolen property. Under section 14, the residents were presumed guilty of any unlawful killing in 
their tract unless they could prove that they had been unable to stop it or had tried unsuccessfully to 
apprehend the offender.  
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necessary, forced relocating of villages could “not fail to be effective in securing 
the extermination of dacoit gangs”, the author of one directive enthused.38  
 
The eliminating of collective crime through the use of fear entailed a type of 
violence that necessitated militarised police force actions. The British 
administration in Burma had from the beginning in the 1820s been unusually 
militarised when compared with other Indian colonies, as well as those in 
Africa.39 The total number of military and paramilitary personnel in the country 
increased following the invasion of the north, as resistance persisted.40 The police 
force was in two branches, one civil and one military.41 Consisting mostly of 
recruits brought as soldiers from India and organised in a military structure, the 
military police force dominated operations from the period of “pacification”, and 
was essentially a paramilitary counterinsurgency outfit.42 Concerns with what the 
colonial state continued to characterise as an admixture of armed resistance and 
banditry ensured that policing remained predominantly paramilitary and 
oriented towards the maintenance of public order. Until the 1920s, the military 
police were superior to their civilian counterparts in terms of personnel, training 
and equipment.43 Only then did the colonial regime expend more time and effort 
on the civilian force, including its intelligence capacity, in no small part due to 
concern at the emergence of urban nationalist political groups.44  
 
                                                        
38 “Orders regarding Removals under section 20 of the Act and the grouping of Villages,” The 
Abridged Law Manual for Sub-Inspectors of Police, Burma (Rangoon: Supdt., Govt. Printing & 
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Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1991) 18-32. 
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correspondingly reduced the size and strength of the military police. J. E. L. Martin, “The Burma 
Military Police,” Burma Police Journal 3.1 (1940): 56-57. 
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nationalist groups. Freitag 148, 52.  
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These three features of the pacification of Burma—resistance as crime, collective 
control of crime, and militarised policing—set a pattern for law-and-order 
maintenance that persisted long after the territory was “pacified”: at the first sign 
of serious trouble, military police and behind them soldiers entered the scene and 
quelled disorder through extraordinary measures directed towards the civilian 
populace as a whole. In the third section of this chapter, I discuss the 
consequences of this pattern of law-and-order maintenance for the postcolony. 
But before that, I turn to consider how the utilitarian codes functioned through 
the courts in colonial Burma during times of quietude, serving the interests of 
empire while also enabling people to speak back to political power, and use the 
authority of the state for their own purposes.  
Procedural interstices 
The Benthamites had been convinced that their genius lay in devising a scientific 
and comprehensive system of law through which the very manner in which the 
colonised lived could be fundamentally altered. The pristine image of their 
jurisprudence was that stripped of technicality it would allow a few well trained, 
enlightened administrators to issue commonsense orders on the basis of a 
handful of statutes, free from the legal game-playing that bedevilled the courts of 
England. John Stuart Mill, son of James, wrote of the Penal Code that it had been 
designed to “contain in itself all the law that is necessary, all that the judge 
requires to enable him to execute the will of the legislator when he knows the 
facts of the particular case”.45 Stephen gushed that “no obscurity or ambiguity 
worth speaking of” had been discovered in the code.46  
 
Reading the utilitarians’ statements on the scope of their project, as well as the 
contents of the codes themselves, I think that Foucault is correct in insisting that 
we treat utilitarianism not merely as an ideology—as I have referred to it up to 
now—but rather as a technology of government “permeated with philosophical, 
theoretical, and juridical elements”.47 The technology represented something 
altogether different from what had existed in India under the mercantile, 
thoroughly pragmatic system of government that preceded it. It proposed to 
govern, and to shape the lives of its subjects, through universal, “scientifically” 
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established principles, set down in the compendium of codes drafted for India, 
but in the utilitarians’ vision, just as readily applicable to Burma.  
 
The technology had at its core a body of procedures that would enable empire to 
have its way but simultaneously limit the capacity of its individual personnel to 
abuse their powers. Nasser Hussain has explained the centrality of procedure to 
the colonial apparatus in India as follows:  
Legal procedure was to be the ultimate answer to the question of what it meant to bring 
law to India. It was to be the form of a civilized despotism, for it would both declare to 
subjects that their identity, their offenses, their grievances, all began and ended in the 
authority of the law, and would reflect the morality of publicity and process lacking in 
the authority of a native despotism. Procedure was not substance but spirit, and in its 
exactitude it covered all law, English or Indian, statutory or customary, insisting that 
no authority preceded law, or more specifically, the workings of law, and that these 
workings created and reflected their own authority.48 
 
That procedure of law was for the utilitarians its spirit is apparent from the 
religiousness with which they expressed their belief in the work, but to ascertain 
what it meant for the workings of the system itself we need to explore how the 
courts actually used the codes. In this section, I do that through a survey of law 
reports issued in Burma from 1900 to 1947.49 
 
The utilitarians wanted law that was clear, concise and predictable. At each point 
in a case, a procedure would exist to indicate to the juridical system’s 
functionaries what they were obligated to do. However, they were equally 
concerned to ensure that these procedures not be used to delay or obstruct 
colonial notions of justice. Superficially, these ends appear consonant. In fact, 
they conceal a contradiction within the technology: procedure must be followed, 
but not to follow procedure is not wrong, provided that it does not cause injustice.  
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The contradiction between adherence to procedure and fairness of outcome is not 
a contradiction peculiar to the utilitarian model. Mirjan Damaška has noted that 
in any system of legal contest before an adjudicator, a tension always exists 
between adherence to procedure on the one hand and substantive notions of right 
and wrong on the other.50 The contradiction presented by the codified law 
introduced to India was not unique, but because of the stress placed upon 
procedure as the spirit of Anglo-Indian law, it loomed large over trial 
proceedings. 
 
The contradiction can be illustrated with reference to section 537 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. The section provides that “no finding, sentence or order passed 
by a Court or competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered... unless [an] 
error, omission, irregularity, or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of 
justice.” Essentially, the section allows that in cases where a judge, court clerk or 
police officer has neglected to fill out a section of a form or sign off on a page in an 
official diary, higher courts can decline to overturn a verdict on appeal because of 
a minor error that has not otherwise affected the outcome of the case.  
  
The thinking behind the section is straightforward, but the specific problem of 
what constitutes a “failure of justice” falls to the circumstances of a case, not the 
contents of statute. Consequently, questions over the distinction between a mere 
technical flaw, which would not be fatal to a case, and an illegality, which would 
be, gave rise to extensive litigation of precisely the sort that the utilitarians had 
expected to avoid. Many of these rulings fell against appellants on the reasoning 
that the intent of procedure was indeed to ensure that mere technical defects 
would not invalidate proceedings.51 The use by a magistrate of an incorrect term, 
for example, was not fatal if the meaning of his order could still be easily 
inferred.52 Failure to read depositions aloud back to witnesses was not sufficient 
cause for retrial.53 An unsigned confession was still valid if a higher court was 
convinced it was genuine.54 Where a magistrate had not recorded his reasons over 
a likely breach of the peace, his order stood so long as he did have a reason and 
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could articulate it when examined before a superior judge.55 Nor did the failure of 
a court to indicate the duration of a restraining order render it void.56 
 
But the courts in many other cases ruled that procedural flaws did cause failures 
of justice. Where an accused had been unable to enter a defence he had to be 
retried.57 A retrial was invalid when the defence witnesses were not re-examined 
but merely had their earlier statements read back to them and were then 
examined by the prosecutor.58 Where a subordinate court had in a committal 
hearing not considered the defence’s evidence it amounted to an illegality.59 A 
prima facie case had to be established at committal before ordering a trial.60 Even 
where convinced that such a case existed, a judge could not dispense with 
procedure and fail to complete the hearing as required by the procedure code.61 A 
retrial was unavoidable where a trial court judge had not actually examined a 
defendant.62 The accused in two different cases could not be tried 
simultaneously.63 Although it was legal to transfer a case from one judge to 
another during trial, the defendants had the right to recall any or all of their 
witnesses to be reheard, and where the accused did not have a lawyer the new 
judge should expressly advise him of this right.64 Where an accused was likely to 
be charged with murder, he had to have an attorney from the outset.65 He also 
had to be informed of a hearing to fix a good behaviour bond and to be heard on 
that date, or else the order for surety was invalid.66 And a judge who passed an 
order on the basis of evidence collected by his predecessors and without 
personally hearing from the accused had violated the law.67  
 
The small spaces in the system that enabled victories for individual defendants 
are what Larry May has described, borrowing from Henry Maine, as interstices of 
procedure.68 May argues that historically the establishing of certain procedural 
guarantees in Europe opened the door for the courts to protect a body of 
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substantive rights that emerged later—that is, rights expressed as “rights” on 
normative grounds, exemplified in bills and declarations. Where procedural 
guarantees are operative, he posits, they introduce minimal fairness to the legal 
system that makes the exercise of other rights possible. Habermas has made a 
somewhat similar point in his discourse theory on law and democracy: 
Procedural rights guarantee each legal person the claim to a fair procedure that in turn 
guarantees not certainty of outcome but a discursive clarification of the pertinent facts 
and legal questions. Thus affected parties can be confident that in procedures issuing in 
judicial decisions only relevant reasons will be decisive, not arbitrary ones.69 
 
To the extent that a claim can be made for a rule of law in India and Burma under 
the British it is, I think, to be found in these procedural interstices and the checks 
on arbitrariness that they contained. In other words, it is a claim for a rule of law 
that corresponds with Hayek’s formal conception of guarantees against the 
arbitrariness of the “rule of man”, which the colonialists associated with their 
indigenous antecedents, conveniently ignoring, in Burma at least, the 
sophisticated legal culture that predated their arrival.70 The men who contrived 
the colonial juridical system were obsessed with the use of codes and rules to—in 
principle, at least—observe and ameliorate the abuse of power. Within the system 
were technical forms that mitigated the worst excesses of despotism. The 
technology was meticulous in its oppressiveness, but equally it left a good deal of 
room for argument—as Martin Chanock has written of the courts in colonial 
Malawi, it was “oppressive in a distinctively legalistic way, not simply randomly 
unjust”.71 Once professionals and parties to cases learned how to navigate the 
system’s terrain, they were able to use it to make claims against the power of the 
state apparatus, and over time they could expand and reshape its interstices to 
suit increasingly political purposes.  
 
To illustrate with reference to a topic of relevance to many cases in the contents of 
subsequent chapters, the superior courts in colonial Burma frequently heard 
appeals in cases where the liberty of a person or persons was under question. In 
many, they ruled in favour of the detainee because of the authorities’ failures to 
comply with procedure. Where a man successfully escaped from a wrongly issued 
arrest order, for instance, the escape was not illegal because only escape from 
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lawful custody could be penalised.72 Likewise, resistance to illegal arrest could not 
constitute an offence.73 A magistrate’s order that a convicted person be 
imprisoned at a police lockup also was against procedure and illegal.74  
 
Many people brought cases complaining about the abuse of security bonds as a 
means of imprisoning them without charge or trial—a practice that continued 
under new forms of legislation after independence, as discussed in the next 
section. The notion of habitual criminality had taken hold both in the British-
ruled colonies and in the metropole.75 In Burma, authorities routinely misused 
laws for dealing with persons alleged to be habitual criminals, detaining people 
against whom they had no proof of criminality on failure to produce money for 
bonds. Superior courts complained at the manner in which lower courts 
interpreted general repute of habitual criminality when issuing bonds, and at the 
“overzeal” of executive authorities in their pursuit and imprisonment of innocent 
people.76 In an early expression of concern to protect civil rights through correct 
adherence to procedure, a judge warned that the law “must not be strained in 
order to secure even a public advantage. It is better that one dangerous man 
should be at large, than that a precedent should be established which would 
jeopardise the liberties of an indefinite number of citizens”.77 Despite such 
concerns, one retired official estimated that in the 1910s and early 1920s some ten 
thousand persons had been jailed for failure to pay bonds.78 
 
The courts also censured defects that were the result of sloppy policing and 
prosecuting. Where a search warrant for gambling was not properly issued or 
based on credible information, the accused had been wrongly imprisoned.79 When 
evidence was uncovered which would “throw an entirely new aspect” onto a case, 
the judge refused to entertain the prosecutor’s appeal for a retrial because of the 
earlier “gross negligence on the part of those whose duty it was to investigate the 
case and put it before the Court”.80 Similarly, after an approver—an accomplice 
turned witness for the prosecutor—absconded having been pardoned and the case 
against the accused collapsed, the approver could not instead be prosecuted: the 
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officials responsible for the case had to learn a lesson from it.81 A magistrate could 
not accept written information from a police officer as evidence if it had not been 
prepared and submitted in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.82 
Where police officers had only generally recorded how they had obtained 
information that two persons had murdered a third, the court refused to accept 
their account and acquitted the accused.83 When they and a magistrate had failed 
to follow correct procedure in issuance of summons, warrants of arrest and 
proclamations of the accused as fugitives for not appearing at court, the appellate 
judge recommended dropping the matter and continued that in all cases it was 
necessary that there be some proof of an offence before giving an order.84 When a 
trial judge failed to give any reason why he had convicted three accused for 
throwing stones at a house, his superior set them free but noted pointedly that 
had the magistrate handled the case properly then they might have been found 
guilty.85 The failure of both a magistrate and higher court judge to put their 
reasoning in writing rendered their orders invalid.86 And, a district police 
superintendent who with a unit of military police had busted a gambling den saw 
his case thrown out because he had conducted the search improperly, had 
exceeded his authority, had acted illegally in delaying prosecution, had submitted 
a report that was inadmissible as evidence, and had ordered an announcement 
which inferred that he had authorised certain types of gambling in certain 
premises.87 Not satisfied with having chastised the police, the court continued 
that for his part the magistrate had tried the case wrongly, and had failed to 
record the charge and his findings as required by the Criminal Procedure Code.  
 
Many cases dealt explicitly or implicitly with police officers and local authorities 
who systematically abused or exceeded their authority. The police had a long 
reputation for abusive behaviour, beginning in India and extending into Burma, 
as I have discussed elsewhere.88 Colonial records attest to this reputation, both 
through their rebukes, but also through guarantees of protection against charges 
of wrongdoing, again speaking to the tension between rule-of-law ideals and law-
and-order imperatives.  
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On the one hand, court records contain numerous accounts of alleged police 
abuses. A superior court warned particularly of the “harassing and oppressing [of] 
persons on charges of gambling”, encouraging magistrates to “be careful to see 
that precautions are used to avoid unnecessary hardship, and to follow strictly the 
procedure laid down by law”.89 A search warrant issued simply to go “fishing for 
evidence” in the general contents of an office was unlawful, and the evidence 
obtained as a result of the search inadmissible.90 And overturning a lower court’s 
sentence of one month’s imprisonment for resisting arrest, an appellate judge 
castigated the magistrate for assuming that an arrest should be accompanied by 
handcuffing, even when an accused resisted a police officer.91  
 
On the other hand, the Courts Manual stipulates that although “allegations of 
tutoring witnesses, of the manufacture or suppression of evidence, and of 
extorting confessions of guilt by threats or inducements are sometimes adopted as 
the line of defence”, it continues that “for the protection of the police force… 
judicial comments on such allegations should be carefully weighed”.92 Despite the 
police being almost universally mistrusted and abhorred—in the words of an 
inquiry committee late in the colonial period—the courts were obligated to refrain 
from extemporaneous comment and observe only the facts before them, in the 
interests of the integrity of the criminal juridical apparatus as a whole.93 
 
The alleged extorting of confessions by threats or inducements came up in many 
cases during this era. Although the nature of these abuses is not always made 
explicit in the court records, it is safe to assume that in many instances police 
officers had tortured or threatened to torture accused persons to confess—a 
subject on which I want to dwell briefly here because it is of special relevance to 
the contents of chapter four, regarding the role of the policeman as sovereign.  
 
Confession obtained through torture is essentially a vestige of an earlier form of 
criminal procedure in which secrecy prevailed. Throughout most of medieval 
Europe not only did confession have the appealing qualities of efficacy and 
convenience that still attach to it in the criminal juridical system of Myanmar 
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today, but also it was associated with a secretive criminal procedure, one in which 
torture was routine and regulated.94 In cases where the police rely on confession, 
the most important part of the criminal juridical process occurs even before the 
trial has started. Once the policeman has obtained the confession, he has, in a 
sense, consummated the criminal inquiry. Everything else happens after the fact 
of the confession itself. In this way, the act of obtaining confession through 
torture or threat of torture at once constantly alludes to the courtroom, although 
inverting its procedure: whereas the judge is formally obligated to consider 
evidence so as to assign punishment, the policeman punishes, or threaten to 
punish, in order to obtain evidence.95 An accused may retract the confession and 
insist that he was tortured, but by this point he has already conceded to 
procedure, and has become a participant in the finding of guilt. Even if he denies 
the contents of a confession, it is still the centrepiece of the trial, only now the 
question turns on its veracity. Therefore, the use of torture by the policeman to 
obtain confession is not simply a form of physical abuse—it is an act of 
tremendous legal and political power.  
 
Both the Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code contain sections to inhibit 
attempts by officials to torture or cajole an accused to give a confession that can 
be used in court. The most important steps in the procedural game concerning the 
use of confession, past and present, require police officers to have an accused 
confess before a magistrate, prohibit a statement given to a policeman from being 
used as evidence, and also stipulate that any confession apparently taken through 
inducement, threat or promise is illegal.96 Cases hinging on these elements 
frequently came up in the law reports during the colonial period, the apex court in 
one such case criticising both a magistrate and appellate judge for failing to 
inquire whether or not an accused had voluntarily confessed, and recording the 
latter as in effect having said “that if a person tells a Magistrate that he is about to 
make a confession voluntarily there is no intrinsic reason why the Magistrate 
should disbelieve him”, continuing that 
If he were right, that object [to protect persons against forced confession] would be 
frustrated in every case by the police inducing would-be confessing prisoners to start 
their statements before a Magistrate with statements similar to the one made before 
the Magistrate in this case.... In view of the propensity of the police to induce prisoners 
to confess the Legislature has imposed on Magistrates the duty of making a substantial 
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inquiry for themselves as to the voluntary nature of a confession, and unless such 
enquiry is made, a confession even before a Magistrate is not admissible in evidence.97 
 
In a subsequent case, the court made clear that police records of an accused 
person’s words that included any incriminating statement would not be 
admissible evidence.98 Furthermore, no witness or police officer could be asked in 
court about what was said during investigation, unless the accused doubted that a 
witness statement in court was the same as what he or she said to the police, in 
which case the accused could ask for the police statement to be put on record for 
purposes of comparison and cross-examination.99 Where police had induced an 
accused to confess even though some material evidence corroborated the 
statement, it was inadmissible.100 A village headman who told a man that he 
would not be punished if he had information about a murder had, the court 
found, induced the defendant and that evidence too was inadmissible.101 
 
The persistent difficulty in questions over the use of confession was, and is, in 
uncovering the likelihood of an inducement, threat or promise. The apex court 
could only vaguely state that it needed something less than positive proof but 
more than mere possibility to show that one of these things had taken place.102 In 
one case an accused had been in custody for two days before he confessed, casting 
doubt on his statement, but the judge giving the final ruling claimed to have 
personally checked and found that the accused had not been formally arrested 
until the date on which he confessed.103 Justice May Oung later referred to this 
ruling when condemning the practice of the police to take an accused into custody 
but to treat him as not detained because no charges had been laid, remarking that 
the design of the police was evidently to infringe the spirit of the law but appear to 
conform to its letter.104 
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The tendency of the police and local authorities to infringe the spirit while 
appearing to conform to the letter of the law also came up in numerous cases 
concerning use of witnesses. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, when the police 
search premises they must have two witnesses in attendance who sign the search 
and seizure form. The apex court overturned the sentencing of twenty-three 
persons convicted for illegal gambling because the search had been witnessed not 
by two independent members of the public but by two ward headmen. It noted 
that although the code did not state it explicitly, its requirement was for witnesses 
“unconnected in any way with the Government and officialdom”, or else “a police 
officer might call in two other police officers to witness the search, and might say 
with truth that the search had been witnessed by two respectable inhabitants of 
the locality”.105 The use of “professional” witnesses or persons intimate with the 
police as witnesses was a characteristic of investigative practices from early on, 
the apex court in one case noting that an excise officer had had the same witness 
to his searches “some 8, 9 or 10 times”.106  
 
The superior courts in some cases also attempted to amplify the rights of an 
accused where the evidence of witnesses was dubious. An accused had the right to 
obtain copies of witness statements in police diaries for the purpose of rebutting 
their claims.107 The evidence of a single witness, especially of an approver, was not 
ordinarily enough for a court to convict.108 And where a magistrate chose not to 
hear defence witnesses he had to record the reason for not doing so and 
demonstrate that the purpose of the defence in calling the witnesses had been to 
vex or delay justice.109 
 
Such rulings obviously impeded police officers’ and administrators’ capacity to 
prosecute their objectives, leading some to criticise the courts. Because later 
accounts of the colonial judicial system have tended to follow their critique, I 
comment upon it here so as to open up some other aspects of how the system 
worked in this period that are again of relevance to the contents of later chapters. 
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I then close this section with a short discussion of the procedural interstices’ 
limits.  
 
When the colonial courts began their work in Burma, they were part of the 
bureaucracy. The magistrates sitting in them were British civil servants appointed 
for the purpose, overseen by district commissioners, also civil servants, some of 
them military personnel. This non-separation of powers was partly due to pull of 
circumstances.110 But it was also consonant with utilitarian ideology. Bentham 
had opposed the separating of powers, describing it as anarchic.111 Nonetheless, 
by the turn of the century the trend across the empire was towards autonomous 
judicial services. From 1900 the apex court in lower Burma comprised both civil 
servants and barristers.112 In 1905 the colonial regime formally separated the 
upper judiciary from the executive, but it was only with independence that the 
judiciary became fully separated. By this time the entire lower professional 
judiciary in Burma was drawn from the local population, although many 
Europeans in the civil service still handled judicial cases. The British continued to 
dominate the upper courts, but none exclusively.113  
 
As the judiciary expanded in size, strength and diversity, civil servants lost power 
that they had previously held, giving rise to disputes between the branches. For a 
time in the 1890s, the judiciary and executive in Bengal fell into open conflict over 
high numbers of acquittals in criminal cases, which the latter attributed to 
procedures that favoured defendants, while the former blamed the governor for 
putting pressure on the police to bring cases through fabricated evidence and use 
of torture.114 Although rancour between the services in Burma did not, so far as I 
have read, lead to open conflict, the administrative elite seems to have resented 
the obstacles put in its path by judges with increasingly different ideas about how 
the colony should be run. Former administrators later vented their discontent at 
the judicial service in articles and books, which some historians used to form their 
own accounts of the judicial system. John Cady’s widely read history of Burma is 
one example: 
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Probably at no point did the British-type government wander into more bewildering 
paths from the Burman point of view than did the court system [sic]. Law as executed 
by the courts ceased to have much relevance to Burmese ideas of justice; it became 
instead a game of technicalities and rules which only the not-too-scrupulous legal 
profession seemed to understand and to profit from.115 
 
Cady cites among his sources the work of John Furnivall, who became a 
vociferous critic of the judicial system, assigning it much blame for what he saw 
as the disintegrating of social life under colonial government.116 Furnivall, a 
colonial bureaucrat-cum-scholar, had in his writings two themes consistent with 
the views of other administrator-critics: first, that as the colonial judicial system 
was alien to indigenous notions of justice, it engendered a rise in violent crime; 
second, that as it was encumbered by technicality, it was out of touch with reality. 
Late in life, Furnivall issued a torrent of grievances about the mischief of the rule 
of law, the lack of deterrents in the British courts as the cause for high levels of 
crime, the dangers of judicial non-accountability, and the overemphasis in the 
postcolonial period on individual rights over the need for social order—the topic 
of the last section in this chapter.117  
 
Furnivall’s critique of colonial injustice in Burma seems to have been echoed by 
colonial officials in other predominantly non-European colonies across the 
empire, from Asia to Africa.118 But to what extent was the critique really a 
response to factual conditions in these colonies, and to what extent was it a 
product of a particular mind-set among the colonisers? Researching colonial-era 
Sri Lanka, John Rogers addresses the question indirectly, through a related 
question about how courts that apparently lacked moral authority could 
nonetheless be sites of prodigious contest.119 He concludes that their most 
important feature was not their moral but their political authority. Through the 
courts, people could get access to the coercive power of the state and try to use it 
for their own purposes—in pursuit of a locally known cattle thief or in a dispute 
with a neighbour over land or property. Rogers also argues that the widely-held 
view that crime was out of control and increasing, which was prevalent in Sri 
Lanka as it was in Burma, was a product for the most part of assumptions among 
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colonial administrators about the inherent criminality of the people with whom 
they were dealing, and their preconceptions about the social consequences that 
followed the collapse of the indigenous system of government, along with the 
religious authority and institutions that it encompassed.120 This finding is 
consistent with historiography on India and Burma in which researchers have 
argued that the perennial view of colonial administrators that crime was on the 
rise because society was in some kind of moral decay had less to do with actual 
conditions than it had to do with growing intellectual and moralist movements in 
Europe of the period.121 There was, after all, no way for the imperial government 
to compare the incidence and types of crime before British conquest and 
afterwards, and in any event the notion of crime was, as we have already seen, 
itself a political construct. 
 
I think that Rogers offers a more compelling image of how the colonial criminal 
juridical system worked than those in administrators’ accounts. People in Sri 
Lanka, India and Burma alike used courts to talk back to power in ways that they 
were not able to do in other institutions. Over time, this communication became 
increasingly political in its qualities. Once lawyers knew how to navigate the 
system’s interstices, anything from a car accident to a charge of exciting public 
disaffection could become an opportunity to challenge state power.122 In effect, 
lawyers took on a role as public representatives in an era when legislative 
representation did not exist, or existed only in a very limited way.123 From Algeria 
to India, lawyers were the natural adversaries of colonial administrators. They 
played the rules of the game against the game-makers, and often did so better 
than the administrators appointed to judicial postings. In other words, the rule of 
law started to take on a meaning in the colonial period through the broadly 
political struggles that colonial subjects began in, and around, the courts.  
 
Despite the maturation of the system in Burma during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
overriding law-and-order imperative remained. The limits imposed on 
procedure—and if we take procedure to be the spirit of colonial jurisprudence as 
Hussain suggests, then the limits on law itself—were clearly demonstrated in the 
cases of alleged rebellion, sometimes recast as dacoity, of the early 1930s. The 
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cases against alleged rebels, Maitrii Aung-Thwin has shown, signalled a return to 
the exception as the rule for dealing with resistance to colonial hegemony.124 
Crosthwaite had pushed against the utilitarian technology on the pretext that he 
did not have the infrastructure that he needed to give it effect. His successors did 
have the infrastructure, yet they too resorted to exceptional measures when 
confronted with a large-scale uprising from the countryside. The procedural 
interstices might be probed and strained a little in ordinary affairs, even at the 
irritation or expense of individual officials, but no such leeway would be given 
with the law and order of the realm at stake. As rural unrest spread and solidified, 
the government moved to amend the criminal law to try a range of Penal Code 
offences summarily, detain suspects without trial, and execute convicted men 
through special tribunals freed from the evidentiary requirements of regular 
courts.125 The legislative council rejected the amendment, one member 
condemning it as a “lawless law” that would inspire terrorism rather than prevent 
it.126 The governor brought it into effect anyway.127 Other regressive laws the 
regime introduced in response to communal violence in Rangoon during 1938; 
and, in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the 1946 Special Judges Act 
and the Courts (Emergency Provisions) Act expedited trials of political dissidents 
and violent criminals alike by dispensing with the usual procedural requirements 
for inquiry and sanction for prosecution, and by allowing police officers to take 
and submit confessions as evidence. The High Court quashed attempts to counter 
these new provisions on the ground that they not only overruled the ordinary law 
but also were outside the ordinary law until repealed or until they expired.128  
 
Thus, at the close of its days in Burma the colonial regime had one foot in the 
utilitarian apparatus of law, the other in a type of legality expressed through a 
willingness to do away with procedural protections in the face of exigencies. Even 
as nationalist leaders were preparing to take back sovereign power, repressive 
laws designed to limit the fundamental rights expressed in the constitution of the 
newly independent country were taking effect. They would remain in effect, and 
be put to use, under the new government. But, the political dynamics of the day 
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changed the way in which the courts did their work, giving rise to new types of 
legal claims from those under the colonial regime, and new types of political 
contests over the meaning and role of law.  
Ruling on rights 
In February 1950, two years after the end of colonial rule, the new Supreme Court 
of Burma ruled on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the 1947 
Constitution. Police officers had arrested a prominent nationalist leader accused 
of plotting against the government, under the Public Order (Preservation) Act, 
1947, which granted authorities sweeping powers to hold persons in custody 
without charge. The lawyers seeking his release argued, among other things, that 
the act was unconstitutional because it was not in accordance with natural law. In 
response, the acting chief justice, E Maung, considered the history of codified law 
making in Burma since the British invasion, finding that 
Customary laws, the Common Law of England and the principles of justice, equity and 
good conscience were not applied by their inherent force but were made applicable by 
enactment. It is by people who had lived or who had been trained under this system 
that the Constitution of the Union of Burma was drawn up and enacted and it is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that when the Constitution speaks of “law” it speaks of 
the will of the legislature enacted in due form, provided that such enactment is within 
the competence of the legislature.129 
 
Burma had been formally freed from colonial rule, but, the court made clear, the 
laws, structures and thinking of the colonial regime were still the stuff and 
substance of the state.130 Nor was there anything remarkable about that 
continuity. Throughout Asia wherever there had been an agreed handover of 
power from a colonial regime to an independent one so too the colonial apparatus 
persisted. As Lev has pointed out of Indonesia, this was an inevitable 
consequence of modernity.131 The modern state needed machinery, and it was 
profoundly easier to work with what already existed than to start from scratch. 
Thus, when an applicant challenged the legality of extant law in the Supreme 
Court shortly after it began its work, Ba U—who was the first chief justice after 
independence—recoiled at his argument, describing the conceivable 
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consequences of invalidating the prior legal regime as “startling and disastrous”, 
and likely to cause “chaos in the economic and social life of the country”.132  
 
Economic and social life was already chaotic. Compounding the damage of the 
Second World War and post-war conflict, civil war began from the moment of 
independence, and over the next two years it escalated. In August 1948, the 
president proclaimed a state of emergency, citing as his reason the efforts of 
evildoers to destroy law and order, ngyeinwut-pibyaye, and endanger the lives 
and property of law-abiding citizens.133 It was followed within a few days by an 
announcement of martial law for Karenni State “instructing all law-abiding 
members of the public to assist in the stability of law and order and public 
security, and to follow the orders and regulations issued by the military 
authorities” there.134 The attorney general did his best to reassure the parliament 
that martial law did not mean “no law”, and that the substantive protections 
afforded to citizens as citizens rather than as imperial subjects distinguished the 
new exceptional provisions from those that had preceded them under the British, 
even if the measures were designed to limit or suspend those protections.135 
Nonetheless, just as the new government continued to employ the utilitarian 
technology of pre-independence days, it also moved quickly to adopt and use the 
same types of extraordinary law-and-order measures as its colonial predecessor.  
 
The most often used piece of draconian legislation in the first years after 
independence was the Public Order [ngyeinwut-pibyaye] (Preservation) Act.136 
Passed, and amended, in the final year of colonial rule as a replacement for an 
expired wartime statute, it became the site of many early battles between the 
courts on one side and the police, administrators and legislature on the other. 
These battles were paradigmatic of the conflict between the persistent imperative 
for law and order, ngyeinwut-pibyaye, captured in the law’s title, and the push 
for a rights-based rule of law that some jurists espoused. The law’s section 5 
enabled the police to arrest without warrant anyone suspected of “having acted, 
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or acting, or being about to act in any manner calculated to disturb, or to assist a 
disturbance of the public tranquillity”. An amendment in 1953 further widened its 
scope, including among offences falling within the law’s ambit the trafficking of 
drugs and illegal trading in rice, among other things, leading a senior lawyer to 
ask how “smuggling of opium or timber or an offence under the Foreign Exchange 
Regulations would have anything to do with the preservation of peace and 
order”.137  
 
The latitude and laxity of the Public Order (Preservation) Act allowed the police 
throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s to pick up pretty much anyone they 
pleased with little if any justification. Judges openly condemned the law. Ba U 
characterised it as “much misused”, remarking acidly that “some of the Acts 
placed on the Statute Book in 1947 have been so badly drafted that they have 
given rise to such misunderstanding and confusion as to interfere with the due 
administration of justice” and advising that the sooner they “are amended, the 
better it will be for everybody concerned”.138 The law was never amended, and in 
1960 Ba U’s successor, U Myint Thein, was left to reflect that “it is unfortunate 
that even in the thirteenth year of our country’s independence there are still 
pieces of legislation which run counter to the ideas of liberty and freedom 
enshrined in the Constitution”.139  
 
The problem that Myint Thein encountered with the Public Order (Preservation) 
Act 13 years after Burma obtained independence is essentially the same one that 
Agamben has identified in drawing a linkage between “protective custody” and 
the permanent state of exception in Europe.140 The juridical foundation for 
protective, or preventive custody is the state of siege, which was in fact the state in 
which Burma was conceived, amid civil war that in its early days came to the 
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doorstep of the capital city.141 But although the existential state of siege had by the 
mid-1950s passed, the legal response to it had not. The Public Order 
(Preservation) Act remained in place, and in active use against whomever 
policemen or administrators found expedient to arrest in the absence of definitive 
evidence of a crime. Detached from the state of exception that justified its 
imposition, the law could be applied to any situation of authorities’ choosing. 
Hence, in the Public Order (Preservation) Act the exception became the rule.  
 
It fell to the relatives of detainees under the Public Order (Preservation) Act to 
bring petitions against their detention to the courts. The first issue that the courts 
had to address was whether or not they could even rule on orders made under the 
law, which claimed to exempt any action taken under its ambit from judicial 
review.142 Having established that any such provision would be unconstitutional 
and void, the Supreme Court began receiving numerous applications for release of 
detainees. And because the only avenue for redress against detention under the 
law was the habeas corpus writ, within a few years, it is said to have become the 
most popularly invoked judicial remedy in the country.143  
  
The Supreme Court released people detained under the law on both procedural 
and substantive grounds.144 “We do not desire to make the path of officers 
entrusted with the preservation of public order and tranquillity difficult,” E 
Maung explained, “But the liberty of the citizen and his fundamental right not to 
be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with the law are matters of 
great import.”145 Consistent with this view, he ordered the release of a man who 
encouraged workers to strike and acted as a messenger for the communist party 
because these were both activities “within the legitimate rights of a citizen of the 
Union”.146 That a detainee happened to be a senior communist party member and 
influential in effecting strike action also was irrelevant, since it was within the 
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rights of the accused both to be a communist and to organise strikes.147 The 
possessing of a copy of a seditious pamphlet did not prove anything against the 
accused to entitle detention.148 Nor was the distributing of political pamphlets 
calling for rebellion a good reason for putting someone in custody: democratic 
government entitled parties to make political attacks on one another, and “in the 
language of politicians these days,” E Maung held, “‘rebellion’ (tawhlan-ye) does 
not necessarily mean much and no undue importance should, in our opinion, be 
attached to its use”.149 In the same spirit, the Supreme Court found that an order 
under the Public Order (Preservation) Act that an alleged criminal be forced to 
reside on a good behaviour bond in a town that was not his hometown was illegal 
because it violated his right to reside wherever he pleased.150 Judges in some early 
cases also pointed out that police officers could not use the law simply to punish 
people where they lacked evidence or inclination to prosecute under other laws.151 
E Maung deplored the police who, in an attempt to evade the court’s authority, 
had transferred a detainee to Insein Prison during a time that the area was under 
military administration owing to insurgency, in a deliberate attempt to evade the 
court’s authority.152 He also deprecated the practice of ordering a person to be 
detained indefinitely under the law while policemen were investigating, in one 
case noting that they had apparently forgotten about a man held in custody for 
over four years.153  
 
The courts in a variety of other cases too ruled on both substantive and 
procedural grounds in favour of the rights of citizens and non-citizens alike. Ba U 
had said from the beginning that “this Court, having been constituted by the 
Constitution as a protector and guardian of the rights of the subjects”—which 
included the rights to settle freely and not to be deprived of personal liberty, and 
rights to freedom of opinion, assembly and association—“will not hesitate to step 
in and afford appropriate relief whenever there is an illegal invasion of these 
rights”.154 This expression of guardianship found its way into a variety of rulings. 
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Commissioner of Police, Rangoon & One, 1949 BLR (SC) 41. 
152 Bo Aye Ko v. Commissioner of Police, Rangoon & 2 Others, 1950 BLR (SC) 181. 
153 U Zan v. Deputy Commissioner, Insein & Another, 1951 BLR (SC) 188. Thet Tun v. Deputy 
Commissioner, Shwebo & Another, 1952 BLR (SC) 33. 
154 U Htwe, at 553, 560-61.  
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Complainants and defendants had equal rights to be heard, to know of formal 
charges in court, and to call and cross-examine witnesses.155 A person alleged to 
be a foreigner, having a burden of proof placed on him to show that he was not 
from abroad, had a right to make a defence in court before deportation.156 Where 
an accused pleaded guilty it was not enough for a judge just to accept the plea. It 
was necessary to ensure that the person understood the nature of the charge, facts 
of the case and consequences of admitting guilt.157 Judges had to record verdicts 
in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, not just issue them orally.158 
Cases had to be heard in open court.159 Where neither an applicant for review of a 
case nor his lawyer appeared, the judge still had a responsibility to go over the 
record and satisfy himself that the lower court had given the correct order.160 If a 
judge made inquiries about a case not so as to understand the facts but to fill gaps 
in the prosecutor’s argument, his verdict was unlawful.161 When he purportedly 
reviewed a case but failed to record any reasoning other than that he was satisfied 
with the evidence and finding from the lower court, it was void.162 The confession 
of a co-accused or approver could not in itself be used to convict, and nor could it 
be used to fill gaps in missing parts of evidence.163 If a statement of an accused to 
the police contained a large number of the facts constituting an offence it was a 
confession and therefore inadmissible as evidence.164 Where a magistrate was a 
friend of a government officer in a case before him this was sufficient ground for 
the case to be transferred, as it created doubt about the impartiality of the judge 
and fairness of trial; it was not necessary to prove that he had actually been 
biased.165 Nor did a person claiming to have confessed because he was afraid of 
the police have to prove that they ill-treated him, only that his fear was 
justified.166  
 
                                                        
155 See for example, Maung Ant Bwe & One v. Union of Burma, 1948 BLR (HC) 863. Union of 
Burma v. Ah Shin & 2 Others, 1955 BLR (HC) 317. U Ba Aye & 3 Others v. Union of Burma, 1958 
BLR (HC) 548. ဘီ႐ွဳး (ခ) မက်င္ႏု ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၅၃ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္) ၁၁၀ [Bishu (a) Ma Kyin Nu v. 
Union of Burma, 1953 BLR (HC) 110].  
156 Hasan Ali v. Secretary, Ministry of Immigration & National Registration & One, 1959 BLR (SC) 
187. 
157 Sri Sawarmal v. Union of Burma (U Thein Maung), 1954 BLR (HC) 331.  
158 ၁၉၅၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၄၊ တရားလႊတ္ေတာ္၊ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၅၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂၀ ရက္။ (Courts General 
Letter No. 4/1956, Supreme Court, Rangoon, 20 Jan. 1956.) 
159 Maung Kyaw Aye v. Union of Burma, 1953 BLR (HC) 114.  
160 B. K. Halder v. S.Kr. Chelliah Pillay & Others, 1952 BLR (HC) 340.  
161 T. S. Mohamed & One v. Union of Burma, 1953 BLR (HC) 107. 
162 U Ba Din v. Union of Burma, 1956 BLR (HC) 166. 
163 Khaw Taw & One v. Union of Burma, 1948 BLR (HC) 310. Maung Aye Maung v. Union of 
Burma, 1956 BLR (HC) 273. 
164 Sobika Rahman v. Union of Burma, 1952 BLR (HC) 385.  
165 U Ba Khin v. Union of Burma, 1954 BLR (HC) 191.  
166 Maung Nyi & One v. Union of Burma, 1952 BLR (HC) 282.  
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It is necessary to keep all these verdicts in perspective. Just as the procedural 
interstices of the utilitarian system could go only so far in the colonial period, so 
too in the postcolonial period did the exercise of rights have its limits. Rulings on 
rights in the higher courts did not necessarily correspond to the active protection 
of rights across the system, or to the taking of action against perpetrators of 
abuses. In only a very small number of cases were police officers or 
administrators made criminally liable for gross violations of rights. Abuses might 
have been common knowledge, but the state lacked coercive means to arrest and 
prosecute government officials. In any event, the government simply could not 
afford to lose personnel: the civil service was depleted and demoralised, and 
thousands of men had absconded from the army and police force soon after 
independence.167  
 
Plans to make up for the attrition of numbers in armed personnel through use of 
paramilitary groups went badly awry and contributed greatly to the incidence of 
abuses. In 1952 the government scaled down a paramilitary force after repeated 
reports of atrocities caused public outrage, disbanding it completely in 1955 and 
incorporating its remaining units into the army.168 But in the same year it 
launched a replacement that again became notorious for its cruelty. Only in 1957, 
under intense public pressure, did the government order inquiries into the litany 
of illegal arrests and confinement, arson, rape, kidnapping, assault, murder, 
shooting and theft of livestock that the group’s members committed.169 The 
following year a case against some of its personnel finally came up in the High 
Court, which found that they had committed “wholesale dacoities and cold-
blooded murders of innocent persons under the cloak of the authority said to have 
been given to them”.170 Writing on the case, Mary Callahan suggests plausibly that 
even just five years earlier the accused would probably never have been 
questioned, let alone arrested, tried and convicted.171 The changed circumstances 
                                                        
167 According to the prime minister in a December 1950 speech, over 4,800 soldiers, 2,000 military 
police, 1,500 paramilitaries and 1,700 civil police and police reserves had deserted with arms in the 
aftermath of independence. U Nu, From Peace to Stability (Ministry of Information, Government of 
Burma, 1951) 202.  
168 Maung Aung Myoe, “The Counterinsurgency in Myanmar: The Government’s Response to the 
Burma Communist Party,” PhD diss., Australian National University, 1999, 139-40. 
169 ေဒၚျမင့္ၾကည္ ႏွင့္ ေနာ္အင္ဂ်လင္း၊ ျပဳစု၊ ၁၉၅၈-၁၉၆၂ ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရး၊ ဒုတိယတြဲ (ရန္ကုန္၊ တကၠသိုလ္မ်ားပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၁) စာ ၇၈-၇၉။ 
[Daw Myint Kyi and Naw Angeline, eds., The Politics of Myanmar 1958-1962, vol. 2 (Yangon: 
Universities Press, 1991) 78-79.]  
170 ခ်စ္လႈိင္၊ ထြန္းဝိုင္း၊ သိန္းေအာင္ ပါ ၂၂ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၅၈ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္) ၅၈၂။ ၆၀၅။ [Chit Hlaing, 
Htun Waing, Thein Aung & 19 v. Union of Burma, 1958 BLR (HC) 582 at 605.] The quote is from 
Judge U San Maung, writing a concurring opinion to the judgement.  
171 Mary P. Callahan, “The Sinking Schooner: Murder and the State in Independent Burma, 1948-
58,” Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia, ed. Carl A. Trocki, Southeast Asia 
Program Ser. (New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1998) 18. 
 62 
she attributes to structural and political consolidation of the state, which enabled 
and indeed obliged action against the perpetrators of the most heinous abuses.  
 
Aside from the sheer practical difficulties associated with protecting people’s 
rights, the courts were equivocal and inconsistent in their stated guardianship 
role. Some rulings worked against the rights of accused persons. An alleged 
insurgent who had surrendered specifically because of a government amnesty 
order would have been dismayed at a verdict that he could be prosecuted anyway, 
as the amnesty was a mere promise, and the government could break this promise 
if it wished to do so.172 And although a communist party member organising strike 
actions had escaped the purview of the Public Order (Preservation) Act, a former 
policeman who had called for other officers to desert their posts could not, having 
committed what the Supreme Court said was “undoubtedly a treasonable act” that 
entitled his detention while a criminal case was being prepared against him.173 
Sections of the law that clearly worked against the interests of the rights of 
citizens, such as an exemption from the requirement for police officers to take 
detainees before magistrates after arrest, the court endorsed.174 A group of school 
students whom it was satisfied had secretly contacted insurgents could also be 
held under the law’s terms.175 And the chief justice in 1957 ruled that even where 
police officers had rearrested a person inside a courthouse immediately after he 
had been acquitted of charges under the Unlawful Associations Act, 1908 and the 
Emergency Provisions Act, 1950—laws still in use today, as we will see in later 
chapters—the custody was justified as the accused apparently posed a risk to 
public order, despite the lack of evidence to convict him of a criminal offence.176  
 
Given the complicated record left by the courts in this decade, we might do well to 
pause here and reconsider the study’s original problem before I go on to discuss 
briefly events in 1958 and their consequences. What animated the criminal 
juridical system in this period? Although the legal forms of the colonial system 
carried through to the post-independence period, changing political 
circumstances altered systemic behaviour considerably. Out of the politics of the 
independence movement, a nascent body of substantive rights had emerged, and 
                                                        
172 Union of Burma v. Boh Sein Tun, 1952 BLR (HC) 206. 
173 Daw Mya Tin v. Commissioner of Police, Rangoon & One, 1949 BLR (SC) 82, at 85. 
174 U Ba Yi & 8 Others v. Officer-in-Charge of Jail, Yamethin, 1950 BLR (SC) 130. 
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176 ေမာင္တင္ေအး ႏွင့္ ခရုိင္ဝန္၊ ပခုကၠဴၿမိဳ႕ပါ ၁၊ ၁၉၅၇ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ)္ ၁၇။ [Maung Tin Aye v. District 
Commissioner, Pakokku & One, 1957 BLR (SC) 17.]  
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had entered into public discourse and also into the work of the courts. At the 
nexus of the struggle over rights was a tussle between competing conceptions of 
“law”: the one, a substantive rule of law, the other, a law and order in which law is 
marked lexically by its absence—the law and order of ngyeinwut-pibyaye. The 
rule of law was in this period being shaped and debated in relation to its 
opposite.177 Conceptually, by 1958 it was no longer the rule-of-law idea of the 
colonial period. It was now taya-ubade-somoye, the rule of law of the 
independent, sovereign state, with all its new political baggage attached. True, we 
ought to be careful not to exaggerate the extent to which a postcolonial rule of law 
contributed to political, social and legal change in the 1950s, but nor should we 
underestimate it. For enough people in Burma, the rule-of-law idea mattered and, 
I suspect, it mattered in a new and politically distinctive way.  
 
Things changed in 1958 when the civilian government was faced with the 
alternative of transferring power to the army or dealing with a mutiny.178 U Nu, 
the prime minister, handed power to the armed forces commander, General Ne 
Win, for an initial six-month period.179 Ne Win then went to parliament to report 
on progress and obtain a constitutional amendment with which to extend his 
term in office by a year. Rather than condemning the coup, many journalists and 
commentators at the time fell over one another in their efforts to lavish praise on 
the government—and Ne Win personally—for uprightness, efficiency and honesty 
even when making mistakes.180 They applauded the committees that his 
government set up for cracking down on crime and getting basic services running. 
They effused at the clearing of rubbish, lowering of prices, and removal of corrupt 
bureaucrats and politicos. They cheered on the army for hunting down crooks, 
                                                        
177 The opposition is evident in the reading of planning and policy documents and speeches from the 
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delivered by U Nu, President (Clean) AFPFL, at Kaba Aye Pagoda, Rangoon, 5 June 1959 (1959), 42-
43, 51. The AFPFL was the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, the ruling political party after 
independence. In 1958 it split into two factions, one named the “clean” faction, led by U Nu and a 
counterpart, the other the “stable” faction. For a synopsis of the split see Michael W. Charney, A 
History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 90-92. 
178 The intrigues of the coup and its countervailing forces are described in Mary P. Callahan, “The 
Origins of Military Rule in Burma,” PhD diss., Cornell University, 1996, (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1996) 
468-80. 
179 Nu’s autobiography contains a brief account of these events: U Nu, U Nu: Saturday’s Son, trans. 
U Law Yone (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1975) 325-27. 
180 See for example the stream of effusive editorials and articles throughout 1959 and 1960 in the 
influential Guardian monthly magazine.  
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which ineffectual policemen and doddery judges could not or would not catch and 
punish. Some international observers also chimed in with ringing endorsements, 
insisting that the army was committed to constitutional, civilian rule.181 
 
In fact, the coup altered the political and legal landscape irrevocably. Operating 
under the slogan, “Peace and the rule of law first”, the caretaker government 
claimed by the end of its tenure to have restored to the courts “the dignity and 
prestige which they enjoyed in pre-war years”.182 This statement is true inasmuch 
as the coup pushed back the nascent body of substantive rights that had emerged 
after colonial rule, through its takeover of institutional spaces with law-and-order 
ideas and practices, and by clamping down on public discourse and basic 
democratic freedoms. It imposed precisely what some parliamentarians had 
sought but could never achieve because of the nature of the parliamentary system: 
sweeping coercive powers through claims to be upholding the rule of law.  
 
Following the coup, police and army personnel rounded up thousands of people 
accused of being underground political activists, opium dealers, gambling 
brokers, black market traders, loudmouth journalists, illegal Bengalis, 
pornography peddlers and whosoever else the caretaker government targeted as a 
threat to order or morality. Some, officials held or forcibly resettled to remote 
townships under the Public Order (Preservation) Act.183 Others they charged. The 
ousted prime minister later alleged widespread illegal arrest and forced 
confession by both army and police personnel.184 Policemen may have resorted to 
unlawful methods habitually, but they now also had more latitude than at any 
time in the prior decade. The caretaker government passed a temporary law to 
exempt officials from the usual procedural requirements in criminal cases, 
enabling confessions taken in police custody to be used as evidence.185 Apparently 
                                                        
181 For example, Richard Butwell and Fred Von der Mehden, “The 1960 Election in Burma,” Pacific 
Affairs 33.2 (1960). 
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၁၇၅။ [Yoe Bun Hwei (a) Kek Nek Hwei La v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of 
the Union of Burma & Others, 1960 BLR (SC) 175.] လင္ေခြးယား (ခ) ေရာင္အိပ ္ႏွင့္ ျပည္ထဲေရးဌာနဝန္ႀကီး၊ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ 
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ျပန္ၾကားေရးဌာန၊ ဖ၊ဆ၊ပ၊လ (သန္႔ရွင္း) အဖြ႔ဲခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၅၉) စာ ၁၀-၂၀။ [U Nu, “Address Given by AFPFL (Clean) Chairman 
U Nu at the 69th May Day Celebration,” (News & Information Department, AFPFL [Clean], 1959), 
10-20.]  
185 Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 21/58, section 2. 
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encouraged by the use of colonial-style authoritarian legality to stamp out crime, 
at least one senior administrator suggested that it might be worth thinking about 
reintroducing colonial-style pacification techniques to stamp out insurgents.186 
 
Another extraordinary temporary measure passed in this period amended, or 
rather, supplemented, the contents of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act. This 
amendment may account for some of the seeming enthusiasm expressed for the 
caretaker government in the media, since it enabled the arrest of anyone who by 
print or otherwise undermined the discipline or morale of the armed forces or 
civil service.187 In a case giving some alarming clues of what the country’s near 
future would hold, three army officers in administrative posts testified against a 
newspaper editor who ran an article criticising a draft bill on labour disputes, 
since it “would create an impression in the minds of the public that the 
employment of military officers in civilian departments was undesirable”.188 
Although the prosecution in this case failed, the next year it succeeded in another 
case under the same provisions, against a newspaper editor, publisher and 
journalist for an article they ran protesting the arrest of a member of 
parliament.189 For the first time, the casting of aspersions towards the integrity of 
the armed forces as an institution constituted a potential criminal offence.  
 
Although postcolonial government in Burma had, like its predecessor, 
experimented with the creating of anomalous legal zones through which to pull 
and detain persons alleged to have committed offences of special concern to the 
state—banditry, rebellion, sedition—the caretaker government, apart from taking 
these experiments further, distinguished itself through another postcolonial 
innovation that recalled law-and-order techniques from the colonial period: the 
turning of the anomalous zone into a physical space. The British regime had in its 
day sent some convicted persons to other colonies or to the Andaman Islands 
deep in the Bay of Bengal. The caretaker government chose one of the remote 
Cocos Islands—just north of the Andamans, which at independence had gone to 
India—for the housing of a new facility. At the end of January 1959 it began 
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187 အေရးေပၚစီမံမႈ (ယာယီျပင္ဆင္ခ်က္) အက္ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂၆/၅၈၊ ပုဒ္မ ၅-က (၁)(ခ) [Emergency Provisions (Temporary 
Amendment) Act, No. 26/58, section 5A(1)(b)]. 
188 U Yu Maung v. Union of Burma, 1959 BLR (HC) 317, at 321. 
189 ဦးေအာင္စိန္ ပါ ၃ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္င၊ံ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ)္ ၉၁။ [U Aung Sein & 2 v. Union of Burma, 
1960 BLR (HC) 91.] 
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transferring alleged insurgents, politicians, journalists, businessmen, and others 
picked up by accident or misfortune to the island prison.190 Hundreds of ordinary 
criminal detainees were also duped into going along and building facilities on 
promises of shortened sentences and stories about an idyll teeming with fish and 
scantily clad sea gypsy girls. Neither detainees nor their families were informed of 
where they were going, or for how long, or if they would ever come back or not. 
 
The official report on the work of the caretaker government disingenuously 
creates an impression—in a couple of sentences—that the island prison was 
analogous to its counterparts on the mainland.191 It reaffirms the prison’s 
relationship to the normal juridical order even though its purpose was to sever 
this relationship. Prisoners could already get lost inside jails for years, and the 
parliamentary government had found a variety of ways and means to imprison 
political opponents, but in Burma proper detainees still had some chance of being 
called to the courts. They had opportunities to communicate with the outside 
world. Where a riot or death occurred in custody, news would reach friends, 
family, journalists, politicians, lawyers and judges. That the records from earlier 
periods abound with cases of alleged unlawful imprisonment speaks to its 
prevalence, but also to the possibility that a detainee had some chance to be 
heard. The island prison signified the deliberate removal of this possibility. 
Distance, weather and lack of vessels made trips to and from the island 
infrequent. It was cut off from the mainland throughout the monsoon. News of a 
riot or death in custody would never get out, or if it did, too long afterwards for 
anything to be done about it. Furthermore, the island was classed as a military 
territory.192 This classification exempted it from the jurisdiction of the civilian 
judicial authorities.193 It also meant that passing commercial vessels, and even 
unauthorised government craft could not berth. The occupants of the prison were 
in both a physical and juridical sense entirely at sea.  
 
                                                        
190 According to Ko Ko Lay, one of those sent in the first batch, among prisoners were teenagers, at 
least one of whom had been arrested because of mistaken identity, and a handful of businessmen of 
no particular significance. ကိုကိုေလး၊ ဘာလဲဟဲ့ ကိုကိုးကၽြန္း (ရန္ကုန္၊ ခင္ေမာင္ရိႏွင့္သားပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၆၀) စာ ၃၉-၄၃။ [Ko Ko 
Lay, What Is Cocos Island (Rangoon: Khin Maung Yi & Son Press, 1960) 39-43.]  
191 Government of the Union of Burma 65. 
192 ေမာင္ခ်စ္ရီ၊ ကိုကိုးကၽြန္းမွ ပုဒ္မငါး၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဦးေစာလြင္၊ ၁၉၆၀) စာ ၁၃၂။ [Maung Chit Yi, Section Five from Cocos 
Island (Rangoon: U Saw Lwin, 1960) 132.] Maung Chit Yi was himself arrested and sent to the 
island prison as a substitute for another person whom police had come to arrest but could not 
locate.  
193 In March 1959 when a team did come to inspect the camp it consisted not of judges but of 
soldiers, police and bureaucrats. ကိုကိုေလး၊ စာ ၆၈။ (Ko Ko Lay 68.)  
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In 1960, the government closed the prison. After the definitive 1962 coup, the 
military regime later reopened it for a time, but by then the geographic distance 
between detainees and courts was redundant. The anomalous zone of the island 
had occupied the mainland. Whether a detainee was held in the middle of the sea 
or the middle of Rangoon no longer made any great difference. The juridical 
system itself was by now at sea, and with it went the fight for the rule of law that 
had been a hallmark of politics throughout the 1950s. From hereon in, the politics 
of law and order were to hold sway.  
Conclusion 
The British colonial regime claimed to distinguish itself from its predecessors 
through an insistence upon firm, albeit oppressive legality. The law of empire 
was, as James Stephen proudly put it, “a compulsory gospel which admits no 
dissent and no disobedience”.194 This statutory gospel had its ideological roots in 
radical utilitarianism, in the handiwork of ideologues who aspired to impartial 
despotism through rational injunctions handed down in a uniform and organised 
body of codes, efficiently dispensed by disinterested bureaucrats. It was a gospel 
not of liberation but of pacification. 
 
This gospel contributed to a novel authoritarian vision for Britain’s Asian 
colonies, one guided by universal ideas, and yet one that also admitted profound 
inequality and rigid hierarchy, above all through the inevitable bifurcation of the 
coloniser and the colonised. The Benthamite technology provided for a form of 
government based on the universal principles of jurisprudential science that 
paradoxically denied the equality on which its universal qualities depended.  
 
Colonial functionaries distrusted the technology. At moments of crisis or 
perceived crisis they resorted to exceptional measures to retain or regain control, 
using the measures that Macaulay had promised would be available in reserve, to 
legislate with promptitude so as to deal with emergencies. The pragmatic goals of 
the administrative elite always came out on top. The existence of the colonial 
state, to paraphrase Schmitt, was indeed undoubted proof of its superiority over 
the validity of the utilitarians’ legal norms.195 The codes’ authors had sought to 
premise the existence of the colonial state on their statutory norms. Ultimately, 
the codes succeeded only in becoming part of the colonial apparatus of rule, 
                                                        
194 Cited in Stokes 302. 
195 Schmitt, Political Theology 12. 
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never, as their designers had hoped, in becoming the basis for that rule. The 
audacious Benthamite dream of conciliating law and order ultimately failed. 
Statutory law could not assert itself over the colonial state’s specific order; 
instead, it was integrated into that order.  
 
But the image of British colonial law is a complex one, and among its outcomes 
was the nurturing of the rule-of-law idea among people who took it and made it 
their own, turning it to their advantage, bringing the language and mechanisms of 
political power in Burma to bear upon the politically powerful, as other colonized 
people were doing across the empire.196 Colonial courts gave people opportunities 
to access and challenge otherwise inaccessible state power. Over time they 
became sites of fierce contest, and to an extent, the empire’s servants became 
prisoners of their rule-of-law rhetoric. Inscribed within the criminal codes and 
judicial structure was a concern to prevent inefficient abuses of power through 
carefully arrayed and fine-tuned procedures. Once colonial subjects learned how 
to negotiate the system, the bureaucrats found that, like Edward Thompson’s 
eighteenth-century Whigs, having “played the games of power according to the 
rules which suited them… they could not break those rules”—or not all of them, 
anyway—“or the whole game would be thrown away”.197 Over time, the British 
Empire was put on trial in its own courtrooms.198  
 
In Burma and across South Asia, many of the people who took the empire to court 
became the politicians of the postcolonial world, while the Asian judges and 
bureaucrats of empire became the judges and bureaucrats of sovereign states. 
They carried with them the colonial ideas and legal forms they had mastered. The 
contradictions of the colony persisted, and were in some respects enlarged, in the 
postcolony. On the one hand, the conditions in which Burma obtained its 
independence demanded the use of exceptional measures for law and order. On 
the other, democratic life, the spirit of independence and other factors all 
contributed to the growth of a rights-based rule-of-law discourse, one that 
developed and amplified the rule-of-law concept. Within the juridical system, the 
fight to conciliate law and order with rule of law took on a new pitch, a new 
intensity.  
 
                                                        
196 For a discussion, see Sally Engle Merry, “Law and Colonialism,” Law and Society Review 25.4 
(1991): 889-922. 
197 E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975) 
263. 
198 Wiener 6. 
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The superior judiciary represented itself as guardian of the country’s nascent 
body of substantive civil and political rights, upholding liberal common law 
tradition, albeit within the codified Anglo-Indian framework. The police force and 
bureaucracy stood for law and order, firmly in pursuit of immediate, pragmatic 
goals: the arrest of suspects, the break up of criminal gangs and underground 
political cells. The government, straining to obtain minimum effective control 
over populace, territory and material resources, acknowledged aspirations for 
rights while coming to terms with the practical realities of civil war and economic 
collapse. It enabled the free exercise of draconian legislation, but did not overtly 
interfere when the courts repeatedly worked against its interests, and when 
judges expressed alarm at the misuse of law. All in all, the politics of the rule of 
law in this period fell far short of its substantive conception, but abided by certain 
formal practices, on which the routine operation of the state apparatus to some 
degree depended.  
 
The first military coup signalled the beginning of the end of the fight. It was not a 
knockout blow, but from that moment the fight was effectively over. Under the 
cover of constitutional niceties, the interim government moved to one side the 
nascent regime of substantive rights, conducted widespread arrests and operated 
a remote island prison on the threshold of the juridical and penal systems. In 
1958 we have in Burma for the first time since the end of British dominion the 
deliberate conflating of the rule of law, taya-ubade-somoye with law and order, 
not only in speech, but in actions at all levels of government. We have a police 
project, under military command, premised on maintenance of, or restoration of, 
the rule of law. In many respects, the first Ne Win government was the closest in 
ideology and practices to the British colonial regime of any after 1948. 
 
Once the caretaker government stepped down, politicians and judges returned for 
a while to old habits, but at least some were aware of the precariousness of their 
positions and their institutions. In a rare direct statement in court on the concept 
of the rule of law, Chief Justice Myint Thein formally noticed that after 
resumption of civilian rule in 1960 the prime minister had called for the Public 
Order (Preservation) Act not to be used indiscriminately, to which he added that,  
This statement is welcome to all and sundry who cherish liberty and the concept of the 
Rule of Law, which in passing we would point out, is very different from rule by law 
promulgated on the plea of necessity to curb the liberty of the individual.199 
 
                                                        
199 Lim Lyan Hwat, at 132. My italics.  
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For me this comment has a keen poignancy, for two reasons. First, in it we see a 
hint from Myint Thein that he recognised the country’s democratic future was in 
serious jeopardy. The existential threats that it had faced at the moment of 
independence had been replaced by a willed existential threat. No longer was 
actual danger needed for the army to justify its aggrandising of power. Burma’s 
soldiers had learned, as their counterparts in Pakistan, Thailand and Indonesia 
also were learning, that the country need not in fact be in peril for them to 
intervene. An existential threat could also be created.  
 
Second, Myint Thein’s reference to rule by law recalls the distinction that I made 
in chapter one between analogous concepts on a rule of law continuum, as against 
opposing concepts to the rule of law. The judge’s remark suggests that at this time 
he was still thinking in terms of the former type of concept—perhaps reflecting on 
the period of constitutional military government, or alluding to the experiences of 
some other Asian states.200 But when the army seized power on the morning of 2 
March 1962, it did so thinking in terms of the latter: it was about to move the 
juridical system conceptually not to another point on a rule-of-law continuum, as 
it had done four years earlier, but to an altogether different place. 
 
The chief justice was among the first it arrested. In a pathetic scene to mark the 
end of an era, the elderly judge asked the group of soldiers who came to his 
residence in the early morning hours to show a warrant. The soldiers, uncertain 
about the new legal space into which they had been dispatched, communicated a 
message to this effect back to their commanding officer. The officer came in 
person and told the judge that as the armed forces had seized power, he was being 
arrested under the authority of a military administration.201 No warrant was 
required. The former chief justice remained in custody, with hundreds of others, 
for six years.202 Although he was eventually released, the rule-of-law idea that he 
had defended stayed captive to the politics of law and order. 
 
                                                        
200 The “plea of necessity” had by this time already been made doctrine in Pakistan in order to 
justify the introducing of emergency powers there. See Tayyab Mahmud, “Praetorianism and 
Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns in 
Pakistan,” Utah Law Review 4 (1993): 1234-42.  
201 ဦးျမဟန္ ႏွင့္ ဦးသိန္းလႈိင္၊ ျပဳစု၊ ၁၉၅၈-၁၉၆၂ ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရး၊ စတုတၳတြဲ (ရန္ကုန္၊ တကၠသိုလ္မ်ားပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၁) စာ ၂၁၃။ [U Mya 
Han and U Thein Hlaing, eds., The Politics of Myanmar 1958-1962, vol. 4 (Yangon: Universities 
Press, 1991) 213.] Myint Zan wrote that the former chief justice had told him years later that when 
he tried to telephone the police chief “he was politely told that all the telephone lines had been cut”. 
Myint Zan, “U Myint Thein MA, LLB, LLD,” Australian Law Journal 69 (1995): 226. 




RECONFIGURING THE CRIMINAL JURIDICAL SYSTEM 
 
Writing during 1959, amid debate about the constitutional amendment that 
would enable Ne Win to stay on as caretaker prime minister for a further year, Dr 
Maung Maung—a journalist and legal scholar of some repute—suggested that 
those who feared the amendment would be the death blow to parliamentary 
democracy in Burma were being “a little melodramatic”, observing with probably 
unintended prescience that, “If a man is strong and brazen enough to commit a 
successful coup he does not require the support of… any section of the 
Constitution. A coup does not obey any law.”1  
 
Within three years, the army had proved his point. The arrest and detention of 
Burma’s chief justice on the morning of the coup was in certain respects symbolic 
of the moment at which the army institutionally realised that “law” indeed need 
not be obeyed; that the “rule of law” for which it had claimed to work in its prior 
role as government caretaker could be held in abeyance if it wanted it to be so. 
But the manner of the chief justice’s arrest was not merely symbolic. It signalled a 
new phase for the juridical system, one in which sovereignty came to reside, as 
Schmitt once put it, in “determining definitively what constitutes public order and 
security”.2 The soldiers who came to take the judge away paused when confronted 
with his demand for a warrant. They would not pause again. In coming years, 
when ordered to arrest they would arrest, and when ordered to shoot to hit, as Ne 
Win put it in his infamous parting warning to protestors in 1988, they would 
shoot to hit.3 Controversy would no longer be resolved through discussion. It 
would instead be resolved through the instance of the sovereign decision. 
 
                                                        
1 Maung Maung, “Section 116 of the Constitution,” Guardian Mar. 1959: 12, 11. 
2 Schmitt, Political Theology 9. 
3 “I want the entire people of the country to know that when in future there are crowds making 
disturbances, if the army shoots it shoots to hit; there is no shooting skywards to frighten.” 
(“တိုင္းျပည္တစ္ျပည္လံုး လူထုကို ကၽြန္ေတာ္သိေစခ်င္တယ္၊ ေနာင္ကို လူစုလူေဝးန႔ဲ ဆူဆူပူပူလုပ္လို႔ ရွိရင္ေတာ့ စစ္တပ္ဆိုတာ ပစ္ရင္ မွန္ေအာင္ 
ပစ္တယ္၊ မိုးေပၚေထာင္ၿပီး ေခ်ာက္တာမပါဘူး။”) ၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလုိင္လ ၂၃ ရက္ (စေနေန႔) ၊ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕၊ က်ဳိကၠဆံကြင္း ဆရာစံခန္းမတြင္ 
က်င္းပေသာ ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီအေရးေပၚပါတီညီလာခံ၌ မိန္႔ၾကားသည့္ ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ ဥကၠဌႀကီး ဦးေနဝင္း၏ မိန္႔ခြန္း၊ 
စာ ၅။ [“Speech of Burma Socialist Programme Party Great Chairman U Ne Win at the Emergency 
Party Congress the Burma Socialist Programme Party, in the Saya San Hall, Kyaikkasan Grounds, 
Rangoon, 23 July 1988 (Saturday),” 5.]  
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The reconfiguring of Burma’s criminal juridical system in this period, from 1962 
to 1988—with a key turning point in 1972, marking the establishment of a new 
people’s judicial system, followed by the establishing of a one-party legislature in 
1974—is the subject of this chapter.4 It is organised in three sections, each of 
which mirrors a section of the previous chapter: exploring ideological 
reorientation, the reformulating of rights, and institutional change and 
dissonance. As in chapter two, its contents are not comprehensive, since my 
purpose is again to draw out some aspects of the system relevant to what 
animates it in the contemporary period.5  
 
The first section examines how the new regime set about reorienting the juridical 
system according to expressed socialist ideological goals. It concentrates on three 
aspects of the programme: that policy took precedence over law, or rather, that 
law was to be an expression of policy, an instrument through which policy could 
be realised; that all parts of the state apparatus, and their functionaries, were to 
cooperate in the implementing of policy through law, rather than adopt 
adversarial relationships; and, that because policy was made in the interest of the 
public, denoted the “working people”, everyone had a new moral obligation to 
obey the law, which is to say, to comply with policy expressed through law.  
 
The second section considers how the new junta ruled out the nascent rights-
based regime of the preceding period. It seized power and reformulated notions of 
legality on the back of dictatorship. The nascent rights of the preceding period 
were incompatible with its authoritarian framework and goals. Their elimination 
it justified through socialist ideology. Rights it expressed in terms of the interests 
of the working people. However, these reformulated “rights” are, I argue, better 
understood as entitlements, which could be qualified, delimited and withdrawn 
according to policy.  
                                                        
4 For a demarcating of the periods of 1962 to 1974 and 1974 to 1988 and summary of key events in 
each see, Charney, ch. 6-7. 
5 The chapter is concentrated on events leading up to the major structural changes of 1972 and 1974. 
However, it is not chronological, and draws upon sources from across the whole period covered. 
Among materials consulted for this chapter but not cited, or cited infrequently, are periodicals like 
the Working People’s Daily for over half of the years in the period, and among specialist 
publications, the Legal Issues Serial (တရားေရးရာစာေစာင)္ published by the Chief Court in the early 1970s 
and the University Law Journal (တကၠသိုလ္ဥပေဒဂ်ာနယ္) published in the 1980s by the Rangoon 
University Law Association. Apart from the university’s law journal, I was able to obtain and read 
copies of three volumes of bibliographical data on law theses published from 1968 to 1982. I also 
read a variety of publications issued by the Burma Socialist Programme Party, and internal records, 
mostly concerning administration and restructuring of courts and the bureaucracy. Some general 
details on the work of the system included in the chapter’s contents I obtained from discussions 
with legal professionals who worked in the system during the 1970s and 1980s, conducted in 2009 
and 2010.  
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The third section deals with the institutional reconfiguring of the juridical system 
that followed the coup, which was protracted, incremental and ultimately 
incomplete. The section concentrates on three dissonant aspects of the 
reconfiguration: the establishment and role of a new apparatus of special criminal 
courts; the establishment in 1972 of a “people’s” judicial system; and, as against 
these innovations, the persistence of old law, and its implications. The chapter 
then closes with some reflections on the lasting consequences of this period for 
the contemporary system: specifically, in terms of the eliminating of habits and 
institutional memories of earlier periods, and the enabling of the juridical system 
as an apparatus for the effecting of political instructions through a continuum of 
administrative activity.  
Ideological reorientation 
The day following the 2 March 1962 coup, Ne Win dissolved parliament. Over the 
coming days, his military junta set up new regional administrative bodies in lieu 
of state governments, consisting of both military and civilian personnel. It 
announced that all existing laws would remain in effect and that all courts would 
also continue to exercise enacted authority until otherwise declared.6 At the end 
of the month, Ne Win reconstituted the two topmost courts, the Supreme Court 
and High Court, into a single re-named Chief Court.7 The bench of the new court 
comprised of a chief judge recruited from the Supreme Court, U Bo Gyi, and four 
former High Court judges as members. The subordinate judiciary was left intact, 
and courts were initially able to carry on with non-political cases according to the 
same procedures and practices as before.  
 
Not until a couple of months after the coup did the new regime publicly begin to 
set down its ideological bases for the future state. Senior army officers had some 
ideas about socialism, which was the political ideology with the most currency at 
the time, but these ideas did not motivate the takeover. One of the clique of 
officers involved in both the 1958 and 1962 coups, Brigadier Aung Gyi, later 
admitted that ideology followed the decisive second coup rather than preceded it: 
                                                        
6 ဦးျမဟန္ႏွင့္ အျခားသူမ်ား၊ ျပဳစု၊ ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရးစနစ္ေျပာင္းကာလ (၁၉၆၂-၁၉၇၄) ၊ ပထမတြဲ (ရန္ကုန္၊ တကၠသိုလ္မ်ား ပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၃)      
စာ ၅၇။ [U Mya Han, et al., eds., A Period of Change to Myanmar’s Political System (1962-1974), vol. 1, 
(Yangon: Universities Press, 1993) 57.] 
7 Citations in this chapter refer to rulings issued from 1962 of the Chief Court (CC) and the Special 
Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court (SCCAC), which is discussed in the last section; and, from 1974, the 
Central Court (CC). For a summary of the changing structure and nomenclature of Burma’s upper 
courts see Myint Zan, “A Comparison of the First and Fiftieth Year of Independent Burma’s Law 
Reports,” 386-7. 
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[When] our Revolutionary Council seized power we had no ideology, no political 
agenda, no design prepared. The General and us leaders—by which I do not mean even 
all the members of the Revolutionary Council—just wanted to make a socialist-based 
system. Because the General said he would go socialist, everyone became socialist. It 
was like, I have to upstage the other guy at doing whatever I think will please the 
General.8 
  
Consistent with this account, Callahan has written that the new regime’s move to 
turn Burma into a socialist country “was simply a revival of the rhetoric of the 
anticolonial nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s”.9 Whether it was 
simply this or something more, by taking up a socialist banner, the new regime 
could try to situate itself in an historical narrative of anti-imperial and anti-
capitalist struggle while creating opportunities to target adversaries through new 
legal and administrative measures couched in ideological terms.  
 
Ne Win cited inflation, deteriorating rule of law and the insistence of some ethnic 
groups on federalism as grounds for his takeover.10 Mouthpieces of the army’s 
new Burma Socialist Programme Party and functionaries soon began to critique 
the old system of law as incompatible with Burma’s society.11 Obsequious scholars 
did not merely echo but directly cited the criticisms of former administrators in 
the colonial regime, about which I have written in the previous chapter, that the 
courts were out of touch with reality and indifferent to the interests and needs of 
the masses, too expensive and slow, and that the extant criminal juridical system 
was a cause of crime.12  
                                                        
8 “ကြ်န္ေတာ္တို႔ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးေကာင္စီအေနႏွင့္ အာဏာသိမ္းတယ္။ ဘာသေဘာတရား၊ ဘာႏိုင္ငံေရးအစီအစဥ္၊ ဘာအၾကံဥာဏ္မွ ႀကိဳတင္ 
လုပ္ထားတာ မရွိပါ။ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စနစ္ေတာ့အေျခခံၿပီး လုပ္ခ်င္ၾကပါတယ္။ ဒါလည္း ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႏွင့္ ကြ်န္ေတာ္တို႔ ေခါင္းေဆာင္ပိုင္းကပါ။ 
ေခါင္းေဆာင္ပိုင္းဆိုတာမွာေတာင္ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးေကာင္စီဝင္ေတြအားလံုး မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးလုပ္မယ္ဆိုလို႔ ဝိုင္းဆိုရွယ္လစ္ၾကတာ 
ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အဲဒီေနရာမွာမွ ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီး ႀကိဳက္မယ္ထင္ၿပီး သူ႔ထက္ငါပိုလုပ္ျပတာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။” သခင္ေအာင္ႀကီး၊ လူသားတို႔အခြင့္အေရးအတြက္ 
(၄၁) မ်က္ႏွာစာတမ္းေပါင္းခ်ဳပ္၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဦးၾကည္ဟန္ (အေထြေထြအတြင္းေရးမွဴး) ျပည္ေထာင္စုအမ်ဳိးသားမ်ားဒီမိုကေရစီပါတီ၊ ၁၉၉၀) စာ ၁၄။ 
[Thakin Aung Gyi, “The 41-Page Treatise and Collected Writings for Humans’ Rights,” (Yangon: U 
Kyi Han, General Secretary, Union Nationals Democracy Party, 1990), 14.] The use of “I” in this 
translation is meant in the rhetorical sense of “one”, not to refer to the author himself.  
9 Callahan 209. 
10 ဦးသန္းေဖျမင့္၊ ၆၂-၆၇ သမိုင္းဝင္မွတ္တမ္းမ်ား (ရန္ကုန္၊ စုေပါင္းစာေပ၊ ၁၉၆၈) စာ ၆။ [U Than Pe Myint, Historical 
Records, 62-67 (Rangoon: Subaung Press, 1968) 6.] See also ပါတီစည္းရံုးေရးဗဟိုေကာ္မီတီဌာနခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၆၅ ခုႏွစ္ 
ပါတီႏွီးေႏွာဖလွယ္ပြဲ၊ ဥကၠ႒ႀကီး၏ မိန္႔ခြန္းမ်ားႏွင့္ အေထြေထြအတြင္းေရးမွဴး၏ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအစီရင္ခံစာ (ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ ၁၉၆၆) စာ 
၄၃။ [Central Organising Committee, Party Seminar 1965: Speeches of the Great Chairman and 
Political Report of the General Secretary (Burma Socialist Programme Party, 1966) 43.] Some years 
later Ne Win described the flaws in the pre-coup legal system as including the dictatorial character 
of the presidency and excessive powers of senior judges under the constitution, the scheming of self-
interested lawyers, foreign influences, and the use of the courts for political ends. ပါတီစည္းရံုးေရး 
ဗဟိုေကာ္မီတီဌာနခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၆၉ ခုႏွစ္ ပါတီႏွီးေႏွာဖလွယ္ပြဲ၊ ဥကၠ႒ႀကီး၏ မိန္႔ခြန္းမ်ားႏွင့္ အေထြေထြအတြင္းေရးမွဴး၏ ႏိုင္ငံေရး အစီရင္ခံစာ 
(ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ ၁၉၇၀) စာ ၄၅-၇၀။ [Central Organising Committee, Party Seminar 1969: Speeches 
of the Great Chairman and Political Report of the General Secretary (Burma Socialist Programme 
Party, 1970) 45-70.] 
11 In this chapter all references to “the party” or “one-party legislature” designate the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party and the legislature that it occupied from 1974.  
12 For example, Aung Than Tun, “Law and Lawyer in a Socialist Society,” Guardian Jan. 1964: 16. 
ေအာင္သန္းထြန္း၊ လူတိုင္းအဖို႔ ဥပေဒဗဟုသုတ (ပုဂံစာအုပ္တုိက္၊ ၁၉၇၀) စာ ၂၂၁-၂၂။ [Aung Than Tun, Law General 
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Socialist legality, or socialist law, took the place of the rule of law in public 
discourse. Some authors did attempt to promote the idea of a “rule of law” with 
socialist characteristics.13 But, the rule-of-law idea lost its lexical and political 
force after the coup. The reasons for its decline can be guessed at. A basic problem 
for the new regime with the rule of law was that it still to some extent connoted an 
idea of government subordinate to law. This idea was inimical to the manner in 
which Ne Win and his team came to power, the manner in which they held power, 
and the alternative ideology that they came to profess. Nowhere in these events 
and subsequent arrangements did room exist to accommodate an idea like the 
“rule of law”, at least not so long as it retained some lexical distinction from law 
and order. A quarter century later, and the two concepts had been collapsed into 
one another, both as ideas and practices, and a successor military regime could 
boldly use the term taya-ubade-somoye to signify law and order, as discussed in 
the next chapter. But in the 1960s, with the political discourse and thought of the 
prior decade not yet passed out of the system, for the new regime to use the 
expression liberally, so to speak, would have been inapt.  
 
Another reason that taya-ubade-somoye lost lexical force after the coup was that 
the rule-of-law idea carried with it an odour of the “bourgeois” juridical system 
that the new regime said it wanted to dismantle. Prefixing the expression with the 
adjective “socialist” was unconvincing. The “socialist rule of law” soon ended up 
sounding like the same thing as simple “socialist law”. A professor of law at 
Rangoon University, for instance, explained that, “The main point of the socialist 
rule of law is that in a socialist country the entire working people obey law that 
the authorities enact or ratify in accordance with the will of the working people.”14 
In other words, “socialist rule of law” was just the process of enacting and 
enforcing law. Even used in this sense, the expression was oxymoronic, because 
enacted law was not supreme, but merely an expression of policy. Aung Than 
Tun, one of the lawyers who wrote regularly on changes to the system at the time, 
argued: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Knowledge for Everyone (Rangoon: Pagan Books, 1970) 221-22.] Kyaw Yin, “The Problem of Crime 
and the Criminal and Its Solution in Socialist Burma,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 47.1 
(1964): 206-07. 
13 For example, ေအာင္သန္းထြန္း၊ စာ ၁၃၃။ (Aung Than Tun 133.) ေမာင္တင္အံုး၊ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး၊ ျမဝတီ၊ 
၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ၊ စာ ၁၆၁-၄။ (Maung Tin Ohn, “Socialist Rule of Law,” Myawadi July 1966: 161-4.) 
14 “ဆိုရွယ္လစ္တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး၏ အဓိကအခ်က္မွာ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္ႏိုင္ငံတြင္ အာဏာပိုင္အဖြ႔ဲက xxx လုပ္သားျပည္သူမ်ား၏ ဆႏၵအရ ျပဳလုပ္ 
ထားေသာ သို႔မဟုတ္ အတည္ျပဳထားေသာ တရားဥပေဒကို လုပ္သားျပည္သူတရပ္လံုးက ေလးစားလိုက္နာျခင္းပင္ ျဖစ္ေပသည္။” ေမာင္တင္အံုး၊ 
သုတဥပေဒအေထြေထြ၊ ဒုတိယအႀကိမ္ (ရန္ကုန္၊ မင္းသီမြန္စာေပ၊ ၁၉၈၅) စာ ၆၃။ [Maung Tin Ohn, A Miscellany of Legal 
Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Rangoon: Minthimun Books, 1985) 63.]  
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Laws are passed in a socialist society in order to… guarantee social justice, and are tools 
for social engineering. Eminent socialists believed that “law is only a tool of the State, 
which in turn is the instrument of the dominant group in society.” … Socialist legality 
and law consolidate and safeguard the social and State system and its economic 
foundation—the socialist system of economy and socialist property—the rights and 
freedom of the working people, and ensure the development and strengthening of 
socialist relations in society and call upon the working people to faithfully abide by the 
laws of the State, without which the socialist system and economy could not be 
established.15 
 
This passage contains a number of elements relevant to the problem of what 
animated the criminal juridical system in this period, and to an extent, what has 
animated it since. First, as just noted, law is an instrument to effect policy. It is 
not, to borrow from Douglas Hay, “a power with its own claims”.16 Second, 
because law is an instrument of policy, not independent from policy, it cannot be 
used to oppose policy. The courts and other parts of the juridical apparatus exist 
to help implement a state programme, not to review or question it. Third, because 
unlike in the colonial and postcolonial periods law is now being used to effect 
policy for the working people, everyone is morally obliged to abide by it. Those 
persons who do not do so risk being accused not merely of breaking the law, but 
worse still, of intending to damage the emerging socialist society. With each of 
these elements the remainder of this section is concerned.  
 
The legal component of the socialist programme on which others hinged was the 
recasting of law as an instrument to effect policy. The new regime’s stated aim for 
the courts, and certainly the one that became most pronounced from the mid-
1960s when the programme to reconfigure the juridical system began in earnest, 
was that they make government policy a success.17  
 
This notion of law constituted a decisive break from the preceding era, in which 
law ideally was independent from policy. In 1950 the High Court had ruled that 
where a magistrate had permitted a prosecutor to withdraw a case “on ground of 
public policy” the ruling could give rise to suspicion “that interference with the 
course of justice had taken place”.18 The course of justice and the course of public 
policy were two separate things, and although they might coincide, the one could 
                                                        
15 Aung Than Tun, “Revolution of Law and Justice,” Guardian June 1965: 38.  
16 Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,” Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society 
in Eighteenth-Century England, eds. Douglas Hay, et al. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975) 33. 
17 As made explicit in ၁၉၆၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫ ႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၂၂၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာတ္ရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ၊္ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၆၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၉ 
ရက္။ (Courts General Letter No. 22/1965, Chief Court, Rangoon, 9 Nov. 1965.) Throughout 1966 the 
message was reinforced through news reports. See for instance, “‘Courts Superficial in Dealing with 
Case’,” Working People’s Daily 4 Feb. 1966: 1, 8. “Chief Justice in Mandalay,” Working People’s 
Daily 5 Nov. 1966: 1.  
18 Union of Burma v. U Chit Swe, 1950 BLR (HC) 278, at 280. 
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not be used to justify the other. In 1964, by contrast, the new Chief Court rejected 
an attempt by a lower court to interpret the meaning of the 1963 general amnesty 
for persons accused of a variety of offences because “the Amnesty Order is an act 
of high policy of the Revolutionary Government and it overrides all existing 
laws”.19 Not only could public policy now be an adequate reason for deciding a 
case, it could be a superior one to any offered by law. Thus, where a magistrate 
denied bail on grounds that were not defined by law this was not necessarily 
problematic, because,  
In the past, the chief criteria in dealing with bail applications were (1) whether the 
accused was likely to abscond and (2) whether if enlarged on bail he was likely to 
tamper with witnesses. At present, however, Magistrates have to consider not only 
these questions but also the policy of the Government.20 
 
As the object of the juridical process was the implementing of a specific policy 
agenda, the legal view of a case was only one factor in its final outcome: political, 
economic, social and administrative viewpoints all had equal relevance. And 
because policy goals took precedence over strict legality, official exhortations to 
the system’s functionaries had an increasingly administrative character. 
Furthermore, these exhortations were backed by a coercive power over the 
judiciary that previous governments lacked.  
 
To illustrate, as in other British postcolonies, people in Burma faced persistent 
delays in having their cases heard. A 1948 High Court circular described delays as 
invariably being caused by the non-appearance of accused persons and witnesses 
on dates set for hearings, and lamented the failure of judges to act effectively to 
deal with the problem.21 Despite such injunctions, notions of defendants’ 
individual rights still trumped the need for greater efficiency. A High Court judge 
in 1952, for instance, held that although the Special Judges Act 1946 entitled a 
judge to refuse to hear witnesses, the reason for doing so had to be that their 
evidence would be immaterial to the case, and not just because calling them 
would cause undue delay. Even where, as in this case, the cause of a delay was 
genuine—that the witnesses were residing in an insurgent-occupied area and 
could not be summonsed—it was not reason enough for the lower court to 
proceed without giving time to attempt to make contact. “Mere considerations of 
                                                        
19 U Ba Kyi v. Union of Burma, 1964 BLR (CC) 306, at 308. 
20 “Courts to Consider Govt Policy,” Working People’s Daily 16 July 1965: 1, 8. 
21 General Letter No. 16/1948, High Court, Rangoon, 31 Aug. 1948. 
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a delay are quite insufficient to override the compelling necessity for affording the 
accused person an opportunity of defending himself”, Justice San Maung wrote.22  
 
After 1962, “mere” delays ceased to exist. All delays were cause for special 
concern, and the eliminating of delays was an ideological imperative: a subject of 
constant reminder through articles, administrative injunctions, and rulings from 
the higher courts, with the mantra that the courts had to work “correctly and 
quickly”.23 Party organs attributed delays in the past to the tactics of capitalists 
who had been able to use their money to thwart the system, and urged all civil 
servants, judges, police, lawyers and citizens to put an end to them as soon as 
possible.24 The Chief Court instructed subordinate courts to report on reasons for 
delays, which it would submit to the justice ministry for action.25 It issued 
directions on not calling needless witnesses, not rescheduling hearings because of 
non-appearances, and prompt fixing of charges with which to proceed to trial.26 
When as the years passed the delays continued, officials blamed them on the 
ineptitude of low-ranked personnel and ideological enemies, like “lawyers who 
pursue their own interests by ignoring the Socialist judicial system and exert 
influence in the judicial process”.27 If the system failed, it was due to the 
inadequacies and ill intent of people working in and against it—a feature of the 
official narrative to the present day, as we will see in subsequent chapters.  
 
Turning to the second element of socialist legality identified in Aung Than Tun’s 
writing, because law was an instrument of policy, the criminal juridical apparatus 
also was now to serve the ends of policy, not to inquire after it. Courts were to 
have a cooperative relationship with other parts of the system, and within the 
courts, the various parts of the apparatus also were to cooperate, rather than 
behave as adversaries. All parties to a case would have a shared—rather than 
conflicting—interest in reaching the correct result, namely, the result that would 
bring the best policy outcome. Attorneys, parties and witnesses would direct their 
efforts towards the common end of achieving a socialist economic system and a 
                                                        
22 Hla Maung & Others v. Union of Burma, 1952 BLR (HC) 262, at 271-72. My italics.  
23 “မွန္မွန္ႏွင့္ျမန္ျမန”္။ For discussion, see ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ ပါတီေရးရာစာေစာင္ပါ တရားစီရင္ေရးဆိုင္ရာ ေဆာင္းပါးမ်ား 
(ရန္ကုန္၊ ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္ လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ ၁၉၈၀) စာ ၃၅-၄၈။ [Burma Socialist Programme Party, Articles on the 
Judiciary in the Party Affairs Journal (Rangoon: Burma Socialist Programme Party, 1980) 35-48.] 
ေမာင္ေမာင္၊ တရားဥပေဒအေထြေထြဗဟုသုတ၊ တတိယအႀကိမ္၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ စစ္သည္ေတာ္စာေပ၊ ၂၀၀၄) စာ ၁၆၀-၇၁။ [Maung Maung, 
General Law Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Yangon: Sitthidaw Press, 2004) 160-71.] 
24 ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ စာ ၃၇။ (Burma Socialist Programme Party 37.) 
25 “Delayed Justice Is No Justice,” Working People’s Daily 10 Mar. 1966: 1, 8. 
26 ၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၃၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၄ ရက္။ (Courts General 
Letter No. 3/1966, Chief Court, Rangoon, 4 July 1966.) 
27 “Council of People’s Justices’ Reply to Discussions,” Working People’s Daily 13 Oct. 1979: 4.  
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socialist society.28 And judges would no longer adjudicate from the sidelines as 
they had done in the past, but jump into the trial process and engage in more 
inquisitorial methods.29  
 
This approach is consistent with what comparative legal scholar Mirjan Damaška 
has described as a policy-implementing legal process, one in which the 
adjudicator “must join in procedural action whenever necessary to attain the right 
solution… duty-bound to seek the correct result entirely apart from the argument 
that prevails in the forensic contest”.30 The reason that the adjudicator plays this 
role, the one that ties the role to the idea of the courtroom as a place of 
cooperative inquiry, is that the work of the court is to be directed to the “right 
solution”, the correct policy result, rather than what might be procedurally 
correct. Therefore, the subtext of the call for all agents in the system to work 
cooperatively for the right outcome was that procedure no longer mattered in the 
way that it had previously. Procedure as the spirit of law became an anathema 
when everyone was supposed to be working to give meaning to policy.  
 
The whole idea of procedure had been that it would increase the probability of 
achieving substantively accurate and fair outcomes.31 Once this idea was 
diminished, then so too were other doctrines and practices associated with 
procedure. A new socialist doctrine emerged to take their place, namely, the 
search for authentic truth. As this new doctrine was integral to the ideological 
reorienting of the courts in this period, and so also to the ideological displacement 
of procedure, it deserves some explanation.  
 
The doctrine’s foremost exponent was Dr Maung Maung, with whom I began this 
chapter. Maung Maung had before the coup been a keen defender of the rule of 
law, describing it as “the foundation of justice in Burma”.32 After the coup, he 
became Ne Win’s chief jurist, hagiographer and propagandist.33  
                                                        
28 ကိုခင္ေမာင္ ႏွင့္ မအုန္း ပါ ၃၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၅၇၂။ [Ko Khin Maung v. Ma Ohn & 2, 1966 BLR (CC) 572.] 
မစၥတာ အာ(ရ္) ၊ အက္(စ္) ။ ဘြန္း ပါ ၃ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၆၅။ [Mister R. S. Bun & 2 v. Union of 
Burma, 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 65.] ေမာင္ခ်စ္ေထြး ပါ ၄ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၇ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၉။ [Maung Chit 
Htwe & 3 v. Union of Burma, 1967 BLR (CC) 69.]  
29 ေအာင္သန္းထြန္း၊ ေခတ္ေလးေခတ္ ျမန္မာ့တရားဥပေဒ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ကေလာင္ပ်ံစာအုပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၆၈) စာ ၄၁၄-၁၅။ [Aung Than Tun, 
Four Eras of Burmese Law (Rangoon: Kalaungpyan Press, 1968) 414-15.] ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိငု္ငံ (ေဒၚ႐ႈခင္) 
ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ျမ (ခ) ျမဦး ပါ ၃၊ ၁၉၇၁ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၃၁။ [Union of Burma (Daw Shu Khin) v. Maung Mya (a) Mya Oo 
& 2, 1971 BLR (CC) 31.]  
30 Damaška 170.  
31 Damaška 148. 
32 Maung Maung, Burma in the Family of Nations, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1957) 125. 
33 In this chapter I am concerned only with the first of these three roles. For examples of texts in 
which Maung Maung played the latter two see, Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win 
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Although Maung Maung had no prior experience as a judge, Ne Win appointed 
him to the apex court in 1962, a few months after the army had seized power, and 
just a few days after it had dynamited the Rangoon University student union 
building and crushed protests on campus against the entrenchment of its rule.34 
Less than three years later, he made him chief judge when Bo Gyi resigned, 
appointing him to the top post over the heads of the other more senior members 
of the court.35 
 
Maung Maung had before his appointment to the top job already begun dabbling 
in ideologically oriented rulings, but it was as chief judge that he cited a Soviet 
legal text to introduce the search for authentic truth to jurisprudence in Burma.36 
He explained that according to this text, in the Soviet system “the courts, 
government advocates, lawyers for the plaintiffs and defence have to strive 
cooperatively to uncover the truth”, and to this statement he added that, 
Our government too is devising a judicial system to try cases correctly and quickly and 
eradicate the practice of the law being on the side with money, so that when the people 
come before a court they will get justice… [and] this objective corresponds with the 
criminal jurisprudence of the [Soviet] socialist system set out above.37 
 
A. Trusov, the author of the text that Maung Maung cited, explained the principle: 
The Soviet theory of evidence, based on the postulates of dialectical materialism, 
proceeds from the thesis that the truth can be established in court cases, that those 
engaged in investigation and trial can establish facts with no less success than scientists 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1969). Maung Maung, The 1988 Uprising in Burma, Yale 
Southeast Asia Studies Ser., ed. Marvel Kay Mansfield (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1999). 
34 သန္းေဖျမင့္၊ စာ ၄၀။ (Than Pe Myint 40.) 
35 The state media cited the Who’s Who in Burma entry on Maung Maung at time of his 
appointment to the post of chief justice as follows: “Dr Maung Maung was born in 1924 in 
Mandalay… Editor, New Times of Burma; Assistant Secretary, Burma Railways; State Scholar U.K. 
1950; called to the Bar, Lincoln’s Inn; studied at the Academy of International Law at The Hague; 
University of Utrecht, Holland, L.L.D. (International Law) June 1956. Practised law; served as 
Government Advocate 1953-55; appointed Law Reporter, 1955; appointed Assistant Attorney-
General, 1958; resigned February 1960. Lecturer in International Law, Faculty of Law, University of 
Rangoon; Visiting Lecturer, Political Science and South East Asian Studies, Yale University USA 
September 1960; Member, Rangoon Bar Council, 1957….” “Dr Mg Mg Appointed Chief Judge,” 
Working People’s Daily 8 June 1965: 1. 
36 This citation is the first of its sort in the published rulings. It is possible that Maung Maung or 
other judges had made earlier citations, but they were not published.  
37 “တရားရံုးမ်ား၊ အစိုးရေရွ႕ေန၊ တရားလို၊ တရားခံေရွ႕ေနမ်ားသည္ ပူးေပါင္း၍ အမွန္တရားကို ေဖာ္ထုတ္ရန္ ႀကိဳးစားၾကရမည္ xxx ကြ်ႏ္ုပ္တို႔ 
အစိုးရ အေနႏွင့္လည္း တရားစီရင္ေရးစနစ္ကို တီထြင္ရာတြင္ အမႈမ်ားကို မွန္မွန္ႏွင့္ျမန္ျမန္စစ္ေဆးစီရင္ရန္ႏွင့္ ေငြမ်ားရာဘက္သို႔ တရားပါသည ္
ဆိုေသာအက်င့္ကို ေဖ်ာက္ဖ်က္ပစ္ကာ၊ ျပည္သူအမ်ားသည္ တရားရံုးေရွ႕သို႔ ေရွာက္လွ်င္ မွ်တမႈကို ရရွိမည္၊ xxx ထိုရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္သည္ 
အထက္တြင္ ေဖာ္ျပပါရွိေသာ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စံနစ္ ရာဇဝတ္မႈခင္း စီရင္ေရးမႈမ်ားႏွင့္လည္း ကိုက္ညီေပသည္။” ေမာင္ေအာင္ေဌးျမင့္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စု 
ျမန္မာႏိငု္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၃၉၇။ ၄၀၄၊ ၄၀၅။ [Maung Aung Htay Myint v. Union of Burma, 1965 BLR (CC) 
397, at 404, 405.] The ruling is made to appear as if the lawyer for the appellant brought the text up 
in court of his own accord. In fact, Maung Maung had added a note to a verdict issued the year 
before in which he had cited this text in support of the decision that he had reached, and the lawyer 
in this case had presumably used it because of that prior ruling. ေဒၚစီစီ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၄ မတစ 
(႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၈၇၇။ [Daw Si Si v. Union of Burma, 1964 BLR (CC) 877.]  
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working in various fields. In the theory and practice of Soviet criminal procedure, the 
postulate is quite unacceptable that the court, in making decisions on concrete cases, 
can be satisfied with the probability that the accused is guilty.... For this reason it is 
required that the judiciary, investigators and procurators always strive to establish the 
actual circumstances in each case exactly as they occurred in reality. This means that 
every judgement passed by a Soviet court must be based on the truth, on the 
unconditional authenticity, of the facts presented.38 
 
Leaving aside the self-evident practical difficulties associated with striving to 
uncover the actual circumstances of a case as they occurred in reality, the 
mischief of the truth as foremost object of judicial inquiry is obvious. Emphasis 
upon the truth entitles a court to exclude other claims to the collateral purposes of 
the legal system, especially any claims to protect individuals from abuses of 
official power.39 As the interests of government and those of the public are 
supposedly in alignment, such claims are superfluous. Andrei Vyshinsky in his 
seminal text on Soviet law put it that, “Safeguarding the interests of the socialist 
state, the court thereby safeguards also the interests of citizens for whom the 
might of the state is the primary condition essential for their individual well-
being”.40 Because the interests of the politically dominant group and those of the 
citizenry are ostensibly aligned, the state cannot logically infringe upon public 
interests without infringing upon its own. 
 
In the adversarial arrangements of the colonial-era courts, procedural interstices 
enabled defendants to protect some of their interests against the intrusions of an 
authoritarian state. But according to the new ideology, laws would protect rather 
than oppress the working people, and all participants in the juridical process 
would work to uncover authentic truth. Consequently, the doctrines that guarded 
these interstices ceased to have the same weight that they had had previously. 
Among these doctrines were: the requirement for a prima facie case prior to going 
to trial, for the burden of proving a case to be on the prosecution, and for the 
benefit of the doubt being given to an accused. With regards to the last of these, 
explaining that there could be various reasons for inconsistent evidence from a 
witness, a court bench that included Maung Maung held that this did not 
necessarily cast doubt on the prosecutor’s case:  
As throughout history the administration and judiciary in our country have consisted in 
oppression instead of working for the benefit of the masses, the people are irked to go 
to the police department, courts, etc., so as to bear true witness to all that they know. In 
                                                        
38 A. Trusov, An Introduction to the Theory of Evidence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, n.d.) 21. 
39 Mirjan R. Damaška, “Truth in Adjudication,” Hastings Law Journal 49.2 (1997): 305. 
40 Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State, trans. Hugh W. Babb (Westport, Cn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1948) 497.  
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this kind of situation, in cases where the expression the “benefit of the doubt” cannot 
be unequivocally applied, it is important for the examining courts in revealing the 
whole truth to issue verdicts based on that truth.... If in practicing this principle the 
potency of the “benefit of the doubt”, “burden of proof” and other similar expressions is 
thus necessarily lost, in the process, the potency of the truth will be discernibly 
increased.41 
 
Similarly, in 1966, the Chief Court ruled that if the search for truth warranted it, 
then a prima facie case need not exist before proceeding to trial.42 And in 1970, 
citing an earlier ruling in which the High Court had found that a plausible story 
for the defence, even if not believed by the court, would cast doubt on the case 
and entitle an acquittal because of failure to discharge the burden of proof, the 
same bench with Maung Maung on it held that, 
We are aware that this precedent has been frequently relied upon in the criminal 
courts. Although we accept that remarks from precedents can point towards justice, it 
is a little rich to say that even though a court does not believe the explanation that the 
accused has submitted then he must go free. This seems to be misguidance in the 
uncovering of the truth…. If it is in effect saying that a court that has not accepted an 
explanation must allow the accused to go free, then the court will probably do little to 
fulfill its duty. A court’s duty is merely to decide whether a charge is right or not, having 
weighed up whether witnesses are trustworthy or not from examining them well, and 
whether the evidence is firm or not. In uncovering right and wrong, the supporting 
evidence and the court’s reasoning are what are critical. Legal doctrine ought not be 
determined by words; what is needed is to stay focused on uncovering just the truth 
with which to decide. Legal maxims, precedents, etc., are not to be dogmatically 
applied. One case is different from another. It is necessary to uncover the facts well, 
from which to decide on right and wrong in keeping with commonsense.43 
 
This paragraph shows the extent to which the new ideology departed from the 
system’s originary ideology. The ideological starting point for the criminal 
juridical system had been a Benthamite construct of jurisprudential science. The 
                                                        
41 “ကၽြႏ္ုပ္တို႔ႏိုင္ငံ၌ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရး၊ တရားစီရင္ေရးမ်ားတြင္ ျပည္သူလူထုကို အက်ဳိးျပဳရမည့္အစား ဖိႏွိပ္ျခင္းမ်ားလည္း ရာဇဝင္တေလွ်ာက္၌ 
ရွခိဲ့သျဖင့္ ျပည္သူတို႔ အေနႏွင့္ ရဲဌာန၊ တရား႐ုံးစသည္တို႔သို႔ သြားေရာက္၍ ကိုယ္သိသမွ်ကို အမွန္သက္ေသခံရန္ ဝန္ေလးၾကသည္။ ဤကဲ့သို႔ေသာ 
အေျခအေနမ်ဳိးတြင္ သံသယ၏အက်ဳိးဆိုသည့္ စကားရပ္ကို ပံုေသကားခ်မွတ္ယူျခင္းမျပဳဘဲ အမႈမ်ားကို စစ္ေဆးစီရင္ရေသာ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားအေနႏွင့္ 
အမွန္တရားကို အစြမ္းကုန္ထုတ္ေဖာ္၍ ထိုအမွန္တရားအေပၚတြင္ အေျချပဳကာ ဆံုးျဖတ္စီရင္ရန္ အေရးႀကီးသည္။ xxx ဤမူအရ က်င့္သံုးလွ်င္ 
“သံသယ၏အက်ဳိး” သက္ေသထူရန္တာဝန္စသည့္စာေတြ႔ဆန္ဆန္ စကားရပ္မ်ား၏ တန္ခိုးအာနိသင္သည္ ပ်က္ျပယ္သင့္သလို ပ်က္ျပယ္၍ 
အမွန္တရား၏ တန္ခုိးအာနိသင္သည္ တက္ႂကြေပၚလြင္လာမည္ ျဖစ္သည္။” ေမာင္ေစာေဖ ပါ ၃ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ 
(အထူး) ၅၇။ ၆၃-၆၄။ [Maung Saw Hpe & 2 v. Union of Burma, 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 57, at 63-64.] This 
case was decided in September 1965; however, it was included in the law reports of the following 
year.  
42 ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ေရႊ (ခ) ေမာင္ေရွ၊ ေမာင္ထြန္းရွင္၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၁၆။ [Union of Burma v. Maung 
Shwe (a) Maung She & Maung Htun Shin, 1966 BLR (CC) 616.] 
43 “ယင္းထံုးကို ရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးမ်ား၌ မၾကာခဏ ကိုးကားတတ္သည္ဟု ကၽြႏု္ပ္တို႔ သိရသည္။ စီရင္ထံုးပါမွ မွတ္ခ်က္မ်ားသည္ တရားမွ်တမႈကို 
ဦးတည္သည္အထိ ကၽြႏု္ပ္တို႔ လက္ခံႏိုင္ေသာ္လည္း၊ စြပ္စဲြခံရသူ၊ တင္ျပရွင္းလင္းထုေခ်ခ်က္ကို ႐ုံးက မယံုၾကည္ေစကာမူ၊ ၎အား 
တရားေသလႊတ္ရမည္ဟူသည့္ စကားမ်ားကား အနည္းငယ္ႂကြယ္လွသည္။ အမွန္တရားကို ထုတ္ေဖာ္ရာတြင္ မွားယြင္း တိမ္းေစာင္းေစႏိုင္ေသာ 
လမ္းၫႊန္ ျဖစ္ေနသည္ဟု ယူဆသည္။ xxx ရွင္းလင္းထုေခ်ခ်က္ကို႐ုံးက ယံုၾကည္လက္ခံျခင္း မရွိေစမူလည္း စြပ္စြဲခံရသူအား 
တရားေသလႊတ္ရမည္ဟူသည္ကား၊ တရား႐ုံး၏ တာဝန္ကို ေသးသိမ္ေစေပလိမ့္မည္။ သက္ေသမ်ားကို ေကာင္းစြာစစ္ေဆး၍၊ ယံုၾကည္ထိုက္ 
မထိုက္၊ သက္ေသခိုင္လံုသည္ မခုိင္လံုသည္ကို ခ်ိန္ဆသံုးသပ္၍ စြပ္စဲြသည့္အတိုင္း မွန္ မမွန္ ဆံုးျဖတ္ရန္မွာ တရား႐ုံး၏ တာဝန္သာျဖစ္သည္။ 
သက္ေသ အေထာက္အထားႏွင့္ တရား႐ံုး၏ ဆင္ျခင္တံုတရားတို႔သည္ အမွန္အမွားကို ေဖာ္ထုတ္ရာတြင္ အဓိကျဖစ္သည္။ စကားေနာက္ 
တရားမပါေစပဲ၊ အမွန္တရားကိုသာ မ်က္ေျခမျပတ္ ေဖာ္ထုတ္၍၊ ေပၚလာသည့္အတိုင္း ဆံုးျဖတ္ရန္ လိုသည္။ ဥပေဒေဆာင္ပုဒ္ (Legal Maxim) ၊ 
စီရင္ထံုး စသည္တို႔ကို ပံုေသလက္ခံက်င့္သံုးရန္ မဟုတ္။ တမႈႏွင့္တမႈမတူ။ အေၾကာင္းျခင္းရာကို ေကာင္းစြာ ေဖာ္ထုတ္ၿပီးမွ အမွန္အမွားကို 
သဘာဝယုတၱိႏွင့္ အညီ ဆံုးျဖတ္ရန္ လိုသည္။” မခင္ျမင့္ (ခ) မခင္ညြန္႔ၾကည္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၇၀ မတစ (အထူး) ၁။ ၅။ [Ma 
Khin Myint (a) Ma Khin Nyunt Kyi v. Union of Burma, 1970 BLR (SCCAC) 1, at 5.] The ruling 
superseded was M. Muthiah Servai v. Union of Burma, 1955 BLR (HC) 175. 
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new ideology was also supposed to be scientific and universal, but it was unlike 
the old utilitarianism. Whereas the utilitarians were satisfied with consistency in 
the making of rules and issuing of verdicts so as to meet a formula that—ideally—
the greatest good accrue to the greatest number, the new concern was with a joint 
effort to uncover incontrovertible reality. The emphasis of the former system was 
on a measure of fairness and community advantage obtained through adherence 
to procedure with which to reveal admissible facts, which by definition precluded 
certain inadmissible facts, irrespective of arguments about what they may or may 
not reveal. The emphasis of the new system was on “correct” outcome through a 
shared inquiry into the facts in order to uncover what actually had happened. 
Insistence upon the truth as the sole legitimate object of inquiry exempted the 
courts from adherence to any particular principles so long as a satisfactory 
outcome was reached according to the facts of the individual case. The truth, 
although appearing to be a substitute for those doctrines that it displaced in fact 
was no substitute at all. Whereas the doctrine of the search for authentic truth 
appeared to establish a general rule, in fact it enabled decision-making freed from 
any principle for adjudication. As no two cases were alike, all law could be 
situational.  
 
The reorientation of jurisprudence that the new ideological turn encouraged is 
reflected in the contents of a variety of texts published throughout this time. For 
instance, U Kyaw Zeya, a prolific legal writer of orthodox views explained 
situational jurisprudence in the following terms: 
A socialist economic system is typically constructed by the drawing up of plans. In the 
domain of planning and implementation, the centre supervises; however, in the judicial 
domain, the centre supervises less, and can be seen to give ward and village tracts, 
townships, divisions and states the right to operate according to their local situations. 
It can be seen that ward and village tracts, townships, divisions and states have the 
authority to adjudicate independently in accordance with their local situations. There is 
no policy for ward and village tract, township, division, and state courts to follow 
exactly every ruling of the centre. They have a right to adjudicate independently, having 
taken into consideration the situation of the case and their local situation.44  
 
Absent from this paragraph is any reference to “law”, taya-ubade. When Kyaw 
Zeya describes judicial independence in a socialist system, he does not describe it 
                                                        
44 “ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စီးပြားေရးစနစ္ကို တည္ေထာင္ရာမွာ စီမံကိန္းေတြ ေရးဆြဲခ်မွတ္ေလ့ရွိတယ္။ ဒီလိုေရးဆြဲအေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္တဲ့ေနရာမွာ ဗဟိုက 
ႀကီးၾကပ္ကြပ္ကဲမႈ ျပဳလုပ္ေပမဲ့ တရားစီရင္တဲ့ေနရာမွာေတာ့ ဗဟိုက ႀကီးၾကပ္ကြပ္ကဲမႈ ေလ်ာ့နည္းၿပီး ရပ္ကြက္ ေက်းရြာအုပ္စု၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္၊ တ ိုင္း၊ 
ျပည္နယ္ေတြကို မိမိတို႔ေဒသအေျခအေနန႔ဲအညီ လုပ္ကိုင္ေဆာင္ရြက္ခြင့္ေပးထားတာကို ေတြ႔ရတယ္။ ရပ္ကြက္ ေက်းရြာအုပ္စု၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ 
ျပည္နယ္အလုိက္ မိမိတို႔ေဒသ အေျခအေနန႔ဲ လြတ္လပ္စြာ စီရင္ကြပ္ကဲပိုင္ခြင့္ ရွိတာကို ေတြ႔ရတယ္။ ရပ္ကြက္ ေက်းရြာအုပ္စု၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ 
ျပည္နယ္တရားရံုးေတြဟာ ဗဟိုက ဆံုးျဖတ္တဲ့အတိုင္း တသေဝမတိမ္းလိုက္နာ ဆံုးျဖတ္ရမယ္ဆိုတဲ့မူ မရွိပါဘူး။ အမႈအေျခအေန၊ မိမိေဒသ 
အေျခအေနကို ေထာက္ရႈၿပီး လြတ္လပ္စြာ တရားစီရင္ခြင့္ရွိတယ္။” ဦးေက်ာ္ေဇယ်၊ ျပည္သူၾကားက ေရွ႕ေန၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဇြဲစာပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၈၁)     
စာ ၁၁၅။ [U Kyaw Zeya, Lawyer among the People (Rangoon: Zwe Publishing House, 1981) 115.] Ward 
and village tracts, townships, and divisions and states are administrative zones, from smallest to 
largest, under the national government. Since 2011, divisions have been referred to as “regions”.  
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in terms of the authority of courts to read and interpret law, but their freedom to 
decide on matters of policy according to circumstances. Situational jurisprudence 
did not inhibit the freedom of judges to decide matters for themselves, according 
to local circumstances, so long as their decisions would be consonant with the 
goals of the centre for the socialist economic system.  
 
The ideological shift contained another important element that I have not so far 
addressed. Because cooperative inquiry to uncover the truth implies that 
everyone should work together, rather than on opposing sides, the separation of 
powers became an obstacle to the correct outcome of a case. Instead of having a 
separate judiciary and executive, all people in the criminal juridical system—
police officers, prosecutors, advocates, and judges—had to be answerable to the 
same people’s institutions. In the last case of habeas corpus under the 1947 
Constitution to appear in Burma’s law reports, Maung Maung put it like this:  
When speaking of the administration and judiciary as having to be divided into two 
separate quarters, it is not with the intent that they are fixed in place; actually, they 
must serve as the people’s arms, joining together for a singular purpose, both in work 
for the people’s benefit and in defence of the country’s security.45 
 
A separate judiciary was not just an empirical failure; it was inimical to the 
interests of the working people and socialist society. The non-separation of 
powers was not just a convenience. It was an ideological imperative. Because the 
criminal juridical system now represented the wishes of the working people, 
through policy reflected in law or overriding law, the notion of balancing the 
interests of the individual with those of the state—a notion that was at the centre 
of the tussle between the rule-of-law idea and law-and-order imperative in the 
1950s—ceased to be relevant.46  
 
                                                        
45 “အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးႏွင့္ တရားစီရင္ေရး ဆိုသည္မွာ တသီးတျခား က႑ႏွစ္ရပ္ခဲြ၍ ေဆာင္ရြက္ရေသာ ကိစၥမ်ား ျဖစ္သည္ဟူ၍ ပံုေသမွတ္ယူရန္မဟုတ္၊ 
ျပည္သူ႔အက်ဳိးျပဳလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားတြင္၎၊ တိုင္းျပည္၏ လံုျခံဳေရးကို ကာကြယ္ရာတြင္၎၊ ပူးေပါင္း၍ ရည္မွန္းခ်က္တခုတည္းျဖင့္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ၾကရေသာ 
ျပည္သူ႔လက္႐ုံးမ်ားပင္ ျဖစ္ၾကသည္။” ဦးေအာင္ၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ (နယ္ပိုင္ရာဇဝတ္တရားသူႀကီး၊ တာခ်ီလိတ္) ၊ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ 
(႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၅၇၈။ ၅၈၂။ [U Aung Nyunt v. Union of Burma (Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tachilek), 1965 BLR 
(CC) 578, at 582.]  
46 Somewhat incongruously, Maung Maung further justified the non-separation of powers in terms 
of an opposing model for political power: absolute monarchy. Non-separation of powers, he 
explained, was consistent with traditional practices in which ministers had both legislated and ruled 
wisely to implement policy under leadership of the king and crown prince in precolonial days. He 
also intimated that in Britain itself, the judicial and administrative arms were more integrated than 
people had been led to believe. What he did not mention was that the ideological father of the 
colonial-era codified law on which Burma’s courts continued to rule had also advocated integrated 
judicial and administrative arms, as discussed in the last chapter—albeit an integrated system run 
by disinterested professionals; a rather different vision of non-separated powers from that which 
the new regime had in mind. In အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးအယူခံဖြ႔ဲ စီရင္ထံုးမ်ား (၁၉၆၅-၁၉၇၀) ၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဗဟိုပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၇၀)       
စာ ခ-၁။ [Special Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court Rulings (1965-1970) (Rangoon: Central Publishing 
House, 1970) B1.]  
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The third element in the ideological reorientation of the system after 1962 found 
in the extract from Aung Than Tun’s article that I cited above is that the working 
people were morally obliged to abide by law enacted in their interests. This 
element contained the warning of all criminal law that failure to obey incurs 
sanctions. However, the nature of the warning now was subtly different from that 
of earlier periods. This moral obligation to obey was not the same as the enforced 
disobedience and extorted respect of Stephen. Nor did it abide by the same 
philosophy as the rule-of-law idea of the 1950s. Because law was an instrument 
for the delivery of policy in the interests of the working people—rather than the 
interests of imperialists or capitalists—it implied also a moral obligation to 
comply with policy, not to criticise policy or do anything contrary to it. In other 
words, behaviour that constituted a departure from, or movement against, party 
ideology could be an offence against the people and a criminal offence. Moreover, 
behaviour that might otherwise have attracted a penalty under a pre-existing 
ordinary criminal law—such as misappropriation of funds from a government 
store—additionally risked exceptional deterrent punishment because it could 
undermine the programme to build a socialist economic system with which to 
ensure sufficient affordable food, clothing and shelter for the working people.47 
 
Accordingly, the new regime introduced a number of ideologically freighted laws: 
vehicles for socialist policy, in which non-compliance with party dictate was 
criminalised. The 1965 Law Conferring Authorisations for the Building of a 
Socialist Economic System, for instance, assigned penalties to anyone interfering 
or abetting interference in the building of a socialist economy.48 Under it, threats 
to the “socialist economic system” were simultaneously threats to the regime, 
because in its section 2 the law defined socialist economics as the contents of 
party ideology. These “threats” typically constituted simple criminal offences 
allegedly undertaken with the intent to damage the socialist economic system. For 
example, black marketeers bringing foreign-made car parts, radios, clothes and 
other items from across the border were not merely showing contempt for the law 
but were deliberately upsetting the domestic economy, impoverishing the people 
                                                        
47 ေမာင္ကို ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (အထူး) ၁၁။ [Maung Ko v. Union of Burma, 1965 BLR (SCCAC) 
11.] 
48 ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စီးပြားေရးစနစ္တည္ေဆာက္မႈအတြက္ လုပ္ပိုင္ခြင့္မ်ားအပ္ႏွင္းသည့္ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၈/၁၉၆၅။ (Law Conferring 
Authorisations for the Building of a Socialist Economic System, No. 8/1965.) Amended by Law No. 
1/1968, repealed in 1989 via Law No. 9/89. The translated title of this law is my own, as are others 
in this chapter, since between 1962 and 1988 the government issued official versions of laws only in 
Burmese.  
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and damaging public morality.49 A group of workers who stole from a government 
warehouse had their sentences doubled on appeal as a special deterrent for any of 
their peers thinking of likewise undermining the new system.50  
 
Although certain offences were inherently ideological, ordinary offences under 
extant laws also in some cases took on an ideological quality. Again the question 
for the courts was whether or not accused persons’ crimes caused special damage 
to the government’s project to build a socialist economic system.51 Where they did 
not, they could in principle be treated leniently.52 Where they did, they deserved 
harsh punishment. Therefore, a police officer who attempted to rape a young 
woman as she was going to work in the early hours committed an offence not 
simply against her body, as the Penal Code classes it, but as a worker who should 
be entitled travel safely to and from her place of industry for the benefit of the 
socialist economic order, whom he was supposed to be protecting: 
While we are building a socialist system, in order for the socialist economic system to 
succeed the manufacturing workers in the country are like its lifeblood. It is necessary 
for the working people in manufacturing to be able to travel freely and safely at all 
hours. The People’s Police Force has the duty to ensure that those working people can 
travel freely and safely. However, the present case of a constable having this duty 
maltreating a working woman, more than just amounting to great disloyalty and breach 
of duty, causes damage to the socialist system that the working people are building 
together.53  
 
By contrast, a man accused of raping and assaulting another woman whom the 
court described as being out by the docks at night for no good reason and who had 
abandoned her children and was of loose morality successfully appealed against 
his conviction.54 Whereas the first woman fell into the category of “working 
persons” deserving of socialist rights, the second’s allegedly improper lifestyle 
seems to have been of more interest to the judges in their search for authentic 
                                                        
49 ေမာင္သန္းဝင္း (ခ) တင္ေအာင္ ပါ ၃ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၈ မတစ (အထူး) ၆၁။ [Maung Than Win (a) Tin Aung 
& 2 v. Union of Burma, 1968 BLR (SCCAC) 61.]  
50 ေမာင္ခ်စ္လႈိင္ ပါ ၇ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၁၄၂။ [Maung Chit Hlaing & 6 v. Union of 
Burma, 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 142.] 
51 ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ဦးဘလွ ပါ ၄၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၄၃၇။ [Union of Burma v. U Ba Hla & 3, 1966 BLR 
(CC) 1437.] 
52 ေမာင္တင္လွ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၇ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၂၀။ [Maung Tin Hla v. Union of Burma, 1967 BLR 
(CC) 620.]  
53 “ကၽြႏု္ပ္တို႔သည္ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စံနစ္ကို တည္ေဆာက္လ်က္ရွိၾကရာ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စီးပြားေရးစံနစ္ ေအာင္ျမင္ႏိုင္ရန္အတြက္ တိုင္းျပည္တြင္ ကုန္ထုတ္ 
လုပ္သူသည္ အသက္ေသြးေၾကာသဘြယ္ အေရးႀကီးသည္။ ကုန္ထုတ္လုပ္သူလုပ္သား ျပည္သူမ်ားသည္ လြတ္လပ္လံုျခံဳစြာ အခ်ိန္မေရြးသြားလာ 
ႏိုင္ရန္ လိုသည္။ ထိုသို႔ လြတ္လပ္လံုျခံဳစြာ လုပ္သားျပည္သူတို႔ သြားလာႏိုင္ေရးအတြက္ ျပည္သူ႔ ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲက တာဝန္ယူထမ္းေဆာင္ရသည္။ 
ဤတာဝန္ကို ထမ္းေဆာင္ေနရသည့္ ရဲသားတဦးက ဤအမႈမွာကဲ့သို႔ လုပ္သားျပည္သူ အမ်ဳိးသမီးတဦးကို အဓမၼျပဳက်င့္သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ မ်ားစြာပင္ 
သစၥာမဲ့ရာ၊ တာဝန္ပ်က္ရာ ေရာက္သည့္အျပင္ လုပ္သားျပည္သူတို႔ ဝိုင္းဝန္း၍ တည္ေဆာက္လ်က္ရွိၾကေသာ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စံနစ္ကိုပင္ ထိခုိက္ 
ပ်က္ျပားေစသည္။” ေမာင္ေက်ာ္တင့္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၄၁။ ၄၆-၄၇။ [Maung Kyaw Tint v. Union 
of Burma, 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 41, at 46-47.] The regime in 1964 renamed the police as the People’s 
Police Force.  
54 ပတၱီးဘဲလူး ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၅၁။ [Pattibelu v. Union of Burma, 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 
51.]  
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truth than the alleged offence committed against her. The rights of women were 
protected in the new Burma to the extent that women served the interests of the 
state economically, conformed to the new socialist morality, and matched the 
identity stereotypes that the men in power assigned to them—a topic that we will 
revisit in later chapters. But the rights of women were not the only ones that the 
military regime delimited and qualified in this period. It reformulated all rights to 
correspond with its new authoritarian socialist model of government, as 
explained in the next section. 
Reformulating rights 
When Ne Win seized power in 1962 and ordered the detention of the chief justice, 
president and prime minister, among hundreds of others, he asserted through 
that act that he had the authority to determine the limits of the legal order, and 
the power to decide where any individual might be placed in relation to it. The 
first serious test of this assertion, and the proof, if anyone needed it, that his 
regime had departed from the juridical framework of its predecessor came that 
July, when the army moved swiftly to stop antigovernment protests at Rangoon 
University. It killed an unknown number of protestors, establishing as a feature of 
the new juridical space into which the country had been placed persistent 
uncertainty around numbers of casualties, and circumstances surrounding deaths 
and disposal of bodies following military and police force interventions.55 Ne Win 
then went on radio to state bluntly that anyone else trying to stop him would be 
met “sword with sword, spear with spear”.56  
 
Ne Win’s sword-and-spear approach differed from how his antecedents had used 
their swords and spears. Governments in the colonial period when initiating 
programmes of overt violence brought in extraordinary measures to exempt 
themselves from the constraints imposed by the utilitarians’ codes, as discussed 
in the last chapter. Politicians in the 1950s may have talked tough on dacoits and 
insurgents, but they remained bound by the limits of parliamentary government 
and by the courts. The 1958 coup went along superficially with the language, ideas 
and practices of the period. But the 1962 coup broke from all prior arrangements. 
It constituted an assertion of a sovereign right to act as necessary to identify and 
deal with whatever exigencies emerged after the fact of the coup itself.  
 
                                                        
55 Estimates of the number killed in this instance vary from 15, the official figure, to 600. Donald M. 
Seekins, State and Society in Modern Rangoon (London & New York: Routledge, 2011) 112-13, 215. 
56 “ဒါးကိုဒါးခ်င္း၊ လွံကိုလွံခ်င္း”။ Cited in ျမဟန္ႏွင့္ အျခားသူမ်ား၊ ျပဳစု၊ စာ ၄၅။ (Mya Han, et al., eds., 45.) 
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Among prior arrangements that the new regime had to rule out was the nascent 
regime of rights. The regime had to reformulate rights, first to fit within the new 
authoritarian mode of government; and second, to fit the ideological reorientation 
of the system. The first requirement meant limiting rights so as to protect 
sovereignty and state security, meaning the security of the new political order, 
and the second meant limiting rights ostensibly so as to protect socialist goals and 
national solidarity. Both imperatives required the flat revocation of the existence 
of a body of independently standing rights accruing to individuals of the sort 
associated with the substantive conception of the rule of law: in the first case, 
because no rights could be expressed that did not flow from, or were not granted 
by, sovereign authority; in the second, because rights were meaningful only so 
long as they were anchored to a socialist economy and society. Through 
ideological reorientation the criminal juridical system could also protect the 
conservative authoritarian impulses that lay behind the new regime’s political 
projects for social change.57 
 
The rights that the new regime reformulated and professed were “socialist rights”. 
Socialist rights took the place of “bourgeois” ones, which the regime deprecated 
by associating them with the individual freedoms and wealth of the elite that it 
had displaced. But the new socialist rights were not “rights” in the sense of the 
rights that had preceded them. These new rights were significant only inasmuch 
as they reflected and achieved policy-based goals and outcomes. Expressions of 
rights that went against these outcomes ceased to apply. Damaška has explained 
that this approach to rights is common to states oriented towards the 
implementing of policy through law, which he describes as “activist” states: 
The citizen of the activist state possesses no rights accorded by virtue of his being an 
end in himself. No right is absolute or abstract…. Further, because the policies and 
programs of the activist state are theoretically all-encompassing, broader implications 
can be detected anywhere: all rights are at least potentially subject to qualification or 
denial…. Strictly speaking, then, personal claims based on activist law are mislabeled if 
characterized as rights… it would be better to invent new terms—to say that activist 
decrees accord conditional privileges, create roles, assign tasks, give each their just 
share, and the like.58 
  
                                                        
57 Here I use the term “conservative” in the sense suggested by Hayek in his classic exposition on the 
topic, that the conservative feels safe only if change is closely supervised, only if “some authority is 
charged with keeping the change ‘orderly’”. Friedrich A. Hayek, “Why I Am Not a Conservative,” 
The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) 400. 
58 Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority 83-84. 
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In other words, the purpose of these rights is not to protect the individual against 
the state, as conceived and to an extent practiced in Burma during the 1950s, but 
rather to help to create a new society according to the terms of policy.  
 
Implicit in this notion of rights delimited as conditional privileges is the existence 
of categories of persons towards whom rights do not accrue. Vyshinsky put it this 
way: “In our state, naturally, there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, 
press, and so on for the foes of socialism. Every sort of attempt on their part to 
utilize to the detriment of the state—that is to say, to the detriment of all the 
toilers—these freedoms granted to the toilers must be classified as a 
counterrevolutionary crime”.59 Some officials in Burma echoed such expressions, 
as in a news report of a speech given in 1974 by U Zaw Win, a member of the new 
Council of People’s Attorneys established under the new constitution of that year:  
He pointed out the need for limitations to ensure that the citizen did not exceed his 
rights and privileges. “If the action of a citizen becomes harmful to national 
independence and sovereignty, to the State’s security, to the Socialist system and to 
national unity and solidarity, then timely action must be taken in connection with that 
particular citizen’s action,” he averred.60 
 
The message here is, since all rights are conditional, a person failing to meet the 
conditions attached to them not only ceases to enjoy those rights but may also be 
penalised if she attempts to exercise rights that she does not in fact have.  
 
Although the rationale put for this delimiting of rights as conditional privileges 
was in certain respects ideological, its roots went back to the political character of 
the post-1962 state, defined by the manner of the military takeover itself. Rights 
were ultimately attached to the moment of sovereign decision. The state’s 
security, socialist economy and so on were all synonyms for the maintenance of 
the state’s specific order as determined from the moment of the coup. Maung 
Maung made the character of these reformulated rights clear in a speech given as 
head of a law reform commission in 1980, on the drafting of a new citizenship 
law, when he said that, 
The main cetana of the President is that he wants the people to… come to have a clear 
understanding of their rights, and to be able to ask questions and demand their rights if 
they are in doubt…. He wants the kind of law which the people understand and 
consciously and willingly observe. This is the cetana which the President has in making 
every law.61  
                                                        
59 Vyshinsky 617. 
60 “Duty to Protect and Safeguard Rights, Privileges Explained,” Working People’s Daily 15 Mar. 
1979: 1, 4.  
61 “Law Commission Chairman Explains Matters Relating to Drafting of Citizenship Law,” Working 
People’s Daily 4 July 1980: 1, 4.  
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Integral to this passage is the reference to cetana, which the newspaper did not 
translate. A Pali word, in Buddhist teaching cetana is usually translated as 
‘volition’, or ‘that which motivates action’. Strictly speaking, the meaning is 
neutral, and loosely is equivalent to the word ‘intention’, which is the everyday 
usage of the word in Thai.62 But in political usage in Myanmar, it signifies a 
positive mental process of someone in some sort of authority—a government 
minister, a philanthropist or schoolteacher—and is sometimes translated as 
‘goodwill’, as I have explained elsewhere.63 Gustaaf Houtman has written of this 
type of cetana that, “Differences between groups must be set aside, and shared 
among all must be the intentionality to participate in a benevolent project 
conceived of in the singular, and contained within the boundaries of the state.”64 
This cetana is tied to sovereign authority: the cetana of the sovereign depends on 
the power that he alone holds to realise it. By the same token, enjoyment of rights 
is contingent upon the recipient acknowledging the cetana of the sovereign.  
 
The cetana of the sovereign is not a cetana aimed at protecting rights generally, 
but only certain rights for certain persons who deserve them because they behave 
in a manner that conforms with the vision for the community held by the 
sovereign. Cetana renders rights dependent upon the goodwill of a higher power 
to be of any use. Rights derived from cetana are entitlements paternalistically 
bestowed, rather than rights obtained through uncoerced political participation. 
In fact, the word in Burmese for “right” that Maung Maung used in the above 
passage is not the word connoting substantive rights—in the sense, for instance, 
of human rights—but rather a delimited right, one tied to reciprocal duties, 
suggestive of an “entitlement”.65 As we will see in coming chapters, it is this 
notion of rights as entitlements—by which I mean a delimited right that does not 
automatically accrue to an individual but is conditional, subject to restriction and 
withdrawal according to circumstances determined by the sovereign power—that 
                                                        
62 เจตนา 
63 Nick Cheesman, “Legitimising the Union of Myanmar through Primary School Textbooks,” MEd 
(Hons) diss., University of Western Australia, 2002, 219-20. 
64 Houtman 163.  
65 ရပိုင္ခြင္ ့rather than အခြင့္အေရး။ The passage in Burmese read: “သမၼတႀကီးထားရွိသည့္ ေစတနာအရင္းခံသည္ 
ျပည္သူတို႔ထံ ႏိုင္ငံသားဥပေဒႏွင့္ ပတ္သက္၍ ရွင္းလင္းတင္ျပယင္းျပည္သူတို႔သည္ မိမိတို႔၏ ႏိုင္ငံသားျဖစ္မႈ အေျခအေနမွန္ကို သိနားလည္ 
ေစခ်င္သည္၊ မိမိတို႔၏ ရပိုင္ခြင့္ကို တိတိက်က် သိေစခ်င္သည္။ ဒြိဟ ျဖစ္ေနလွ်င္ ေမးတတ္၊ ေတာင္းဆိတုတ္ေစခ်င္သည္။ xxx အမ်ားျပည္သူ 
သေဘာေပါက္နားလည၍္ လိုလိုလားလား လက္ခံက်င့္သံုးေသာ ဥပေဒမ်ဳိးသာ ျဖစ္ေစခ်ငသ္ည္။ ထိုေစတနာကို ဥပေဒျပဳလုပ္ျခင္းဟူသမွ်တို႔ႏွင့္ 
ပတ္သက္၍ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္သမၼတႀကီး ထားရွိပါသည္။” ႏိုင္ငံသားဥပေဒၾကမ္း ေရးဆြဲေရး ရွင္းလင္းေဆြးေႏြးပဲြတြင္ ဥပေဒေကာ္မရွင္ ဥကၠ႒ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေကာင္စီဝင္ ေဒါက္တာေမာင္ေမာင္ ေျပာၾကားေသာ အမွာစကား၊ ေရွ႕သို႔၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ၊ ၁၉၈၀၊ စာ ၆။ (“Address of Law 
Commission Chairman, Member of the Council of State Dr Maung Maung at Explanatory 
Conference on Draft Citizenship Law,” Forward Aug. 1980: 6.) 
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carried over into the post-1988 pragmatic state, and is the type of “right” inherent 
in the notion of a rule of law that is synonymous with law and order.  
 
That Maung Maung linked the expression of sovereign cetana to rights in a talk 
on citizenship was not coincidental. In modern times, the linkage of legal rights to 
membership in a political community has meant that the most effective way to 
deny someone rights has been to deny political membership. Hannah Arendt 
understood this from personal experience when she observed that the paradox of 
inalienable rights is that to be realised they depend upon the abstract individual 
being part of a specific people. “The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable,” she 
wrote, “Proved to be unenforceable… whenever people appeared who were no 
longer citizens of any sovereign state.”66 Inalienable rights founder in the paradox 
of sovereignty. Only where a sovereign authority produces law can people claim to 
be protected by law, but because the sovereign is both inside and outside the law, 
the only claim to rights that is not subject to qualification or withdrawal by a 
sovereign decision is a claim to a universal or natural right, which exceeds 
sovereign authority and therefore cannot be realised because no sovereign exists 
to produce law with which to protect the right.  
 
Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law, on which Maung Maung was working when he 
spoke in 1980, captured the paradox of the inalienability of rights by rendering 
stateless, or potentially stateless, large numbers of people, most of South Asian 
descent. To understand how it did this, we need to compare its contents with the 
formulae for citizenship at the time of independence. Under section 11 of the 1947 
Constitution, anyone born anywhere in any British dominion territory having 
lived in Burma for eight out of the ten years prior to independence or prior to the 
Japanese occupation in 1942 could opt to become a citizen. Under section 5 of the 
1948 Union Citizenship Act, anybody born in the country to at least one citizen, or 
born outside with a father as citizen, or a mother as citizen if in government 
service, was entitled to citizenship. The law also provided for the concerned 
minister to grant citizenship at his discretion, and for naturalisation of persons 
who had resided in the country for at least five years and who could speak any one 
of the indigenous languages: meaning a language of any group settled in the 
territory prior to 1823, the eve of the first British invasion.  
 
                                                        
66 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3rd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1966) 293. 
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The 1982 law took the subsidiary concept of indigenousness from the original law, 
and turned it into the primary basis for citizenship. Under section 3, indigenous 
groups were classed as “national races”.67 Under section 5, citizenship was 
contingent on being born of parents both of whom could be classed as national 
races. Other persons could belong to secondary categories, as “associate citizens” 
and naturalised citizens. An executive council had the authority to decide which 
ethnic group was a national race or not. No criteria were set for that purpose, 
other than that they had to have settled in the territory prior to 1823, the year 
before the first British invasion of lower Burma. So far as individuals were 
concerned, anyone who already had citizenship prior to the law being introduced 
would not automatically forfeit it; however, anyone found to have “acquired 
citizenship by making a false representation or by concealment” would lose it.  
 
The government had from the mid-1960s been forcing out Indian residents and 
coercing non-indigenous citizens to leave, some on specific orders, most by 
measures aimed at making life untenable for them. According to one author, over 
100,000 had left the country by as early as September 1964, long before the end 
of the repatriation programme.68 Most the government squeezed out 
economically. Others it accused of illegal business activity, such as “bloodsucking 
Chettyar Indians lending money unlawfully”.69 In 1968 it set up a national 
registration department and committees to scrutinise citizenship applications and 
records.70 But the new law went beyond simple police actions and removed the 
normative basis for claims to rights of some persons on the pretext of protecting 
the rights of others. It has since been used to deny or restrict the rights of 
hundreds of thousands of people in Burma, most notably, the Rohingya living in 
parts of the country neighbouring Bangladesh, whom successive governments 
have refused to recognise as a national race under the terms of the 1982 law. In 
other words, the effect of the Citizenship Law was and is to criminalise the 
identities of entire populations of people, since to claim to be a member of an 
                                                        
67 On the concept of national races see Nick Cheesman, “Seeing ‘Karen’ in the Union of Myanmar,” 
Asian Ethnicity 3.2 (2002): 215-19. 
68 Robert A. Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization,” Asian Survey 7.3 
(1967): 191-92.  
69 “မတရားေငြတိုးခ်ဂုတ္ေသြးစုပ္ေနသည့္ ခ်စ္တီးကုလားမ်ား”။ ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန၊ သမိုင္းမွတ္တမ္းႏွင့္ စြမ္းေဆာင္ခ်က္မ်ား၊ (ျပည္ေထာင္စ ု
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ ၂၀၀၀) စာ ၂၇၈-၇၉။ [Ministry of Home Affairs: Historical Record and Achievements 
(Government of the Union of Myanmar, 2000) 278-79.] On the role of the Chettyar moneylenders, 
see, Sean Turnell and Alison Vicary, “Parching the Land? The Chettiars in Burma,” Australian 
Economic History Review 48.1 (2008): 1-25. 
70 ခင္ေမာင္ေက်ာ္၊ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏိုင္ငံသားမ်ားႏွင့ ္ႏိုင္ငံျခားသားမ်ားျပႆနာ (ရန္ကုန္၊ စံေက်ာ့ယဥ္၊ ၁၉၇၁) စာ ၂၁၇-၂၁။ [Khin Maung 
Kyaw, Burma: The Problem of Citizens and Foreigners (Rangoon: San Kyaw Yin, 1971) 217-21.] 
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ethnicity that officially does not exist is to risk being labelled a foreigner 
pretending to be a citizen, and thus to incur criminal penalties.  
 
I illustrate how the Citizenship Law works by way of a case study in the next 
chapter. But before we get to that point, having explained the ideological 
reorienting of the system in the 1960s and 1970s and the corresponding 
reformulating of rights as entitlements, I need to end the chapter by sketching 
some of the main institutional changes and dissonances in this period. 
Institutional dissonances 
In the previous two sections, I explained how following the decisive coup of 1962, 
Burma’s criminal juridical system was reoriented ideologically towards what the 
new regime described as socialist goals. One consequence of this reorientation 
was that all participants in the criminal juridical process were supposed to work 
cooperatively with the common aim of defending the rights of working people. 
But the system was not set up to work this way. Court proceedings were 
adversarial rather than inquisitorial in character, the different parts of the system 
were structurally separated from one another, and the ingrained habits of the 
system’s functionaries were resistant to the changes that the regime proposed.  
 
In his comparative model of the legal process, Damaška has taken up precisely 
this problem of what happens when a state develops an appetite to intervene 
more in social life through the juridical system, but the legal process is designed 
so as to restrict it: 
A dissonance or tension must now be expected to arise between the legal procedure 
conceived as a privately controlled contest and the novel objectives of the legal process. 
Increasingly, the inherited dominance of private parties over procedural action… will 
clash with the state’s growing desire to enforce its own policies through the legal 
process… legal process begins to serve policy-implementing objectives while outwardly 
retaining features of the contest style…. The image of the judge as neutral arbiter of a 
debate—indifferent to the issue debated—becomes inapposite, perhaps even repulsive. 
The contest structure of proceedings tends to be weakened, and departures from the 
pure conflict-solving mode are accepted.71 
 
Much of this dissonance can be resolved by ditching an outdated system and 
designing or importing one to suit the state’s new objectives, as a revolutionary 
government did in Vietnam. There, during the 1940s and 50s the communist 
party set up special military and civilian courts to bring about dramatic social and 
economic change within a relatively short time. As the party consolidated and 
                                                        
71 Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority 92, 103. 
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organised the system, from 1959 it prohibited the use of French colonial laws and 
practices, purged old terminology, and eventually imported an entirely new 
system from the Soviet Union.72 Sweeping changes meant that the system 
ultimately bore little resemblance to the pre-revolutionary model. 
 
Because the project to build a “people’s” judicial system in Burma was driven by 
military authoritarian imperatives, it was more incremental and less 
comprehensive than that in Vietnam, where the ruling regime emerged from a 
popular national liberation struggle. Its counterpart in Burma, by contrast, lacked 
public backing and was beneath its self-styled revolutionary image profoundly 
conservative: concerned with the maintenance of order through the continuous 
attention of authority, and with the continual maintenance of that authority.73 Its 
underlying objective was not to effect radical social and economic change of the 
sort that the Vietnamese attempted, which could have threatened its own hold on 
power, but to ensure hierarchical command through a bureaucratic one-party 
system under military control. Consequently, its programme of reform was 
extensive but gradual: a programme that experienced a multitude of dissonances 
and tensions between its ideological expressions and conservative aspirations, 
between old practices and new, between old laws and new.  
 
In this section, I explore some of the dissonance in the criminal juridical system 
after 1962, concentrating on the establishment and functioning of special criminal 
courts under army supervision; the eliminating of the professional judiciary and 
inaugurating in 1972 of a system of courts comprising of lay judges; and, the 
continued use of colonial-era statutory law that conflicted with ideological goals, 
but corresponded with authoritarian ones. Although most of the discussion in this 
section is concerned with structural and institutional changes, as in other parts of 
this study my purpose in raising these is to get at corresponding changes in 
thinking and practices, and at their longer-term implications for what animates 
the criminal juridical system up to the present day.  
 
In the mid-1960s, the military regime began introducing new administrative 
bodies through which to disperse and dilute judicial authority. These bodies had 
quasi-judicial functions. Some had special policing units attached. For example, 
in 1966, the regime set up tribunals to hear cases under the Law Conferring 
                                                        
72 John Gillespie, “Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a ‘Rule of Law’ in Vietnam,” 
PhD diss., Australian National University, 2005, 92-95. 
73 Hayek, “Why I Am Not a Conservative,” 401. 
 95 
Authorisations for the Building of a Socialist Economic System.74 Those tribunals 
were accompanied with investigative teams comprising of representatives from 
township councils, police officers and local elders.75 The government also 
established special agencies to decide land and labour disputes, and other matters 
that were previously in the domain of the judiciary. But none of these can 
compare in terms of power and ideological importance to the Special Criminal 
Courts and their appellate bench. 
 
In late 1962 the new regime passed a law to establish Special Criminal Courts to 
try cases that authorities preferred not to have heard in an ordinary court.76 The 
SCCs were three-member panels, typically consisting of serving or retired 
soldiers, police, bureaucrats, judges and prosecutors, and now and then, 
handpicked ordinary citizens. The law authorising their establishment initially 
charged them with trying crimes of insurgency, crimes of obstructing state policy 
and programme, crimes against the society and other “important” crimes, but an 
amendment soon deleted the schedule of offences.77 The SCCs could impose only 
three penalties: at least three years’ imprisonment with hard labour, full life 
imprisonment, and death.78 They had wide powers, which narrowed or removed 
accused persons’ ordinary procedural rights.79  
                                                        
74 “Primary People’s Courts Formed,” Working People’s Daily 13 Jan. 1966: 1. 
75 ၁၉၆၅ ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စီးပြားေရးစနစ္တည္ေဆာက္မႈအတြက္ လုပ္ပိုင္ခြင့္မ်ားအပ္ႏွင္းသည့္ ဥပေဒအရ အျပစ္က်ဴးလြန္သူမ်ားအား အေရးယူသည့္ 
ကိစၥမ်ားတြင္ လိုက္နာရမည့္ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ား၊ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးအစိုးရ၊ ျပည္ထဲေရးဌာန၊ ၁၉၆၅။ 
(Instructions on Procedures for the Taking of Action against Offenders Under the Law Conferring 
Authorisations for the Building of a Socialist Economic System 1965, Department of Home Affairs, 
Revolutionary Government, Union of Burma, 1965.) The teams could conduct searches and send 
cases to the tribunals established under the law. The tribunals themselves consisted of 
representatives from local and regional administrative bodies, and new administrative councils 
ostensibly to represent the interests of peasants and workers. Initially, losing parties could appeal 
verdicts in the ordinary courts, but in 1967 the government established an appellate tribunal with an 
army officer as its chairman and a retired policeman and some bureaucrats as members. “Appelate 
Court Formed,” Working People’s Daily 5 Apr. 1967: 1.  
76 အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၅/၆၂။ (Special Criminal Courts Law, No. 15/62.) 
77 အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒကို ျပင္သည့္ ဥပေဒ အမွတ္ ၃၄/၆၃။ (Special Criminal Courts Law Amending Law,                 
No. 34/63.) 
78 These sentencing options are the same as those for military tribunals established under martial 
law. See for instance, ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔ မာရွယ္ေလာအမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၂/၈၉၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၈ ရက္။ 
(State Law and Order Restoration Council Martial Law Order No. 2/89, 18 July 1989.)  
79 Under the law, special court judges could at any time during trial—with government permission—
add, remove or alter charges; add defendants on the same or related charges; and, take action 
against any person found to have given false evidence. The SCC law also gave the government 
authority to intervene directly into the court process at any time by ordering the transfer of cases in 
mid-hearing to other special courts or ordinary courts, and from ordinary courts to the special 
courts. Nor were tribunal decisions final: after each verdict was handed down, it went to a 
“confirming authority”, a panel of three army officers, which had authority to alter the original 
ruling. The law did not stipulate any criteria for selecting the members of the confirming authority, 
other than that this be the government’s prerogative; however, the appointees were up to 1970 all 
senior army officers. အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးအယူခံဖြ႔ဲ စီရင္ထံုးမ်ား၊ စာ ဃ-၁ - ဃ-၅။ (Special Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court 
Rulings D1-D5.) The criteria for their work also were not set down in the law itself, but an article 
from a government party mouthpiece described the authorities’ role as confirming verdicts with 
reference to “established law, state tenets and objectives, etc.” (“တည္ဆဲတရား ဥပေဒ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၏ ဝါဒႏွင့္ 
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In 1965 the Special Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court began hearing appeals from the 
SCCs, via a further amendment to the 1962 law.80 The court consisted of Maung 
Maung, who had just taken up the post of chief judge in the Chief Court, alongside 
two army officers from the ruling council.81 In a special volume of the court’s 
rulings issued in 1971, Maung Maung justified the soldiers’ presence in terms of 
the non-separation of powers ideal: 
In making state policy a success by issuing rulings with the quality of justice, the 
Special Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court is the vanguard. Significantly, in order to fulfill 
its leadership duties the Appeal Court’s chairman and members include members of 
the Revolutionary Council and cabinet ministers. There can be no persons more 
familiar with state policy than those persons involved in formulating policy. There can 
be no persons with more practical understanding of how the power of law also can be 
used to make policy a success than those persons.82 
 
The vanguard role of the SCCAC went beyond the making of ideologically oriented 
rulings within the Special Criminal Courts’ system itself. Because Maung Maung 
was both a member of the appellate bench and chief judge of the ordinary 
judiciary, he could use his position to pass rulings in the SCCAC unfettered by 
ordinary legal process or doctrine, then cite them in the Chief Court, and issue 
directives to feed them back into the lower judiciary.  
 
The SCCAC’s role as an organ to exceed and break down the authority of the 
mainstream judiciary distinguishes it not only from how special courts had been 
used in earlier periods in Burma but also how they have been used in other 
authoritarian settings. Scholars tend to agree that authoritarian regimes use 
special courts to insulate the mainstream judiciary from politically oriented 
                                                                                                                                                        
ရည္မွန္းခ်က္ စသည”္။) ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ စာ ၁၁။ (Burma Socialist Programme Party 11.) Where a 
conflict existed between the Special Criminal Courts Law and the Criminal Procedure Code, the 
former prevailed. ေမာင္ကိ၊ု ၄၀၃။ (Maung Ko, at 403.) The courts could also try accused in absentia. 
ဦးတင္ေမာင္ဟန္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၇၅ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၄၀။ [U Tin Maung Han v. Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma, 1975 BLR (CC) 40.] 
80 အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒကို ျပင္သည့္ ဥပေဒ အမွတ္ ၁၁/၆၄။ (Special Criminal Courts Law Amending Law,                 
No. 11/64.) Revolutionary Council Orders No. 6/64 and No. 1/66 ordered that the appellate bench 
be set up and modified pursuant to the law.  
81 The two officers were minister for health, education, information and culture, Colonel Hla Han, as 
chairman; and, minister for industry and workers, Colonel Than Sein. In 1966 Brigadier General 
Sein Win joined them. Maung Maung also sat on the Courts Martial Appeal Court, the one other 
peak court with rulings cited in the law reports from 1963. 
82 “ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ မူဝါဒကို ေအာင္ျမင္ထိေရာက္ေစကာ တရားမွ်တျခင္း တန္ဘိုးကို ေဆာင္ေသာ စီရင္ထံုးမ်ားကို ျပဳရာတြင္၊ အထူးရာဇဝတ္ရံုးအယူခ ံ
အဖဲြ႔သည္ ဦးေဆာင္အဖြ႔ဲျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ထိုသို႔ဦးေဆာင္တာဝန္ကို ေက်ပြန္စြာ ထမ္းေဆာင္ႏိုင္သည့္ အေၾကာင္းမ်ားတြင္ အယူခံအဖြ႔ဲ၏ ဥကၠ႒ႏွင့္ 
အဖြ႔ဲဝင္အမ်ားသည္ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးေကာင္စီဝင္၊ အစိုးရအဖြ႔ဲဝန္ႀကီးမ်ားျဖစ္ၾကျခင္းသည္ အဓိကက်က်ပါဝင္ပါသည္။ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္မူဝါဒကို 
သတ္မွတ္ရာတြင္ ပါဝင္ေသာပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားထက္ ယင္းမူဝါဒႏွင့္ ရင္းႏွီးေသာ ပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားမရွိႏိုင္ပါ။ မူဝါဒကို တရားဥပေဒအာနိသင္ျဖင့္ေဆာင္မ ွ 
ေအာင္ႏိုင္ေၾကာင္းကိလုည္း ယင္းပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားထက္ လက္ေတြ႔သေဘာ သိနားလည္ေသာ ပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားမရွိႏိုင္ပါ။” အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးအယူခံဖြ႔ဲ 
စီရင္ထံုးမ်ား၊ စာ ခ - ခ-၁။ (Special Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court Rulings B-B1.) 
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cases.83 In Burma, the opposite was the case. The SCCAC served to defeat, not 
insulate judicial independence, since this role was consistent with ideology, and 
with the military authoritarian objectives that lay behind the ideology. 
 
The SCCAC was also distinct from the special courts of earlier periods, which I 
described briefly in the last chapter. The colonial regime and early postcolonial 
governments established special courts and tribunals to exempt their proceedings 
from the constraints imposed by utilitarian statute, not to alter the work of the 
mainstream judiciary itself. The superior courts in those periods yielded to special 
tribunals on the basis that they did not interfere with the work of the apex court, 
which retained its powers as the court of final appeal over all courts in the 
country, including those set up under special laws.84 The SCCs, by contrast, were 
not under the authority of the regular judiciary at all: appeals were heard in the 
SCCAC, not the Chief Court, which had no jurisdiction over the tribunals.85  
 
But the SCCAC was not merely exempt from the Chief Court’s jurisdiction. Over 
time it exceeded the latter’s authority, and became the de facto apex court. It took 
on this role by having the question of conflicts between its rulings and those of the 
Chief Court ruled in its favour. The Chief Court instructed in 1965 that where 
there appeared to be a conflict between its own rulings and that of the SCCAC—
one that might create a problem for a lower court—then the case was to be 
referred to it.86 Before the year was out, it declared that the SCCAC’s 
interpretation in a case was correct—and here we have Maung Maung as chief 
justice endorsing his own ruling as a member of the SCCAC bench—not because it 
was more legally sound but because it adhered to state policy.87 The following 
year the Chief Court sent a further directive to judges instructing them to study 
carefully the SCC law and rules, and SCCAC rulings, and adhere to them in 
                                                        
83 For example, Hilbink 27-28. Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Co. & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 109. Moustafa and Ginsburg 4. Osiel 500. Tate and 
Haynie 715. José Toharia, “Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of 
Contemporary Spain,” Law and Society Review 9.3 (1974): 475-96. 
84 Chittambaram v. King-Emperor, (1947) RLR 66. Union of Burma v. U Khin Maung Lat & One, 
1950 BLR (HC) 376. Khin Maung Myint v. Union of Burma, 1953 BLR (SC) 24.  
85 In this respect they were consistent with other special tribunals set up in the period, such as those 
under the Law Conferring Authorisations for the Building of a Socialist Economic System, on which 
the Chief Court also declined to rule for reasons of jurisdiction in ေဒၚေအးတင္ ႏွင့္ မိတၳီလာခ႐ိုင္ေဒသျပည္သူ႔ 
တရား႐ုံးအယူခံအဖြ႔ဲပါ ၂၊ ၁၉၇၁ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၇။ [Daw Aye Tin v. Meikhtila District Area People’s Court Appeal 
Court & Another, 1971 BLR (CC) 17.]  
86 ၁၉၆၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၆၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၆၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၇ ရက္။ (Courts General 
Letter No. 6/1965, Chief Court, Rangoon, 7 July 1965.) 
87 ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ (ေဒါက္တာျပည္စိုး) ႏွင့္ ေဒၚတင္တင္၊ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၀၇၅။ [Union of Burma (Dr Pyi Soe) v. 
Daw Tin Tin, 1965 BLR (CC) 1075.]  
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performance of their duties.88 In 1970, again heading the Chief Court bench, 
Maung Maung ruled further that, 
The Special Criminal Courts’ Appeal Court is the vanguard. The Special Criminal 
Courts system is a significant foundation of the system that we are leading towards in 
which the people decide on the people’s law. Judicial officers and lawyers while 
studying the Special Criminal Courts system well, rendering assistance effectively and 
endeavouring together to make it a success need to follow its guidance seriously.89  
 
Meanwhile, Maung Maung was emasculating the Chief Court in his capacity as 
chief judge, by issuing rulings that narrowed its authority in favour of the 
executive, and in favour of the SCCAC, as I have discussed elsewhere.90 Finally, in 
1972 the Chief Court bench held that not only did the verdicts of the SCCAC have 
to be studied and applied in ordinary courts, as the Chief Court had already been 
issuing guidance, but that the Chief Court too had to comply with verdicts issued 
in the SCCAC.91 Practically, the ruling mattered little, as the professional 
judiciary’s days were numbered, but it did serve to put beyond doubt the 
supremacy of the SCCAC and in so doing it marked the end of the battle for 
judicial independence in Burma.  
 
By 1972 the professional judiciary was bereft of means to resist when the military 
regime began to implement a plan to demolish the extant hierarchical judicial 
system and set in place one completely integrated with the executive at all levels, 
consisting of lay judges. Executive committees acting as administrative boards 
across the country moved to set up new judges’ committees and occupy the courts 
at all levels.92 The committees comprised of government administrators, and 
higher up also included army officers, bureaucrats and representatives from the 
                                                        
88 ၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၄၊ ႏိုငင္ံေတာ္တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၃ ရက္။ (Courts 
General Letter No. 4/1966, Chief Court, Rangoon, 23 Sept. 1966.) 
89 “အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးအယူခံအဖြ႔ဲသည္ ဦးေဆာင္အဖဲြ႔ျဖစ္ေပသည္။ အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးစနစ္သည္ ကၽြႏု္ပ္တို႔ဦးတည္လ်က္ရွိၾကေသာ ျပည္သူ႔တရားကို 
ျပည္သူက စီရင္သည့္စနစ္၏ အဓိကက်ေသာ အေျခခံတရပ္ျဖစ္သည္။ တရားေရးဝန္ထမ္းမ်ား၊ ေရွ႕ေနႀကီးမ်ားသည္၊ အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးစနစ္ကို 
ေကာင္းစြာ ေလ့လာျခင္း၊ ပါဝင္၍ ထိေရာက္စြာ ကူညီေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္း၊ ဝိုင္းဝန္း၍ ေအာင္ျမင္ေအာင္ ႀကိဳးပမ္းျခင္းတို႔ကိုျပဳကာ အယူခံအဖြ႔ဲ၏ 
လမ္းၫႊန္မႈကို ေလးနက္စြာ လုိက္နာၾကရန္ျဖစ္ေပသည္။” ဦးထြန္းေအာင္၊ ဦးထြန္းသိန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၇၀ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၉၀။ 
၁၉၃။ [U Htun Aung & U Htun Thein v. Union of Burma, 1970 BLR (CC) 190, at 193.] 
90 Nick Cheesman, “How an Authoritarian Regime Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial 
Independence in Burma,” Law and Society Review 45.4 (2011): 801-30. 
91 ေမာင္ခ်စ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၇၂ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၀။ [Maung Chit v. Union of Burma, 1972 BLR (CC) 
20.] The court registrar subsequently ordered that the judgment be distributed to all sessions and 
district criminal judges and they in turn take responsibility to see that their subordinates were 
apprised of it and that it was followed. ၁၉၇၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၉၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၇၂ 
ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၁ ရက္။ (Courts General Letter No. 9/1972, Chief Court, Rangoon, 21 July 1972.) 
92 August 7, 1972 is recorded as they day that the new system took effect, but the changes were 
begun across the state apparatus from March of that year, via Revolutionary Council Proclamation 
No. 97.  
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workers’ and peasants’ councils.93 These committees the government designated 
“people’s courts” of the sort introduced into some other socialist states. Panels of 
three persons, in the style of the SCCs, took the places of individual judges. 
Among them there had to be “people’s representatives” with no legal training, 
who would instead receive advice from court staff, including ousted judges.94 
Although bound to receive the judicial advisors’ legal advice, the lay judges were 
not obliged to follow it. Indeed, faithful adherence to policy, rather than 
knowledge of law, was the key criterion for persons hoping to be selected to the 
new panels.95  
 
In 1974, with the establishment of a one-party political system under a new 
constitution, a Central Court consisting of party apparatchiks and military men 
took over from the Chief Court. The judges of the Central Court altogether 
constituted what was called the Council of People’s Justices, through which they 
reported to the legislature. This council was the supreme judicial body, which—
along with committees of judges at other levels—the party appointed and 
removed together with the rest of the state apparatus.96 Chairmen of the peak 
council and many of its members were former or serving army officers, as were 
those at the divisional and state levels. The justice ministry ceased to exist. So did 
the SCCAC.97 Those cases remaining before it went back into the mainstream 
system, which was now fully integrated with the administration. People’s councils 
at all levels of the state apparatus formally took control of all juridical and 
administrative responsibilities. These councils the public elected from candidates 
among party members. They oversaw other government organs in their locality, 
including the courts and the police force.98  
                                                        
93 For an outline of the new committees’ composition and responsibilities see, တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရာဇဝတ္ 
တရားစီရင္ေရး (ရန္ကုန္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၇၃) စာ ၁၁-၁၄။ [Chief Court, Criminal Justice (Rangoon: Chief Court, 
1973) 11-14.] 
94 Myint Zan, “Judicial Independence in Burma: Constitutional History, Actual Practice and Future 
Prospects,” Southern Cross University Law Review 4 (2000): 36. 
95 ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ စာ ၁၀၃။ (Burma Socialist Programme Party 103.) 
96 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1974, articles 95-7, 106-8. See also 
ျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ဂ/၇၄ (People’s Council Law, No. 8/74), articles 4, 5, 38, 63-9, 85, 110-16, 132, 
157-63; corresponding articles are contained in ျပည္သူ႔တရားသူႀကီးအဖဲြ႔ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၃/၇၄ (Council of People’s 
Justices Law, No. 13/74). After the one-party legislature was established, it began issuing laws from 
number 1/74, therefore there are some laws bearing the same number in 1974, those issued in the 
last days of the Revolutionary Council and those via the new legislature.  
97 အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒကို ႐ုပ္သိမ္းသည့္ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၈/၇၄။ (Special Criminal Courts Law Repealing Law,             
No. 8/74.)  
98 Section 132 of the 1974 Constitution assigned the People’s Councils authority—among other 
things—over public administration and judicial affairs; protection of rights, and organising of 
people to fulfill duties; coordinating of local bodies; performing such other necessary works in the 
public interest as may be prescribed by law; and, in its subsection (c), “local security, defence, 
maintenance of rule of law [taya-ubade-somoye] and order”. Here, the expression used for order is 
 100 
 
The collapsing of all branches of the state apparatus into these omnicompetent 
councils created a range of predictable problems. Council members found that 
they could manipulate court cases so that whatever suited their own personal 
interests became matters of importance to the state, and hence, could be decided 
in their favour. Bias, abuses of power, incompetence, and pressures from higher 
authorities undermined the search for authentic truth.99 
 
A full survey of the juridical system’s operations after 1974 is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. But one aspect of the system’s operations both before and after 1974 
that is of special relevance to later chapters in this study and which brings us back 
to questions of what animated the system in this period is the continued use 
throughout this time of colonial-era statutory law. It is with this aspect of the 
system, and with what it tells us about the politics of law and order in this period, 
that I will end this chapter.  
 
Whereas the ideological project to reconfigure the system extended far enough to 
dislodge and eliminate the professional judiciary, it did not extend so far as to do 
the same to the body of utilitarian codes or most other parts of the codified law on 
which the system had been built. In the early years after the coup, officials and 
experts explained away the persistence of colonial-era law because they had 
simply not had enough time to work through it and make all the changes 
necessary.100 Maung Maung Kyi, a registrar and later director of the judicial 
bureaucracy at the Chief Court, in a 1967 text explained that,  
Total obliteration of the existing legal system is impossible of achievement at this 
critical moment of the transition period. It will linger for some time. … While awaiting 
the introduction of new laws, the old laws have perforce to be made use of in cases 
where they help to protect the gains already obtained by the people and maintain law 
and order against all sorts of anti-social elements.101  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
neither ngyeinwut-pibyaye nor ngyeinwut-ye, but a term that would be better translated as 
“discipline” (စည္းကမ္းေသဝပ)္. 
99 ဦးသိန္းလႈိင္ ႏွင့္ ေဒါက္တာေဒၚခင္လွွဟန္၊ ျပဳစု၊ ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရးစနစ္ေျပာင္းကာလ (၁၉၆၂-၁၉၇၄) ၊ တတိယတြဲ (ရန္ကုန္၊ တကၠသိုလ္မ်ား 
ပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၃) စာ ၆၁-၆၂။ [U Thein Hlaing and Dr Daw Khin Hla Han, eds., A Period of Change to 
Myanmar’s Political System (1962-1974), vol. 3 (Yangon: Universities Press, 1993) 61-62.] 
According to the author of an unpublished paper who worked as a prosecutor in this period, judges 
also over time became more and more preoccupied with pleasing council officials so as to secure 
reappointment—for reasons of financial and economic incentives—than with the problems of 
defendants and victims of crime. ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၏ ဥပေဒျပဳေရး၊ တရားစီရင္ေရး၊ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးတို႔အေပၚ ေလ့လာသံုးသပ္ျခင္း၊ 
ပံုႏွိပ္ထုတ္ေဝျခင္း မျပဳ (၂၀၀၆) စာ ၆။ [“Analysis of Myanmar’s Legislature, Judiciary and Administration,” 
unpublished paper (2006), 6.]  
100 For example, ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ စာ ၄၀။ (Burma Socialist Programme Party 40.) 
101 Maung Maung Kyi, A New Approach to Law and Life in Burma (Rangoon: 1967) 101. 
 101 
This remark is particularly telling, since for the purpose of maintaining law and 
order the old laws clearly did retain their efficacy.102 The Penal Code remained the 
backbone of the system, and a formidable instrument for coercive control, just as 
Macaulay had intended it to be.103 In addition, the courts continued to hear cases 
under highly repressive laws from earlier periods, such as the 1907 Unlawful 
Associations Act and 1950 Emergency Provisions Act.104 They also continued to be 
preoccupied with many of the same types of procedural issues as in earlier 
periods. Although, as discussed above, many of the doctrines attached to these 
procedures lost their significance, since the Criminal Procedure Code and 
Evidence Act continued to serve as the bases for procedure in criminal cases, 
questions on admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence, trial process, framing 
of charges and use of confession under these statutes kept coming up before the 
courts, as they had since the colonial period.105  
                                                        
102 Maung Maung Kyi’s book was later translated to Burmese. In the translation, “law and order” is 
ngyeinwut-pibyaye. ေမာင္ေမာင္ၾကည္၊ ျမန္မာ့ဥပေဒႏွင့္ဘဝ (ရန္ကုန္၊ စာေပဗိမာန္စာတိုက္၊ ၁၉၇၅) စာ ၁၃၁။ [Maung Maung 
Kyi, Burmese Law and Life (Rangoon: Sarpay Beikman Press, 1975) 131.] 
103 In a concession to ideology, from 1974 the Penal Code’s Burmese language name was belatedly 
changed from Yazathat-gyi (ရာဇသတ္ႀကီး), which translates roughly as the “king’s great prescription”, 
to a literal translation of its English name (ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာဥပေဒ). Note that in conventional Pali 
Romanisation yazathat is rajasat, or rajasatta, where gyi is a Burmese equivalent of maha, “great”. 
One scholar of ancient texts—from where the title originates—has translated yazathat as the “king’s 
knowledge”. Huxley, “Postivists and Buddhists,” 116. An outdated term for “crime” in the title of the 
procedure code, yazawut the government also replaced in 1974 with the same modern equivalent. 
Curiously, although the new title of the Criminal Procedure Code (ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာက်င့္ထံုးဥပေဒ) today appears 
as common usage, the published Penal Code still bears the older Yazathat-gyi, and some township 
courts persist with it in their documentation.  
104 For example, ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ထြန္းစိန္၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၄၂၅။ [Union of Burma v. Maung 
Htun Sein, 1966 BLR (CC) 1425.] ေစာဘိုးၾကဴး ႏွင္ ့ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၇ မတစ (အထူး) ၄၅။ [Saw Bogyu v. 
Union of Burma, 1967 BLR (SCCAC) 45.] U Tun Aung Tha v. Union of Burma, 1968 BLR (CC) 10. 
ေမာင္တင္ေမာင ္ပါ ၈ ႏွင္ ့ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၂၂။ [Maung Tin Maung & 7 v. Union of Burma, 
1969 BLR (CC) 222.] ဦးဝင္းဟန္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၇၅ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၀၁။ [U Win Han v. 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1975 BLR (CC) 101.] 
105 Some examples of cases on these types of procedural issues in the law reports include: ဦးမာမြတ္ (ခ) 
ဦးေမာင္ႀကီး ႏွင့္ ၁။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂။ ဦးဘထြန္း၊ ၁၉၈၂ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၅၄။ [U Mahmud (a) U 
Maung Gyi v. 1. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 2. U Ba Htun, 1982 BLR (CC) 54.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စဆုိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးေအာင္ႀကီး ပါ ၂၊ ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၃၉ [Socialist Republic of the Union 
of Burma v. U Aung Gyi & Another, 1980 BLR (CC) 39.] ဦးစံျမင့္ (ခ) ဦးစံညြန္႔ (ခ) ရွင္အဂၢစံသ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စု 
ဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ (ဦးသန္းျမင့္) ၊ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၃။ [U San Myint (a) U San Nyunt (a) Shin 
Aggasantha v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (U Than Myint), 1981 BLR (CC) 23.] 
ျပည္ေထာငစ္ုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးေက်ာ္ရင၊္ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၆၆ [Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma v. U Kyaw Yin, 1981 BLR (CC) 66.] ဦးေက်ာ္ထင္ ပါ ၉ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၈၂ 
မတစ (ဗဟို) ၃။ [U Kyaw Htin & 8 v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1982 BLR (CC) 3.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးကံသိန္း၊ ၁၉၈၇ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၂။ [Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma v. U Kan Thein, 1987 BLR (CC) 22.] ေမာင္စိုးျမင့္ (ခ) ရာရွစ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ 
၁၉၈၂ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၉။ [Maung Soe Myint (a) Rashid v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1982 
BLR (CC) 19.] ေမာင္မႈံ ပါ ၃ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၀၃။ [Maung Hmon & 2 
v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1981 BLR (CC) 103.] ဦးဝင္း ပါ ၂ ႏွင့္ ၁။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္ 
သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂။ ဦးအုန္းခင္ (ခ) ဦးရွမ္းေလး၊ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၁၅။ [U Win and Another v. 1. Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma, 2. U Ohn Khin (a) U Shan Lay, 1981 BLR (CC) 115.] ကိုသိန္းဝင္း ပါ ၂ ႏွင့္ 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၂၆။ [Ko Thein Win & Another v. Socialist Republic 
of the Union of Burma, 1981 BLR (CC) 126.] ေမာင္စိုးစိုးေအာင္ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚျမင့္ျမင့္ခင္ ပါ ၃၊ ၁၉၈၃ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၉၀။ [Maung 
Soe Soe Aung v. Daw Myint Myint Khin & 2, 1983 BLR (CC) 90.] 
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Inevitably, colonial-era law started to chafe on lay judges who had been led to 
believe that they did not need to worry about it greatly. “If a case is examined and 
the facts brought out well, it is rather like the right decision becomes obvious,” 
Maung Maung had reassured them in a 1975 legal primer, adding that,  
If the purpose of adjudication is understood, judging is easy. There is no need to get 
worn out from looking at big thick law books, big and small sections, no need to get 
confused from reading. Gently put down the books; study the reason that the parties 
came to court and the cause of their dispute.106 
 
So advised, lay judges took to the business of adjudicating by passing situation-
specific and policy-based verdicts, disregarding whatever legal advisers suggested 
to them.107 Others raised questions as to why they were obliged to enforce 
colonial-era law in a system that was supposedly now serving the interests of the 
working people. Yet, when such questions came to higher-ups, the control 
syndrome showed itself clearly. For superior courts to put policy ahead of law was 
one thing; for the lower courts to do so, or at least to do so without having 
received instructions from above, was a different matter entirely. In 1977 Thura U 
Aung Pe, chairman of the Council of People’s Justices, replied to points raised in 
the legislature that,  
One representative said that judges appointed under the socialist system should be 
encouraged to have full faith in the system and to pass courageous decisions in line 
with socialist principles. What he meant is that though some judges wanted to pass 
decisions based on socialist principles, they did not dare to do it as they had to follow 
the old laws which they do not understand well…. I wish to point out that eight 
principles were prescribed in the Constitution with regard to the administration of 
justice. The Committees of Judges are formed under the Constitution…. They have to 
decide cases in accordance with existing laws.108  
 
Contrary to the rhetoric of the “revolutionary” period that policy should take 
precedence over law, and even the notion expressed by Kyaw Zeya that local 
courts had the right to adjudicate according to local circumstances, expressions 
                                                        
106 “အမႈ၏ အခ်က္အလက္တို႔ကို ေကာင္းစြာ စစ္ေဆးေဖာ္ထုတ္ႏိုင္လွ်င္ မွ်တမွန္ကန္ေသာ ဆံုးျဖတ္ခ်က္သည္ သူ႔အလိုလို ေပၚလြင္လာမည္ 
ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ xxx တရားစီရင္ေရး၏ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္သေဘာကို သိနားလည္လွ်င္ စစ္ေဆးစီရင္ရတာ လြယ္ပါသည္။ ဥပေဒစာအုပ္ ထူထူႀကီးေတြ၊ 
ပုဒ္မႀကီး၊ ပုဒ္မငယ္ေတြကို ၾကည့္ၿပီး ေမာေနရန္ မလိုပါ။ ဖတ္ၿပီး ေခါင္း႐ႈပ္ေနရန္ မလိုပါ။ စာအုပ္ေတြ အသာ ထားပါဦး၊ အမႈသယ္ေတြ 
ဘာကိစၥေၾကာင့္ ရုံးေရာက္လာၾကသည္၊ ဘာကို စြဲဆိုျငင္းခံုေနၾကသည္ကို ေလ့လာပါဦး။” ေမာင္ေမာင္၊ စာ ၃၄၊ ၈၉။ (Maung Maung 34, 
89.) 
107 ေက်ာ္ေဇယ်၊ စာ ၁၂၀-၂၁။ (Kyaw Zeya 120-21.) According to Myint Zan, rulings in this period included 
vague statements asserting that the court was satisfied with the guilt of the accused person, such as 
that “the evidence is strong”, rather than giving legal reasoning for convictions. (Personal 
communication, Feb. 2012.) The extent to which rulings contained reasoning may in part have 
depended upon the extent to which judicial advisors were prepared to do the work to bring the 
decisions of lay judges up to a “legal” standard: according to one former judicial advisor with whom 
I spoke in 2010, in his experience, lay judges tended to pay scant regard to his advice and issued 
rulings that for various reasons they thought were correct; however, he said that he would then 
work on drafting a judgement for them to sign that would give, so far as possible, legal reasons for 
the decision. 
108 “There Are Plans to Build Courts,” Working People’s Daily 27 Mar. 1977: 4.  
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from senior figures suggest resistance to the idea of policy as law when the idea 
came from below, and over time also suggest a renewed insistence on adherence 
to the contents of statute.109 Maung Maung tried to mollify critics: 
Some are inclined to say that the established laws are a legacy of the old colonial-era 
system, therefore, there is no need to be following those laws and that they can decide 
as they like.... It is true that old laws remain. It is true that some of the old laws’ ideas 
are out of date, also that the writing is convoluted. However, the essential laws have 
been amended as much as possible. In the Revolutionary Council era, new ideas and 
precedents were written, a judicial system established, even a new constitution that the 
people wrote together already enacted. Work must still be done to repeal needless old 
laws, consider them from a Burmese viewpoint, and write them in Burmese prose. 
However, that work will have to be coordinated. It has to be discussed and enacted in 
the legislature. Until these things can be consulted and decided upon in unison, 
established law must be followed.110  
 
Despite the efforts of Maung Maung and other party bosses to give the 
appearance that they were somewhat reluctantly applying antiquated law until it 
could be overhauled, the record suggests otherwise. In almost twelve years in 
power, the Revolutionary Council made only minor adjustments to the Penal 
Code and Criminal Procedure Code, one time each. The one-party legislature 
made no changes to either of these statutes, or to other colonial-era criminal law 
of note.111 Contemporaneous internal directives to courts likewise suggest a 
tendency to cling to colonial-era law and practices where these suited official 
purposes, such as in matters of exemplary punishment for criminals threatening 
the political, economic and social order.112 On the other hand, the power elite 
                                                        
109 In replies to questions reported on the same page of the above news article, Aung Pe went on to 
note that the council had reprinted and distributed the 13-volume colonial-era Burma Code for the 
use of courts, many—perhaps most—of whose judges could not make head or tail of its 
predominantly English-language contents. A party mouthpiece had previously itself acknowledged 
that even published in Burmese, the Criminal Procedure Code was confounding for judges at the 
lowest levels. ျမန္မာ့ဆိုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ၊ စာ ၁၂၄။ (Burma Socialist Programme Party 124.) 
110 “အခ်ဳိ႕က ေျပာတတ္သည္၊ တည္ဆဲဥပေဒမ်ားသည္ ကိုလိုနီစနစ္ေခတ္ေဟာင္း အေမြေတြျဖစ္သည္။ ထို႔ေၾကာင့္ ထိုဥပေဒေတြကို လိုက္နာေနရန္ 
မလို၊ ႀကိဳက္သလို ဆံုးျဖတ္ႏိုင္သည္။ xxx ဥပေဒေဟာင္းတြင္ ရွိေနေသးသည္ မွန္၏၊ ဥပေဒေဟာင္းအခ်ဳိ႕၏ အေတြးအေခၚသည္ ေခတ္ႏွင့္မေလ်ာ္၊ 
အေရးအသားမွာလည္း ႐ႈပ္ေထြးသည္ မွန္၏။ သို႔ရာတြင္ ပဓာနက်ေသာ ဥပေဒမ်ားကို ျပင္ဆင္ႏိုင္သေလာက္ ျပင္ခဲ့ၾကၿပီ။ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးေကာင္စီ 
ေခတ္တြင္ အေတြးသစ္၊ ေရွးထံုးသစ္ႏွင့္ေရးခဲ့ၿပီး၊ တရားစီရင္ေရးစနစ္ကို တီထြင္ခဲ့ၿပီး၊ အေျခခံဥပေဒသစ္ကိုပင္ ျပည္သူေတြ ဝိုင္းဝန္ေရးဆဲြ 
ျပ႒ာန္းခဲ့ၿပီးၿပီ။ ဥပေဒေဟာင္းမ်ားမွ မလိုတာ ပယ္၊ ျမန္မာလို ေတြး၊ ျမန္မာစကားေျပႏွင့္ ေရးဖြ႔ဲလုပ္ၾကရဦးမည္။ သို႔ရာတြင္ ယင္းသို႔ လုပ္ရန္အမ်ား 
ညႇိႏိႈင္းၾကရမည္။ လႊတ္ေတာ္တြင္ ေဆြးေႏြးျပ႒ာန္းၾကရမည္။ ညီၫြတ္စြာ တိုင္ပင္ဆံုးျဖတ္ျပ႒ာန္းျခင္း မျပဳႏိုင္မီ တည္ဆဲဥပေဒကိုသာ 
လိုက္နာက်င့္သံုးရသည္။” ေမာင္ေမာင္၊ စာ ၇၅-၇၆။ (Maung Maung 75-76.)  
111 ေတာ္လွန္ေရးေကာင္စီ၊ ေတာ္လွန္ေရးေကာင္စီ၏ လုပ္ေဆာင္ခ်က္ သမိုင္းအက်ဥ္းခ်ဳပ္၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ပံုႏွိပ္လုပ္ငန္းႏွင့္ စာအုပ္ထုတ္ေဝေရး 
ေကာ္ပိုေရးရွင္း၊ ၁၉၇၄) စာ ၆၁၅။	  [Revolutionary Council, Concise History of the Revolutionary Council’s 
Activity (Rangoon: Printing & Publishing Corporation, 1974) 615.] The parliamentary government 
of the 1950s exceeded both subsequent regimes in the quantity of its legislative activity. In seven 
years between 1955 and 1962 alone, the parliamentary government and caretaker government 
together passed 334 laws, of which 156 repealed existing laws, 58 were new laws and 128 were 
amending laws. From 1962 to 1974 the Revolutionary Council issued 182 laws, out of which 70 
repealed existing laws, 76 were new laws and 36 were amending laws. In the period from 1974 to 
1988, the one-party legislature issued 125 laws, of which 31 repealed existing laws, 65 were new laws 
and 29 were amending laws. ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ဥပေဒမ်ားႏွင့္ ျပင္ဆင္ခ်က္မ်ားအၫႊန္း (ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္႐ုံး၊ ၁၉၉၈) စာ ၇၁၊ ၁၂၂၊ ၅၅။ [Government of the Union of Myanmar, Guide to Myanmar Laws and 
Amendments (Yangon: Office of the Attorney General, 1998) 71, 122, 55.] 
112 As in, for instance, ၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ တရား႐ုံးမ်ားၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာအမွတ္ ၂၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကုန္၊ ၁၉၆၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၄ ရက္။ 
(Courts General Letter No. 2/1966, Chief Court, Rangoon, 4 July 1966.) ျပည္သူ႔တရားသူႀကီးအဖြ႔ဲ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္ 
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showed pique when judges shifted charges from socialist-era statutes with harsh 
penalties to colonial-era ones with lesser punishments attached.113  
 
The problem of colonial versus socialist law was at its bottom not a legal problem 
but a political one. Whether or not judges were justified in shifting charges to 
colonial-era offences was irrelevant. Some, perhaps most, might have had good 
legal reasons for shifting charges—such as that under colonial-era laws it would 
be easier to secure a conviction. But that was not the issue. The issue, rather, was 
that the system’s functionaries were not supposed to think for themselves. 
Authoritarian government obliged that they participate cooperatively so as to 
serve the state and its interests. If the sovereign demanded that colonial law be 
enforced in a socialist system, then it had to be done. After all, the sovereign had 
nothing other than goodwill for the working people—it would be impertinent to 
think otherwise, and possibly illegal to say so. Where participants in the system 
talked back to it, for their own good they had to be shouted down. And so 
government went on in this manner until in 1988 the numbers of voices talking 
back became too many to ignore, and the regime crumbled under the weight of 
massive nationwide protests. After a short period of optimism that Burma would 
return to civilian rule, a new cabal of army officers forced its way into power and 
set the country onto a new, highly authoritarian path, to which we arrive in 
chapter four.  
Conclusion 
After the 1962 coup, the military began implementing a programme ostensibly to 
build a new socialist economic system in Burma. The ideology of socialist legality 
enabled the regime to insist that the authority of its policies exceeded law, and 
that the juridical system serve as an instrument for policy. Consequently, the “rule 
of law” ceased to have the presence in the system that it had in earlier periods, 
either in public narratives or in practices.114 The nascent regime of substantive 
rights had no place in the new system, since rights contrary to policy were 
incompatible with socialist goals. In fact, the reformulating of rights as 
conditional entitlements revised downward the notion of citizenship, from one in 
which rights accrued through a juridical standing that required no particular 
                                                                                                                                                        
အမွတ္ ၉၊ ၁၉၇၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၂ ရက္။ (Council of People’s Justices Instruction No. 9, 12 July 1975.) ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ 
ေကာင္စီ႐ံုး ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္ ၅/၇၇၊ ၁၉၇၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၂ ရက္။ (Council of State Instruction 5/77, 12 Aug. 1977.) 
113 ျပည္သူ႔တရားသူႀကီးအဖြ႔ဲ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၃၀၊ ၁၉၈၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၈ ရက္။ (Council of People’s Justices 
Instruction No. 30, 8 Jan. 1987.)  
114 On the supplanting of the rule of law by the administration of policy, see Michael Oakeshott, “The 
Rule of Law,” On History, and Other Essays (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) 162-64. 
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demonstration of fidelity to sovereign power, to one in which entitlements were 
exercised contingent upon a subject’s implicit acknowledgement of the 
sovereign’s generosity in granting them. 
 
A new class of special courts after 1963 tried people whom the executive preferred 
not to bring before professional judges. Observing that many things could be done 
more easily without the professional judiciary, the regime set about demolishing 
and rebuilding it entirely. In 1972 it inaugurated a system of people’s courts, in 
which lay judges heard cases. At the higher ends of the system, these lay judges 
were administrators, military officers and others with direct links to the ruling 
regime. From 1974, it fully integrated the judiciary into the new one-party 
legislative apparatus. 
 
Despite these structural changes, the new regime’s programme to reconfigure the 
juridical system remained incomplete, in part because the military came to power 
without an ideological blueprint or popular support, and was throughout guided 
by pragmatic objectives. It passed new laws to institute a socialist economic 
system but did not demonstrate serious intent at any time to rewrite or remove 
the compendium of utilitarian statutes on which the system was based. Its senior 
functionaries put policy before law where expedient, but objected when people 
whom it brought into the system departed from the strictures of colonial-era law 
so as to express their own ideas about socialist legality. The changes made tended 
to reflect the regime’s predilection with control of personnel and institutions; that 
the contents of laws were incompatible with stated ideological goals mattered 
little. In fact, the contents of many colonial laws suited the new regime’s 
authoritarian objectives nicely. 
 
While claiming to eliminate the bureaucratisation of the colonial era, the new 
regime established its own type of highly bureaucratic control, built around a 
party structure that was in turn based on an assertion of sovereign authority 
through seizure of political power. At its inception, the new regime took a 
despotic form that, like its colonial predecessor, was based on conquest, on 
insistence of law and order through intimidation and violence. Like its colonial 
predecessor, the new regime sought to build up an institutional arrangement 
through which it could exercise power over the longer run. But its approach was 
unlike its colonial predecessor. The colonial regime sought to exempt itself from 
the contents of its law through the creating of exceptional zones: juridically 
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framed exemptions from ordinary law for the purposes of trying cases of special 
importance, or in times of exigency. The military regime declined to be bound by 
the idea that it was subject to legal restraints. I obviously do not mean to imply by 
this statement that it was not restrained or did not feel restrained in what it could 
or could not do. But the restraints it felt were pragmatic. Like the officials in 
Fuller’s managerial context, for its personnel rules mattered because its 
administrators needed rules. They mattered for reasons of expediency, and 
therefore they could be ignored, bypassed or overridden where inconvenient, or 
where they opposed policy. Consequently, the distinctive function of the juridical 
system declined, until from 1972 onwards the system merged with the 
administrative apparatus. 
 
Although the reconfiguring of the juridical system in the decade following the 
1962 coup and the removal in 1972 of the professional judiciary constituted 
obvious evidence of institutional reconfiguration, the two most important 
developments in thinking and behaviour during this period were, in my opinion, 
the displacement of the nascent regime of substantive rights from the preceding 
era, and the ideological push against procedural rights of the colonial era. The 
reframing of rights as entitlements placed citizens in a new type of relationship 
with sovereign power, whereby subjects of power who declined to acknowledge 
the sovereign’s largesse, or who for one reason or another did not fall into the 
categories of persons towards whom sovereign cetana flowed could lose their 
entitlements. And, the lost significance of procedure meant that the minimal 
protections against the colonial coercive apparatus that the utilitarians had built 
into the system also lacked the efficacy that they had had previously. These two 
developments had the effect of eliminating from the system the bases upon which 
even a minimal formally conceived rule of law might be established or 
maintained. The coercive apparatus remained, but the structural defences of 
rights fell away. Under these inauspicious circumstances, precisely at the time 
that the rule of law in Burma was at its nadir, taya-ubade-somoye returned to the 






THE CRIMINAL JURIDICAL SYSTEM AS POLICE 
 
In 1988 the one-party regime collapsed under the weight of massive nationwide 
protests. With the regime went the apparatus of party-based councils at all levels 
horizontally managing other agencies. A new military junta abolished all organs 
of state power under the 1974 Constitution, and established new councils with 
soldiers as chairmen.1 It described itself explicitly as a council to restore—in 
Burmese, to build—law and order.2 It established subordinate bodies with the 
same nomenclature.3 
 
The coup-makers specified in their first announcement that the rule of law, taya-
ubade-somoye, was topmost among four major tasks facing their government 
because of deteriorating conditions in the country.4 They terminated the people’s 
courts, re-established a Supreme Court and placed a new chief justice directly 
under the military council at the system’s apex.5 Eleven days after the takeover 
the appointee chief justice, former Central Court registrar U Aung Toe, issued 
orders appointing judicial bureaucrats and legal advisors as judges, in lieu of the 
panels of lay judges of the post-1972 system.6 Within a fortnight, the people’s 
                                                        
1 ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔ ေၾကညာခ်က္အမွတ္ ၂/၈၈၊ ၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၈ ရက္။ (State Law and 
Order Restoration Council Announcement No. 2/88, 18 Sept. 1988.) ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ 
တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔ ေၾကညာခ်က္အမွတ္ ၅/၈၈၊ ၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၀ ရက္။ (State Law and Order Restoration 
Council Announcement No. 5/88, 20 Sept. 1988.)  
2 The State Law and Order Restoration Council ran from 18 September 1988 to 15 November 1997 
when it reconstituted itself as the State Peace and Development Council. For the sake of simplicity, 
in this chapter I refer to these two councils without differentiation, since the change in 1997 did not 
constitute a reconfiguration to the form of government but rather one of personnel in its upper 
echelons.  
3 Councils at each level under the national level were, in descending order, division/state councils, 
district councils, township councils, and ward/village tract councils.  
4 ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲ ေၾကညာခ်က္ အမွတ္ ၁/၈၈၊ ၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၈ ရက္။ (State Law and 
Order Restoration Council Announcement No. 1/88, 18 Sept. 1988.) The other three tasks were to 
provide security for travel and communcations; to aid in providing for people’s basic needs; and, 
thereafter to hold multiparty elections. 
5 တရားစီရင္ေရးဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂/၈၈။ (Judiciary Law, No. 2/88.) ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔မ်ား၏ လုပ္ငန္း 
တာဝန္မ်ားႏွင့္ လုပ္ငန္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈစနစ္၊ ႏုိင္ငံေတာၿ္ငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔ရံုး၊ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၁၈ ရက္၊ ေနာက္ဆက္တြဲ (ခ) ။ (Township Law and Order Restoration Councils’ Responsibilities and 
Work Regimen, Office of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Union of Myanmar, 18 Jan. 
1989, Appendix B.)  
6 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမိန႔္ေၾကာ္ျငာစာအမွတ္ ၂/၈၈၊ ၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၉ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Notification No. 2/88, 
29 Sept. 1988.) The 1988 Judiciary Law established three levels of courts at the apex, division/state 
and township levels. Village level courts the new council abolished. District level courts operated 
under the division/state courts, not as a separate tier. Later, section 12 of the Judiciary Law, No. 
5/2000 (တရားစီရင္ေရးဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၅/၂၀၀၀) established district level courts as a separate tier.  
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justice system was officially a thing of the past. Burma had the beginning of a new 
professional judiciary, one comprising of civil servants in a pyramid with a 
military council at the apex.  
 
The junta indicated that it would stay in power until 1990, when it would conduct 
a general multiparty election and step down. To prepare for the election, in 1989, 
it declared a period of martial law and convened military tribunals specifically “in 
order to carry out more effectively tasks for security, the rule of law, and regional 
peace and tranquillity”.7 In a series of subsequent orders it withdrew martial law 
from various parts of the country in the lead up to the May election, because the 
rule of law had sufficiently “improved”.8 The National League for Democracy won 
the election overwhelmingly, but the military regime declined to recognise the 
results as a mandate to govern.9 So Myanmar entered a period of new and 
protracted highly authoritarian rule, culminating in a return to semi-civilian 
legislative government over twenty-two years later, in 2011.10 
 
The remaining four chapters of this study are concerned with this period. In this 
chapter and the next, I argue that the criminal juridical system after 1988 has 
performed two pragmatic functions within the state apparatus. First, it has 
continued to operate in conjunction with other parts of the apparatus to effect 
state policy and specifically, to maintain law and order, as it did prior to 1988; 
                                                        
7 “လံုျခံဳေရး၊ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးႏွင့္ နယ္ေျမေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးကို ပိုမိုထိေရာက္စြာ ေဆာင္ရြက္ႏိုင္ရန”္။ ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ 
တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁/၈၉၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၇ ရက္။ (State Law and Order Restoration Council 
Order No. 1/89, 17 July 1989.) 
8 “တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးႏွင့္ နယ္ေျမေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရး တိုးတက္ေကာင္းမြန္လာၿပီျဖစ”္။ ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔ အမိန္႔ 
အမွတ္ ၃/၈၉၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၃ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၂/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ 
မတ္လ ၁၁ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၃/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၅ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၁၁ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၅/၉၀၊ 
၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၁၇ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၆/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၁၈ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၇/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၅ ရက္။ 
အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၈/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၈ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၉/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၉ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၀/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ 
ေမလ ၂၂ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၁/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၂၄ ရက္။ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၂/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၂၆ ရက္။ (State Law 
and Order Restoration Council Order No. 3/89, 3 Nov. 1989; No. 1/90, 2 Jan. 1990; No. 2/90, 11 
Mar. 1990; No. 3/90, 15 Mar. 1990; No. 4/90, 11 Apr. 1990; No. 5/90, 17 Apr. 1990; No. 6/90, 18 
Apr. 1990; No. 7/90, 15 May 1990; No. 8/90, 18 May 1990; No. 9/90, 19 May 1990; No. 10/90, 22 
May 1990; No. 11/90, 24 May 1990; No. 12/90, 26 May 1990.) 
9 ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕ေၾကညာခ်က္ အမွတ္ ၁/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၇ ရက္။ (State Law and Order 
Restoration Council Announcement No.1/90, 27 July 1990.)  
10 I am in this chapter concerned strictly with the ideas and practices that animated the criminal 
juridical system in this period. For studies on wider political, economic and social affairs see, 
Charney, ch. 8, 9. Nick Cheesman, Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, eds., Ruling Myanmar: 
From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010). Christina Fink, Living 
Silence: Burma under Military Rule (London & New York: Zed Books, 2001). N Ganesan and Kyaw 
Yin Hlaing, Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Singapore: ISEAS & Hiroshima Peace Institute, 
2007). Emily Rudland, Morten B. Pedersen and R. J. May, eds., Burma/Myanmar: Strong Regime, 
Weak State? (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000). Monique Skidmore, Karaoke Fascism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, eds., 
Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008). Monique 
Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, eds., Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment 
(Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007). Trevor Wilson, Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation 
(Singapore: ISEAS; Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2006). 
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however, it has done this absent of any ideological goals, and in the manner, 
recalling my remarks in chapter one, of police. Second, the system after 1988 has 
functioned to earn money for its personnel. This feature of the system existed in 
all earlier periods, but it has become increasingly pronounced in the last two 
decades. Therefore, I characterise the system as a marketplace. Police and 
marketplace coexist, and have a kind of symbiosis, as I will explain in the next 
chapter. In the remaining two chapters, I explore specific aspects of the system in 
response to authorised and unauthorised challenges to its authority.  
 
Each of the four chapters begins with a section exploring aspects of the official 
narrative on what animates the criminal juridical system. To write these sections, 
I have drawn on published materials from the last twenty-two years, 
concentrating on those from the mid-1990s onwards. By this time, the new 
regime had firmly established itself and had made clear—through the setting up 
of a convention to draft a new constitution—that like its 1962 precursor it did not 
intend to surrender power promptly, or on terms other than its own. The 
remaining sections in each chapter highlight specific features of the system that 
from my research findings I argue are indicative of what has animated the 
criminal juridical system throughout this time. These sections constitute the 
empirical core of my study, and are drawn from the contents of cases and 
research in Myanmar conducted from 2008 to 2011, which I described in chapter 
one.11  
 
In this chapter, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss how the military after 1988 
discarded ideological bases for the organising of the state and consequently, for 
the orienting of the criminal juridical system. I also consider the implications of 
this ‘end of ideology’ for how the system has operated since. Second, I concentrate 
on two paradigmatic features of the system as police: the pursuit of the public 
enemy; and, the role of policeman as sovereign.  
 
                                                        
11 For this chapter, I examined documents pertaining to 166 cases involving 205 accused or 
respondents, from thirty-five courts at all levels (township, district, state/division, apex). This figure 
does not include those cases cited from the law reports. The case documents studied include 
complaint letters, first information reports, search and seizure forms, arrest sheets, charge sheets, 
court daily diaries, trial testimonies, trial verdicts and appeal submissions. Supplementary 
secondary material studied includes comments and analysis by persons familiar with the cases, and 
reports from both state and non-state media. Some cases cited are from the law reports. Most are 
from court records. Some of these have been publicised, some not. Those that have been publicised, 
I have cited. These cases mostly have political or other special significance. Where cases have not to 
my knowledge been publicised, I have omitted identifying details. 
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To ask the question of what animates a law-and-order system is to ask what 
animates it in response to the public enemy. In a law-and-order system the case 
against the public enemy is an archetypal case, because the public enemy occupies 
a higher place in the hierarchy of threats to law and order than other persons. 
Therefore, the pursuit of the public enemy through the criminal juridical system 
is not only an unavoidable topic but also the foremost topic to address. Another 
paradigmatic feature of this system I characterise, drawing on Agamben, as the 
policeman as sovereign: the policeman as a bearer of political and juridical power 
that exceeds the formal role assigned to him in criminal procedure, whose role is 
magnified by the power structure of the state itself. In the last section of the 
chapter I concentrate on the role of the sovereign policeman through study of the 
use of torture to extract confession, since it is at the moment of torture that the 
sovereign power of the policeman is manifest, and it is through the act of torture 
that he exerts a certain type of power over the juridical apparatus, as well as over 
the victim of torture.  
 
A question of English tense remains. Most of the cases discussed in this chapter, 
and those in subsequent chapters, concern the period of direct military rule up to 
2011, before the establishment of a semi-elected legislature with a former army 
officer as executive president, under the terms of the new constitution, which 
passed through a contrived referendum in 2008.12 By the start of 2012 Myanmar 
had entered a new political phase. The government had in a series of amnesties 
released many persons whose cases I describe in this chapter, citing the detainees’ 
understanding of the loving kindness, or metta, and cetana of the state as one of 
the grounds for its actions.13  
 
                                                        
12 On the referendum see Human Rights Watch, Vote to Nowhere: The May 2008 Constitutional 
Referendum in Burma (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008). Public International Law and 
Policy Group, Burmese Constitutional Referendum: Neither Free nor Fair (Washington DC: Public 
International Law and Policy Group, 2008). The referendum was badly timed because it coincided 
with the biggest natural disaster in Myanmar in living memory, the cyclone that swept through the 
delta and into Yangon at the start of May resulting in more than 100,000 deaths. The regime 
declined to postpone the referendum, holding it in most parts of the country a week after the 
cyclone, as scheduled. In areas directly affected by the disaster, it put back the vote from the 
scheduled date by a couple of weeks.  
13 As in အက်ဥ္းသား၊ အက်ဥ္းသူ (၆၅၁) ဦးအား ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာက်င့္ထံုးဥပေဒပုဒ္မ ၄၀၁၊ ပုဒ္မခဲြ (၁) အရ လြတ္ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းသာခြင့္ျပဳ၊ အမ်ဳိးသား 
ျပန္လည္စည္းလံုးညီညြတ္ေရးႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးလုပ္ငန္းစဥ္မ်ားတြင္ အားလံုးပါဝင္ႏိုင္ခြင့္ ရရွိေစေရးရည္ရြယ္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၁၃ 
ရက္၊ စာ ၁။ [“651 Prisoners Given Amnesty in Accordance with Section 401(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code with the Objective of All Having the Opportunity to Participate in National 
Reconciliation and Political Programmes,” Myanma Alin 13 Jan. 2012: 1.] For a comment on 
amnesties by successive regimes in Myanmar see, Book Zone, “Burma Amnesties,” 19 Oct. 2011, 
New Mandala, 20 Oct. 2011 <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/>. The Assistance 
Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) made a list of released detainees available on its website 
shortly after the amnesty: <http://www.aappb.org>.  
 111 
The new constitution introduced some structural changes to the upper judiciary, 
most notably, the establishment of fourteen “high courts” under the Supreme 
Court, and a constitutional tribunal.14 The constitution has provided for writ 
petitions to the Supreme Court, about which I have written elsewhere.15 None of 
these changes directly affects the subordinate judiciary. The work of most courts 
has not so far altered discernibly, and nor have any significant changes been 
made to the criminal law to affect the management or outcomes of cases. As in the 
past, legislators have begun to talk about reviewing and amending or revoking 
outdated laws, but so far little action has been taken to this end. Reports in state 
media of policy on judicial affairs have been broadly consistent in language and 
contents with earlier periods. Although discussion about problems within the 
judiciary has noticeably increased in the private media, whether or not this 
discussion will translate into lasting systemic change remains to be seen. For 
these reasons, in this chapter I retain present tense to signal overall continuity in 
ideas and practices across the period studied. 
The end of ideology 
Nineteen-eighty eight brought a new type of authoritarianism to Myanmar. In 
each prior period discussed in this study, the government of the day had with it 
when it came into power, or soon came up with, some ideological framework 
against which its successes and failures could be measured—utilitarian legalist, 
social democratic, and authoritarian socialist. The new junta abandoned ideology 
as a basis for government. It declined to adhere to any coherent and 
                                                        
14 As set out in ျပည္ေထာင္စုတရားစီရင္ေရးဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂၀/၂၀၁၀။ (Union Judiciary Law, No. 20/2010.) The 
constitution also again changed the title of the apex court, this time only in Burmese, from တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ 
to တရားလႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ,္ thereby restoring its original nomenclature at time of independence in 1948. For 
an overview of the changes, see, Myint Zan, “Burma’s ‘New’ Supreme Court and New Constitutional 
Tribunal: Marginal Improvement or More of the Same?” unpublished paper presented at the 
Myanmar/Burma Update Conference 2011 (Australian National University, Canberra: 2011). See 
also, Dominic Nardi, “Discipline-Flourishing Constitutional Review: A Legal and Political Analysis 
of Myanmar’s New Constitutional Tribunal,” Asian Law 12.1 (2010): 1-34. On the framing of rights 
under the constitution see, Nick Cheesman, “The Eliminating of Rights and the Politics of Being 
Burmese,” unpublished paper presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting 2011 
(San Francisco, 2011). Yash Ghai, The 2008 Myanmar Constitution: Analysis and Assessment (n.d.). 
15 Cheesman, “The Incongruous Return of Habeas Corpus to Myanmar,” 90-111. Shortly before 
finalising this study I received news that a number of habeas corpus applications had been lodged in 
2011, but that none are known to have been successful. Among them, at the start of February 2012, 
news outlets reported that the husband of a woman abducted by soldiers had lodged a writ of 
habeas corpus application against their battalion. See ကခ်င္တိုင္းရင္းသူ စစ္တပ္ဖမ္းဆီးမႈ ေနျပည္ေတာ္၌ ၾကားနာမည္၊ 
၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက္၊ ဧရာဝတီ၊ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂ ရက္ <http://burma.irrawaddy.org>။ (“Army Unit Arrest 
of Kachin Woman Case to Be Heard at Naypyitaw,” 1 Feb. 2012, The Irrawaddy, 2 Feb. 2012 
<http://burma.irrawaddy.org>.) The Supreme Court rejected the application because the applicant 
could present no evidence to show that the woman had ever been in army custody. ဦးေဒါင္လြမ္း ႏွင့္ 
ဒုဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီးေဇာ္မ်ဳိးထြဋ၊္ ၂၀၁၂၊ ျပစ္မ ႈဆိုင္ရာအေထြေထြေလွ်ာက္ထားမႈ (စာခၽြန္) အမွတ္ ၃၊ တရားလႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ၊္ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁ ရက္၊ 
တရားသူႀကီး ျမင့္ေအာင။္ [U Daun Lun v. Lieutenant Colonel Zaw Myo Htut, 2012 Criminal Miscellaneous 
Application (Writ) No. 3, Supreme Court, 1 Mar. 2012, Judge Myint Aung.] 
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independently standing set of principles. It pronounced the rule of law, taya-
ubade-somoye, to be its objective by conflating it with the law and order of its 
title. It made no attempt at ideological justification beyond this. As such, the 
claim to be protecting the rule of law as law and order is actually the closest thing 
we have to a stated principle of government against which more than two decades 
of military rule can be assessed. Therefore, in this section, I explore some of the 
contents of this rhetoric, and consider how it advances the ideas and practices of 
the criminal juridical system as police with which this chapter is concerned. 
 
In one speech after the next, members of the junta iterated their reasons for 
taking power. Talking to judges in 1994, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, then 
secretary-one of the ruling council and military intelligence chief, offered a typical 
account: 
We all know that collapsed rule of law [taya-ubade-somoye] and overriding anarchy in 
the nation was one of the primary reasons that the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council took over the responsibilities of state. Consequently, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council gave special consideration to responsibility for the rule of law 
[taya-ubade-somoye] and regional peace and tranquillity as first among its designated 
four major tasks.16 
 
The new regime did not come to its self-appointed role as guardian of national 
sovereignty with a grand vision for the future. It did not propose to transform 
society through a new ideological framework. Nor did it make a plan to come up 
with one. Its vision was narrow, its narrative limited. Anarchy prevailed, law-and-
order council took power, and rule of law was restored. The absence of anarchy—
in Burmese, literally a condition of being “kingless”—in this narrative corresponds 
with rule of law. The rule of law is nothing other than the opposite of anarchy, 
Hobbes’ “confusion of the disunited multitude”.17 The certain opposition of the 
rule of law is in this text not an opposition between norms and commands, 
between one principle of government and another, but an opposition between the 
existence of a commander and the absence of one. Taya-ubade-somoye is in this 
conception nothing other than the existence of a sovereign, the existence of a 
                                                        
16 “ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲက ႏိုငင္ံေတာ္ရဲ႕တာဝန္ကို ရယူခဲ့ရတဲ့ အေၾကာင္းေတြမွာ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္မွာ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးမႈ 
ပ်က္ျပားၿပီး မင္းမဲ့စရိုက္ေတြ ႀကီးစိုးခဲ့တဲ့ အေၾကာင္းဟာ အဓိကအေၾကာင္းရင္းတစ္ခုအျဖစ္ ပါဝင္တယ္ဆိုတာ အားလံုးသိၾကၿပီး ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ 
ဒါေၾကာင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ ႔ဲအေနန႔ဲ အဓိကလုပ္ငန္းတာဝန္ႀကီးေလးရပ္ သတ္မွတ္ေဆာင္ရြက္ခဲ့ရာမွာ တရားဥပေဒ 
စိုးမိုးေရးန႔ဲနယ္ေျမေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးတာဝန္ကို ပထမအခ်က္အျဖစ္ အေလးထားသတ္မွတ္ခဲ့ျခင္း ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။” ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခ႐ုိင္တရား 
သူႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ား လုပ္ငန္းညိႇႏႈိင္းအစည္းအေဝးတြင္ ႏိငု္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲ၊ အတြင္းေရးမႉး (၁) ဒုတိယ 
ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ေျပာၾကားသည့္ လမ္းၫႊန္အမွာစကား၊ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ တရားစီရင္ထံုးမ်ား၊ ၁၉၉၄ ခုႏွစ ္(ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ျမဝတီစာေပတိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၆) စာမ်က္ႏွာနံပါတ္မပါ။ [“State Law and Order Restoration Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant 
General Khin Nyunt’s Address at the Work Coordination Meeting of State, Divisional and District 
Judges and Law Officers,” Union of Myanmar Supreme Court Rulings, 1994 (Yangon: Myawadi 
Literature House, 1996) n.pag.] 
17 Hobbes 229. 
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sovereign’s specific order. Therefore, to restore law and order through restoration 
of sovereignty was to restore the rule of law.  
 
The mischief in this equation lies in its taking certain conditions necessary for 
both the rule of law and for law and order, namely the existence of a state and the 
corresponding absence of anarchy, and in implying that because certain prior 
conditions for both the rule of law and law and order are the same, therefore the 
two concepts are also the same. It lumps all types of rulemaking together by 
implying that as long as somebody is making rules, and society is following those 
rules, then the rule of law exists.  
 
The semantic conflating of taya-ubade-somoye with ngyeinwut-pibyaye, or 
rather, the subsuming of the former, an essentially normative concept, into the 
latter, a pragmatic one, was characteristic of the new authoritarianism in the new 
“Myanmar”. The rule of law, although apparently grounded in norms that should 
transcend the state’s specific order, actually had the opposite meaning: that the 
state’s specific order transcended any norms of law. As Schmitt once put it, “The 
existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the 
legal norm.”18 Khin Nyunt would have had every reason to agree.  
 
Thus, after 1988 we have the criminal juridical system expressed as a more 
pragmatic system than in earlier periods, and in a number of specific respects. 
First, the criminal juridical system as police consists of legal concepts that are 
emptied of significance. Doctrines are not attached to a system of ideas and 
practices that can give them meaning. Second, it levels out juridical instruments. 
The injunctions of police all have approximately the same coercive value, 
irrespective of whether described as law or regulation. Third, it elevates 
administrative ideals. These ideals include some that are consonant with stated 
goals, such as efficiency in sentencing, and some contrary to stated goals that are 
equally important to its actual operations, notably, maintenance of secrecy. 
 
The lost significance of legal doctrine, of legal concepts, is in the contemporary 
period consequential to the preceding era, when regime intellectuals like Maung 
Maung introduced socialist doctrine—in particular, the notion of the authentic 
truth—to displace concepts and practices from earlier periods. Although the 
doctrine of the truth rather than having a universal quality enabled a type of 
                                                        
18 Schmitt, Political Theology 12. 
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situational jurisprudence, it was nonetheless located in a larger ideological project 
for the reorienting of the juridical system, which I discussed in the last chapter. 
After 1988, legal concepts from prior periods ceased to attach to any particular 
ideological framework. This loss of significance did not mean that they fell into 
disuse. On the contrary, legal concepts remained useful as verbiage. But because 
they were no longer anchored to a system of ideas, they floated around, 
weightless, bumping into one another at random, as in Khin Nyunt’s speech from 
1994 that I cited above:  
The laws, procedures and so on are very useful instruments with which to reveal the 
truth. But in the hands of bad people, legal procedures can be exploited so that which 
shouldn’t happen happens. Once a court’s main duty—the revealing of truth—grows 
dim, the law is separated from one of its arms and playing favourites, playing foul, 
cheating and lying come to the fore… judges in order to have the capability to deliberate 
and reveal the truth, to enlarge their wisdom and vision, must be honest and also 
endowed with unblemished morals…. Bravely and steadily endeavour without being 
demoralised to reveal the truth so offenders will fear and respect the law, such that 
people will trust and rely upon the judiciary….19  
 
In 2011, the new chief justice—a former army lieutenant colonel—U Tun Tun Oo, 
reportedly gave a speech in which, from the newspaper’s synopsis, he said “that 
the main duty of the judiciary is to search for and reveal the truth, that when 
finding the truth [judges need] to decide fairly in accordance with law, that [they] 
need to be abreast of judicial affairs and relevant basic facts, that facts and law 
decide a case, that having resolved to bring out only the authentic truth in the 
handing down of verdicts one is to act thus, and oneself being free from corrupt 
practices is to supervise closely at all times to see that corrupt practices also do 
not occur among one’s subordinates”.20 These statements are not quite the same 
in meaning as those in the preceding quote, but they are not far off. Both quotes 
resonate with rhetoric of law and order as taya-ubade-somoye in which the 
spaces that ideology once occupied are filled with a jumble of hollowed-out 
                                                        
19 “ဥပေဒ၊ က်င့္ထံုး စတာေတြဟာ အမွန္တရားကို ရွာေဖြေဖာ္ထုတ္ေရးမွာ အလြန္အသံုးဝင္တဲ့ တန္ဆာပလာမ်ား ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့္ မသမာ 
သူမ်ားရဲ႕ လက္ဝယ္မွာ ဥပေဒက်င့္ထံုးတို႔ဟာ လိုသလိုဆြဲအသံုးခ်ခံရၿပီး မျဖစ္သင့္တာေတြ ျဖစ္လာရပါတယ္။ အမွန္တရား ရွာေဖြေဖာ္ထုတ္ျခင္း 
ဆိုတဲ့ တရား႐ုံးရဲ႕ ပင္မတာဝန္ဟာ ေမွးမိွန္သြားၿပီး ဥပေဒကို လက္တစ္လံုးျခားလုပ္ၿပီး ကပ္တာ၊ ညစ္တာ၊ လိမ္တာ၊ ညာတာေတြ ေရွ႕တန္း 
ေရာက္လာတာ ေတြ႕ရပါတယ္။ xxx တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားဟာ အမွန္တရားကို ခ်င့္ခ်ိန္ေဖာ္ထုတ္ႏိုင္စြမ္းရွိဖို႔၊ ဥာဏ္ပညာ၊ အေမွ်ာ္အျမင္ ႀကီးမားဖုိ႔ 
လိုအပ္သလို ႐ုိးသားၾကၿပီး ျဖဴစင္တဲ့ အက်င့္သီလန႔ဲလည္း ျပည့္စံုရမွာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ xxx တရားစီရင္ေရးကို ျပည္သူမ်ားက ယံုၾကည္ကိုးစားလာသလို 
ဥပေဒ ခ်ဳိးေဖာက္သူမ်ားက ေၾကာက္ရြံ႕႐ိုေသလာရေအာင္ အမွန္တရား ေဖာ္ထုတ္ေရးကို ရဲဝံ့တည္ၾကည္စြာ မဆုတ္မနစ္ ႀကိဳးပမ္းေဆာင္ရြက္ၾကပါ၊” 
ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခ႐ုိင္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ား လုပ္ငန္းညိႇႏႈိင္းအစည္းအေဝးတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲ၊ 
အတြင္းေရးမႉး (၁) ဒုတိယဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ေျပာၾကားသည့္ လမ္းၫႊန္အမွာစကား၊ စာမ်က္ႏွာနံပါတ္မပါ။ (“State Law and Order 
Restoration Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s Address at the Work 
Coordination Meeting of State, Divisional and District Judges and Law Officers,” n.pag.) 
20 “တရားစီရင္ေရး၏ အဓိကတာဝန္သည္ အမွန္ကို ရွာေဖြေဖာ္ထုတ္ျခင္းပင္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ အမွန္ကို ေတြ႕ၿပီးမွ ဥပေဒႏွင့္အညီ မွန္ကန္မွ်တစြာ 
ဆံုးျဖတ္ႏိုင္မည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ တရားစီရင္ေရးႏွင့္ သက္ဆိုင္သည့္အေျခခံအခ်က္မ်ားကို ပိုင္ႏိုင္ရန္လိုေၾကာင္း၊ အခ်က္အလက္မ်ားႏွင့္ ဥပေဒတို႔က 
အမႈကို ဆံုးျဖတ္ျခင္းျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ မိမိတို႔ခ်မွတ္သည့္ စီရင္ခ်က္သည္ အမွန္တရားသာ ျဖစ္ထြန္းေစရမည္ဆိုသည့္ သႏၷိ႒ာန္ခ်ၿပီး ေဆာင္ရြက္ၾကရန္ႏွင့္ 
မိမိကိုယ္တိုင္ အဂတိလိုက္စားမႈကင္းရွင္းၿပီး မိမိလက္ေအာက္ဝန္ထမ္းမ်ား အဂတိလုိက္စားမႈမ်ား မျဖစ္ေပၚေစေရးအတြက္ အစဥ္တစိုက္ ၾကပ္မတ္ 
ေဆာင္ရြက္သြားၾကရန္ လိုေၾကာင္း”။ တရားစီရင္ေရး၏ အဓိကတာဝန္သည္ အမွန္ကို ရွာေဖြေဖာ္ထုတ္ျခင္းျဖစ္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ၊္ 
စက္တင္ဘာလ ၄ ရက္၊ စာ ၁။ (“Main Duty of Judiciary Is Uncovering of the Truth,” Myanma Alin 4 Sept. 
2011: 1.)  
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concepts from former periods, brushing against incessant reminders about 
virtuous public service—on which I will have more to say in chapter five. The legal 
rhetoric of the pragmatic state distinguishes itself not by rejecting former 
doctrines in favour of new ones, but by adopting and incorporating literally 
everything that has come before, and all of it in the name of the rule of law.  
 
What of the levelling out of injunctions? That different types of injunctions have 
approximately the same coercive value is not to be taken literally. Not every 
injunction carries the same weight or is of the same type. The system 
differentiates functionally between one type of injunction and another, as it must, 
since it values and uses the procedural apparatus that it has inherited. But in a 
state where legislative, judicial and executive powers are not separated, or are 
separated in a descriptive sense, “to the extent possible”, the differentiation 
between a law, a regulation and an order is pragmatic.21 The difference between 
one and the next is a question of efficacy, of usefulness, of functionality.  
 
The levelling out of different types of injunctions is reinforced semantically, such 
as in a speech by the chief justice to judicial personnel in 1999, that the state had 
as its goal a “judicial system on which the entire people can trust and rely, in 
which judicial tasks are undertaken in accordance with established laws, rules, 
procedures, orders and instructions, with political views, economic views, social 
views and administrative views based on the state’s policies and aims”, or as at 
the end of 2008 when he remarked that, “The duty of the judiciary is to search for 
and reveal the authentic truth, so as to solve grievances in accordance with law. 
This goal is attainable with the codes of conduct imposed in law, rules, 
procedures, handbooks, instructions, etc.”22 These lists of injunctions are, I think, 
                                                        
21 The 2008 Constitution in section 11(a) declares powers between branches of government formally 
separated “to the extent possible” (“တတ္ႏိုင္သမွ်”). 
22 “တရားစီရင္ေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားေဆာင္ရြက္ရာမွာ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ရဲ႕မုူဝါဒမ်ား၊ ဦးတည္ခ်က္မ်ားအေပၚအေျခခံ၍ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအျမင္၊ စီးပြားေရးအျမင္၊ 
လူမႈေရးအျမင္န႔ဲ စီမံခန္႔ခြဲေရးအျမင္မ်ားျဖင့္ တည္ဆဲဥပေဒ၊ နည္းဥပေဒ၊ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္း၊ အမိန္႔၊ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္အညီ ျပည္သတူစ္ရပ္လံုးက 
ယံုၾကည္ကိုးစားအားကိုးလာေစႏိုင္မယ့္ တရားစီရင္ေရးစနစ”္။ တရားေရးဝန္ထမ္းအရာရွိမ်ား အထူးမြမ္းမံသင္တန္းအမွတ္စဥ္ (၁) သင္တန္းဆင္းပြဲ 
အခမ္းအနားက်င္းပျခင္း၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ျပန္တမ္း၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၁။ (“Judicial Officers Special Refresher 
Course No. 1 Closing Ceremony Held,” Supreme Court Gazette 26 Mar. 1999: 11.) The contents of 
this speech, like many of those by this chief justice, were a reiteration of a speech given earlier by an 
army officer, in this case: ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင္ ့ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရး ေကာင္စီ အတြင္းေရးမႉး (၁) ဒုတိယဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ 
ဗဟိုဝန္ထမ္းတကၠသိုလ္ တရားေရးဝန္ထမ္းအရာရွိမ်ား အထူးမြမ္းမံသင္တန္း အမွတ္စဥ္ (၁) သင္တန္းဖြင့္ပြဲတြင္ မိန္႔ၾကားသည့္အမွာစကား၊ 
တရားေရးဂ်ာနယ၊္ အတြဲ (၁) အမွတ္ (၅) (၁၉၉၉) ၊ စာ ၇-၁၄။ [“State Peace and Development Council Secretary-1 
Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s Address at the Opening of the Judicial Officers Special Refresher 
Course No. 1, Central Civil Service Institute,” Judicial Journal 1.5 (1999): 7-14.] “တရားစီရင္ေရးတာဝန္ဟာ 
အမွန္တရားရွာေဖြေဖာ္ထတု္ၿပီး နစ္နာမႈမ်ားကို ဥပေဒန႔ဲအညီ ကုစားေပးဖို႔ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အဲဒီရည္မွန္းခ်က္ ျပည့္ေျမာက္ ေအာင္ျမင္ေစေရးအတြက္ 
ဥပေဒ၊ နည္းဥပေဒ၊ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းမ်ား၊ လိုက္နာက်င့္သံုးရမယ့္ လက္စြဲမ်ား၊ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ားအစရွိတဲ့ စည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္း က်င့္ဝတ္မ်ားန႔ဲ 
ထိန္းကြပ္ေပးထားျခင္း ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။” ဒုတိယၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ား မြမ္းမံသင္တန္းအမွတ္စဥ္ (၆) သင္တန္းဆင္းပြဲအခမ္းအနားတြင္ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရားသူႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ ေျပာၾကားသည့္မိန္႔ခြန္း၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ ္ျပန္တမ္း၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၄ ရက္၊ စာ ၄။ (“Chief Justice’s 
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not merely inventories of juridical instruments and other paraphernalia that 
judges need to have a their disposal. They are inventories of like types of 
instruments and paraphernalia. In the criminal juridical system as police, laws, 
rules, procedures, orders and instructions occupy the same lexical and semantic 
plane. They all serve the state’s interests; all carry the same rhetorical weight for 
the senior official admonishing judicial personnel to do their jobs correctly.23  
 
Lastly, in the criminal juridical system as police, administrative ideals 
predominate. These ideals are concerned with efficiency and accuracy, with things 
that can be measured and compared statistically, with evidence of continued 
cooperation and coordination among departments, agencies and their personnel. 
Many of the practices associated with these ideals were, as I have discussed in 
previous chapters, inculcated in earlier periods and are not unique to the current 
system. However, through the conflating of law and order with taya-ubade-
somoye, the rule of law, they have obtained a particular force and urgency. The 
reason is, as Foucault has observed, that police has as an instrument for the 
measurement of success or failure the use of statistics.24 Police needs to be able to 
count and measure. Therefore we see in the internal records of the period 
following 1988 a constant concern with systematic and efficient working 
procedures, with faster and more accurate sentencing, and with longer, harsher 
sentences—with more deterrent sentencing in more types of cases.  
 
To illustrate, among offences that the stream of injunctions after 1988 frequently 
mentions as cause for deterrent sentencing are those concerned with narcotic 
drugs. From 1962 to 1988 the apex courts issued about ten injunctions to 
subordinates on narcotics, but at least eight were issued in the following decade 
alone, each reiterating the contents of the last on the importance of imposing 
harsh punishments.25 The new regime in 1993 passed a law to impose three to 15-
                                                                                                                                                        
Address at Closing Ceremony of Deputy Township Judges Refresher Training No. 6,” Supreme 
Court Gazette 14 Nov. 2008: 4.) 
23 This message is reinforced in written text by the fact that from 1988 to 2010 laws were published 
not separately from other instruments, as in prior years, but in annual volumes together with rules, 
which set down administrative provisions for the implementing of laws by relevant agencies; 
executive orders and announcements covering a wide range of topics; and, proclamations 
appointing and dismissing senior personnel from posts. (I am here referring to the Burmese 
versions of the annual volumes. The English versions contain only laws. I am also stipulating the 
period up to 2010 because at time of wriing I had not seen the first volume issued under the new 
legislature. Ordinarily these volumes are published in the first quarter of the following year.)  
24 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population 315. 
25 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၂/၉၉၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ။ (Supreme Court Instruction No. 2/99, Jan. 1999.) 
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year sentences for use, cultivation, possession and trafficking of drugs.26 Its 
officials also routinely admonished judges and prosecutors on the need for stiff 
sentences, as in another speech by Khin Nyunt, this time in 2002: 
Everyone is aware that the national government has drawn up a 15-year narcotic drugs 
eradication project and in endeavouring to undertake narcotic drugs eradication tasks 
with vigour it has set up central, state, division, district and township Committees for 
Drug Abuse Control which are operating widely. In this context, it is necessary for the 
courts to hand down deterrent punishments under the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Law in narcotic drugs-related criminal cases where guilt is 
established. However, it is observed that some trial courts have not handed down 
deterrent punishments in cases at first instance, and likewise some upper courts also 
have handed down light punishments on revision. Therefore, it must be said that it is 
still necessary for the judicial branch to operate in harmony with the implementing of 
the state’s objectives and projects.27 
 
The Supreme Court has followed up on public admonitions of this sort by 
threatening judges in circulars with disciplinary action for failure to convict 
enough accused persons, and for failure to hand out deterrent sentences.28 
Warnings issued against individual judges are also published in the court’s 
gazette, such as in the case of a judge in the delta who in 2009 let off some alleged 
drug dealers with light penalties and acquittals: 
At a time that the state is doing projects for the prevention and suppression of narcotic 
drugs as a national danger, [this] judge who has a responsibility to uphold and 
implement the state’s policy guidelines did the above things while turning a blind eye to 
the policy guidelines that the state leadership and heads of relevant departments are 
leaving [sic] on deterrent sentencing in criminal cases concerning narcotic drugs.29 
                                                        
26 မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးႏွင့္ စိတ္ကိုေျပာင္းလဲေစေသာ ေဆးဝါမ်ားဆိုင္ရာ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁/၉၃၊ ပုဒ္မ ၁၅-၂၀။ (The Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Law, No. 1/93, sections 15-20.) The next chapter contains some discussion 
of cases under this law. 
27 “ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရအေနန႔ဲ မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးပေပ်ာက္ေရး (၁၅) ႏွစ္ စီမံကိန္းကို ေရးဆြဲဲၿပီး၊ မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးပေပ်ာက္ေရးလုပ္ငန္းေတြကို အရွိန္ 
အဟုန္န႔ဲ ႀကိဳးပမ္းေဆာင္ရြက္လ်က္ရွိရာမွာ ဗဟို၊ ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခရိုင္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးန႔ဲ စိတ္ကို ေျပာင္းလဲေစေသာ ေဆးဝါးမ်ား အႏၱရာယ္ 
တားဆီးကာကြယ္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲေတြကို ဖဲြ႔စည္းၿပီး က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနတာ အားလံုး အသိပဲ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒီလိုအေျခအေနမွာ မူးယစ္ 
ေဆးဝါးဆိုင္ရာ မႈခင္းေတြန႔ဲ ပတ္သက္လို႔ျပစ္မႈ ထင္ရွားရင္ မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးႏွင့္ စိတ္ကို ေျပာင္းလဲေစေသာ ေဆးဝါးမ်ားဆိုင္ရာ ဥပေဒအရ ထိေရာက္ 
ဟန္႔တားေလာက္တဲ့ ျပစ္ဒဏ္ကို တရားရံုးေတြက ခ်မွတ္ဖို႔ လိုပါတယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့္ မူလအမႈေတြကို စီရင္တဲ့ အခ်ဳိ႕တရားရုံးေတြက ထိေရာက္ဟန္႔တား 
ေလာက္တဲ့ ျပစ္ဒဏ္ခ်မွတ္ျခင္း မရွိၾကသလို အယူခံမႈ၊ ျပင္ဆင္မႈစီရင္တဲ့ အဆင့္ျမင့္ တရားရုံးအခ်ဳိ႕ဟာလည္း ေပါ႔ေလ်ာ့တဲ့ ျပစ္ဒဏ္ေတြ ခ်မွတ္ 
ေနတာကို ေတြ႔ရွိေနပါတယ္။ ဒါ႔ေၾကာင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ရဲ႕ ရည္မွန္းခ်က္ေတြ၊ စီမံကိန္းေတြကို အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ရာမွာ တရားစီရင္ေရးက႑ကလည္း 
ဟန္ခ်က္ညီညီ လိုက္ပါေဆာင္ရြက္ဖို႔ လုိေနေသးတယ္လို႔ ေျပာၾကားလိုပါတယ္။” ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ (၉) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ သူနာျပဳတကၠသိုလ္၌ 
က်င္းပေသာ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရုံးႏွင့္ ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ား၊ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ားမွ တရားစီရင္ေရးဆိုင္ရာ ၾသဝါဒခံယူျခင္း 
အခမ္းအနားတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီ အတြင္းေရးမွဴး (၁) ဒုတိယဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ ေျပာၾကားသည့္ မိန္႔ခြန္း၊ စာ 
၁၂။ (“State Peace and Development Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s Address on 
9 July 2002 at the Institute of Nursing to Supreme Court, Office of the Attorney General and State, 
Division and District Judges and Law Officers Assembled for Receipt of Advice on Judicial Affairs,” 
12.)  
28 Such as contained in တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၄/၉၂၊ ၁၉၉၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court 
Instruction No. 4/92, 28 Sept. 1992.) တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၁/၉၉၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၅ ရက္။ (Supreme 
Court Instruction No. 1/99, 5 Jan. 1999.) တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၄/၉၉၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၇ ရက္။ 
(Supreme Court Instruction No. 4/99, 7 July 1999.) တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ စာအမွတ္ ၂၀၁၆၃/ျပစ္ယူ/၉၉၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ 
၁၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Letter No. 20163/PyitYu/99, 16 Dec. 1999.) တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၁/၂၀၀၁၊ 
၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Instruction No. 1/2001, 2 Feb. 2001.)  
29 “မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးကို ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္မွ အမ်ဳိးသားေရးအႏၱရာယ္တစ္ရပ္အျဖစ္ စီမံကိန္းမ်ားခ်မွတ္၍ ကာကြယ္တားဆီးႏွိိမ္နင္းေရးမ်ား ျပဳလုပ္ေနသည္ ့
အခ်ိန္တြင္ မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးႏွင့္ပတ္သက္ေသာျပစ္မႈမ်ားကို ထိေရာက္ဟန္႔တားေသာျပစ္ဒဏ္မ်ားခ်မွတ္ရန္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အႀကီးအကဲမ်ားႏွင့္ ဌာနဆိုင္ရာ 
အႀကီးအကဲမ်ားမွ မူဝါဒသဖြယ္ လမ္းညႊန္မႈယူထားပါလ်က္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၏ မူဝါဒလမ္းညႊန္ခ်က္မ်ားကို ထိန္းသိမ္းေစာင့္ေရွာက္အေကာင္အထည္ 
ေဖာ္ရန္ တာဝန္ရွိသည့္ တရားသူႀကီးတစ္ဦးအေနျဖင့္ အထက္ပါအခ်က္မ်ားကို လ်စ္လ်ဴရွဳ၍ ေဆာင္ရြက္ခဲ့သည္။” တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ 
၇၃/၂၀၀၉၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၀ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 73/2009, 10 Oct. 2009.)  
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Closely related to deterrent sentencing, and a subject also of repeated circulars, is 
speed in handling of cases as evidence of efficiency.30 Courts across South Asia 
with substantially the same body of procedural law as in Myanmar can take 
decades to resolve ordinary criminal cases.31 In Myanmar, by contrast, the 
emphasis on efficiency ensures that criminal cases are processed relatively 
quickly. For an ordinary case to progress from the court of first instance to the 
apex court can take as little as fourteen to sixteen months, again with individual 
judges being officially reprimanded for delayed cases caused by inefficiency.32 
Speedy dispatch not only improves court statistics, which are tabulated and 
submitted to higher courts regularly, but also helps to dispel allegations of 
malfeasance, because anti-corruption rhetoric associates the acceptance of bribes 
with delays to cases.33 
 
One administrative ideal guiding the work of the criminal juridical system as 
police that is relevant to the contents of this chapter but which is not written 
explicitly into the contents of most internal directives and notifications is the 
ideal of secrecy. Max Weber once observed that a core principle of bureaucratic 
administration is to minimise public knowledge of what it is being done.34 The 
criminal juridical system in Myanmar has for some two decades operated by this 
principle without ever professing it. We do not see any expressions of secrecy as 
an ideal in its official narrative, since it is an ideal that does not offer itself up 
publicly. But the principle is on display through a range of practices, which 
convey a message that nobody has any particular right to know what is going on 
within the system.  
 
The ideal of secrecy is manifest in the disappearance of trial from the public 
media. In contrast to the 1950s and even most of the 1960s, when trials or legal 
issues were on the pages of state and private media alike, and even, to a lesser 
extent, in contrast to state media in the following two decades, after 1988 news 
                                                        
30 Such as contained in တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ စာအမွတ္ ၆၀၄/စု ၁၁/(၇/၂၀၀၃) ၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၁၃ ရက္။ [Supreme Court 
Letter No. 604/Su 11/(7/2007), 13 Feb. 2003.]  
31 As discussed in Salar M. Khan, “Judicial Delays to Criminal Trials in Delhi,” Article 2 7.2 (2008): 
7-60. 
32 As for example in တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၆-၇/၂၀၀၃၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၃၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order Nos. 
46-7/2003, 31 Mar. 2003.) 
33 As in တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမွာစာ၊ စာအမွတ္ ၆၉၀/၃၄/၉၁(လထန) ၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂၅ ရက္။ [Supreme Court 
Memorandum, Letter No. 690/34/89(LaTaNa), 25 Jan. 1989.] 
34 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, trans. Ephraim Fischoff 
et al., eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 3 (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of 
California Press, 1968) 992. 
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about the work of courts in Myanmar practically ceased. Judges do not appear on 
television or in print unless being lectured by an army officer or the chief justice. 
They appear as endnotes to articles on the arrest of drug dealers and human 
traffickers, the sentences they hand down recorded as formalities following the 
hard work of the police and other officials. Now and then, they have participated 
in a show trial, such as in the 2009 case against Aung San Suu Kyi for alleged 
violation of the terms of her house arrest.35 What they have stopped doing 
publicly is to adjudicate.  
 
To the extent that the criminal juridical system has appeared in the public realm 
it has been in the shape of the police force. In burgeoning private sector news 
journals and magazines, crime reports consist of accounts drawn from police 
station records, complete with photographs of apprehended perpetrators and 
evidence to prove guilt. Of course, such publications are a staple of the media 
consumed in practically all parts of Asia, but in Myanmar the growing presence in 
the media of the policeman has not so far corresponded with the reappearance of 
the judge. The police investigate speedily, apprehend suspects, and charge them. 
Then a sentence is imposed. The policeman, not the judge, occupies both the 
pages of periodicals and public space as the physical embodiment and foremost 
representative of the rule of law. 
 
The special role that the policeman plays in the system as police is the topic of the 
third section in this chapter. However, before turning to the policeman, I must 
discuss his opposite number: the public enemy, the criminalised adversary who 
gives meaning to the policeman’s role as bearer of sovereign authority, and on 
whose body law and order is inscribed through the use of torture. 
Prosecuting the public enemy 
Carl Schmitt thought a great deal about enemies, so it is convenient to begin this 
section of the chapter with him. Schmitt considered that, “The endeavour of a 
normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the state and its 
territory. … As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal 
peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy.”36 
                                                        
35 ဒုရဲမွဴးႀကီးေဇာ္မင္းေအာင္ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚေအာင္ဆန္းစုၾကည္ ပါ ၄၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၇၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၁ ရက္၊ ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ဦးေသာင္းၫြန္႔ (ဥကၠ႒) ၊ ခရိုင္တရားသူႀကီး ဦးညီညီစိုး။ [Police Lieutenant Colonel Zaw 
Min Aung v. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi & 3, 2009 Criminal Case No. 47, Yangon Northern District 
Court, 11 Aug. 2009, District Judge U Thaung Nyunt (Chairman), District Judge U Nyi Nyi Soe.] 
36 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago & London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007) 46.  
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The law-and-order mind-set is on full display here. The state seeks total peace, a 
perfectly orderly territory, which is a territory free from conflict or strife. This 
goal necessitates the eliminating of internal enemies. Schmitt is not much 
concerned with the idea that an enemy exists. He takes the existence of an enemy 
to be the defining characteristic of politics.37 Nor is he bothered by what is to be 
done with the enemy. What troubles him is the question of how the enemy is to be 
identified, and the formula that can be used to decide upon the enemy, which he 
reminds us, is always the public enemy.38 So the question for a criminal juridical 
system in pursuit of a public enemy is, who is the public enemy? How do we know 
her when we see her?  
 
So far as the criminal juridical system of Myanmar is concerned, my answer to 
this question is that the public enemy is merely the person from whom sovereign 
cetana has been withdrawn, the person whose attempts to exercise entitlements 
cease to be efficacious, not because the attempts are flawed legally, but because 
the person is flawed politically. From this description, I may appear to have 
confused the consequences of being classed as a public enemy with the prior 
qualities of being one. But I do not think so. To engage in a search for prior, 
independently standing defining qualities of the public enemy within the 
operations of the state that justifies its existence on the maintenance of law and 
order would not only be fruitless, but would also be to misunderstand the nature 
of this state. Because it is pragmatic, within its discretionary framework the state 
is entitled to decline to stipulate in advance how it will behave in response to a 
specific situation or specific case, including in the identification and manner of 
action taken against public enemies. Therefore, the withdrawal of sovereign 
cetana—not through direct sovereign intervention but through the mechanical 
operation of police—is not a consequence of prior classification as an adversary. It 
occurs simultaneously with that classification. 
 
Because sovereign cetana is withdrawn from the public enemy, she is no longer 
able to exercise legal entitlements as she would ordinarily. In the juridical system, 
the radical distinction between the public enemy and the other criminal accused 
is that the latter person may still use the system’s vestigial procedural defences. 
The latter person can also attempt to buy her way out of a case, or out of some 
                                                        
37 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 26. 
38 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 28. 
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aspect of a case, as discussed in the next chapter. The public enemy can do neither 
of these things. Police, not law or marketplace, determines her fate.  
 
This method of classing and dealing with the public enemy strips her of her legal 
entitlements and also of her political potency. A criminalised enemy is still 
politically dangerous. After criminalisation, a further step is required to deny the 
public enemy a political quality. The absence of any distinctive formulation for 
the public enemy achieves that purpose, since it makes the accused person 
politically irrelevant. The public enemy is nobody other than any criminal 
offender. To Schmitt, this formulation would be paradoxical, since if the political 
quality of a public enemy is denied, how could she be an enemy? Yet, for years the 
state in Myanmar did deny the existence of either political offences or political 
prisoners, even while it daily broadcast a slogan that urged people to “Identify 
and annihilate internal and external destructionists as the public enemy.”39 In 
short, the enemy was everywhere, but through a juridical process she could be 
disappeared—not physically, but politically. 
 
The most radical withdrawal of sovereign cetana comes through revocation of a 
person’s citizenship. Since, as discussed in the last chapter, all entitlements that 
people enjoy flow from sovereign authority towards those who are designated as 
citizens, the withdrawal of citizenship constitutes the most complete withdrawal 
of those entitlements. Therefore, I am going to begin the empirical contents of 
this chapter by narrating a case on the withdrawal of citizenship from a public 
enemy, in order to illustrate and further explicate the argument. 
 
The case is that of U Kyaw Min, a graduate from the Institute of Economics and 
Institute of Education in Yangon who at age forty-six gave up his job to be elected 
in 1990 to a seat in the never-to-be-convened parliament for the National Human 
Rights Democratic Party, representing ethnic Rohingya. As mentioned in the 
                                                        
39 “ျပည္တြင္းျပည္ပ အဖ်က္သမားမ်ားအား ဘံုရန္သူအျဖစ္ သတ္မွတ္ေခ်မႈန္းၾက။” My translation; the official English version 
is, “Crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy.” On the non-
existence of political prisoners see for example, Statement by His Excellency U Wunna Maung Lwin, 
Ambassador/ Permanent Representative and leader of the Myanmar delegation to the 10th session 
of the Human Rights Council (Geneva, 17 Mar. 2009). And in the state media: ႏိုင္ျမင့္ (ေတာင္သာ) ၊ 
ႏိုင္ငံေရးျပစ္မႈ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအက်ဥ္းသားႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံဥပေဒျပ႒ာန္းခ်က္မ်ား၊ ျမန္မာအ့လင္း၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၂-၂၄ ရက္၊ စာ ၈-၉။ [Naing 
Myint (Taungthar), “Political Crimes, Political Prisoners and Myanmar Law Provisions,” Myanma 
Alin 22-24 July 2008: 8-9.] Only late in 2011 did the new government partly acknowledge, prior to 
releasing many of them, the existence of what Lieutenant General Ko Ko, the home affairs minister, 
reportedly referred to as “so-called ‘persons held for reasons of conscience’”. (“ယံုၾကည္ခ်က္ေၾကာင့္ 
အက်ဥ္းက်ခံံေနရၿပီးဆိုသူမ်ား”။) Press conference by the home affairs minister, details broadcast on BBC 
Burmese Service evening programme, 15 Jan. 2012. I could not find any details of the press 
conference in the state press. 
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previous chapter, the government refuses to acknowledge that the Rohingya are a 
“national race”. Almost two years after the military regime nullified the 1990 
election results, it also outlawed Kyaw Min’s party, among eight others, on vague 
grounds of non-compliance with political party procedures.40 After being detained 
without charge for three months in the same year as the deregistration order, 
Kyaw Min brought his family to Yangon. There they kept a low profile for some 
years.  
 
In 2005 Kyaw Min met visiting officials from the International Labour 
Organisation and also joined with other successful candidates in the 1990 election 
to call for the parliament to be allowed to sit. One or both of these actions 
prompted a series of criminal cases against Kyaw Min under section 18 of the 
1982 Citizenship Law: that anyone found to have “acquired citizenship by making 
a false representation or by concealment” will lose it. Prosecutors charged not 
only he but also his entire immediate family with allegedly falsifying their 
identities in order to get national registration cards.41 According to them, Kyaw 
Min and his family falsely claimed to belong to national races, when they are 
Bengali. Kyaw Min maintained in his trial in the court of first instance, conducted 
behind closed doors, that he and his family are Rohingya but because the group’s 
existence is not recognised officially when registering for identity documents they 
just followed the advice of officials in putting down whatever ethnic details were 
suggested. Notwithstanding, the Yangon Western District Court sentenced him to 
forty-seven years in prison and his wife, son and two daughters to seventeen years 
each—ten years under section 18 and seven for allegedly disseminating false news 
in breach of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act. It convicted Kyaw Min of four 
separate offences under section 18.42  
 
A lawyer took the family’s appeals to the Supreme Court. 43 He pointed to the 
many breaches of law in the cases against his clients, including that the charges 
                                                        
40 ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပပ္ိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ဂ/၉၂၊ ၁၉၉၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၉ ရက္။ (State Law and Order 
Restoration Council Order No. 8/92, 19 Mar. 1992.)  
41 Formally, prosecutors in Myanmar are refered to as “law officers” (ဥပေဒအရာရွ)ိ. For simplicity’s 
sake, throughout this study I refer to them by the generic term, prosecutor.  
42 The basic facts as decided by the court of first instance are set out in ရဲမွဴးေစာအဲလ္ဘတ္ ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္မင္း (ခ) 
မာမက္ေရွာင္ရွဳ အေနာရူလာေဟာက္၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၉၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၉ ရက္၊ 
ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး (၄) ။ [Police Major Saw Elbert v. Kyaw Min (a) Md. Shamsul Anwarul Haque, 2005 
Criminal Case No. 49, Yangon Western District Court, 29 July 2005, District Judge-4.] The other 
three cases under section 18 were decided in Criminal Case Nos. 50-52 of the same court, and the 
case under section 5(e) of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act in Criminal Case No. 55. All verdicts 
were issued simultaneously.  
43 Officially, two categories of lawyer exist in Myanmar today. Newly licenced lawyers become 
“higher grade pleaders”, who can practice in all courts except for the Supreme Court. After three 
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had been framed incorrectly; that a mismatch existed between the language in the 
verdicts and the sections of law under which the accused were convicted; and, 
that a key prosecution witness had submitted evidence via document but had not 
been called to the court and therefore could not be cross-examined.44 He pointed 
out that prior to Kyaw Min standing for election in 1990 the authorities had 
scrutinised his and his wife’s backgrounds to determine his eligibility, and had 
not uncovered any irregularities. He cited numerous procedural errors that 
should at very least have greatly reduced the sentences of the accused, even had 
they been found guilty.45  
 
In the Supreme Court, the basic question should have been whether or not the 
defects in the case vitiated the trial. But the judges simply iterated the facts as set 
out in the lower courts and did not attempt to address the defence attorney’s 
arguments as to errors in law.46 The arguments were legally relevant but 
practically pointless because his clients had ceased to be persons with 
entitlements to press legal claims. The minutiae of evidence, facts of the case and 
how they could be interpreted were of issue only so long as the defendants’ legal 
entitlements to make these points, or rather, to make these points stick, could be 
said to exist. Because the system as police insists on at least formal compliance 
with procedure—because the system is held together by rules that still matter for 
administrative reasons—the attorney could raise an appeal. But because the 
                                                                                                                                                        
years of practice, they may apply to become advocates, and work in the Supreme Court also (Courts 
Manual, paragraph 3). As the distinction between the two has little bearing on the contents of this 
study, again for the sake of simplicity, I use the generic term “lawyer” to describe both types. For 
some discussion on these professional distinctions see, Myint Zan, “A Comparison of the First and 
Fiftieth Year of Independent Burma’s Law Reports,” 394. 
44 The basic facts and findings of the Yangon Divisional Court and Supreme Court are set out in: 
ဦးေက်ာ္မင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအယူခံမႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၈၊ ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းတရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၉ ရက္၊ 
တြဲဖက္တိုင္းတရားသူႀကီး ျမင့္ဝင္း။ (U Kyaw Min v. Union of Myanmar, 2005 Criminal Appeal Case No. 138, 
Yangon Divisional Court, 9 Dec. 2005, Additional Divisional Judge Myint Win.) Also 2006 Criminal 
Appeal Case Nos. 139-42. ဦးေက်ာ္မင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂၀၀၆၊ ျပစ္မႈျပင္ဆင္မႈအမွတ္ ၁၄၄(ခ) ၊ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕ 
တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၃ ရက္၊ တရားသူႀကီး ခင္ေမာင္ေအး။ [U Kyaw Min v. Union of Myanmar, 2006 
Criminal Revision No. 144(b), Supreme Court, Yangon, 3 May 2006, Judge Khin Maung Aye.]; also 
2006 Criminal Revision Nos. 145(b), 146(b), 147(b) and 148(b).  
45 These included that under section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code the four identical charges 
laid against Kyaw Min should have been tried as a single offence; that the charge against each of the 
accused under the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act was also in breach of section 403(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, which prohibits the duplication of trial for the same offence or on the 
same facts; and, that the penalties imposed violated section 71 of the Penal Code that, “Where 
anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force… the 
offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could 
award for any one of such offences.” 
46 ဦးေက်ာ္မင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂၀၀၆၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအေထြေထြေလွ်ာက္လႊာ (အထူးအယူခံ) နံပါတ္ ၁၇၇၊ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕ 
တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၃ ရက္၊ တရားသူႀကီး ေဒါက္တာတင္ေအာင္ေအး (သဘပတိ) ၊ တရားသူႀကီး ခ်စ္လြင္ (အဖြ႔ဲဝင္) ။ [U 
Kyaw Min v. Union of Myanmar, 2006 Criminal Miscellaneous Application (Special Appeal) No. 
177, Supreme Court, Yangon, 23 Aug. 2006, Judge Dr Tin Aung Aye, presiding; Judge Chit Lwin.]; 
also 2006 Criminal Miscellaneous Application (Special Appeal) Nos. 178-81.  
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system as police had classed Kyaw Min and his family as public enemies, the 
procedures to give credence to his counsel’s objections ceased to be operative.47  
 
Kyaw Min’s case contains a number of features through which we can proceed to 
examine further what has animated the criminal juridical system of Myanmar in 
its pursuit of public enemies. These features are that the alleged offence need not 
coincide with the actual reason for prosecution; that trial can be conducted 
secretly; and, that procedure matters for the purposes of formal compliance with 
law, which is to say, police demands that the continuum of administrative activity 
follow rules, even if the end result of trial is independent from the process of trial.  
  
One distinguishing feature of Kyaw Min’s case common to many others brought 
against public enemies is that he received most of his sentence not for his political 
activities, which motivated the charges, but for other unrelated offences. 
Prosecutors did not charge Kyaw Min with meeting representatives of the ILO. 
They did not charge him with calling for the parliament to sit. They charged him 
with falsifying his and his family’s identities.  
 
The public enemy need not be accused and convicted of any particular type of 
offence, let alone one that has any bearing on the real reason for his arrest. A case 
against the public enemy, who is potentially any person, can be brought under 
potentially any provision of law. The police have long brought cases against public 
enemies under certain laws designed for the purpose, such as the 1908 Unlawful 
Associations Act and 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, and certain sections of the 
Penal Code, such as those concerning sedition and treason.48 But cases against 
public enemies can be brought under practically any law, and for all manner of 
offences. For example, policemen charged a monk who waited outside the court 
hearing a case against Aung San Suu Kyi during 2009 for alleged violation of the 
terms of her house arrest with insulting religion under section 295(a) of the Penal 
                                                        
47 The authorities released Kyaw Min and family under the 13 January 2012 amnesty. They all 
served around seven years in jail. At time of writing I have no information about their prospects or 
intentions to reapply for citizenship. 
48 In a draft 2010 criminal appeal application to the Supreme Court a lawyer argued for his client, 
who had been convicted under the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, that as no state of emergency 
had been proclaimed in the country at the time that his client was arrested and charged, the use of 
this law against the accused (and by inference, against all persons charged under the law) was 
unjustified. ဝင္းႏိုင္ေက်ာ ္ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအယူခံမႈအမွတ္ ၉၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕၊ 
၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ -- ရက္။ (Win Naing Kyaw v. Union of Myanmar, 2010 Criminal Appeal Case No. 
9, Supreme Court, Yangon, -- Nov. 2010.) The application failed.  
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Code.49 The policemen alleged that the monk had planned to immolate himself, 
despite the absence of material evidence to prove the claim. A court jailed a 
woman who was arrested for collecting video footage to send abroad under, 
among other things, section 5(1) of the Control of Imports and Exports 
(Temporary) Act, 1947 for travelling on the back of an illegally imported 
motorcycle, which the police said she co-owned.50 Other charges brought against 
her included Internet and video offences, and a 15-day sentence for failing to 
register with the local authorities as a visitor at somebody’s house under the 1907 
Towns Act. The police charged a man collecting signatures for a campaign to 
release political detainees with selling illegal lottery tickets in violation of the 
Gambling Act, and also with assaulting a public servant under section 353 of the 
Penal Code.51 Another man collecting signatures arrested separately a court 
convicted of forgery and cheating under sections 420, 465 and 468 of the Penal 
Code. The charges stemmed from his alleged filling in of the petition with the 
names of persons who had not in fact signed it.52  
 
The police prosecuted two men arrested in 2007 allegedly in possession of video 
footage of the wedding of the gold and diamond-encrusted daughter of the then-
head of state, Senior General Than Shwe, under the 1996 Television and Video 
Law—since the CD containing the video had not been approved for distribution—
and section 505(b) of the Penal Code for upsetting public tranquillity, ngyeinwut-
ye. The latter charge is a generic provision reserved for people alleged to have 
threatened public order somehow. In this case the charge was irrelevant to the 
alleged offence, since by definition the upsetting of public tranquillity requires a 
public act, not the concealment of an offending article. The distance between the 
charges and the actual alleged offence are made clear from the contents of the 
verdict: that the video makers, who were neither of the two accused, “had 
narrated and shot images of ordinary working people’s food and interspersed 
                                                        
49 ရဲအုပ္ေဇာ္ဘုန္းဝင္း ႏွင့္ စႏၵာဓိက (ခ) ညီညီလြင္ (ခ) ညီညီစံ၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၅၀၇၊ ဗဟန္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ တြဲဖက္ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး ေဒၚတိုးတိုးယဥ္ [Inspector Zaw Hpone Win v. Sandadhika (a) Nyi Nyi Lwin (a) Nyi Nyi 
San, 2009 Criminal Case No. 507, Bahan Township Court, 2009, Additional Township Judge Daw 
Toe Toe Yein.]  
50 ရဲအုပ္ထင္ေပၚ ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ျမင့္ႏိုင္ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၇၆၃၊ ပခုကၠဴၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၆ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေအးေအးမ။ူ [Inspector Htin Paw v. Maung Myint Naing & Another, 2009 
Criminal Case No. 1763, Pakokku Township Court, 6 Oct. 2009, Township Judge (Special Power) 
Aye Aye Mu.]  
51 လက္ပံတန္းဘူတာ၌ ႏွစ္လံုးထီေရာင္းခ်သူ ဖမ္းမိ၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၀ ရက္၊ စာ ၅။ (“Two-Numeral 
Lottery Sellers Arrested at Letpadan Station,” Myanma Alin 10 Oct. 2006: 5.)  
52 ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အေနျဖင့္ ျပည္ပရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံမႈေတြ က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔အခြင့္အေရးေပးၿပီးေခၚေဆာင္၊ ျပည္ပကေနဝင္ေရာက္လာမႈမျပဳေအာင္ 
နည္းအမ်ဳိးမ်ဳိးန႔ဲေႏွာင့္ယွယ္ဟန္႔တားမႈကိုသံုးၿပီး ပိတ္ပင္ေန၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၃ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၀ (“The State Has 
Given Ample Opportunity to Bring in External Investments; Various Methods and Obstacles Are 
Being Used to Block Them from Coming In,” Myanma Alin 3 Nov. 2006: 10.) 
 126 
them with the images of dress and food at the wedding of the head of state’s 
daughter, the images of dress and food of the military leaders, and images of the 
food of the head of state’s family [and therefore] that footage caused harm to state 
law and order and was seditious towards the heads of the state”.53 Along the same 
lines, two other people who sold a small number of DVDs containing footage of a 
September 2011 farmers’ rally in the delta capital of Pathein were at the end of the 
year facing a case for operating a commercial video business without a licence.54  
 
In the mid-2000s, courts convicted at least two public enemies of giving illegal 
classes in violation of the 1984 Tuition Law. Both had held licences to tutor that 
had lapsed. U Aung Pe had paid the licence fee for a number of years but finally 
refused to do so because he was teaching indigent students for free. A court in 
2005 sentenced him to three years in jail because he spoke to a group of children 
on the birthday of national martyr General Aung San, led them in 
commemorative song, and displayed a t-shirt bearing the image of the hero’s 
daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi. The court verdict makes clear that the t-shirt 
constituted evidence of an offence, despite the fact that it was irrelevant to the 
charge of illegal tutoring.55 In Bago, north of Yangon, a young man named Min 
Min had been working as a private tuition teacher but as he was preparing to go 
abroad for further study, he had not renewed his licence. According to him, he 
had taken down the signboard advertising tuition. Subsequently he held talks on 
human rights in the room where he had previously taught. The township 
authorities claimed that whatever talks he was holding still constituted classes. 
Despite students and local residents testifying on Min Min’s behalf that he had 
ceased giving tutorials, a judge in 2007 said that they lacked firm evidence to back 
their claims, and also gave him three years in jail.56  
                                                        
53 “ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အႀကီးအကဲသမီး၏ မဂၤါလာေဆာင္ဝတ္ဆင္စားေသာက္ပံု စစ္ေခါင္းေဆာင္မ်ား၏ ဝတ္ဆင္စားေသာက္ပံု ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အႀကီးအကဲ 
မိသားစုစားေသာက္ပံုမ်ားကို သာမန္လုပ္သားျပည္သူမ်ား၏ စားေသာက္ပံုမ်ားႏွင့္ ယွဥ္တြဲ၍ ေနာက္ခံစကားေျပာႏွင့ ္ရိုက္ကူူထားေၾကာင္း ထိုရိုက္ 
ကူးခ်က္မ်ားသည္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈကို ထိခုိက္ေစျခင္း ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အႀကီးအကဲမ်ားကို အၾကည္ညိဳပ်က္ေစျခင္း ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း”။ ရဲအုပ္ 
ေက်ာ္ျမသန္း ႏွင့္ သန္းထြန္း ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၁၉၊ ေညာင္တုန္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခႏုွစ္၊ ဧၿပလီ ၂၅ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဒၚေစာႏြ႔ဲႏြ႔ဲဝင္း၊ စာ ၅-၆။ [Inspector Kyaw Mya Than v. Than Htun & Another, 2007 
Criminal Case No. 319, Nyaungdon Township Court, 25 Apr. 2007, Township Judge (Special Power) 
Daw Saw Nwet Nwet Win: 5-6.] Details of the case are contained in Opinion No. 7/2008 (8 May 
2008) of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. 
54 ဦးသိန္းထြန္းဝင္း ႏွင့္ ဦးျမင့္ႏိုင္ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၁၁၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၁၅၂၊ ပုသိမ္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး။ (U Thein Htun Win v. U Myint 
Naing, 2011 Criminal Case No. 4152, Pathein Township Court.) 
55 ဦးစိန္လြင္ ႏွင့္ ခင္ေမာင္ဦး (ခ) ဦးေအာင္ေဖ၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၁၀၊ တြံေတးၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၅ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးေဇာ္ေဇာ္သိန္း။ [U Sein Lwin v. Khin Maung Oo (a) U Aung Hpe, 2005 
Criminal Case No. 210, Twante Township Court, 25 Aug. 2005, Township Judge (Special Power) U 
Zaw Zaw Thein.] 
56 ဦးခ်မ္းေအာင္ ႏွင့္ မင္းမင္း (ခ) လမင္းထြန္း ၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၈၇၄၊ ျပညၿ္မိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၃၀ ရက္၊် ၿမိဳ႕နယ ္
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ခင္ေမာင္ဝင္း။ [U Chan Aung v. Min Min (a) La Min Htun, 2007 Criminal Case No. 
1874, Pyi Township Court, 30 July 2007, Township Judge (Special Power) Khin Maung Win.] 
Higher courts dismissed the case without a hearing. 
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At the time he gave the talks Min Min was a member of a small group called 
Human Rights Defenders and Promoters. Officials targeted and imprisoned some 
forty members of this group as public enemies between about 2006 and 2010.57 
Among them was a man named Myint Naing, who in April 2007 had travelled 
with the group’s founder, Myint Aye and colleagues to meet villagers in the delta. 
On April 18 they were returning on two motorcycles through a nearby village 
when around fifty persons attacked them with sticks, bricks and slingshots, 
resulting in Myint Naing suffering cranial injuries for which he had to be 
hospitalised, along with another of the group. Two days later, Myint Naing lodged 
a complaint in which he alleged that while the mob attacked, officials stood to one 
side with the local secretary of the government’s Union Solidarity and 
Development Association who yelled through a loudhailer, “Hit them! Beat them! 
Beat them to death!”58 The state media put the events somewhat differently: 
It is known that human rights show-off provocateur Myint Aye [and party]… assembled 
around 20 Ingapo villagers, and Myint Aye read from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, that he said for victims of human rights violations in Ingapo village to 
speak up about these and that they would submit them to the Universal Human Rights 
Commission [sic], that then the villagers replied that, in our village there are no such 
matters to speak of and that there are also no human rights violations. It is known that 
then, as by showing off human rights they could not cause trouble, Myint Aye and party 
went on the morning of April 18 from Ingapo village to Oatpone village… [and] stirred 
up the villagers. It is known that Oatpone villagers who had no need for those 
incitements… yelled, “Your coming hurts our village and divides the villagers”, and 
beating them up, drove them from the village.59  
 
Before the victims of assault had even had a chance for their complaint against 
the attackers to be heard, this account made clear that they had no prospect of 
obtaining any redress.60 It also made clear why they had no prospect. The attack 
                                                        
57 Concerning Human Rights and Burma’s Election (Yangon: Human Rights Defenders and 
Promoters, 2010), 10. 
58 “ခ်ကြ၊ ရိုက္ကြ၊ ေသေအာင္ရိုက္ကြ”။ Copy of signed complaint letter; dated 20 Apr. 2007.  
59 “လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးကို ဗန္းျပေသြးထိုးလႈံ႕ေဆာ္ေနသူ ျမင့္ေအး xxx အဂၤပိုက်းရြာသူရြာသား ၂၀ ခန္႔အား စုရံုး၍ ျမင့္ေအးက အျပည္ျပည္ဆိုင္ရာ 
လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးေၾကးညာစာတမ္းပါ စာသားမ်ားအား ဖတ္ျပခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ အဂၤပိုေက်းရြာတြင္ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ခံရသူမ်ားရွိပါက ၎တို႔အား 
ေျပာၾကားရန္ႏွင့္ ၎တို႔အေနျဖင့္ အျပည္ျပည္ဆိုင္ရာလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးေကာ္မရွင္သို႔ ဆက္လက္တင္ျပေပးမည္ဟု ေျပာဆိုခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ ထိုအခါ 
ရြာသူရြာသားမ်ားက မိမိတို႔ေက်းရြာတြင္ ယင္းကဲသို႔ေသာ ကိစၥမ်ားေျပာဆိုရန္မရွိေၾကာင္း၊ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္မႈလည္းမရွိေၾကာင္း ျပန္လည္ 
ေျပာၾကားခဲ့သည္ဟု သိရွိရသည္။ ထိုသို႔လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးကို ဗန္းျပလ်က္ ျပႆနာျဖစ္ေအာင္လုပ္၍မရသည့္အခါ ျမင့္ေအးႏွင့္အဖြ႔ဲသည္ ဧၿပီ          
၁၈ ရက္ေန႔ နံနက္တြင္ အဂၤပိုေက်းရြာမွ အုတ္ပံုေက်းရြာသို႔ ဆက္လက္သြားေရာက္ခဲ့ၾကၿပီး xxx ရြာသားမ်ားအၾကား စည္းရံုးေသြးထိုးမႈမ်ား 
ျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့ၾကေၾကာင္း သိရွိရသည္။ ထိုသို႔ရြာသူရြာသားမ်ားအၾကား ေသြးထိုးလံႈ႕ေဆာ္ျခင္းမ်ား xxx ကို မလိုလားၾကေသာ အုတ္ပံုရြာသူရြာသားမ်ားက 
“မင္းတို႔လာ၍ ရြာနာေၾကာင္း၊ ရြာသူရြာသားေတြ စိတ္ဝမ္းကြဲရေၾကာင္း” ေျပာဆိုေအာ္ဟစ္ၿပီး ဝိုင္းဝန္းထိုးႀကိတ္ရိုက္ႏွက္၍ ေက်းရြာမွ 
ေမာင္းထုတ္ခဲ့ၾကေၾကာင္း သိရွိရသည္။” မတည္ၿငိမ္မႈႏွင့္ ဆူပူလႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားျဖစ္ပြားေအာင္ ျပည္သူလူထုအား အႀကိမ္ႀကိမ္ေသြးထိုးလႈံ႔ေဆာ္မႈ 
က်ဴးလြန္ခဲ့သည့္ ထင္ေက်ာ္ (ေခၚ) ေက်ာ္ထင္ႏွင့္ NLD ပါတီဝင္အခ်ဳိ႕ သဃၤးကၽြန္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္စံျပေစ်းေရွ႕တြင္ ဆူပူလႈပ္ရွားမႈႏွင့္ လူစုလူေဝးျဖစ္ေအာင္ 
ထပ္မံလုပ္ေဆာင္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၃ ရက္၊ စာ ၂၀၊ ၁၁။ [“Htin Kyaw (Alias) Kyaw Htin and Some NLD 
Party Members Who Have Repeatedly Committed Instigations against the People in Order to Cause 
Unrest and Disturbances Again Try to Cause a Disturbance and Throng at the Front of the Sanpya 
Market, Thingangyun Township,” Myanma Alin 23 Apr. 2007: 20, 11.]  
60 ကိုျမင့္ႏိုင္ (ခ) ကိုျမင့္လႈိင္ ႏွင့္ ဦးၫြန္႔ဦး ပါ ၁၂၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၇၇၉ ၊ ဟသၤာတၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး ေလွ်ာက္လႊာ၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ 
၂ ရက္။ [Ko Myint Naing (a) Ko Myint Hlaing v. U Nyunt Oo & 11, 2007 Criminal Case No. 779, 
Hinthada Township Court, Application, 2 May 2007.] 
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might have been illegal, but it was provoked, and deserved. Conversely, cases 
brought by the local authorities against members of the human rights group and 
local villagers who had worked with them ended in convictions. The officials 
lodged one case under section 505(b)(c) of the Penal Code, for upsetting public 
tranquillity, and for incitement. Although ten villagers came at personal risk as 
witnesses for the defence, the judge sentenced the two accused to four years in 
prison each.61 Another case related not to events in April but to a list of grievances 
against the activists that had apparently motivated the attack.62 These included 
that in December 2006 the village abbot and elders had organised people to clear 
bushes and tidy up along the roadside but that the defendants accused them of 
using forced labour; that they had meddled in at least two local criminal cases, 
accusing the authorities of wrongfully charging and assaulting the defendant in 
one and siding with an influential party in another; and, that they had sown 
discord in the local religious community over a range of matters. For these 
offences the four accused each again received four years. 
 
Myint Aye was not on this occasion imprisoned, as he had not been travelling 
with the group when it met with the mob, but police officers took him from his 
house after he spoke on radio about conditions following the cyclone that swept 
through the delta in May 2008 killing over 100,000 people. In September that 
year the police chief described him as the mastermind of a terrorist network who 
had confessed to having “used over 70 million Kyat for work of his [human rights 
group] and as donations to victims of Cyclone Nargis, and for exploding bombs at 
government offices and for domestic bombing work”.63 Myint Aye and two alleged 
conspirators subsequently testified in court that the police had tortured them to 
extract confessions—a subject to which I will return in the next section. Although 
they reportedly also complained of torture in other cases before another court, the 
                                                        
61 ဦးဝင္ေဇာ္ဦး ႏွင့္ ကိုျမင့္ႏိုင္ (ခ) ကိုျမင့္လႈိင္ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၇၄၂၊ ဟသၤာတၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၄ ရက္။ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေအာင္မင္း။ [U Win Zaw Oo v. Ko Myint Naing (a) Ko Myint Hlaing & 
Another, 2007 Criminal Case No. 742, Hinthada Township Court, 24 July 2007, Township Judge 
(Special Power) Aung Min.]  
62 ဦးေအာင္သန္း ႏွင့္ ကိုျမင့္ႏိုင္ (ခ) ကိုျမင့္လႈိင္ ပါ ၅၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၇၄၃၊ ဟသၤာတၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိငု္လ ၂၄ ရက္။ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေအာင္မင္း။ [U Aung Than v. Ko Myint Naing (a) Ko Myint Hlaing & 4, 2007 
Criminal Case No. 743, Hinthada Township Court, 24 July 2007, Township Judge (Special Power) 
Aung Min.] 
63 “ေငြက်ပ္သိန္း ၇၀၀ ေက်ာ္ကို ၎ရဲ႕ HRDP လုပ္ငန္းမ်ား၊ နာဂစ္မုန္တိုင္းဒဏ္ခံသူမ်ားကို လွဴဒါန္းရန္၊ အစိုးရဌာနရံုးမ်ားကို ဗံုးေဖာက္ခြဲရန္န႔ဲ 
ျပည္တြင္းေဖာက္ခြဲေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားအတြက္ သံုးစြဲခဲ့ေၾကာင္း”။ FDB အပါအဝင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ကို ဆန္႔က်င္ေနၾကတဲ့ ျပည္ပက အဖြဲ႕အစည္းေတြဟာ 
ဒီမိုကေရစီန႔ဲ လူအခြင့္အေရးကို ဟန္ေဆာင္ဗန္းျပၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံတကာရဲ႕ ေပးစာကမ္းစာအျဖစ္ ရရွိလာတဲ့ေငြေတြကို အစိုးရဆန္႔က်င္ေရး၊ ျပည္တြင္း 
ဆူပူေရး၊ ေဖာက္ခဲြဖ်က္ဆီးေရးလုပ္ငန္းေတြမွာ အသြင္ေျပာင္းအသံုးျပဳေန၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၈ ရက္၊ စာ ၈။ (“FDB 
and Other Anti-State External Groups on Pretence of Democracy and Human Rights Misusing 
International Community’s Charity for Anti-Government Enterprises, Internal Unrest and 
Destruction,” Myanma Alin 8 Sept. 2008: 8.) 
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presiding judge in those cases omitted from his verdicts any reference to the 
alleged torture.64  
 
The trials of Myint Aye and his co-accused, like those against Kyaw Min and his 
family, were heard in “reserved” or separated courtrooms.65 Reserved trials are 
not analogous to military tribunals of the sort that the new regime set up to try 
offenders under the martial law provisions in the wake of the 1988 protests, nor 
are they like the special courts established in preceding eras to exempt trial from 
ordinary criminal procedure. The juridical space for the holding of closed trial is a 
part of the ordinary law. Under section 352 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a 
judge has authority to select the place of trial and also to issue orders to exclude 
“the public generally, or any particular person” from the premises. The provision 
is grounded in concern for the security of the court, as set out in paragraph 48(1) 
of the Courts Manual. In practice, closed trials have in the contemporary period 
been held on orders issued from the Supreme Court, not usually on the initiative 
of judges assigned to cases.66  
 
As the point of holding trial behind closed doors is to keep people out, authorities 
have various techniques to obstruct defence counsel, family members and friends 
of accused persons trying to get in. Sometimes these methods have included 
harassment at the prison gates, including full body searches, methodical checking 
of bags, and, in the case of lawyers, even checking inside the traditional 
headscarves that they wear as part of their uniform.67 At other times guards have 
simply refused entry, as a lawyer for two jailed parliamentarians elected in 1990 
learned when he arrived at the central prison for hearings. A court in 2009 
sentenced his two clients, unrepresented, to twenty-seven years in jail for sending 
an open letter to the United Nations Secretary General on the topic of, “The role 
                                                        
64 ရဲအုပ္စိုးလြင္ ႏွင့္ ရန္ေရႊ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၀၂၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္၊ 
ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ေသာင္းၫြန္႔၊ စာ ၄။ (Inspector Soe Lwin v. Yan Shwe & Two, 2008 Criminal Case No. 102, 
Yangon Northern District Court, 28 Nov. 2008, District Judge Thaung Nyunt: 4.) The other two 
cases were: ရဲအုပ္ရန္ႏိုင ္ႏွင့္ ျမင့္ေအး၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၁၉၅၊ အင္းစိန္ၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးေစာလြင။္ [Inspector Yan Naing v. Myint Aye, 2008 Criminal Case No. 
2195, Insein Township Court, 28 Nov. 2008, Township Judge (Special Power) U Saw Lwin.] 
ရဲအုပ္ရန္ႏိုင ္ႏွင့္ ရန္ေရႊ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၁၉၆၊ အင္းစိန္ၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး 
(အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးေစာလြင။္ [Inspector Yan Naing v. Yan Shwe, 2008 Criminal Case No. 2196, Insein 
Township Court, 28 Nov. 2008, Township Judge (Special Power) U Saw Lwin.] 
65 The courts are not described as closed but as “သီးသန္႔”—reserved or separated, usually translated to 
English as “special”.  
66 As explained by the new chief justice, U Tun Tun Oo in “Second Regular Session of First Pyithu 
Hluttaw Continues for Fifth Day,” New Light of Myanmar 27 Aug. 2011: 7. 
67 As mentioned in ေဒၚခင္မ်ဳိးသက္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ေရွ႕ေနႀကီး ၂ ဦး တရားရံုးအသြားအေႏွာက္အယွက္ျပဳခံရ၊ (Daw Khin Myo 
Thet, “Two Advocates Attending Court Hassled,”) VOA, 4 July 2007. 
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of the United Nations for national reconciliation and democratisation in 
Myanmar”.68  
 
A judge hearing charges against Phyo Wai Aung, a young man accused of 
involvement in a fatal April 2010 bombing, refused to allow his lawyer copies of 
the police records on which the case was prepared, and denied the defendant’s 
relatives entry by recording in the court’s diary “that whoever should have 
permission to enter or leave the courtroom is a matter of no relevance to the 
court”.69 In other words, according to the judge, the guards, not he, held the 
power over the court gates. Phyo Wai Aung’s lawyer disputed this understanding 
of the judge’s authority and took the matter to the Supreme Court. In January 
2011, a Supreme Court judge ruled that he saw no cause to interfere in the 
proceedings, and dismissed the application, noting that the order for the trial to 
be heard in a reserved courtroom was justified because the case was “not an 
ordinary criminal case but a well-known case”.70 In other words, for the very 
reason that the case would attract onlookers, it could not be held publicly. 
 
Actually, rather than talking of closed court, I think we should talk of these cases 
as being heard in “enclosed court”. Enclosure takes two forms. One is the 
enclosure of the court within the penitentiary—or within the juridical perimeter of 
the penitentiary, even if the court actually sits outside a prison’s walls. To 
describe such a court as reserved or “separated” court is a misnomer. The court is 
not separated but integrated. It becomes part of the penitentiary, homogenising 
the defendant’s experience of imprisonment and his experience of trial. The 
enclosed court is in this sense emblematic of the juridical process in the police 
state, since it best ensures the effective conveyance of the accused through the 
continuum of administrative activity to his final destination, which is, 
conveniently, the same place from which he has come.  
 
                                                        
68 “အမ်ဳိးသားျပန္လည္သင့္ျမတ္ေရးႏွင့္ ဒီမိုကေရစီေဖာ္ေဆာင္ေရးအတြက္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၌ ကုလသမဂၢ၏ အခန္းက႑”။ ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ 
ဦးတင္မင္းထြဋ္ (ခ) တင္ထြဋ္ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၄၀၊ ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းအေနာက္ပိုင္းခရုိငတ္ရားရုံး (သီးသန္႔) ၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရလီ ၁၃ ရက္၊ ဒုတိယခရိုင္တရားသူႀကီး တင္ထြဋ္။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. U Tin Min Htut (a) Tin Htut & 
Another, 2009 Criminal Case No. 140, Yangon Western District Court (Special), 13 Feb. 2009, 
Deputy District Judge Tin Htut.] The government released the two men under amnesty on 13 
January 2012. 
69 “တရားရုံးအတြင္း မည္သူ တစံုတဦးအား ဝင္ထြက္သြားလာခြင့္ျပဳသင့္မသင့္ ကိစၥမွာ တရားရုံးႏွင့္သက္ဆိုင္ျခင္းမရွိေၾကာင္း”။ Cited in 
ဦးၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈျပင္ဆင္မႈအမွတ္ -- ၊ ရန္ကုနတ္ိုင္းတရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၇ ရက္၊ 
ျပင္ဆင္မႈေလွ်ာက္လႊာ။ (U Phyo Wai Aung v. Union of Myanmar, 2010 Criminal Revision No. --, Yangon 
Divisional Court, Application for Revision, 27 Aug. 2010.)  
70 “သာမန္ရာဇဝတ္မႈမဟုတ္ေၾကာင္း ထင္ရွားသည့္အမႈျဖစ”္။ ဦးၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာျပင္ဆင္မႈ 
အမွတ္ ၄၉၅(ခ) ၊ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၁၄ ရက္၊ စာ ၂။ [U Phyo Wai Aung v. Union of Myanmar, 2010 
Criminal Revision No. 495(b), Supreme Court, 14 Jan. 2011: 2.] 
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The enclosed court as ordinary court also encloses the criminal juridical system 
itself. Because the enclosed court is demarcated from the system but also is a part 
of the system, it draws ordinary personnel and procedures into a special domain 
in which they maintain the pretence of carrying on with their work as usual. 
Everybody and every part of the system is a latent participant in its enclosure. 
Any judge can be called upon to sit in it. Any prosecutor, policeman or 
administrator can be required to appear before one. In these respects, the use of 
enclosed court in Myanmar during the last two decades is again distinguished 
from the use of special courts established under draconian regulations to try 
rebels against the colonial regime, or those established to curtail the procedural 
rights of defendants during wartime. The whole point of those courts was to 
impress upon all and sundry that exigencies demanded routine practice be 
suspended. The use of enclosed courts in the contemporary period, by contrast, 
insistently conveys a message that nothing abnormal is taking place at all.  
 
The remaining feature of Kyaw Min’s case that I will discuss here is how 
procedure matters in cases against public enemies essentially for administrative 
purposes. Because public enemies have forfeited legal entitlements that would 
otherwise accrue to them, the residual procedural interstices and other spaces for 
a defence—most commonly, payment of money to the relevant personnel, as 
described in the next chapter—available to ordinary criminal accused cease to 
apply. The procedural accuracy of a case file does not determine the case 
outcome. Like cases framed against opponents of the Suharto regime in 
Indonesia, where courts imposed reflex punishments on enemies of sovereign 
authority, policemen and prosecutors bringing cases against public enemies in 
Myanmar need not fabricate convincing evidence or fill out records accurately.71 
To do anything more than the minimum required so as to get a case through court 
would be to expend unnecessary effort for the same outcome.  
 
In cases against public enemies, as long as policemen have complied formally 
with procedure they can submit documents to court consisting of falsehoods 
about dates of arrest, dates of detention and dates of charges laid without fear 
that these will undermine the case. On the one hand, in the system as police, 
procedure matters—without procedure, the administrative continuum from 
agency to agency and officer to officer cannot be maintained. Paperwork exists 
                                                        
71 See Ariel Heryanto, State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 119-22.  
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not only to be filled out but also to enable the authorities to move the defendant 
from one part of the process to the next. On the other hand, in the case against 
the public enemy, procedure does not matter to the outcome. Consequently, 
police officers bringing charges against public enemies comply with the 
formalities of procedure, but may make little effort to present a credible case.  
 
For example, the police charged two public enemies arrested and brought to the 
central prison from the east of the country in 2008 under the 1947 Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act, with illegal possession of US dollars. Under cross-
examination, the investigating officer acknowledged that the purported evidence 
of an offence, the money, was only uncovered at the prison, some four days after 
the two were already taken into custody.72 His testimony to the effect that the 
police had no evidence of an offence at the time that they arrested the couple 
made no difference to the case’s outcome. In another case, the state media 
announced the arrest on 4 September 2009 of Ye Htet Soe, whom it accused of 
involvement in an antigovernment student group.73 When the police completed 
their paperwork, they recorded the date of arrest on the charge sheet as 12 
November 2009, some two months after the date reported in the newspaper.74 
The police held Shwe Gyoe and three others for around half a year before bringing 
an evidence-less case against them, for allegedly receiving money from abroad. 
The cross-examination record shows an investigating officer’s replies to a lawyer’s 
questions as follows: 
Ko Shwe Gyoe was arrested starting from 7-3-2009?—Correct.  
The date that this case was submitted for prosecution was 10-9-2009?—I see it shown 
thus before the court.  
In your testimony-in-chief you testified that persons in the country connected with Ko 
Shwe Gyoe (a) Mya Soe had accepted financial support, of which I put it to you that you 
have not been able to submit to the court any supporting evidence, be it receipts or 
otherwise—Correct.75 
                                                        
72 ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ခင္မိုးေအး (ခ) မိုးမိုး (ခ) ႀကီးေတာ္ႀကီး ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၁၁၊ စမ္းေခ်ာင္းၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔၏ 
ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၅ ရက္၊ စာ ၂-၃။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Khin Moe Aye (a) 
Moe Moe (a) Kyidaw Kyi & Another, 2008 Criminal Case No. 111, Sanchaung Township Court, 
Testimony of Police Major Ye Nyunt, Prosecution Witness No. 3, 5 June 2008: 2-3.] 
73 “Conspiracies of Internal and External Anti-Government Groups to Instigate Uprising and 
Launch Terrorist Attacks in 2009 Exposed,” New Light of Myanmar 24 Sept. 2009: 16.  
74 စြဲခ်က္အမွတ္ ၁၆၂/၀၉၊ ဗိုလ္တေထာင္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ရဲတပ္ဖဲြ႕စခန္း၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၁၀ ရက္။ (Charge No. 162/09, Botataung 
Township Police Station, 10 Dec. 2009). 
75 “ကိုေရႊဂ်ဳိးအား ၇-၃-၂၀၀၉ ေန႔တြင္စတင္ဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ မွန္ပါသည္။ ယခုအမႈအားတရားစဲြဆိုတင္ပို႔သည့္ေန႔မွာ ၁၀-၉-၂၀၀၉ ျဖစ္သည္ 
ဆိုလွ်င္ ရုံးေရွ႕ျပသ၍ ေတြ႔ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္၏အဓိကထြက္ခ်က္တြင္ ကိုေရႊဂ်ဳိး (ခ) ျမစိုးထံမွ တဆင့္ ျပည္တြင္းရွိဆက္စပ္သူမ်ားအား  
ေငြေထာက္ပံ့ေငြကို လက္ခံရရွိခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ ထြက္ဆိုခဲ့ရာ၌ ထိုသို႔လက္ခံရရွိေၾကာင္းေငြရေျပစာကို၎၊ မည္သည့္သက္ေသအေထာက္အထားကိုမွ် 
ရံုးေတာ္သို႔ တင္ျပႏိုင္ျခင္းမရွိဟုဆိုလွ်င္ မွန္ပါသည္။” ဒုရဲမွဴးျမတ္ၾကည္ ႏွင့္ စိန္လႈိင္ ပါ ၄၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၃၂၊ စမ္းေခ်ာင္းၿမိဳ႕နယ ္
တရားရုံး၊ ရဲအုပ္ေက်ာ္စိုး၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၇။ (Police Captain 
Myat Kyi v. Sein Hlaing & 3, 2009 Criminal Case No. 432, Sanchaung Township Court, Testimony 
of Inspector Kyaw Soe, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 22 Sept. 2009: 7.) In cross-examination records, 
lawyers’ questions are expressed as statements suffixed by ဆိုလွ်င္ or roughly, in courtroom jargon “I 
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Here and elsewhere in the testimony the inspector acknowledges that he has no 
material evidence to secure a conviction. He is seemingly unconcerned by this, 
stating that the accused did not keep records, but that the facts had “emerged” in 
the course of interrogation. His response to the second question, aimed at having 
him admit to illegal custody of the defendants, is a statement of profound 
impunity, since it constitutes an admission that what the court has on the record 
before it was a false document, as the gap of six months was not explained.  
 
Policemen bringing cases against public enemies include on some charge sheets a 
range of irrelevant, contradictory, inconsistent and sometimes ridiculous 
evidence. To prove that five accused had gone to visit refugee camps in Thailand, 
police officers listed among the items in evidence against them a map of the sites 
of camps along the border taken from a government-issued school textbook.76 In a 
related case against Ne Moe Aung, a man accused with four others of setting up 
an illegal organisation, the prosecution evidence included three innocuous poems 
the accused had authored, and computer equipment and books on computing 
taken from the room of one of the accused, a computing student. 77 The records in 
this case contain a litany of inconsistencies. The charge sheet recorded the date of 
arrest of all accused as 10 April 2009, two weeks before charges were lodged in 
court; however, the search and seizure records and first information reports all 
contain dates in January, when the arrests actually occurred. The defence 
attorney teased these facts from one of the investigating officers, a member of the 
police Special Branch, which is supposed to be an elite intelligence unit, having 
among its duties to investigate “political activities, student and Sangha [Buddhist 
monastic order] activities, foreign citizen activity and aboveground and 
underground subversives’ activities”.78 The cross examination ran: 
                                                                                                                                                        
put it to you”. In this study, so as to avoid repetition and make the English text more readable I have 
expressed some of the questions in the interrogative form, and in all cases have replaced the spoken 
“I put it to you” with an em-dash between question and answer. See further John Okell and Anna 
Allott, Burmese/Myanmar Dictionary of Grammatical Forms (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001) 65-
66. 
76 ဒုရဲမွဴးမ်ဳိးသန္႔ ႏွင့္ ညီညီေအာင္၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၅၇၊ လႈိင္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၂၂ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး ဝင္းေဆြ။ (Police Captain Myo Thant v. Nyi Nyi Aung, 2009 Criminal Case No. 357, Hlaing 
Township Court, 22 Oct. 2009, Township Judge Win Swe.) The map is contained in: လူမႈေရးဘာသာ၊ 
ျမန္မာသ့မိုင္း (အေျခခံပညာအလယ္တန္းအဆင့္) ၊ အတြဲ (၂) (ပညာေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန၊ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ ၂၀၀၁) စာ ၅၂။ 
[Social Studies: Myanma History (Basic Education Mid Level), vol. 2 (Ministry of Education, 
Government of the Union of Myanmar, 2001) 52.] 
77 ဒုရဲမွဴးမ်ဳိးသန္႔ ႏွင့္ ညီညီေအာင္ ပါ ၅၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၅၆၊ လႈိင္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၂၂ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး ဝင္းေဆြ။ (Police Captain Myo Thant v. Nyi Nyi Aung & 4, 2009 Criminal Case No. 356, 
Hlaing Township Court, 22 Oct. 2009, Township Judge Win Swe.)  
78 “ႏိုင္ငံေရးလႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ား၊ ေက်ာင္းသားသံဃာလႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ား၊ ႏိုင္ငံျခားသားလႈပ္ရွားမႈႏွင့္ ေျမေပၚေျမေအာက္ အဖ်က္သမားမ်ား၏ လႈပ္ရွားမ ႈမ်ား”။ 
ရဲလက္စြဲ၊ အပိုဒ္ ၅၈(ဃ) ။ [Police Manual, paragraph 58(d).]  
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In your capacity as a ranking Special Branch officer searching and seizing material, you 
searched and seized pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code?—Correct. 
You opened a complaint and had authorisation to search and seize in accordance with 
law?—I had a duty to follow orders. 
In the current matter of the search, you had a duty to follow said orders from which 
individual?—Police Captain Soe Thein assigned the duty. 
Is the date of search on the search form, Evidence Item B, 27 or 28?—It is 28-1-2009. 
The police charge sheet is (Pa) No. 156/09?—Correct. 
On the [police] complaint is written 26-3-09?—Correct. 
You were instructed precisely on which items to search for?—Correct. My instructions 
were to search Ko Ne Moe Aung’s room, to arrest him if present, and to seize any 
material infringing the law.  
None of the 10 varieties of material you seized infringe the law.—Incorrect. If you read 
the poems you can see that they infringe it. As regards the remaining items, I don’t 
know exactly.  
As you have been a police officer for 24 years, you can expertly conduct search and 
seizure pursuant to the law?—[No answer recorded] 
Not being a policeman at an ordinary police station, you can include points [on the 
record] that are not in accordance with law?—I made the seizure in accordance with 
law.  
… 
You did not state that you had, nor did you show to Ko Ne Moe Aung a search 
warrant?—Correct. I went and conducted the search without a search warrant. The 
search was under order from above.79 
 
The lawyer’s cross-examination exposes the errors in the arrest and charging of 
the accused: from the gap between date of arrest and date that the police opened 
the case before court, to the patent lack of evidence. The claim of the police officer 
that the poems purportedly violated the law was not pressed, but nor did it have 
to be. That the officer concerned had an order from higher up was sufficient to 
justify his not having a warrant from a court to enter and go through the room of 
the accused, as required under section 102(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Indeed, not only in this case, but in any case against a public enemy, the system’s 
administrative function can be reinforced through recourse to the “the order” 
                                                        
79 “က်ေနာ္ကိုသတင္းတပ္ဖြဲ႕အရာရွိအေနျဖင့္ ပစၥည္းရွာေဖြသိမ္းဆည္းရာတြင္ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာက်င့္ထံုးဥပေဒႏွင့္အညီရွာေဖြသိမ္းဆည္းရသည္ဆိလုွ်င ္
မွန္ပါသည္။ ဥပေဒအရ တိုင္ခ်က္ဖြင့္ၿပီးမွ ရွာေဖြသိမ္းဆည္းခြင့္ရွိသညဆ္ိုလွ်င္ အထက္ကအမိန္႔ေပးေသာအခါသိမ္းရန္တာဝန္ရွိပါသည္။ ယခုရွာေဖြ 
ကိစၥကို က်ေနာ္အထက္ကတာဝန္ေပး၍သိမ္းေသာေၾကာင့္ အဆိုပါ အထက္ဆိုေသာပုဂၢိဳလ္ကိုေျပာျပပါဆိုလွ်င္ ဒုရဲမွဴးစိုးသိန္းမွတာဝန္ေပးျခင္း 
ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ သက္ေသခံ-ခ ရွာေဖြပံုစံရွိရွာေဖြရက္မွာ ၂၇ လား ၂၈ လားဆိုလွ်င္ ၂၈-၁-၂၀၀၉ ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ရဲစြဲခ်က္တြင္ (ပ) အမွတ္ ၁၅၆/၀၉ 
ျဖစ္သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ မွန္ပါသည္။ တိုင္တန္းသည့္ေန႕ကို ၂၆-၃-၂၀၀၉ ဟုေရးသြင္းသည္ဆိုကမွန္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ့္ကိုအထက္မွတာဝန္ေပးစဥ္က 
မည္သည့္ပစၥည္းမ်ားကို ရွာေဖြရန္တိတိက်က် ညႊနၾ္ကားခဲ့သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ မွန္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္႔ကိညုႊနၾ္ကားခ်က္ေပးသည္မွာ ကိုေနမိုးေအာင္ အခန္းကိ ု
ရွာရန္ လူေတြ႔လွ်ငဖ္မ္းဆီးရန္ ဥပေဒႏွင့္မၿငိစြန္းေသာ ပစၥည္းေတြ႔လွ်ငသ္ိမ္းဆည္းရန္ ညႊန္ၾကားခဲ့ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္သိမ္းေသာပစၥည္း (၁၀) မ်ိဳးသည္ 
ဥပေဒႏွင့္ၿငိစြန္းမႈမရွဆိိုလွ်င္ မဟုတ္ပါ။ ကဗ်ာကို ဖတလ္ွ်ငၿ္ငိစြန္းေၾကာင္းေတြ႕ရပါသည္။ က်န္ပစၥည္းႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ က်ေနာ္အတိအက်မသိပါ။ 
က်ေနာ္သည္ ရဲအရာရွိအေနျဖင့္ ၂၄ ႏွစ္ တာဝန္ယူခဲ့ေသာေၾကာင့္ ရွာေဖြျခင္းသိမ္းဆည္းျခင္းကို ဥပေဒႏွင့္ အညီကၽြမ္းကၽြမ္းက်င္က်င္ေဆာင္ရြက္ 
ႏိုင္သူျဖစ္သည္ ဆိုလွ်င္။ သာမန္ရဲစခန္းမွ ရဲမဟုတ္၍ ဥပေဒႏွင့္ မညီေသာအခ်က္မ်ားပါႏိုင္သညဆ္ိုလွ်င္ က်ေနာ္ဥပေဒႏွင့္ အညီသိမ္းဆည္းျခင္း 
ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ xxx က်ေနာ့္အေနျဖင့္ ကိုေနမိုးေအာင္အားရွာေဖြဝရမ္း ပါေၾကာင္းေျပာၾကားျခင္းျပသျခင္းမရွဆိိုလွ်င္ မွန္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ့္အေနျဖင့္ 
ရွာေဖြဝရမ္းမပါဘဲသြားေရာက္ရွာေဖြခဲ့ျခင္း ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ အထက္အမိန္႔ေပး၍ ယင္းသို႔ရွာေဖြရျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။” ဒုရဲအုပ္ဝင္းေအာင၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၃-၅။ (Testimony of Sub Inspector Win Aung, Prosecution 
Witness No. 2, 2 July 2009: 3-5.) 
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from above as justification for action. Judges receive orders from above to try the 
cases in enclosed hearings, police officers receive orders from above to investigate 
people and submit cases. The “order” once invoked has a lexical superiority to any 
juridical instrument that may be invoked in favour of the defendant. Not only 
does the order justify action against the accused, it does not require any 
explanation. Its origins do not need to be probed. Sometimes, they cannot be 
probed. When the lawyer for Shwe Gyoe and his co-accused, whose case I 
mentioned above, asked the investigating officer who assigned him the case, the 
officer replied cryptically that it “was a person with the authority to assign me 
responsibility”.80 The remainder of his testimony was similarly opaque:  
Having testified that, “Ko Sein Hlaing was interrogated by me,” in which place was he 
interrogated?—I am unable to say; as my unit is investigating a great many crimes that 
must be kept secret I am unable to reveal our interrogating places. 
You are appearing as a witness to be examined before the court for reason of having 
been an interrogating officer of Ko Sein Hlaing—Correct.  
After arresting Ko Sein Hlaing on 16-3-2009 was the interrogation at the Aungthapyay 
Camp?—I cannot reveal if it was so or not.81  
 
Police officers working on cases against public enemies can insist upon secrecy 
both for operational reasons but also because by doing so they are working 
consistently with the system’s administrative ideals. Efficient pursuit of the public 
enemy requires that things not be done publicly, whether during investigation or 
during trial. In the case of Kyaw Soe and two other defendants whom the police 
accused of travelling to Thailand illegally in 2006, for instance, the complainant 
officer declined to answer basic questions about how he obtained information 
that the accused had committed an offence, on what date he had received the 
information, or why at least a year had passed between the unspecified date of the 
alleged offence and his lodging of a complaint to the court.82 In a related case, 
another officer said that he had investigated as part of a joint operation, but when 
                                                        
80 “တာဝန္ေပးႏိုင္ခြင္ရ့ွိသူက တာဝန္ေပးျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည”္။ ဒုရဲမွဴးျမတ္ၾကည္ ႏွင့္ စိန္လႈိင္ ပါ ၄၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၃၂၊ စမ္းေခ်ာင္း 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ရဲအုပ္ေက်ာ္စိုး၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၀။ (Police 
Captain Myat Kyi v. Sein Hlaing & 3, 2009 Criminal Case No. 432, Sanchaung Township Court, 
Testimony of Inspector Kyaw Soe, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 22 Sept. 2009: 10.)  
81 “ကိုစိန္လႈိင္အားက်ေနာ္မွ စစ္ေဆးေဆာင္ရြက္ခ့ဲပါသည္ဟု ထြက္ဆိုထား၍ မည္သည့္ေနရာတြင္ စစ္ေဆးခဲ့ပါသလဲဆိုလွ်င္ ေျပာဆိုျခင္းမျပဳႏိုင္ပါ။ 
မိမိတပ္ဖဲြ႔ေနျဖင့္ လွ်ဳိ႕ဝွက္ထားရွိရမည့္ အမႈအခင္းေပါင္းေျမာက္မ်ားစြာကို စစ္ေဆးေနရျခင္းျဖစ္သျဖင့္ မိမိစစ္ေဆးခဲ့သည့္ေနရာမ်ားေျပာျပမႈ 
မျပဳႏိုင္ျခင္း ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္သည္ ကိုစိန္လႈိင္အား စစ္ေဆးခဲ့သည့္အမႈစစ္တဦးအေနျဖင့္ ရုံးေရွ႕၌ သက္ေသအျဖစ္လာေရာက္အစစ္ခံေနျခင္း 
ျဖစ္သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ မွန္ပါသည္။ ကိုစိန္လႈိင္အား ၁၆-၃-၂၀၀၉ ေန႔တြင္ ဖမ္းဆီးေခၚေဆာင္ၿပီး ေအာင္သေျပစခန္း၌ စစ္ေၾကာေမးျမန္းခဲ့ျခင္းသာျဖစ္သည္ 
ဆိုလွ်င္ ဟုတ္သည္မဟုတ္သည္ေျပာျပႏိုင္ျခင္းမရွိပါ။” ဒုရဲမွဴးျမတ္ၾကည္ ႏွင့္ စိန္လႈိင္ ပါ ၄၊ ရဲအုပ္ေက်ာ္စိုး၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ စာ ၄။ (Police 
Captain Myat Kyi v. Sein Hlaing & 3, Testimony of Inspector Kyaw Soe: 4.) 
82 ဒုရဲမွဴးမ်ဳိးသန္႕ ႏွင့္ ကမ္လမ္ခုပ္ (ခ) ေက်ာ္စိုး ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၅၄၊ ဒဂံုၿမိဳ႕သစ္ (ေတာင္ပိုင္း) ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ဒုရဲမွဴး 
မ်ဳိးသန္႕၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၉ ရက္။ [Police Captain Myo Thant v. Kam Lam 
Khut (a) Kyaw Soe & 2, 2008 Criminal Case No. 354, New Dagon (Southern) Township Court, 
Testimony of Police Captain Myo Thant, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 19 Mar. 2008.]  
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asked by the defence attorney to name the agencies involved, he replied that he 
was not authorised to reveal details.83  
 
Cases against public enemies often proceed after extraction of a confession. Once 
a case against a public enemy comes to court, it matters not that the person 
complains of torture or other wrongdoing to have them confess. Indeed, one 
striking feature of courtroom testimonies in some cases against public enemies is 
the extent to which the defendant is at liberty to describe how they have been 
abused. As the testimony will not materially alter the outcome of the case, rather 
than constituting evidence upon which guilt or innocence is to be determined, it 
merely constitutes another stage in the administrative processing of the accused.  
 
For example, officers from the Yangon Divisional Police Headquarters arrested 
Than Myint Aung on 3 March 2009 and accused him of meeting dissidents in 
Malaysia during 2007, and of having used the Internet illegally. In court, Than 
Myint Aung described what happened to him in illegal custody: 
While interrogating they tied a cloth over my face and punched me; I was interrogated 
while being punched from all sides. The people who punched me from all sides were 
on-duty police officers. One of the interrogating police forced my backside onto the 
floor and made it so that my forehead was on the floor at the same level, then stamped 
on my spine with boots…. I was hit with rubber truncheons and questioned. They hit 
me like that on the thighs, groin and spine. They also whacked my knuckles with 
rubber truncheons. They inserted ball pens in between my fingers, grasped them and 
rotated the ball pens to cause pain, then interrogated more…. During that month in 
interrogation for 15 days straight I couldn’t sleep at all at night. They also didn’t feed 
me or give water. They hit me continuously. They forced me to sit on my haunches. 
They forced me to stand, and hit me if I sat…. Nine days into interrogation, they moved 
me from upstairs to downstairs and while interrogating me there the duty police hit my 
head with rubber truncheons to the point of breaking two truncheons. My head 
ruptured. They sliced chilli thinly and put it in my mouth. They also stuffed in a bundle 
of cloth. They stripped my entire body naked and ran rubber truncheons along my 
shins. A duty policeman stood alongside and pressed down on my thighs so that I 
couldn’t move about. I was hit on the soles of my feet with rubber truncheons and 
furthermore hit on my back with them also. A duty policeman poured hot water onto 
my genitals.84  
                                                        
83 ဒုရဲမွဴးမ်ဳိးသန္႕ ႏွင့္ ကမ္လမ္ခုပ္ (ခ) ေက်ာ္စိုး ပါ ၃ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၅၃၊ ဒဂံုၿမိဳ႕သစ္ (ေတာင္ပိုင္း) ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ရဲအုပ္ 
ထြန္းသိန္း၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၆ ရက္။ [Police Captain Myo Thant v. Kam 
Lam Khut (a) Kyaw Soe & 2, 2008 Criminal Case No. 353, New Dagon (Southern) Township Court, 
Testimony of Inspector Htun Thein, Prosecution Witness No. 2, 26 Mar. 2008.] 
84 “စစ္ေဆးေမးျမန္းရာ၌ မ်က္ႏွာတြင္ အဝတ္ျဖင့္အုပ္လွ်က္ခ်ည္ေႏွာင္ထားၿပီး၊ လက္သီးျဖင့္ထိုး၊ ဝိုင္းထိုး၍ စစ္ေဆးေမးျမန္းျခင္းကို ခံရပါသည္။ 
လက္သီးျဖင့္ ဝိုင္းထိုးသည့္သူမ်ားမွာ တာဝန္က်ရဲအရာရွိမ်ားျဖစ္ပါသည္။ စစ္ေဆးေမးျမန္းသည့္ ရဲမ်ားထဲမွ တေယာက္က က်ေနာ့အားၾကမ္းျပင္တြင္ 
ဖင္ခ်ထားခုိင္းၿပီး နဖူးႏွင့္ ၾကမ္းျပင္တေျပးတည္းျဖစ္ေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္ထားၿပီးေနာက္ေက်ာရုိးအား ဖိနပ္ျဖင့္ ေပါက္ပါသည္။ xxx ရာဘာဒုတ္ျဖင့္ ရုိက္ႏွက္ 
ေမးျမန္းျခင္းခံခဲ့ရသည္။ ထိုသို႔ ရိုက္ႏွက္သည့္ေနရာမွာ ေပါင္ရင္းႏွင့္ တင္ပါးေက်ာရိုးတို႔ကို ရိကု္ႏွက္ခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္၏ 
လက္ဆစ္မ်ားကိုလည္း ရာဘာဒုတ္ျဖင့္ ေခါက္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္၏ လက္ေခ်ာင္းၾကားတြင္လည္း ေဘာပင္မ်ားထည့္၍ ညႇပ္ၿပီး ဆုပ္ကိုင္ၿပီး ေဘာပင္ကို 
လွည္၍ နာက်င္ေအာင္ျပဳလုပ္ၿပီး ပိုၿပီးစစ္ေဆးေမးျမန္းပါသည္။ xxx ထိုစစ္ေၾကာေရးတလတြင္ (၁၅) ရက္ဆက္တိုက္မွာ ညတိုင္းလံုးဝမအိပ္ခဲ့ရပါ။ 
ထမင္းလဲမေကၽြး၊ ေရလည္းမတိုက္ပါ။ ေဒါက္ေလွ်ာက္္ရုိက္ပါသည္။ ဒူးေထာက္ၿပီးထိုင္ခိုင္းပါသည္။ မတ္တတ္ရပ္ခိုင္းပါသည္။ ထိုင္ရင္ရိုက္ပါသည ္။ 
xxx စစ္ေၾကာေရးစတင္ဝင္ေရာက္ၿပီး (၉) ရက္အၾကာ အေပၚထပ္မွ ေအာက္ထပ္သို႔ ေျပာင္းေရႊ႕စစ္ေၾကာရာတြင္လည္း တာဝန္ရွိရဲမ်ားက က်ေနာ့္ 
ေခါင္းကို ရာဘာဒုတ္ျဖင့္ (၂) ေခ်ာင္းကြဲကုန္သည္အထိရုိက္ႏွက္စစ္ေဆးၿပီးေမးျမန္းခဲ့ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ့္ေခါင္းေပါက္သြားပါသည္။ က်ေနာ့္ကို 
ကုလားေအာ္ငရုပ္သီးကို ဒါးျဖင့္ပါးပါးလွီးၿပီး က်ေနာ္၏ ပါးစပ္ထဲသို႔ ထည့္ပါသည္။ အဝတ္ျဖင့္လည္း စည္းထားခဲ့ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္က့ိုယ္လံုးရွိ 
အဝတ္အစားမ်ားခၽြတ္ၿပီး ေျခသလံုးညိဳ႕သက်ဥ္းကို ရာဘာဒုတ္ျဖင့္ လွိမ့္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္မလႈပ္ႏုိင္ေအာင္ ေပါင္ေပၚတြင္ တာဝန္ရွိရဲတေယာက္က 
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The judge reduced this narrative of torture to the following: 
Than Myint Aung (DW-1) testified that… he was interrogated and assaulted for a 
month… that he affixed his signature to 3 search forms, then after that was sent to 
Sanchaung Police Station, that as he was unwell he received treatment at the Yangon 
General Hospital, Emergency and Neurology Departments….85  
 
Counsel for the accused unsuccessfully sought to have staff from the hospital 
appear as witnesses, or to at least obtain their medical records with which to 
support the allegations of torture. No reference to these requests or any other 
aspect of the defence case appears in the judge’s summing up, even though after 
sentencing Than Myint Aung was returned to a medical facility because of the 
damage sustained to his skull. Similarly, the judge hearing charges lodged against 
a man accused of going to Thailand to meet opposition groups reduced his 
lengthy account of torture to a couple of identical lines per judgment before 
sentencing him to a total of eight years for illegal immigration and contact with 
unlawful associations.86 And, in 2009 a single judge recorded confessions from at 
least nine different persons charged in at least seven different cases, all of whom 
retracted their confessions in court, most alleging that they had been severely 
tortured at police stations in a number of localities.87 All were convicted.  
                                                                                                                                                        
မတ္တတ္ရပ္၍ ဖိႏွိပ္ထားပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္၏ ေျခဖမိုးကို ရာဘာဒုတ္ျဖင့္ရိုက္သည့္အျပင္ ေနာက္ေက်ာကိုလည္း ရာဘာဒုတ္ျဖင့္ ရိုက္ပါသည္။ 
တာဝန္ရွိရဲတေယာက္က ေရေႏြးပူျဖင့္ က်ေနာ္၏အဂၤါစပ္ကို ေလာင္းပါသည္။” ရဲအုပ္သက္ႏိုင္ ႏွင့္ သန္းျမင့္ေအာင္ (ခ) ကိုမ်ဳိး (ခ) သီဟသူရ၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ 
ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၇၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ သန္းျမင့္ေအာင၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားခံသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ 
၁၈ ရက္ စာ ၁-၃။ [Inspector Thet Naing v. Than Myint Aung (a) Ko Myo (a) Thiha Thura, 2009 
Criminal Case No. 47, Yangon Western District Court, Testimony of Than Myint Aung, Defence 
Witness No. 1, 18 June 2010: 1-3.]  
85 “သန္းျမင့္ေအာင္ (ခံျပ-၁) က xxx တစ္လၾကာစစ္ေဆးေမးျမန္းခဲ့ၿပီး ရိုက္ႏွက္ညႇင္းပန္းခဲ့ xxx ေၾကာင္း၊ ရွာေဖြပံုစံအလြက္ (၃) ရြက္ေပၚ၌ ၎မွ 
လက္မွတ္ေရးထိုးေပးခဲ့ရေၾကာင္း၊ ၎ေနာက္စမ္းေခ်ာင္းရဲစခန္းသို႔ ပို႔ခဲ့ၿပီး၊ ေနထိုင္မေကာင္းသည့္အတြက္ ရန္ကုန္ေဆးရံုႀကီးအေရးေပၚဌာန 
ဦးေႏွာက္ႏွင့္အာရုံေၾကာဌာနတို႔၌ ကသုမႈခံရေၾကာင္း xxx ထြက္ဆိုခဲ့သည္။” ရဲအုပ္သက္ႏိုင္ ႏွင့္ သန္းျမင့္ေအာင္ (ခ) ကိုမ်ဳိး (ခ) သီဟသူရ၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ 
ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၇၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇူလုိင္လ ၁၅ ရက္၊ ဒုတိယခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ေဒၚႏုႏုခင္၊ စာ ၃။ 
[Inspector Thet Naing v. Than Myint Aung (a) Ko Myo (a) Thiha Thura, 2009 Criminal Case No. 
47, Yangon Western District Court, 15 July 2010, Deputy District Judge Daw Nu Nu Khin: 3.] The 
other verdicts decided against the defendant on the basis of the same extracted confession were on 1 
June 2010 in the Thingangyun Township Court, Township Judge (Special Power) Daw Nyunt Nyunt 
Win presiding: ရဲအုပ္သက္ႏိုင္ ႏွင့္ သန္းျမင့္ေအာင္ (ခ) ကိုမ်ဳိး (ခ) သီဟသူရ၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၃၂ [Inspector Thet 
Naing v. Than Myint Aung (a) Ko Myo (a) Thiha Thura, 2009 Criminal Case No. 432] and ဦးၾကည္ျမင့္ 
(လဝက ဦးစီးမွဴး) ႏွင့္ သန္းျမင့္ေအာင္ (ခ) ကိုမ်ဳိး (ခ) သီဟသူရ၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၈၉၇ [U Kyi Myint (Immig. Dept.) v. 
Than Myint Aung (a) Ko Myo (a) Thiha Thura, 2009 Criminal Case No. 897]. 
86 ရဲအုပ္ေအာင္စိုးႏိုင ္ႏွင့္ စည္သူေဇယ်၊ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၆၆-၄၆၇၊ မဂၤလာေတာင္ညြန္႔ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ 
၂၁ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးတင္ထြန္းဦး။ [Inspector Aung Soe Naing v. Sithu Zeya, 2010 Criminal 
Case Nos. 466-467, Mingalartaung-nyunt Township Court, 21 Dec. 2010, Township Judge (Special 
Power) U Tin Htun Oo.] 
87 Deputy District Judge Ohn Myint recorded in each of his verdicts dated 23 Dec. 2009 that 
Associate Township Judge Daw Baby, Aungmyaythazan Township Court, took the confessions of all 
the accused, each of which was subsequently retracted, in the following cases: ဒုရဲမွဴးခင္စိုး ႏွင္ ့မ်ိဳးမင္းသန္း ပါ 
၂၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၉၈၊ မႏၱေလးခရုိငတ္ရားရုံး။ (Police Captain Khin Soe v. Myo Min Than & Another, 
2009 Criminal Case No. 198, Mandalay District Court.) ဒုရဲမွဴးေမာင္ေမာင္လြင ္ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ထြန္းလင္း (ခ) ကိုလတ္ ပါ ၂၊ 
၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၀၄-၀၅၊ မႏၱေလးခရုိငတ္ရားရုံး။ [Police Captain Maung Maung Lwin v. Kyaw Htun Lin (a) 
Ko Lat & Another, 2009 Criminal Case Nos. 204-05, Mandalay District Court.] ဒုရဲမွဴးေမာင္ေမာင္လြင ္ႏွင့္ 
ေက်ာ္ထြန္းလင္း (ခ) ကိုလတ္၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၀၆-၀၇၊ မႏၱေလးခရုိငတ္ရားရုံး။ [Police Captain Maung Maung Lwin 
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In sum, as a consequence of the withdrawal of sovereign cetana, the legal 
entitlements that accrue ordinarily to citizens—about which I wrote in chapter 
three—cease to have efficacy for public enemies. The public enemy cannot pay his 
way out of a case and nor can he use vestigial procedural defences to any good 
effect. If subjected to torture to extract a confession, the details of torture can be 
admitted onto the court record without altering the outcome of the case. But 
torture to extract confession is not limited to cases of public enemies in Myanmar, 
and it is with that practice, and with what it indicates about the exercise of 
political power through the criminal juridical system, that the next section is 
concerned.  
The policeman as sovereign 
People in Myanmar with whom I have spoken remark—sometimes when asked 
and sometimes of their own volition—that they fear the police. In discussions 
while conducting this research I frequently heard comments about the police like 
“what they want to do, they can do”, “they are too powerful” and “they always 
show their muscle”. Comments along these lines are made both by members of 
the general public, such as taxi drivers, sidewalk vendors, and clientele at the 
country’s ubiquitous teashops, and also by people familiar with and working in 
the juridical system, such as retired lower-ranked officials and practising lawyers.  
 
That people in Myanmar fear the police hardly makes them unique, and nor is it 
anything new. Policing in Myanmar was from the beginning highly coercive and 
abusive, but it was not unusually bad.88 In former British colonies across Africa 
we can discern patterns of abusive and corrupt policing that are found in the 
empire’s Asian postcolonies.89 Fear of the police in Myanmar has some of its roots 
in this common colonial history, and a common inheritance of laws that 
                                                                                                                                                        
v. Kyaw Htun Lin (a) Ko Lat, 2009 Criminal Case Nos. 206-07, Mandalay District Court.] 
ဒုရဲမွဴးေမာင္ေမာင္လြင ္ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ထြန္းလင္း (ခ) ကိုလတ္ ပါ ၄၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၀၉၊ မႏၱေလးခရုိငတ္ရားရုံး။ [Police Captain 
Maung Maung Lwin v. Kyaw Htun Lin (a) Ko Lat & 3, 2009 Criminal Case No. 209, Mandalay 
District Court.] ဒုရဲမွဴးေမာင္ေမာင္လြင ္ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ထြန္းလင္း (ခ) ကိုလတ္ ပါ ၆၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၁၄၊ မႏၱေလးခရုိငတ္ရားရုံး။ 
[Police Captain Maung Maung Lwin v. Kyaw Htun Lin (a) Ko Lat & 5, 2009 Criminal Case No. 
214, Mandalay District Court.] A second judge of the same district court heard a series of related 
cases in which the accused again retracted confessions. He did not refer to the judge who took the 
confessions by name; however, it is likely that the same township judge took them also. In 2010 the 
divisional court declined to hear appeals in all of the abovementioned cases.  
88 For some related discussion see Selth, Burma’s Police Forces 11-12. 
89 See for example, Etannibi E. O. Alemika, “Policing and Perceptions of Police in Nigeria,” Police 
Studies 11 (1988). James S. E. Opolot, “The Resilience of the British Colonial Police Legacies in East 
Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa,” Police Studies 17.1 (1992). Justice Tankebe, “Colonialism, 
Legitimation, and Policing in Ghana,” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 36 (2008). 
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aggrandise police powers, and enable policing to be habitually abusive.90 But it is 
not a phenomenon peculiar to countries once occupied by the British. Throughout 
Asia, the police in many jurisdictions have excessive powers that make them a 
source of frequent concern for people going about their daily lives.91 In this 
respect too, the police in Myanmar are typical, rather than atypical, of police 
forces around the region.  
 
Looked at simply in terms of practices, we could conclude that the police in 
Myanmar are unremarkable. But my problem for this study is not to look simply 
at practices, but to go deeper into what animates the criminal juridical system. My 
interest is in the political aspects of the system that motivate certain types of 
behaviour. Specifically, with respect to the role of the police in a system for the 
maintenance of law and order, my interest in this section lies in how they are 
enabled to perform certain tasks for certain purposes, and in the systemic 
consequences of this enabling process. Therefore, my concern here is not to 
compile a list of abuses that policemen in Myanmar have committed and compare 
it with lists from earlier periods or other countries. Rather, it is to examine 
through the lens of criminal cases in the courts how in the criminal juridical 
system as police, the police might occupy a special position of authority.  
 
To be clear, the police force is not the only agency that investigates criminal 
offences and brings cases to court in Myanmar. Other agencies with policing 
powers include immigration and national registration officials under the 
immigration and population ministry, municipal authorities in major cities, and 
the Bureau of Special Investigation under the home affairs ministry—which the 
first U Nu government set up as a counter-corruption agency, and which now also 
investigates a range of financial crimes and smuggling. These agencies 
investigate, make arrests and perform other tasks together with civil 
administrators and surveillance officers at police stations around the country. 
They lodge cases in court directly as well as through township police stations, and 
appear as witnesses.  
 
                                                        
90 On the incidence of police torture, ill-treatment and attendant abuses in contemporary India see 
for example, Human Rights Watch, Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the Indian 
Police (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
91 See generally: Basil Fernando, “Police and the Rule of Law in Asia,” Human Rights and the Police 
in Transitional Countries, eds. L. Lindholt, et al. (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
Human Rights Correspondence School, Rule of Law and Human Rights in Asia (Hong Kong: Asian 
Human Rights Commission, 2006) 37-70. 
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A variety of agencies also take part in routine security and policing operations. 
Personnel joining with police officers on operations might include, on top of those 
already mentioned, firemen, auxiliary firemen, customs officers, education 
committee members, video scrutiny officers, and religious departmental staff 
members. Groups of officers coming to people’s houses—from personal 
observation as well as from the accounts of others—rarely identify themselves 
clearly, and many wear only parts of their uniforms or no uniforms at all, making 
it difficult for members of the public to distinguish between one group and the 
next. In many places, the local police post and personnel from other agencies may 
be situated in the same premises, or adjacent to one another, spatially reinforcing 
the message that these agencies are functionally integrated, and giving a rather 
expanded and amorphous appearance to the notion of the police, one that merges 
the idea of the police with the idea of “police”.  
 
Notwithstanding, I will in this section restrict my discussion to the practices of 
the police force, for two reasons.92 First, most of the criminal cases that I have 
studied, and most to come through the courts, are brought by police officers. 
Second, from my study of these cases and from discussions with legal 
professionals, I have a particular interest in the special authority that police have 
in this system, as distinct from other personnel. As the first reason is self-
explanatory, I am going to proceed to the second.  
 
In a short essay on “sovereign police” Giorgio Agamben has explored the idea of 
the police as occupying a zone symmetrical to that of the sovereign, arguing they,  
[Are] not merely an administrative function of law enforcement; rather, the police are 
perhaps the place where the proximity and the almost constitutive exchange between 
violence and right that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is shown more nakedly 
and clearly than anywhere else. … The rationales of “public order” and “security” on 
which the police have to decide on a case-by-case basis define an area of indistinction 
between violence and right that is exactly symmetrical to that of sovereignty.93 
 
If the policeman generally occupies and enlarges an area of indistinction 
symmetrical to sovereignty in which the right of the sovereign to exert violence 
plays out in the individual case, then in Myanmar this area is further complicated 
                                                        
92 By the police force I am referring to the corporate police entity that in 1995 the incumbent 
military junta renamed the Myanmar Police Force. ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕အမိန္႔ အမတွ္ ၁/၉၅၊ 
၁၉၉၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၃ ရက္။ (State Law and Order Restoration Council Order No. 1/95, 13 Sept. 
1995.) I will here not discuss the structure or composition of the police force. For an overview see 
Selth, Burma’s Police Forces 7-9. 
93 Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare 
Casarino, Theory out of Bounds Ser., eds. Sandra Buckley, Michael Hardt and Brian Massumi,      
vol. 20 (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 104. 
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and enlarged by the situating of the policeman within a system in which 
rationales of public order and security are unusually enlarged. Therefore, when 
thinking about the policeman in Myanmar as occupying an area symmetrical to 
that of the sovereign, we need to consider both the particular aspects of the 
policeman’s role in the individual case, and the role of the police in a state 
apparatus that is organised for the maintenance of law and order.  
 
In this section, I am going to proceed by referencing the idea of the sovereign 
policeman to the use of confession in the criminal juridical system, and in turn to 
the linkage between the use of confession and the use of torture. In doing this I 
will suggest that the confession of an accused at once constitutes proof that an 
offence has been committed and also proof that the accused has submitted to 
sovereign power. The confession serves both juridical and political purposes. It 
serves to acknowledge an offence and also acknowledge the sovereign right to 
impose punishment. And, because the incentive to obtain a confession is high, it 
is accompanied by the implicit threat of violence, which at the moment of that 
threat constitutes the transforming of the right of sovereign violence into the right 
of the individual officer to commit violence upon the accused.  
 
Before turning to specific cases, I need to mention the relationship between the 
army and the police.94 When talking about the power of the police in Myanmar, 
we also need to be attentive to the close subordinate role of the police force to the 
military over the last couple of decades, a relationship in which military 
commanders have characterised the police as the “brother” of the armed forces.95 
This sibling relationship has elements of past and present in it. In chapter two I 
mentioned how the colonial regime in Burma adopted a militarised form of law-
and-order policing that in its latter stages became more civilian, partly in 
response to emergent urban political movements; and, in chapter three, how 
many practices and institutional arrangements of the colonial period continued 
after independence. Some aspects of the military-police relationship in the 
current period are the consequences of these earlier periods. Others are, as I have 
                                                        
94 As discussed in Selth, Burma’s Police Forces 12-14. 
95 For instance: “The Myanmar Police Force is the brother armed force of the Defence Services and 
is a key organisation for regional peace and tranquillity and the rule of law.” (“ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဟာ 
တပ္မေတာ္န႔ဲ ညီေနာင္တပ္ဖဲြ႔ျဖစ္ၿပီး ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးမွာ အဓိကက်တဲ့ အဖဲြ႔အစည္းျဖစ္တယ္။”) Senior 
General Than Shwe speaking on Defence Services Day 1998, cited in ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန၊ စာ ၄၃။ (Ministry 
of Home Affairs 43.) 
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discussed elsewhere, the result of a push by the army in the 1990s to make the 
police more responsive to its needs and to its commands.96  
 
A review of the military-managed police reform project is beyond the scope of this 
study.97 The project is relevant to this discussion insofar as it had a broad political 
quality. By bringing the police force closer to its political power, the military 
privileged the station and role of the police over other parts of the juridical 
apparatus. The brother, although having weak corporate power when compared 
with his sibling, has derivative authority within the criminal juridical system. 
Since the military has claimed sovereign power, and continues to represent itself 
as the guardian of sovereignty, within the criminal juridical system policemen, 
not judges, are the de facto guardians of sovereignty.98  
 
Given this relationship, it is not surprising that within a few years of the new 
regime seizing power in 1988 the legal and political superiority of confession to 
other forms of evidence was reaffirmed through a criminal case that involved both 
military and police personnel. The case was Union of Myanmar v. U Ye Naung. 
Since this case is relevant to the contents of this study, and since it has not been 
described previously in academic work in English I am going to use it to introduce 
the discussion on the use of torture to obtain confession in Myanmar as a 
characteristic of the policeman as bearer of sovereign authority.99  
 
Ye Naung was a non-commissioned army officer who together with his co-
respondent to the prosecutor’s appeal against him had with twenty others 
allegedly been involved in stealing and selling ammunition from an army base. 
Customs officers had in 1988 caught some of the accused red-handed. The police 
opened a case against those defendants because of the munitions found in their 
possession. But no material evidence implicated either Ye Naung or the other 
respondent. Only their own confessions, which they had retracted, and 
corroborating confessions of two other accused, stood as evidence against them.  
                                                        
96 Cheesman, “Policing Burma,” 37-39.  
97 For a detailed discussion of structural reconfigurations in this period see Ei Ei Zaw, “A Study on 
the Changing Role of [the] Myanmar Police Force (1988-2000),” M.Res diss., Yangon University, 
2002.  
98 Section 20(e) of the 2008 Constitution reads that, “The primary responsibility to ensure the non-
disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and enduring sovereignty lies 
with the Defence Services.” (“ျပည္ေထာင္စုမၿပိဳကဲြေရး၊ တိုင္းရင္းသားစည္းလံုးညီညြတ္မႈမၿပိဳကြဲေရးႏွင့္ အခ်ဳပ္အျခာအာဏာတည္တံ့ 
ခိုင္ျမဲေရးတို႔ကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ရန္ တပ္မေတာ္တြင္ အဓိကတာဝန္ ရွိသည္။”) My translation.  
99 ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးရဲေနာင္ ပါ ၂၊ ၁၉၉၁ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၃။ [Union of Myanmar v. U Ye Naung & 
Another, 1991 MLR (SC) 63.] In keeping with the shift in nomenclature from Burma to Myanmar in 
1989, I have abbreviated the citations from this time as Myanmar Law Reports (MLR). Only rulings 
of the Supreme Court (SC) were reported from 1989 to 2010.  
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So we come to the law of evidence. To recall from chapter two, questions over the 
voluntariness of confession have come up in Myanmar’s courts since colonial 
times. That policemen force people to confess is in part habitual, in part a 
consequence of statutory and systemic design. One aspect of the law that 
encourages the forcing of confession is that even if an accused person retracts a 
confession, it can still stand as proof of a crime if a court believes it is true and 
that it was made voluntarily.100 Some judges accept the veracity of confessions 
based on the strength of their contents, such as where they contain detailed 
knowledge of a series of events around a crime.101 Others point to the 
correspondence between the contents of the confession and the testimonies of 
witnesses to court as lending credence to a confession—as in the case of a former 
army officer charged with stealing state secrets who retracted his confession on 
grounds that he had been tortured by a joint police-military intelligence unit 
through sleep deprivation, drugging, and threats made against the “health” of his 
family members.102 In any event, under section 80 of the Evidence Act, once a 
confession is recorded in accordance with procedure, the judge in a trial is 
entitled to presume it is genuine.103  
 
Under sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and sections 162 and 164(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, only a judge can record a confession. Police officers can 
neither record nor submit confessions to court, for reasons that to the codes’ 
authors were all too obvious. Where the police can take a confession at a police 
station or anywhere else, and present it in evidence, they can torture or otherwise 
                                                        
100 Union of Burma v. Ah Hla (a) Maung Hla & 2, 1958 BLR (HC) 29. See also: Union of Burma v. 
Aung Tun (a) Aung Myint, Aung Tun (a) Aung Myint v. Union of Burma, 1958 BLR (SC) 1.  
101 As in ေမာငစ္သံိန္း (ခ) ေမာင္သိန္းေဇာ္/ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္င ံႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္င/ံေမာငစ္သံိန္း (ခ) ေမာင္သိန္းေဇာ၊္ ၁၉၆၉ 
မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၈။ [Maung San Thein (a) Maung Thein Zaw/Union of Burma v. Union of Burma/ 
Maung San Thein (a) Maung Thein Zaw, 1969 BLR (CC) 28.] 
102 ဒုရဲမွဴးသန္းစိုး ႏွင့္ ဝင္းႏိုင္ေက်ာ ္ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၃၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရလီ ၇ ရက္။ 
(Police Captain Than Soe v. Win Naing Kyaw & Another, 2010 Criminal Case No. 133, Yangon 
Northern District Court, 7 Jan. 2010.) A panel of two judges signed the ruling but their names are 
illegible. Details of the torture are contained in a draft application for revision of the ruling to the 
Supreme Court: ဝင္းႏိုင္ေက်ာ ္ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာျပင္ဆင္မ ႈအမွတ္ ၄၁၄/ခ၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ 
ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ -- ရက္။ (Win Naing Kyaw v. Union of Myanmar, 2010 Criminal Revision 
Case No. 414/b, Supreme Court, Yangon, -- Nov. 2010.) 
103 Under the Criminal Procedure Code, section 533(1) even if a judge finds that a confession has not 
been recorded in accordance with procedure, she can still take certain measures to correct it and 
accept it as evidence provided that “the error has not injured the accused as to his defence on the 
merits”. See also: ကိုေမွး ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၁၉၉၄ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၄၉။ [Ko Hmei v. Union of Myanmar, 
1994 MLR (SC) 149.] သိန္းေဌး (ခ) ခရု၊ အငယ္ေလး (ခ) အုန္းေက်ာ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ 
ႏွင့္ ခရု (ခ) သိန္းေဌး ပါ ၂၊ ၁၉၉၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၇၇။ [Thein Htay (a) Khayu / Ange Le (a) Ohn Kyaw v. Union of 
Myanmar, Union of Myanmar v. Khayu (a) Thein Htay and Another, 1999 MLR (SC) 77.] 
 144 
coerce the accused to extract it. Cognisant of such practices, the Courts Manual 
reminds the judge receiving a confession that, 
It is his duty to satisfy himself in every reasonable way that the confession is made 
voluntarily, and with this end in view he should endeavour to ascertain the exact 
circumstances leading up to the confession, the length of time during which the 
accused has been in the custody of the police and whether any action on the part of the 
police may have induced the accused to confess. He should, whenever feasible, before 
recording the confession of the accused give him a few hours for reflection in 
circumstances in which he cannot be influenced by the police.104  
 
In an overworked and underfunded court system, even ethical and scrupulous 
judges would have difficulty in fulfilling these requirements in every instance. 
According to professionals, judges in Myanmar today routinely sign off on 
confessions without actually hearing from—or sometimes even seeing—the 
defendants. But before Ye Naung defendants could at least appeal to the legal 
principle that only a judge could record a confession, the superior courts having 
repeatedly ruled out the taking of confessions by army officers or in military 
facilities, as well as in police stations and other premises outside of the courts.105  
 
The legal issue in Ye Naung’s case was that his confession had been taken by 
military intelligence, not by a judge.106 A single Supreme Court judge in 1989 
acquitted the accused on the basis that the confession was inadmissible evidence. 
The prosecutor then made a special appeal against the ruling.107 The Supreme 
Court bench, headed by Aung Toe, in 1991 overturned the previous order and 
restored a conviction from a lower court, by avoiding the real issue of whether or 
not a confession to military intelligence is admissible, restricting its inquiry to 
                                                        
104 Courts Manual, paragraph 602(3). 
105 See Sobika Rahman; ေမာငထ္ြန္းတင္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၈၅။ [Maung Tun Tin v. 
Union of Burma, 1965 BLR (CC) 185]; ေမာင္သိန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၅၈။ [Maung 
Thein v. Union of Burma, 1966 BLR (CC) 158]; ေမာငသ္န္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၇၃ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၄။ 
[Maung Than v. Union of Burma, 1973 BLR (CC) 24]; ဦးမင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ 
၁၉၇၇ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၂။ [U Min v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1977 BLR (CC) 22]; ေမာငက္ိုးနီ ႏွင့္ 
ျပည္ေထာင္စဆုိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၇။ [Maung Ko Ni v. Socialist Republic of the Union 
of Burma, 1980 BLR (CC) 7]; ဦးစိန္ထြန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စဆုိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၃။ [U Sein 
Tun v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1980 BLR (CC) 13]; ေမာင္တင့္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စဆုိုရွယ္လစ္ 
သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၀။ [Maung Tint Swe v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 
1980 BLR (CC) 20]; and, ေမာင္စိုးျမင္ ့ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စဆုိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၈။ [Maung 
Soe Myint v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1981 BLR (CC) 28]. 
106 On the history and functions of the intelligence service, see, Andrew Selth, “Burma’s Intelligence 
Apparatus,” Intelligence and National Security 13.4 (1998): 33-70. James McAndrew, “From 
Combat to Karaoke: Burmese Military Intelligence, 1948-2006,” MSc (Strategic Intelligence) diss., 
National Defense Intelligence College, 2007. 
107 The procedures for hearing special appeals only took effect in December 1989, after the single 
Supreme Court judge had already passed an order of final acquittal. Therefore, the Thailand-based 
Burma Lawyers’ Council has argued that the Supreme Court in taking the special appeal violated the 
principle of non-retrospectivity. Burma Lawyers’ Council, “Accepting Statements Made before 
Police or Military Intelligence in Court Violates the Principle of an Independent Judiciary,” LawKa 
PaLa.29 (2008): 25-26. 
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whether or not there had been a violation of section 24 of the Evidence Act, that 
“a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if 
the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any 
inducement, threat or promise”. In other words, the court asked, was there any 
evidence that the accused had been coerced into confessing? Finding none, it 
concluded that “in the absence of indication that [the confessions] were obtained 
on account of inducement, threat or promise as stipulated in the Evidence Act, 
section 24 there is no reason not to accept the said interrogation statements given 
to Defence Services intelligence personnel”.108  
 
According to one practitioner, Ye Naung “shook and moved” the legal world in 
Myanmar.109 Whereas in the 1960s so as to advance the doctrine of truth Maung 
Maung as chief justice undermined the burden of proof, his successor Aung Toe 
effectively reversed it without offering any explanation at all. As at least one 
lawyer pointed out when appealing a subsequent decision based on the ruling, Ye 
Naung had unfairly placed the onus on his client to prove that she had not been 
tortured.110 Nor was the onus reversed only in certain types of exceptional cases.111 
The ruling constituted a general repudiation of the contents of statute.  
 
As Ye Naung opened the door for the police to submit cases on confessions 
recorded by intelligence officers, through the open door, cases came. Some were 
lodged against political activists, like five men who allegedly sent a statement to 
the Voice of America radio station via the United States embassy; three who 
issued and distributed a statement from a student union without approval, and 
others accused of having contact with unlawful groups abroad.112 In each of these 
                                                        
108 “သက္ေသခံအက္ဥပေဒပုဒ္မ ၂၄ တြင္ ေဖာ္ျပထားေသာ ေသြးေဆာင္ျခင္း၊ ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္ျခင္း၊ ကတိျပဳျခင္းတို႔ ျပဳလုပ္ေၾကာင္းေပၚလြင္ 
ထင္ရွားျခင္း မရွိသည့္အတြက္ ၎တို႔က တပ္မေတာ္ေထာက္လွမ္းေရးအဖဲြ႔ဝင္ထံတြင္ ေပးခဲ့ေသာ စစ္ေၾကာခ်က္မ်ားကို လက္မခံႏိုင္စရာ 
အေၾကာင္းမရွိေခ်။” ဦးရဲေနာင္၊ စာ ၆၉။ (U Ye Naung, at 69.) My emphasis.  
109 Kyaw Min San, “Critical Issues for the Rule of Law in Myanmar,” unpublished paper presented at 
the Myanmar/Burma Update Conference 2011 (Australian National University, Canberra: 2011), 8. 
110 ေဒၚရီရီဝင္း ပါ ၄ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၀၆၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး အထူးအယူခံမႈအမွတ္ ၁၉၊ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ အထူးအယူခံမႈအား 
လက္ခံေပးပါရန္ ေလွ်ာက္လဲခ်က္၊၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂၄ ရက္။ (Daw Yi Yi Win & 3 v. Union of Myanmar, 2006 
Criminal Special Appeal No. 19, Supreme Court, Yangon, Application to grant leave for special 
appeal, 24 Jan. 2006.) 
111 In cases brought specifically under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in Sri Lanka, statements to 
police officers above a certain rank can be submitted in evidence provided that they are not ruled 
out under the analogous section 24 of that country’s Evidence Ordinance. Discussed in the views 
adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Communication No. 1033/2001: Sri Lanka, 
23 Aug. 2004, CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001 (Jurisprudence), text reproduced in full in “A Confession 
under Duress: The Nallaratnam Singarasa Case,” Article 2 4.4 (2005): 54-70. 
112 ဒုရဲမွဴးလွျမင့္ ႏွင့္ ဦးေအးၾကဴ (ခ) မံုရြာေအာင္ရွင္ ပါ ၅၊ ၂၀၀၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၃-၂၄၊ ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းတရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ 
၁၄ ရက္၊ တြဲဖက္တိုင္းတရားသူႀကီး ဘေက်ာ္။ [Police Captain Hla Myint v. U Aye Kyu (a) Monywa Aung Shin & 
4, 2000 Criminal Case Nos. 23 & 24, Yangon Divisional Court, 14 Dec. 2000, Additional Divisional 
Judge Ba Kyaw.] ဒုရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ဦးေအာင္ႀကီး ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၃၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၄၇၊ ဒဂံုသစ္ (ေတာင္ပိုင္း) ၿမိဳ႕နယ ္တရားရုံး  
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cases the verdict explicitly mentioned Ye Naung as the authority for acceptance of 
a confession or confessions obtained by military intelligence. According to 
practitioners, police officers also used the ruling to bring to court the confessions 
of ordinary criminal accused, such as in timber and gems smuggling cases, 
obtained under similar circumstances. 
 
For some detainees, Ye Naung had fatal consequences. In 2005 a young woman 
took a case to court over the custodial death of her husband, a fishmonger and 
political activist. Ma Hnin Sandar lodged a missing person complaint on May 1, 
the same day that unidentified men took her husband from a public restaurant. 
On May 10, a lieutenant colonel from military intelligence and some other men 
came to meet her at her local ward council office, told her that her husband had 
died three days earlier, and offered her K.100,000—about US$100—as 
compensation. When Hnin Sandar said that she wanted only her husband’s body, 
the officer told her that he had already been cremated. She refused the money and 
lodged an application in court against the lieutenant colonel, two other soldiers 
and three police. The application cites officials’ testimony in a coronial inquiry 
that the deceased was arrested four days after his wife had already lodged a 
missing person complaint. According to them, after being brought to a police 
station he was transferred to military intelligence, who interrogated him “only a 
little” before he was found unconscious in his cell on May 8, whereupon he died 
while being sent to hospital. It then cites the findings of a doctor at the hospital 
who examined the body, stating 
That he saw external injuries in 24 places on the body of the plaintiff’s husband Ko 
Aung Hlaing Win; that he saw that left rib no. 4 and right rib no. 4 were each fractured, 




                                                                                                                                                        
(သီးသန္႔) ၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၇ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးအုန္းလြင္။ [Police Captain Ye Nyunt v. Aung 
Gyi & 2, 2003 Criminal Case No. 1347, New Dagon (Southern) Township Court (Special), 7 Jan. 
2004, Township Judge (Special Power) U Ohn Lwin.] ဒုရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ နႏၵာစစ္ေအာင္ (ခ) စစ္ကိုေအာင္ ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၄၊ 
ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၈၊ ရန္ကုန္အေရွ႕ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂၀ ရက္၊ ဒုတိယခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ေဒၚပိုက္ပိုက္ေအး။ 
[Police Captain Ye Nyunt v. Nanda Sit Aung (a) Sit Ko Aung & 2, 2004 Criminal Case No. 8, 
Yangon Eastern District Court, 20 Feb. 2004, Deputy District Judge Daw Paik Paik Aye.] ဒုရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ 
ရီရီဝင္း ပါ ၄၊ ၂၀၀၄၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၇၄-၇၆၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရုိင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၃ ရက္၊ 
ဒုတိယခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ဦးအုန္းျမင္။့ (Police Captain Ye Nyunt v. Yi Yi Win & 3, 2004 Criminal Case Nos. 74-
76, Yangon Western District Court, 23 Sept. 2004, Deputy District Judge U Ohn Myint.)  
113 “တရားလို၏ ခင္ပြန္းကိုေအာင္လႈိင္ဝင္း၏ ခႏၵာကိုယ္ေပၚတြင္ ဒဏ္ရာ (၂၄) ေနရာေတြ႔ရွိရၿပီး ဝဲဘက္နံရိုးအမွတ္ (၄) တစ္ေခ်ာင္းႏွင့္ 
ယာဘက္နံရိုးအမွတ္ (၄) တစ္ေခ်ာင္းစီက်ဳိးေနျခင္း၊ နံရိုးတစ္ေခ်ာင္းတစ္ေနရာတြင္ႏွစ္ပိုင္းက်ဳိးေနေသာ အေနအထားေတြ႔ရွရိျခင္း၊ xxx ခႏၵာကိုယ္၌ 
ေရဓာတ္ခမ္းေျခာက္ေနေၾကာင္း”။ မႏွင္းစႏၵာ ႏွင့္ ဒုတိယဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီးမင္းႏိုင္ ပါ ၆၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ -- ၊ မရမ္းကုန္းၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး 
ေလွ်ာက္လႊာ၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၁ ရက္၊ စာ ၄။ (Ma Hnin Sandar v. Lieutenant Colonel Min Naing & 5, 2005 
Criminal Case No. --, Mayangone Township Court, Application, 1 June 2005: 4.) 
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These injuries point to the use of severe torture resulting in the death of this 
hitherto reasonably healthy and physically intact young man; however, the doctor 
instead found that his death was the result of an enlarged liver, tonsillitis and 
pneumonia. The court ordered that as Aung Hlaing Win had died a “natural” 
death, Hnin Sandar’s complaint was groundless.114 Subsequent applications for 
revision in higher courts also failed.115 
 
In 2006, a single Supreme Court judge followed Ye Naung but narrowed the 
ruling somewhat, finding that although a confession to military intelligence could 
be submitted to court, it should not be the only evidence upon which to convict.116 
Whether due to this ruling, a change of instructions elsewhere in the apparatus, 
or because the old military intelligence service was in 2004 demolished, around 
this time cases seem to have stopped citing Ye Naung. But the spirit of Ye Naung, 
what the case represents—the authority of the police to lodge cases in court based 
upon confession possibly obtained through the use of torture or threat of 
torture—remains fundamentally a part of the juridical system in Myanmar, and is 
that aspect of the system with which the remainder of this chapter is concerned.  
 
In a relatively minor case, if the police obtain a confession they need not spend 
time and effort searching for material evidence or doing real investigative work. If 
they can get an accused to confess, and can gather up or manufacture some 
corroborating evidence, they have what they need. They may also pay, or be paid, 
to help alter the case outcome in some way for which they find torture convenient. 
For instance, in the course of this research I followed a case in which a court 
convicted two teenage girls of stealing from an employer. The employer had paid 
the police to charge the girls. As the police had no material evidence, they 
obtained confessions by forcing the girls’ fingers and hands into stress positions: 
a simple enough technique on frightened teenagers, which took only a short time 
to get the required result. A lawyer’s efforts to get the girls released on various 
                                                        
114 မႏွင္းစႏၵာ ႏွင့္ ဒုတိယဗိုလ္မွဴးႀကီးမင္းႏိုင္ ပါ ၆၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ -- ၊ မရမ္းကုန္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၉ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးတင္ထြဋ္။ [Ma Hnin Sandar v. Lieutenant Colonel Min Naing & 5, 2005 
Criminal Case No. --, Mayangone Township Court, 9 July 2005, Township Judge (Special Power) U 
Tin Htut.] 
115 မႏွင္းစႏၵာ ႏွင့္ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ပါ ၇၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာျပင္ဆင္မႈအမွတ္ ၇၅၄၊ အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရိုင္တရားရုံး ေလွ်ာက္လႊာ၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁ ရက္။ (Ma Hnin Sandar v. State of Myanmar & 6, 2005 Criminal Revision Case No. 754, 
Western District Court, application, 1 Sept. 2005.) မႏွင္းစႏၵာ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၀၅၊ 
ျပစ္မ ႈဆိုင္ရာျပင္ဆင္မႈအမွတ္ ၅၉၅၊ ရန္ကုန္တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ ္ေလွ်ာက္လႊာ၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္။ (Ma Hnin Sandar v. 
Union of Myanmar, 2005 Criminal Revision Case No. 595, Supreme Court, Yangon, application, 11 
Oct. 2005.) 
116 ဦးတင္ေငြ၊ ေဒၚျမျမဝင္း (ခ) ေဒၚသန္းဝင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂၀၀၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁။ [U Tin Ngwe, Daw Mya 
Mya Win (a) Daw Than Win v. Union of Myanmar, 2006 MLR (SC) 1.]  
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grounds, including that they had been tortured, failed. After the girls had served 
more than half of their sentences—including time deducted spent in remand 
awaiting trial—the lawyer decided to let the case go, reasoning that if a successful 
appeal were put up, the employer would learn of it and lodge another false charge. 
If the girls did their time, the lawyer reluctantly concluded, the employer would 
leave them be.117  
 
In a more important criminal case, because of the premium attached to obtaining 
a confession and because of pressure from above to get results quickly—not to 
mention the benefits in promotions or other perks for a job well done—the police 
will work much harder to extract a confession. To illustrate, here is one account of 
a police investigation into a person accused of involvement in a bombing which 
occurred during time of research, as recorded by a relative of the defendant in an 
enumerated letter submitted to higher authorities: 
[The defendant] was arrested at home… after midnight and taken to the Aungthapyay 
Interrogation Camp for interrogation. [He] explained but could not convince them that 
he was not among the persons involved in the bombing. Inspector Maung Aye 
threatened him that, “If you die it’s nothing to us”, while Police Major Tin Oo 
threatened him that, “We’ll interrogate until you can’t take it. We’ll bring your family 
and torture you in front of them.” (3) [He] was forced to stand throughout 
interrogation for two whole days and nights with his hands cuffed behind his back. He 
was forced to sit like a jockey and hit and kicked in the head; stepped on the crook of 
the knee and hit with a broom; boxed simultaneously on both ears; stripped naked and 
forced to kneel on gravel with arms raised; burned on his genitals with lit paper; had 
hot wax dripped onto his genitals; was blindfolded throughout various types of torture; 
was forced to sit down and stand up repeatedly for over an hour at a time; and was 
forced to stay seated in a chair for five days without sleeping. There was no order from 
a court for him to be remanded in custody. (4) [He] was given various promises as 
inducement, that, “If you give a confession we’ll make the case easy on you”; “You won’t 
get the death penalty”; “We’ll fix it so that you’re out after one or two years”; and, “If we 
get another accused, we’ll make you a state witness.” (5) As he was afraid for the threats 
to his life, as he could no longer stand the torture that the police officers unceasingly 
practiced on rotation; and as he believed the various promises made as inducement, he 
agreed to give a confession. (6) For the three days after he agreed to confess he was fed 
well and able to sleep well, then the officers made [him] repeat over and over what to 
say about the bombing…. A police inspector made him repeatedly practice his lines 
until there were no errors, then, “Just say it like that [in court], and if you say anything 
wrong it’s going to hurt.” … He gave a confession at the court due to fear that he would 
be tortured further.118 
 
In this description, the police are clearly anxious for the accused man’s 
performance before the judge receiving the confession to go well. They feed him, 
allow him to rest, and help him to remember what he has to say. But what is the 
cause of their anxiousness? Is it related explicitly to the authority of the judge? Or 
is it rather that in the system as police, in which all personnel are engaged in 
                                                        
117 Personal communication in 2009 with a professional involved in the case.  
118 Translated from Burmese; signed copy of letter on file. Names of police officers changed.  
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cooperative activity, the police have to do their part to satisfy the judge that she 
too can do hers? The police, after all, understand that they need to meet certain 
requirements to satisfy the judge that she can confidently join with them. They 
must ensure that the accused perform well enough to enable judicial cooperation 
in the establishing of guilt.  
 
Because the system emphasises a certain type of orderliness for the judge, as I 
discuss in the next chapter, she needs certain reassurances from the police that 
the requirements of orderliness can be maintained. It will not do for the police to 
bring a bloodied and dazed defendant to confess. Later in trial when the accused 
retracts the confession, the judge needs to be able to state that she received him 
and recorded the confession in accordance with procedure. Whatever else 
happens, her part was done correctly. Only where the police fail in this regard can 
they, and the judge recording confession, encounter trouble, as, for example, in a 
1996 Supreme Court ruling that acquitted a man accused of murder who said that 
the police tortured him after they took him to a judge one day to confess, and he 
refused. When they took him the next day he complied.119 Although the judge 
attributed his sudden change to coercion by the police, even in this ruling, the 
lesson to the police is not “do not torture”. Indeed nowhere in the judgement is 
torture condemned, or even commented upon by the judge. Rather, I would argue 
that the subtext of the ruling is that both the police and the judge receiving a 
confession need to take care to ensure the accused is sufficiently committed to the 
procedure beforehand, so that the procedural game plays out as required for the 
purpose of reaching the “correct” result.  
 
This practice of torture in Myanmar can be described as a type of judicial torture. 
To be sure, it is not the judicial torture of history, which was a formal part of the 
criminal process.120 However, it is a form of torture that has as its objective the 
obtaining of proof for a judicial purpose, and has tacit judicial endorsement, since 
judges must know that police officers force confessions from people in their 
custody, and since many judges work closely with the police in a variety of 
enterprises—including the moneymaking with which the next chapter is 
                                                        
119 ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ မာဒင္ (ခ) ၾကည္လြင္၊ ၁၉၉၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၂၉။ [Union of Myanmar v. Mardin (a) 
Kyi Lwin, 1996 MLR (SC) 129.] See also ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ / တိုးရီ ႏငွ့္ တိုးရီ / ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ 
၁၉၉၂ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၈။ [Union of Myanmar/Toe Yi v. Toe Yi/Union of Myanmar, 1992 MLR (SC) 28.] A 
similar case is described in ေမာငပ္န္းဇံ ုႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ၊ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာခ္်ဳပ္) ၁၅။ [Maung Pan Zone 
v. Union of Burma, 1960 BLR (SC) 15.]  
120 As discussed in John H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the 
Ancien Re ́gime (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
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concerned. It is a form of torture that is practiced privately, consistent with the 
secretive character of the criminal juridical system as a whole, but is known 
publicly. It is not torture as punishment, imposed once the juridical process is 
completed. Torture is part of a procedural game itself, one that precedes most 
other parts of the game, and one which like the lodgement of charges and the 
testimonies of witnesses, if done properly will yield the required result. The trial 
hangs over the act of torture, present in the inverted process of interrogation and 
confession, present also in the promise that the accused will have his day in court 
only once the formalities of the police are completed to their satisfaction.  
 
Judicial torture of this sort is not concerned with the obtaining of information but 
with the exercise of power to get someone to admit guilt. As Elaine Scarry has 
written in her seminal work on the topic, torture is misunderstood as being 
associated with the gathering of information, because the physical act of torture 
and verbal act of interrogation are intertwined.121 Interrogation, she writes, is 
internal to the structure of torture because it objectifies the act of causing pain in 
the exercise of power. Thus, a policeman who tortures to obtain a confession may 
have no interest in whether the accused is guilty or innocent. Often he may know 
that the latter is the case.122 The interrogation and the confession stand 
independently from the question of who actually committed a crime. Phyo Wai 
Aung, on whose case I have already commented, in a remarkable testimony to an 
enclosed court recognised that the system works this way when he said that: 
Confession has a use only for the prosecuting agencies. It can have no benefit for 
anyone else. In my view, it does not even assist in the reduction of crime. In prison, I 
have met [persons accused of being] thieves who [were convicted] just on the giving of 
confession. Because of the Myanmar Police Force’s inadequate training in the detection 
of crime, so many accused people facing fabricated charges who do not understand the 
law and who had nothing to do with anything give confessions in place of the real 
offenders.123 
                                                        
121 Scarry 28-29. 
122 For some pertinent observations concerning the use of torture in Sri Lanka, see Basil Fernando, 
“Torturing and Killing the Innocent,” Article 2 3.1 (2004): 61-65. 
123 “ေျဖာင့္ခ်က္သည္ တရားလိုတရားစြဲအဖဲြ႔အစည္းအတြက္သာ အသံုးတည့္ၿပီး၊ အျခားမည့္သူတစ္ဦးတစ္ေယာက္ကိုမွ် ေကာင္းက်ဳိးမေပးသည့္ကိစၥ 
ျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္အျမင္အရ မႈခင္းက်ဆင္းေရးကိုပင္လွ်င္ အေထာက္အကူမျပဳပါ။ ေထာင္ထဲ၌ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ ႀကံဳဆံုခဲ့ရေသာ သူခိုးမ်ားပင္လွ်င္ 
ေျဖာင့္ခ်က္ေပးေနရပါသည္။ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲ၏ အရည္အခ်င္း မျပည့္ဝေသာ မႈခင္းစံုစမ္းေဖာ္ထုတ္မႈ ပညာရပ္မ်ားေၾကာင့္ ဥပေဒနားမလည္သ ူ
အမွန္တကယ္က်ဴးလြန္ခဲ့ေသာတရားခံမ်ားေရာ၊ မည္သို႔မွ်စပ္ဆိုင္ျခင္းမရွိသူလုပ္ၾကံခံရသည့္စြပ္စြဲခံရသူမ်ား ပါလိႈင္လႈိင္ႀကီး ေျဖာင့္ခ်က္ 
ေပးေနၾကသည္။” ရဲအုပ္ေသာင္းေငြ ႏွင့္ ဦးၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီးမႈအမွတ္ ၁၀၃၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင၏္ 
ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားခသံက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၀။ (Inspector Thaung Ngwe v. U Phyo Wai 
Aung, 2010 Criminal Case No. 103, Yangon Northern District Court, Testimony of Phyo Wai Aung, 
Defence Witness No. 1, 2 Feb. 2012: 10.) The court convicted Phyo Wai Aung in this case and a 
series of others in May 2012, sentencing him to death, and to a total of thirty-nine years of 
imprisonment, relying almost entirely in the verdicts on the confession, and rejecting the 
defendant’s allegations that it had been obtained illegally as baseless. ရဲအုပ္ေသာင္းေငြ ႏွင့္ ဦးၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင၊္ 
၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီးမႈအမွတ္ ၁၀၂၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ဂ ရက္၊ ခရိုင္တရားသူႀကီး ေအာင္သိန္း။ (Inspector 
Thaung Ngwe v. U Phyo Wai Aung, 2010 Criminal Case No. 102, Yangon Northern District Court, 8 
May 2012, District Judge Aung Thein); also case numbers 103-105/2010.  
 151 
 
What Phyo Wai Aung is implicitly recognising in his testimony is that confession 
is desirable not because it establishes right from wrong but because it represents 
a form of both political and juridical power. Although arguing that it stems in part 
from poor training, the nub of his argument is that confession is used because it 
works, and because it is to the advantage of the police. As it can serve only the 
interests of the state against the accused, by obtaining it from the accused, the 
state obtains acquiescence to its authority, and thereby reinforces proper 
relations between sovereign and subject within the system as police.  
 
This last point brings us back to Agamben’s portrayal of the policeman as 
sovereign. In the act of torture, the power of the sovereign over the subject is 
directly expressed through the policeman, insofar as the sovereign “is the point of 
indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes 
over into law and law passes over into violence”.124 In the act of torture, the 
policeman is at once inside the juridical system and transcending it. He stands 
above it, invested with political power that surpasses the system. But he also 
stands in it, having as his objective the obtaining of the confession that is integral 
to the procedural games that will follow. Consequently, torture is unregulated, 
since the sovereign will is not restrained by the juridical order that flows from it, 
but it is also routinised, since it does not happen for its own sake but so as to 
trigger a series of other procedures and outcomes.  
 
Because the policeman as sovereign commits torture that is at once unregulated 
but routinised, accounts of torture suggest that the types of methods used are 
diverse, but not random. In similar types of cases we see patterns of torture that 
bear a close resemblance to one another. Take the case of another man accused of 
involvement in a bombing, this time during 2010, again as told in a letter to 
higher authorities, signed by a relative: 
From the day [he] was arrested and thus detained the 16 police including Inspector 
Saw Maung interrogated him in pairs on rotation continuously for the 6 days. During 
the interrogation he was tortured seriously. He was not fed throughout the 6 days and 
was given only two handfuls of water per day. [He] was hit in the face and on the 
cheeks with shoes; was kicked and stomped on the head while his hands were tied with 
rope at the rear; was forced to kneel on gravel for 30 minutes at a time; had his fingers 
squeezed together with ball pens between them; had a truncheon pushed into his anus; 
and, was beaten with truncheons on his back, chest and feet, resulting in serious 
injuries to his body.125  
 
                                                        
124 Agamben, Homo Sacer 32. 
125 Translated from Burmese, copy of complaint letter on file. Name of the police officer changed.  
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Although we might conclude from the above descriptions that severe torture of 
this sort is a peculiarity of cases against public enemies or in high-profile cases 
where the police are under heavy pressure to get confessions quickly, anecdotally 
policemen use similar methods of torture in other types of cases too. For example, 
two men in Yangon alleged that the police illegally detained and severely tortured 
them during 2009, one for five days, to admit to the theft of gold from a local 
businesswoman. In a written complaint, according to one: 
They covered my face with a men’s sarong and then four or five of them assaulted me. 
They hit me on the cheeks and punched me in the face. They hit me with truncheons 
over 100 times on my ankles, knuckles, elbow joints, shoulder blades and head. They 
made me stand on my tip-toes then put something sharp and pointy under my feet and 
made me hold a pose like I was riding a motorcycle, for about two hours. They prodded 
my back with a truncheon.126  
 
The types of torture allegedly practiced in this case, which according to the other 
detainee also included the running of bamboo up and down his shins, are 
consistent with the types of torture that former political prisoners have 
described.127 They suggest that as torture is routinised, it also follows a certain 
internal logic, irrespective of the specific quality of the case.  
 
The transactional character of this form of torture, the holding out of an end to 
torture in exchange for a confession or payment, is integral to its success. The 
policeman has the power to commit violence and he has the power to stop it. But 
to do that he must get something in return. In all cases of torture to obtain 
confession, the same basic outcome determines the methods used. However, in 
non-political cases, detainees are able to escape torture through payment of 
money, as did the two men in the case described above. By way of another 
example, a man called Sithu Zeya in 2010 testified that policemen tortured him to 
confess to going to Thailand to meet members of antigovernment groups: 
They told me to admit to having been involved in [a] bombing. As I said that I had not 
been involved so I could not admit to it, they hit my mouth with a shoe. They said, “If 
you don’t admit to it, we’ll pick up your dad too.” For about four days they tortured me 
saying like this, didn’t feed me or give me water, forced me to stand upright on tiptoes 
and so on, and then they brought my father’s photo. They showed me my father’s photo 
taken with a digital camera. They told me that, “Although you won’t admit to the 
bombing, you’ll admit to another case, or your mum will be next.” They made me sign 
those papers they wrote out about having contact with Ko Pwa of [Democratic Voice of 
Burma] in the adjacent country, and how I would get funds from Ko Pwa, and the other 
matter they wrote was that I had gone via Myawadi to Mae Sot…. They said that on 4-5-
10 when I would arrive at the court I would have to tell [the details of the documents] 
in front of the judge, that what the judge asked I was to answer well, and that if I did 
not then “you and your dad are going to jail”. Saying that if I spoke well then they 
                                                        
126 Translated from Burmese, signed copy of complaint letter on file. 
127 As described in The Darkness We See: Torture in Burma’s Detention Centres and Prisons (Mae 
Sot, Thailand: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Burma, 2005). 
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would release me from detention, they took me to court. Three police officers took me 
in front of the judge. At that time, I didn’t have a clue about what a confession was. I 
just said everything that they had told me to say in front of the judge…. In reality I had 
no idea about the meaning of the confession. I said it to get relief from their 
torture….128 
 
The person confessing need not understand what he is doing or why. All he need 
do is accept the assurance of the police that they have the power to make things 
better, once the confession is given. Of course, because the policeman as torturer 
makes promises on the threshold of the juridical system, at a point of 
indistinction between violence and law, his promises contain no guarantees. He 
may make false promises to which the victim clings for want of anything else—
indeed, in his courtroom testimony Phyo Wai Aung said that despite being 
tortured he still believed the police when they reassured him that he had nothing 
to worry about if he gave a statement to a judge, and that they had sorted 
everything out with higher-ups.129 Only when he was finally brought before a 
court and learned the charges against him and the harshness of the penalties, 
including the death sentence, did he realise that he had been duped. 
 
Here is a clear parallel between the policeman as sovereign and the sovereign 
power, which also gives promises to which it cannot be held, offers of leniency 
through transactions with wayward citizenry, for which people can only take it at 
its word. Consider the following statement in 2008 from the then-police chief, 
Brigadier General Khin Yi, while explaining the state’s response to a terrorist 
conspiracy:  
                                                        
128 “ဗံုးေပါက္ကြဲရာတြင္ က်ေနာ္ပါဝင္သည္ဟု ေျပာဆိုဝန္ခံခိုင္းခဲ့ရာ၊ က်ေနာ္မွ အဆိုပါကိစၥတြင္ပါဝင္ခဲ့ျခင္းမရွိ၍ ဝန္မခံႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း ေျပာဆိုသျဖင့္ 
က်ေနာ့္ပါးကို ဖိနပ္ျဖင့္ ရိုက္ပါသည္။ မင္းဝန္မခံလွ်င—္မင္းအေဖကိုလည္း ေခၚရလိမ့္မည္ဟု ေျပာဆိုခဲ့ပါသည္။ ထိုသို႔ေျပာဆိုခဲ့သည္မ်ားကို 
က်ေနာ့္အား ထမင္းမေကြ်းျခင္း၊ ေရမတိုက္ျခင္း၊ ေျခဖ်ားေထာက္၍ မတ္တတရ္ပ္ခုိင္းျခင္းအစရွိသည့္ ႏွိပ္စက္မႈမ်ားကို (၄) ရက္မွ် 
ျပဳလုပ္ၿပီးသည့္ေနာက္ က်ေနာ့္ဖခင္၏ ဓာတ္ပံုကို ယူေဆာင္လာပါသည္။ က်ေနာ့္ဖခင္၏ ဓာတ္ပံုအား ဒီဂ်စ္တယ္ကင္မရာျဖင့္ ရိုက္ထားေသာပံုကို 
ျပသျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ မင္း ေဖာက္ခဲြတြင္ဝန္မခံ ေပမယ့္ ေနာက္တစ္မႈကေတာ့ဝန္ခံရလိမ့္မည္ဟု ေျပာဆိုပါသည္။ ဝန္မခံလွ်င—္မင္းအေမကို 
ထပ္ဖမ္းရမည္ဟု က်ေနာ့္အား ေျပာဆိုပါသည္။ ၎တို႔ ေရးသားလာေသာစာရြက္ပါအေၾကာင္းအရာမ်ားမွာ—တစ္ဖက္ႏိုင္ငံဒီဗြီဘီမွ ကိုပြႏွင့္ 
ဆက္သြယ္သည့္အေၾကာင္းမ်ားႏွင့္ ကိုပြထံမွ ေထာက္ပံ့ ေၾကးမည္၍ မည္မွ်ရရွိေၾကာင္းျဖစ္ၿပီး အျခားကိစၥတစ္ခုမွာ—ျမဝတီမွတဆင့္မဲေဆာက္သို႔ 
သြားလာခဲ့သည့္အေၾကာင္းမ်ားကို ေရးသားထားၿပီး က်ေနာ့္အား လက္မွတ္ ေရးထိုးခိုင္းျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ xxx ၄-၅-၁၀ ေန႔ က်ေနာ့္အား 
တရားရံုးေရွ႕သို႔ သြားေရာက္၍ တရားသူႀကီးထံ ေျပာဆိုရမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ တရားသူႀကီး ေမးသမွ်အား ေကာင္းေကာင္းမြန္မြန္ႏွင္ ့ေျပာဆိုထားသည့္ 
အတိုင္း ေျဖၾကားေပးရန္ႏွင့္ ေကာင္းေကာင္းမြန္မြန္ ေျပာဆိုျခင္းမရွိပါက မင္းအေဖႏွင့္မင္းကို ေထာင္ခ်ရမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ေျပာဆိုၿပီး၊ ေကာင္းေကာင္း 
မြန္မြန္ေျပာဆိုခဲ့ပါကအခ်ဳပ္မွလႊတ္ေပးမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ေျပာဆိုတာ တရားရံုးသို႔ က်ေနာ့္အား ေခၚေဆာင္ခဲ့ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္အား ရဲ (၃) ဦးမွ 
ေခၚေဆာင္လာၿပီး၊ တရားသူႀကီးေရွ႕ေမွာက္သို႔ပို႔ေပးခဲ့ပါသည္။ ထိုစဥ္က—ေျဖာင့္ခ်က္ဆိုသည္မွာ က်ေနာ္ ဘာမွန္းမသိခဲ့ပါ။ ၎တို႔ေျပာဆိုသည့္ 
အတိုင္း တရားသူႀကီးေရွ႕ေမွာက္၌ က်ေနာ္ေျဖၾကားေျပာဆိုခဲ့ျခင္းသာျဖစ္ပါသည္။ xxx အမွန္တကယ္တြင္ ေျဖာင့္ခ်က္ အဓိပၸါယ္ကို က်ေနာ္ 
နားလည္ျခင္းမရွိပါ။ ၎တို႔၏ ႏွိပ္စက္ခံရသမွ်ကို သက္သာခြင့္ရရွိေစရန္ က်ေနာ္ေျပာဆိုခဲ့ရျခင္းျဖစ္ၿပီး xxx”။ ရဲအုပ္ေအာင္စိုးႏိုင ္ႏွင့္ စည္သူေဇယ်၊ 
၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၄၆၆၊ မဂၤလာေတာင္ညြန္႔ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ေမာင္စည္သူေဇယ်၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားခသံက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၁၀ 
ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၃-၄။ (Inspector Aung Soe Naing v. Sithu Zeya, 2010 Criminal Case No. 466, 
Mingalartaung-nyunt Township Court, Testimony of Maung Sithu Zeya, Defence Witness No. 1, 26 
Nov. 2010: 3-4.) The police did in fact arrest Sithu Zeya’s father and charge him with a number of 
offences.  
129 ရဲအုပ္ေသာင္းေငြ ႏွင့္ ဦးၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင၊္ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီးမႈအမွတ္ ၁၀၃၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၿဖိဳးေဝေအာင၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားခသံက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၁၃ ရက္၊ စာ ၇-၈။ (Inspector Thaung Ngwe v. U Phyo Wai Aung, 
2010 Criminal Case No. 103, Yangon Northern District Court, Testimony of Phyo Wai Aung, 
Defence Witness No. 1, 13 Feb. 2012: 7-8.) On 8 May 2012 the court convicted Phyo Wai Aung on all 
charges and sentenced him to death, plus a total of 39 years of imprisonment.  
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Among those who attended the trainings to destroy peace and stability, including the 
explosives training, most did not understand exactly their facts and purpose…. As for 
this sort of innocent and ignorant youth, whose actions constitute a loss for the state 
and are also for themselves a waste of their lives, I wish to say here with sympathy that 
if whoever in their circles notifies the responsible persons then our security personnel 
will treat them with understanding and leniency.130  
 
We can see the symmetry in the expression of sovereign power found between the 
state and the society on the one hand, and between the policeman and the 
criminal accused on the other. The sovereign is lenient. The person who does 
wrong but who admits to it, who acts ignorantly but who realises his mistake, 
deserves to be treated gently. Like the sovereign policeman in the torture 
chamber, the police chief as sovereign promises to make everything better in 
exchange for the confession, the admission of guilt and acknowledgment of his 
power through voluntary reportage of the whereabouts and circumstances of the 
accused. No principle exists to guarantee anyone fair treatment or a second 
chance, but pragmatism dictates that some people should get one sometimes. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this study I proposed to describe the criminal juridical system 
in Myanmar as police. Police, to recall, establishes an administrative continuum 
that, Foucault has written, “from the general law to the particular measure, makes 
the public authorities and the injunctions they give one and the same type of 
principle, according to one and the same type of coercive value”.131 Police 
connotes administration in its broadest sense, in its institutional and procedural 
means to secure order among a given people within a given territory.132 Foucault 
distinguishes this form of state from the despotic state because the latter refers 
the power of injunctions back to the sovereign will, whereas in the police state an 
injunction has power regardless of its specific origin or form.  
 
                                                        
130 “ေဖာက္ခြဲဖ်က္ဆီးေရးသင္တန္း အပါအဝင္ တည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းေရးကို ဖ်က္ဆီးလိုတဲ့ သင္တန္းမ်ားကို တက္ခဲ့ၾကသူမ်ားအနက္ 
အေၾကာင္းျခင္းရာန႔ဲ ရည္ရြက္ခ်က္ကို ေသခ်ာစြာ သိရွိနားလည္မႈမရွိၾကတဲ့သူေတြလည္း အမ်ားအျပားပါရွိေနေၾကာင္း ေဖာ္ထုတ္သိရွိရပါသည္။ xxx 
ဒီလိုအျပစ္မဲ့၊ အသိမဲ့ လူငယ္ေတြအတြက္ ဒီလုပ္ငန္းေတြဟာ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အတြက္လည္း ဆံုး႐ႈံး၊ ကိုယ္အတြက္လည္း ဘဝတံုး၊ ပတ္ဝန္းက်င္ 
အသိုက္အဝန္းကပါျဖစ္ျဖစ္ တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားထံ သတင္းပို႔ ဆက္သြယ္ အသိေပး အပ္ႏွံသြားၾကမယ္ဆိုရင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ လံုျခံဳေရး 
ဝန္ထမ္းေတြအေနန႔ဲကလည္း နားလည္သက္ညႇာစြာ စဥ္းစားေပးမွာျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ဒီေနရာကေန စာနာစိတ္န႔ဲ အသိေပးေျပာၾကားလိုပါတယ္။” FDB 
အပါအဝင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ကို ဆန္႔က်င္ေနၾကတဲ့ ျပည္ပက အဖြဲ႕အစည္းေတြဟာ ဒီမိုကေရစီန႔ဲ လူအခြင့္အေရးကို ဟန္ေဆာင္ဗန္းျပၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံတကာရဲ႕ 
ေပးစာကမ္းစာအျဖစ္ ရရွိလာတဲ့ေငြေတြကို အစိုးရဆန္႔က်င္ေရး၊ ျပည္တြင္းဆူပူေရး၊ ေဖာက္ခဲြဖ်က္ဆီးေရးလုပ္ငန္းေတြမွာ အသြင္ေျပာင္းအသံုးျပဳေန၊ 
စာ ၉။ (“FDB and Other Anti-State External Groups on Pretence of Democracy and Human Rights 
Misusing International Community’s Charity for Anti-Government Enterprises, Internal Unrest and 
Destruction,” 9.) 
131 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics 168-69. 
132 Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the 
Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983) 5. 
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I discussed this idea of police in the last chapter by arguing that after 1962 the 
state apparatus moved towards more pragmatic goals but did so within an 
authoritarian ideological framework that justified the eliminating of normative 
bases for claims to legal rights. The regime developed many features of a classic 
police state in the sense of its being comprised of an authoritarian sovereign aided 
by a professional corps directed towards the shaping of a well-ordered society.133  
 
The new regime that seized power in 1988 built up a more comprehensive form of 
police than that which preceded it. The regime proposed to do nothing with the 
criminal juridical system other than use it to enforce its specific order: it would 
not attempt to shape human society through juridical instruments, as the 
Benthamites had hoped to do; nor guard the liberties of citizens, as the post-
independence courts had professed was their responsibility; nor shape a new 
economic and moral order of the sort expressed via the post-1962 ideology. It 
would do no more and no less than maintain order, which it described as the rule 
of law, taya-ubade-somoye.  
 
In this chapter I have looked at two paradigmatic features of this “rule of law”, 
namely, the pursuit of the public enemy through the criminal juridical system, 
and use of torture to extract confession as an exercise in sovereign power by the 
policeman. On trial the public enemy is an exemplary object for administrative 
action. She provides participants in the courtroom process the opportunity to 
demonstrate their commitment to the system’s pragmatic principles, and their 
abilities and willingness to give effect to these ideals through cooperative efforts 
to maintain law and order, through a shared understanding of their respective 
roles in the administrative continuum. But in the case against the public enemy 
we also see the greatest incongruence between official action and declared rule, to 
recall Fuller’s distinction between the rule of law and the managerial context, 
since expediency demands an outcome that satisfies the system’s law-and-order 
imperatives, independent of declared rules.  
 
Among personnel in this system, the policeman occupies a special place, an area 
of indistinction symmetrical to sovereignty, in which the right of the sovereign to 
exert violence plays out in the individual case. Although this symmetry is, as 
Agamben has argued, to an extent a feature of the policeman’s role everywhere, in 
Myanmar it is enlarged by a system in which rationales of law and order surpass 
                                                        
133 Raeff 251. 
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others, enabling the policeman-sovereign to aggrandise his part and exceed the 
authority of other personnel. 
 
The policeman as sovereign and the pursuit of the public enemy through the 
criminal juridical system are intimately related. Both are consistent with the 
bureaucratic ideal of secrecy that has animated the system in the contemporary 
period. Just as the police torture in an enclosed space, the case against the public 
enemy too has typically gone on in a spatially and juridically enclosed court. The 
person heard in an enclosed court has no legal right to be heard in public. But nor 
does the public have any legal right to insist that they hear her. The system as 
police is premised on the idea that the public does not have any inherent right to 
know what is going on.  
 
In the law-and-order system, judges participate with the police in the recording of 
confessions obtained from torture. The confession constitutes proof both that an 
offence has been committed and also that the accused has submitted to sovereign 
power. In other words, it has political and juridical power that reinforces the 
intimate relationship between the use of torture to obtain confession and the 
prosecuting of the public enemy. When the enemy is criminalised, the policeman 
must be the agent of sovereign power in relation to the enemy, just as that the 
soldier is the agent who goes into the battlefield. Therefore, an intimate linkage 
exists between the public enemy and the sovereign policeman, and we should not 
be surprised that some of the most egregious reports of torture to extract 
confession concern cases where the accused is a public enemy.  
 
Although cases brought against public enemies are in a system of law and order 
emblematic of values and practices that oppose the rule of law, they are not most 
cases. The vast majority of criminal cases that go through the system are cases in 
which, unlike those against public enemies, lawyers can defend the interests of 
their clients with some expectation that their work will affect the outcome of the 
case, and judges have the authority to decide on the guilt or innocence of an 
individual accused. But where the system wants for normative contents, 
professionals find little value in an insistence upon strict adherence to law. In a 
pragmatic system, most people are pragmatists. For this reason, many, perhaps 
the majority of cases heard in Myanmar’s courts today are won or lost not 
according to their merits but according to the value assigned to them by the 




THE CRIMINAL JURIDICAL SYSTEM AS MARKETPLACE 
 
At the start of 2007, Deputy Township Judge U Sein Lwin lost his job and went to 
jail. His alleged crime was to have solicited bribes so that three women not 
become co-accused in a case before him. A prosecutor charged the judge under 
the 1948 Prevention of Corruption Act, and a court in Taunggyi promptly 
sentenced him to seven years in prison.1 If the facts of the case were more or less 
as set out on paper, then the judge should have known better. The cases against 
the women fell under the Unlawful Associations Act. In other words, they were in 
some way political. The judge ought never to have asked for money. Indeed, 
according to one professional who around that time attended a government legal 
training programme, one of his trainers directly warned his class that, “If 
[someone] above says you have to imprison in a political case, don’t release for 
lack of evidence. If you do, it’ll be your ruin.”2 To this we can add, from observing 
what happened to Sein Lwin, don’t release in a case of this sort in exchange for 
money, or it will be your ruin too.  
 
Unlike this judge, most judicial personnel do appear to get the message, and 
restrict their moneymaking to cases where it is appropriate to do so. The business 
of criminal “justice” in which they engage is the topic of this chapter. My reason 
for dedicating a separate chapter to the criminal juridical system as marketplace 
is because although moneymaking through positions of authority has been a 
feature of the system since the colonial days—to which I advert at a couple of 
points in this chapter—the sheer scale and audacity of the business now compels 
our attention. One professional interviewed in the course of this research 
remarked that whereas before 1988 judges did not take large bribes partly 
because they could not use a lot of money without attracting comment and 
suspicion, nowadays judges advertise their expensive cars and big houses. 
Another noted that whereas in the socialist period payments were often not in 
cash but in the form of simple, locally manufactured goods—a new sarong, a drum 
                                                        
1 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄/၂၀၀၇၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 4/2007, 22 Jan. 
2007.) 
2 “အထက္ႏိုင္ငံေရးမႈန႔ဲ ေထာင္ခ်ဆိုဒါကိုေတာ့ သက္ေသမခုိင္လံုလို႔ဆိုၿပီး သြားမလႊတ္ပါန႔ဲ၊ အဲသလိုလုပ္ရင္ ထမင္းအိုးကြဲသြားလိမ္႔မယ္။” In the 
original, “ruin” also is idiomatic speech, meaning literally that the person’s rice pot will be broken: a 
particularly apt idiom given the context. 
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of quality cooking oil—now a gift hamper or biscuit tin conceals the wads of 
money inside, or is a mere thank you message with the assurance of the actual gift 
to come later. Writing in 2011, Kyaw Min San, a practicing lawyer, said that a 
senior counterpart with whom he spoke told him that, 
He believes bribery and corruption are now prevalent in more than 50 per cent of 
courts in the present legal system. He said that in his opinion without giving a bribe, 
there is no possibility to win a case. Another highly experienced lawyer said that most 
of the courts in which he practices take bribes from clients…. He also added that 
bribery at the courts was not under the table but that it was on the table, meaning that 
judges take bribes as if the laws permit it.3  
 
This perception that bribery is on the table even though it is officially prohibited 
is central to the ideas and practices that I want to explore in this chapter, both 
through study of the narratives and mechanics of the business. To examine the 
narratives, I draw upon James Scott’s study of public and hidden transcripts: 
where the former consists in gesture, speech and practices in open interaction 
between dominant and subordinate groups, whereas the latter takes place beyond 
direct observation of non-participants in the transcript.4 Broadly speaking, the 
anti-corruption speechifying of officeholders, media reports and government 
records constitute the public transcript. The language and methods adopted 
among legal professionals to describe and negotiate their financial wheeling and 
dealing constitute a hidden one, albeit one that at times is barely hidden. 
 
The chapter begins with a sketch of the public transcript on bribery and 
corruption in the judiciary. I argue that the anti-corruption rhetoric helps to 
intertwine police, on which the last chapter was concentrated, with the 
marketplace. It does this first by reinforcing essentially administrative messages 
about the importance of orderliness in appearances, and about cooperative work 
among personnel and departments. In exchange, it concedes to subordinates’ 
interests. Far from prohibiting the making of money in the courts, it discreetly 
establishes certain guidelines and issues sub-textual warnings on suitable and 
unsuitable methods of moneymaking.  
 
From the public transcript the chapter turns to the politics of disguise, the 
contents of the hidden transcript. I look at how the hidden transcript variously 
accommodates, inverts and contradicts its public counterpart. I explore a little of 
the language in the hidden transcript, and briefly illustrate a couple of its 
                                                        
3 Kyaw Min San 12-13. 
4 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 2, 4. 
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methods for translating and reconciling the ideas of the public transcript with the 
practices of the marketplace.  
 
Lastly, I sketch the mechanics of moneymaking in the criminal juridical system 
through some cases and scenarios. I describe how officials use the control that 
they exercise over different parts of the process to earn money. These methods of 
control reveal how the business of criminal justice in Myanmar is not a simple 
matter of offering a judge some money to acquit or convict someone. Rather, it 
consists of horizontal and vertical arrangements that aim to satisfy all relevant 
parties, while at the same time accommodating administrative imperatives. I 
close the chapter with some reflections on the interplay between the criminal 
juridical system as police and as marketplace. 
 
Most of the primary source material for this chapter is drawn from research 
conducted with the assistance of professionals in Myanmar during annual trips 
from 2008 to 2011.5 Noting the time period for collection of data, I preface the 
chapter with a small caveat. The criminal juridical system as marketplace changes 
constantly. From one week to the next, new methods emerge while old ones fall 
into disuse. New language enters the lexicon, while other terminology becomes 
redundant. Certain basic features of the business seem to remain fairly constant, 
and some integral practices, like the use of brokers, are enduring. But many 
specific practices change quickly. A number of practices that professionals had 
described enthusiastically when I began this research in 2008 had by 2011 ceased 
to attract their interest. Therefore, I make no claim that the contents of this 
chapter are a lasting description of specific practices. Rather, I view the cases it 
describes as illustrative of ideas and practices found in the marketplace, some of 
which are constant, others fleeting.  
  
                                                        
5 For the purposes of this chapter, I worked closely with three professionals over a series of research 
trips from 2008 to 2011 who collected case details, wrote narratives and analysis pieces, provided 
lists of cases and issues with which to explore the topic, and verified my writing up of the research 
findings. As noted in chapter one, I regret that I cannot identify these persons or reveal any details 
of cases they provided, since to do so may cause them interruption to their professional practices. 
Those cases cited are from other sources, and, as in the previous chapter, are cases that have already 
been in some way publicised. In the first section of the chapter, I also rely extensively on the 
contents of the Supreme Court gazette, which fortnightly publishes orders issued against judges and 
lawyers for alleged breaches of official codes of conduct. 
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Law and orderliness 
Scott describes the public transcript as “the self-portrait of dominant elites as 
they would have themselves seen”, and, he continues, “While it is unlikely to be 
merely a skein of lies and misrepresentations, it is, on the other hand, a highly 
partisan and partial narrative. It is designed to be impressive, to affirm and 
naturalise the power of dominant elites, and to conceal or euphemise the dirty 
linen of their rule.”6 However, the public transcript is not just a papering over of 
unsavoury realities. It emerges from ideas behind the rule of the dominant elite. 
In the last chapter I examined those aspects of the public transcript that pertain 
specifically to the system as police. In this section, I do the same for the public 
transcript pertaining to the marketplace.  
 
The self-portrait of the dominant elite in Myanmar seen through the official 
narrative on moneymaking in the courts of the last two decades is one of 
benevolent, enlightened men who must constantly exhort their subordinates to 
aspire to their own high standards. They do not deny the existence of corruption. 
On the contrary, they acknowledge it and, in a sense, they celebrate it. The 
existence of a thing called corruption enables the dominant elite to naturalise its 
own authority. Its anti-corruption talk affirms its inherent superiority: rulers are 
ethical, subordinates not; rulers establish clean and good government, while 
subordinates sully it. Their language does not conceal the dirty linen, but 
euphemises it by shifting the blame to everyone except those who have seized the 
mantle of authority. It has as its recurrent theme that the state is trying its best to 
eliminate wrongdoing. To the extent that corruption exists it is a consequence of 
human weakness, a problem of the rotten apple in the barrel, or in Burmese, the 
rotten fish in the boat.7 The public transcript turns on the failures of judges, 
judicial bureaucrats and others, exploring the moral hazards of their professional 
activities, and the need for uprightness when shouldering the burden of national 
responsibilities, so that people can trust and rely upon the system.  
 
The basic elements in the transcript have changed relatively little over the last two 
decades, although the manner of its expression has differed somewhat. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s Khin Nyunt chastised judges, and other personnel at 
length for corrupt practices. In 1993 the intelligence chief said:  
                                                        
6 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 18. 
7 “ငါးခံုးမတစ္ေကာင္ေၾကာင့္ တစ္ေလွလံုးပုပ”္။ As expressed in တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမွာစာ၊ စာအမွတ္ ၈၇၁/စ ု၁၂/၁၄၆/၂၀၁၀၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ 
စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၃ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Memorandum, Letter No. 871/Su 12/146/2010, 13 Sept. 2010.) 
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I have time and again ordered that steps be taken to eliminate undesirable things once 
found around courts, to eradicate malpractice and self-serving behaviour from court 
environs. However, it is observed that judicial personnel, including judges; law officers, 
and People’s Police Force personnel at some state, division, district and township 
courts are colluding and acting as case brokers, saying that they will cut short days in 
detention if a case is prosecuted, will cut the fine, not to hire a lawyer as that would 
prolong the case, which lawyer to hire, which judge to approach, etc., and that civil 
servants and lawyers alike are operating fraudulently outside the boundaries of the law. 
It is heard that at some courts, detainees expecting to have their case examined on the 
appointed day can only get brought up to the front of the courtroom from the court 
holding cell after giving money to the guard. It must be said that because of this type of 
malpractice and self-serving behaviour, the people lack trust in the judicial system, and 
have a kind of loathsome and fearful attitude towards it.8  
 
The following year, in a long speech published at the front of the law reports that I 
cited in the last chapter, Khin Nyunt went on to list a variety of cases to prove the 
point, all of them illustrative of routine practices in the criminal juridical system 
as marketplace. These included cases in which a judge and prosecutor colluded 
with a defence lawyer to release an accused drug manufacturer; in which a judge 
released three persons accused of counterfeiting banknotes, despite ample 
evidence with which to convict; in which a judge altered a charge against timber 
smugglers from a serious offence to one carrying only minor penalties; in which a 
judge imprisoned a person or persons for playing the illegal lottery but released 
the broker; and in which a judge forced the sister of a defendant to have sex with 
him in his chambers to secure her brother’s release.9 In 2002, he warned of 
possible sanctions for wrongdoing, but as usual stressed the need for judges to be 
supervised well and to comport themselves appropriately: 
It is learned that some judges are acting immorally and violating civil service discipline, 
behaving so as to cause public doubt, and are notorious for taking bribes. Therefore, 
matters have often arisen where action has been taken against judges not adequately 
fulfilling their duties, judges violating civil service regulations, and immoral judges. If 
we review the numbers for actions taken annually, it is known that there were 24 
persons in 1999, 28 in 2000 and 66 in 2001. Therefore, be warned that the number of 
                                                        
8 “တရားရုံးပတ္ဝန္းက်င္မွာ မသမာမႈေတြ၊ ကိုယ္က်ဳိးရွာမႈေတြ ပေပ်ာက္ဖို႔ တရားရံုးဝန္းက်င္မွာ တစ္ခ်ိန္က ေတြ႕ၾကံဳခဲ့ရတဲ့ အနိဠာရံုေတြ 
ေပ်ာက္ေအာင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ၾကဖို႔ အႀကိမ္ႀကိမ္ မွာၾကားခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့္ ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခရုိင္န႔ဲ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ရုံးေတြမွာ ရွိၾကတဲ့ တရားရံုး 
အခ်ဳိ႕မွာ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားအပါအဝင္ တရားရုံးဝန္ထမ္းေတြ၊ ဥပေဒဝန္ထမ္းေတြ၊ ျပည္သူ႕ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္ေတြ ပူးေပါင္းၿပီး အမႈပြဲစားလုပ္ေနၾကတာ၊ 
အမႈတစ္မႈ စြဲလာရင္ ခ်ဳပ္ရက္န႔ဲ ျဖတ္ေပးမယ္၊ ေငြဒဏ္န႔ဲ ျဖတ္ေပးမယ္၊ ေရွ႕ေနမငွားန႔ဲ အမႈရွည္တယ္၊ ဘယ္ေရွ႕ေနကို ငွား၊ 
ဘယ္တရားသူႀကီးကိုေတာ့ ေျပာၿပီးၿပီ စသည္ျဖင့္ ဝန္ထမ္းေတြေရာ ေရွ႕ေနေတြပါ ဥပေဒေဘာင္ျပင္ပက လိမ္ညာလုပ္ကိုင္ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနၾကတာ 
ေတြ႔ရွိေနတယ္လို႔ သိရပါတယ္။ အခ်ဳိ႕တရားရုံးေတြမွာ အခ်ဳပ္တရားခံမ်ားဟာ အမႈခ်ိန္းတဲ့ေန႔မွာ ကိုယ့္အမႈကို စစ္လိမ့္မယ္လို႔ ေမွ်ာ္လင့္ေနေပမယ့္ 
အေစာင့္ကို ေငြေပးမွ တရားရံုးယာယီအခ်ဳပ္ခန္းက တရားခြင္ေရွ႕ကို ပို႔ေပးတယ္လို႔ ၾကားေနရပါတယ္။ အဲဒီလို မသမာမႈေတြ၊ 
ကိုယ္က်ဳိးရွာမႈေတြေၾကာင့္ တရားစီရင္ေရးစနစ္ကိ ုျပည္သူအမ်ားက ယံုၾကည္မႈ ကင္းမဲ့ၿပီး၊ ရြံရွာေၾကာက္ရြံ႕တဲ့ အေျခအေနမ်ဳိး ေရာက္ေနၿပီလို႔ 
ေျပာၾကားလိုပါတယ္။” ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခ႐ုိင္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ား လုပ္ငန္းညိႇႏႈိင္းအစည္းအေဝးတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ 
တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲ၊ အတြင္းေရးမႉး (၁) ဒုတိယဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ေျပာၾကားသည့္ လမ္းၫႊန္အမွာစကား၊ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ 
တရားစီရင္ထံုးမ်ား၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၏ စီရင္ခ်က္မ်ား၊ ၁၉၉၃ ခုႏွစ ္(ရန္ကုန္၊ ျမဝတီပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၅) စာမ်က္ႏွာနံပါတ္မပါ။ [“State Law and 
Order Restoration Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s Address at the Work 
Coordination Meeting of State, Divisional and District Judges and Law Officers,” Union of Myanmar 
Law Reports, Supreme Court Rulings, 1993 (Yangon: Myawadi Press, 1995) n.pag.] 
9 ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခ႐ုငိ္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ား လုပ္ငန္းညိႇႏႈိင္းအစည္းအေဝးတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖြ႔ဲ၊ 
အတြင္းေရးမႉး (၁) ဒုတိယဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ေျပာၾကားသည့္ လမ္းၫႊန္အမွာစကား၊ စာမ်က္ႏွာနံပါတ္မပါ။ (“State Law and Order 
Restoration Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s Address at the Work 
Coordination Meeting of State, Divisional and District Judges and Law Officers,” n.pag.)  
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judges against whom actions have been taken and fault laid has been increasing year by 
year, and it needs to be stressed that superior organisations unceasingly closely 
supervise and admonish [judges] and that judges also need to reform themselves.10 
 
In 2004 Khin Nyunt lost his own job and was placed under house arrest due to 
alleged corruption.11 His successors have since continued the moralistic narrative, 
although in a more circumspect manner. In 2007, the then-prime minister, 
General Soe Win, stated that people outside the courts were commonly discussing 
the taking of bribes and behaviour of judges and that for this reason all judicial 
personnel needed to be upstanding in their qualities and work practices, adding: 
That up to the present day complaint letters are still arriving regarding the judiciary, 
about weaknesses, omissions, judges’ and law officers’ impoliteness and malpractice in 
cases sent up for prosecution… [and] that if the weaknesses and flaws are examined, it 
can be observed that generally they are resulting not from inadequacies and 
weaknesses in the system, codes of conduct and working procedures, but are flaws and 
weaknesses of the individual….12 
 
In 2009 Prime Minister General Thein Sein read from literally the same script, or 
at least from the same scriptwriters, when he again told assembled judges that the 
weaknesses were not systemic but individualistic.13 He also dwelled upon the 
types of transactions constituting alleged corruption and bribery, describing how  
                                                        
10 “အခ်ဳိ႕တရားသူႀကီးေတြဟာ အက်င့္စာရိတၱေဖာက္ျပန္ၿပီး ဝန္ထမ္းစည္းကမ္းေဖာက္ဖ်က္တာေတြ၊ အမ်ားျပည္သူအျမင္မရွင္းေအာင္ ေနထိုင္ 
ေျပာဆိုတာေတြ၊ လာဘ္ေပးလာဘ္ယူေက်ာ္ေစာသတင္းရွိေနတာေတြကိုလည္း ၾကားသိေနရပါတယ္။ ဒါေၾကာင့္ တာဝန္ထမ္းေဆာင္ရာမွာ တာဝန္ 
မေက်ပြန္တဲ့ တရားသူးႀကီးေတြ၊ ဝန္ထမ္းစည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္းေဖာက္ဖ်က္တဲ့ တရားသူႀကီးေတြ၊ အက်င့္ပ်က္တဲ့ တရားသူႀကီးေတြကို အေရးယူရတဲ့ 
ကိစၥေတြ မၾကာခဏေပၚေပါက္ခဲ့တာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ႏွစ္စဥ္အေရးယူခဲ့ရတဲ့အေရအတြက္ကို ျပန္ၾကည့္တဲ့အခါ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္အတြင္းမွာ အေရးယူခံရတဲ့ 
ဦးေရ (၂၄) ဦးရွိၿပီး၊ ၂၀၀၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္ အတြင္းမွာ (၂၈) ဦး၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္အတြင္းမွာ (၆၆) ဦးရွိခဲ့ေၾကာင္း သိရပါတယ္။ ဒါေၾကာင့္ တရားသူႀကီးေတြကို 
အေရးယူ အျပစ္ေပးရတဲ့ ဦးေရဟာ တစ္ႏွစ္ထက္တစ္ႏွစ္ ပိုမိုမ်ားျပားလာတယ္ ဆိုတာကို သတိျပဳၾကၿပီး အထက္အဖြ႔ဲအစည္းက မျပတ္ၾကပ္မတ္ 
သြန္သင္ဆံုးမေပးဖို႔န႔ဲ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားကိုယ္တိုင္ကလည္း မိမိတို႔ကိုယ္မိမိတို႔ ျပဳျပင္ၾကဖို႔ အေလးအနက္ မွာၾကားလိုပါတယ္။” ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ 
(၉) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ သူနာျပဳတကၠသိုလ္၌ က်င္းပေသာ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရုံးႏွင့္ ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္း၊ ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီးမ်ား၊ ဥပေဒ အရာရွိမ်ားမွ 
တရားစီရင္ေရးဆိုင္ရာ ၾသဝါဒခံယူျခင္း အခမ္းအနားတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီ အတြင္းေရးမွဴး (၁) ဒုတိယ 
ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ႀကီးခင္ၫြန္႔ ေျပာၾကားသည့္ မိန္႔ခြန္း၊ တရားေရးဂ်ာနယ၊္ အတြဲ (၁) အမွတ္ (၁၄) (၂၀၀၂) ၊ စာ ၁၄။ [“State Peace and 
Development Council Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s address on 9 July 2002 at the 
Institute of Nursing to Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office and state, division and district 
judges and law officers assembled for receipt of advice on judicial affairs,” Judicial Journal 1.14 
(2002): 14.] 
11 For a summary of the reasons given for Khin Nyunt’s removal see Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Myanmar in 
2004: Another Year of Uncertainty,” Asian Survey 45.1 (2005): 174-75. Despite announcements at 
the time of Khin Nyunt’s removal that “nobody is above the law”, the ousted spymaster did not go to 
jail for his alleged crimes. He was instead detained at his house, from which the government 
released him in the 13 January 2012 amnesty. In an interview given shortly afterwards, he said that 
he had spent his time gardening and studying environmental protection. ဝန္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ေဟာင္း ဦးခင္ညြန္႔ႏွင့္ 
အထူးေတြ႕ဆံုေမးျမန္းျခင္း၊ ျမန္မာတိုင္း(မ္) ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂၀-၂၆ ရက္။ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၃၀ ရက္ 
<http://www.myanmar.mmtimes.com>။ (“Special Interview with Former Prime Minister, U Khin Nyunt,” 
Myanmar Times 20-26 Jan. 2012, 30 Jan. 2012 <http://www.myanmar.mmtimes.com>.) 
12 “ယေန႔အခ်ိန္အထိ တရားစီရင္ေရးႏွင့္ စပ္လ်ဥ္းၿပီး အမႈစဲြဆိုတင္ပို႔ သူတို႔၏ အားနည္းမႈ၊ ပ်က္ကြက္မႈ၊ တရားသူႀကီးႏွင့္ ဥပေဒအရာရွိတို႔၏ 
မလိမ္မာမႈ၊ အက်င့္ပ်က္မႈမ်ားအေပၚ တိုင္ၾကားစာမ်ား ေရာက္ရွိေနဆဲျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း။ xxx အားနည္းခ်က္၊ ခ်ဳိ႕ယြင္းခ်က္မ်ားကို ေယဘုယ်ျခံဳၿပီး 
စိစစ္မည္ဆိုလွ်င္ စနစ္၊ က်င့္ဝတ္၊ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းတို႔၏ မျပည့္စံုမႈ၊ အားနည္းမႈမ်ားေၾကာင့္ မဟုတ္ဘဲ လူပုဂၢိဳလ္ဆိုင္ရာ ခ်ဳိ႕ယြင္း 
အားနည္းခ်က္မ်ားေၾကာင့္ ျဖစ္ေနသည္ကို ေတြ႔ရွိရေၾကာင္း။” တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားသည္ ေခတ္အျမင္၊ ေခတ္အေတြးျဖင့္ ေျမာ္ျမင္ႏိုင္အားရွိရမည္၊ 
ျပည္သူတို႔က ေလးစားယံုၾကည္ေသာ သိကၡာ၊ ကိုယ္က်င့္တရားရွိေအာင္ အျမဲေစာင့့္ထိန္း၊ ျမန္မာအ့လင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၆။ 
(“Judges Must Have Views in Keeping with the Times; Always Maintain Morality and Personal 
Behaviour to Earn the People’s Respect and Trust,” Myanma Alin 6 Feb. 2007: 6.) 
13 At least one paragraph of the prime minister’s speech as reported in 2009 was a word-for-word 
repetition of his predecessor’s speech in 2007.  
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It is observed that there are many cases involving the exchange of money between 
people and between organisations, and that there are many cases to be tried as civil 
matters that are tried as criminal matters; that there are many cases that are assessed 
and decided to be prosecuted merely as civil matters even though it is apparent that a 
criminal offence has been committed… that judges are persons who are receiving 
appropriate salaries from the people’s wage revenue to carry out judicial work, and that 
therefore it is necessary that they not make verdicts on receipt of bribes from parties in 
cases, that the Supreme Court also has on multiple occasions issued instructions, 
memorandums and orders for judges to be free from corruption and for the elimination 
of favouritism….14 
 
In March 2011 during his inaugural oratory as President U Thein Sein, the former 
general did not address the problem of judicial corruption explicitly but he did 
speak to the importance of the rule of law and avoidance of corrupt practices in 
order to ensure clean government.15  
 
The consistently moralistic and individualistic quality of the narrative not only 
enables official denial of political and institutional responsibility for the 
wrongdoing of judicial personnel, but also reinforces at least two objectives of 
police: an appearance of orderliness; and, compliance with orders from above. 
The remainder of this section is taken up with these two features of the narrative, 
through study of official warnings and sanctions that the Supreme Court issues 
against judicial personnel. These warnings, although not made known to the 
general public, are part of the public transcript insofar as they are distributed 
within the system and serve to advertise to staff that personnel who have failed to 
fulfill adequately the obligations imposed on them through the narrative, or who 
for whatever other reason have fallen foul of superiors, suffer as a result.  
 
The foremost demand of the public transcript is that officials appear to subscribe 
to it. The elite self-portrait can be sustained only when an audience exists that 
tacitly goes along with it. As Scott has noted, it is in subordinates’ interests to 
produce a reasonably credible performance.16 An official who can play the part 
assigned her by the public transcript earns an entitlement to enter the 
                                                        
14 “ျပည္သူအခ်င္းခ်င္း၊ အဖြ႔ဲအစည္းအခ်င္းခ်င္းတို႔အၾကားတြင္ ေငြေပးေငြယကူိစၥမ်ားႏွင့္ ပတ္သက္၍ အမႈအခင္းမ်ား ျဖစ္ပြားမႈမ်ားရွိေနေၾကာင္းႏွင့္ 
တရားမေၾကာင္းအရ အေရးယူရမည့္ အမႈမ်ားကို ျပစ္မႈေၾကာင္းအရ အေရးယူေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ား ရွိေနေၾကာင္းကို ေတြ႔ေနရေၾကာင္း၊ 
ျပစ္မႈေၾကာင္းအရ ျပစ္မႈက်ဴးလြန္ေၾကာင္း ေပၚေပါက္ေနသည့္အမႈမ်ားကို တရားမမႈသာ စြဲဆိုရန္ျဖစ္သည္ဟု သံုးသပ္၍ ဆံုးျဖတ္ေနျခင္းမ်ားလည္း 
ရွိေနေၾကာင္း၊ xxx တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားသည္ ျပည္သူ႔ဘ႑ာလစာမွ ထိုက္သင့္ေသာလစာေငြမ်ားကို ရယူခံစား၍ တရားစီရင္ေရးလုပ္ငန္းမ်ားကို 
ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနၾကသူမ်ား ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ ထို႔ေၾကာင့္ အမႈသည္မ်ားထံမွ တံစိုးလက္ေဆာင္ပစၥည္းမ်ား လက္ခံ၍ တရားစီရင္ျခင္းမျပဳလုပ္ရန္ 
လိုအပ္ေၾကာင္း၊ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္မွလည္း လာဘ္ေပးလာဘ္ယူကင္းရွင္းေရး၊ အဂတိလိုက္စားမႈပေပ်ာက္ေရးတို႔အတြက္ ၫႊန္ၾကားခ်က္၊ အမွာစာ၊ 
အမိန္႔မ်ားကို အႀကိမ္ႀကိမ္ထုတ္ဆင့္ခဲ့ၿပီး”။ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားသည္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရားရုံးမ်ားကို ကိုယ္စားျပဳသူမ်ားျဖစ္၊ ဥပေဒအရာရွိမ်ား၊ 
ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲတို႔ႏွင့္ပူးေပါင္းၿပီး ျပည္သူမ်ားကို ဥပေဒႏွင့္အညီ ကူညီ၊ ျမန္မာအ့လင္း၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၃ ရက္၊ စာ ၃။ (“Judges Are the 
Persons Who Represent the Courts, Must Cooperate with Law Officers and the Police Force to Help 
People in Accordance with Law,” Myanma Alin 13 May 2009: 3.) 
15 “President U Thein Sein Speaks to Members of Union Government, Heads of Union Level 
Organizations,” New Light of Myanmar 1 Apr. 2011: 1, 7-11. 
16 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 4. 
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marketplace and make money. Where a major official delivers a homily about 
corruption, it will not do to have a crowd of manifestly uninterested subordinates, 
no matter how long-winded, repetitive and boring his speech might be. And 
because senior officials in Myanmar have been in the habit of making speeches of 
this sort, the director general of the Supreme Court in 1997 felt it necessary to 
issue a circular to all judges warning them to appear suitably attentive, as 
Upon examination of the national news on Myanmar Television and the photographs in 
daily newspapers it is observed that some judicial officers in attendance at the said 
events are not attired neatly and are not listening attentively to the guidance being 
delivered.17 
 
For me this is a compelling illustration of police in miniature, of, as Foucault has 
put it, “the art of the state’s splendor as visible order and manifest force”.18 The 
state’s splendour depends on its personnel maintaining the appropriate image for 
the cameras. Scrappy, disinterested officials are a danger to everything that the 
system purports to represent. The system working on the principle of law and 
order has, as I discussed in the last chapter, no contents upon which to assert a 
claim to exist other than its capacity to maintain orderliness. Appearances not 
only matter, they matter entirely. 
 
Judges also need to maintain orderliness in their courts. A judge is the 
commander of his court.19 He has responsibility both to maintain his own 
decorum, and that of his staff. A judge who cannot do this much is a liability, and 
no advantage is to be had in keeping him employed. 
 
Orderliness, for the purpose of this discussion, is of a general type, and of a 
specific type. Orderliness in dealings with one’s superiors, with court staff and 
with the public in general ensures smooth operations of the administrative 
continuum through the courts. This general type of orderliness encompasses 
matters of dress, speech and manner. Where a judge fails to wear the correct 
                                                        
17 “အဆိုပါအခမ္းအနားမ်ားသို႔တက္ေရာက္သည့္ အခ်ဳိ႕ေသာတရားေရးဝန္ထမ္းအရာရွိမ်ားသည္ ဝတ္စားဆင္ယင္မႈ သပ္ရပ္မႈမရွိျခင္း၊ လမ္းညႊန္ 
မွာၾကားခ်က္ကို စိတ္ပါဝင္စားစြာ မွတ္သားနာခံမႈမရွိျခင္းမ်ားကို ျမန္မာ့ရုပ္ျမင္သံၾကား ျပည္တြင္းသတင္းႏွင့္ ေန႔စဥ္ထုတ္ သတင္းစာမ်ားပါ 
ဓာတ္ပံုမ်ားအရ စိစစ္ေတြ႔ရွိရသည။္” တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၂၁၅၃/စု ၁၄(၈) ၃၆/၉၇၊ ၁၉၉၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၁ ရက္။ [Supreme Court 
Letter No. 2153/Su 14(8) 36/97, 21 Mar. 1997.] Two judges in 2003 did in fact receive reprimands 
for yawning, dozing off and being obviously distracted during an address by the chief justice at a 
training programme they attended. တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၂၀၉-၁၀/၂၀၀၃၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၅ ရက္။ (Supreme 
Court Order Nos. 209-10/2003, 25 Nov. 2003.) 
18 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population 314. 
19 The military analogy U Aung Toe himself used in a speech in which he referred to divisional and 
state judges as “regional commanders”: တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ႏွင့္ျပည္နယ္၊ တိုင္းတရားသူႀကီးမ်ား၏ (၂၃) ႀကိမ္ေျမာက္ လုပ္ငန္းညႇိႏႈိင္း 
အစည္းအေဝးတြင္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရားသူႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ ေျပာၾကားသည့္ မိန္႔ခြန္း၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ျပန္တမ္း၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၉ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၈။ (“Chief 
Justice’s Address at 23rd Work Coordination Meeting of Supreme Court and State and Divisional 
Judges,” Supreme Court Gazette 9 Jan. 2004: 18.) 
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outfit, hears cases in his chambers and has clerks do work that is his own 
responsibility he is failing to do the minimum required of him.20 Judges need to 
treat court personnel decently.21 Judges and also lawyers should avoid using 
impolite, aggressive or abrasive language with peers, superiors and parties in 
cases.22 A judge should not, as in one case in Yangon, allow a meddling spouse to 
interfere in cases, or, as in this particular court, to write verdicts on his behalf.23 
 
Some judges and lawyers drink too much and bring the habit with them to 
court.24 Turning up to court drunk and yelling incivilities at judicial staff and the 
police, as one judge in the delta allegedly was in the habit of doing, is 
inappropriate.25 A judge in Bago in the 1990s apparently enjoyed going out to 
have a drink while shooting birds with his air rifle.26 It is not clear from the 
official reprimand whether the bottle or the gun was cause for greater concern at 
the Supreme Court. In any event, the judge’s passion for what his colonial-era 
predecessors would have classed as a bit of “sport” seems anachronistic. The 
gazette’s contents suggest that inebriated male judicial officers are more likely to 
reach for their female colleagues than for firearms.27 
 
Sexual liaisons that attract undue attention are also ill advised. In 2009 the 
Supreme Court dismissed a judge after he took a second wife while still married.28 
It claims to have found another married judge having an affair with a university 
                                                        
20 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၃၂/၂၀၁၀၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၁၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 32/2010, 17 June 
2010.) 
21 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၄/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 44/98, 18 May 1998.) 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၈၁/၂၀၀၂၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 81/2002, 16 May 2002.) 
22 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၆/၉၅၊ ၁၉၉၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 16/95, 16 Aug. 1995.) 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၄/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 14/98, 6 Feb. 1998.) 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၅၉/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 59/98, 26 Aug. 1998.) 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၆၇/၂၀၀၁၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၃၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 67/2001, 31 July 2001.) 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၂၂၄၀/၈၅-ရန (၂၀၀၁) ၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂၇ ရက္။ [Supreme Court Letter No. 2240/85-YaNa 
(2001), 27 Dec. 2001.] 
23 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၄၄/၂၀၀၁၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 144/2001, 7 Dec. 
2001.) 
24 For example, တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၁၂/၂၀၀၂၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၂၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 
112/2002, 28 June 2002.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၃၀/၂၀၀၈၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂၀ ရက္။ (Supreme Court 
Order No. 30/2008, 20 Feb. 2008.) 
25 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၁/၂၀၀၅၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 41/2005, 1 Mar. 2005.) 
26 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၃၇/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 37/98, 21 Apr. 1998.) 
27 For example, တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၄/၉၇၊ ၁၉၉၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂၄ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 14/97, 
24 Feb. 1997.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၃၄/၉၇၊ ၁၉၉၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 34/97, 18 
July 1997.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၂၁/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Letter No. 21/98, 2 Feb. 
1998.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၀/၂၀၀၁၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၄ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 40/2001, 4 June 
2001.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၅၇/၂၀၀၄၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၄ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 57/2004, 14 May 
2004.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၈၇/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာကတ္ိုဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 87/2006, 
11 Oct. 2006.) 
28 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၇၀/၂၀၀၉၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 70/2009, 28 Aug. 
2009.) 
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student.29 He too lost his job. In 2006 the court severely reprimanded a judge 
who when transferred between courts took one of the clerks with him and at his 
new post cohabited with her.30 In 2003 it did the same to one who allegedly slept 
with his court clerk.31 In 1995, a judge from Sagaing got off with a warning for 
bringing a woman who had been a defendant in a case before him to Yangon and 
keeping her as “domestic staff” at a residence there.32 Another who hired a 
woman whom he fancied to work as a court clerk without obtaining permission to 
do so was not as lucky—the Supreme Court sacked him.33  
 
Sanctions of women judges for the same types of wrongdoing are less precise 
about the actual nature of the offence, and seem to be more condemnatory in 
tone. In one from 2003, the Supreme Court avoids specifying the details of a 
judge’s relationship with a retired counterpart, but pointedly refers to the 30-year 
age gap between the two, implying that had she chosen someone younger it might 
have turned a blind eye.34 The Supreme Court also vaguely described a deputy 
district judge as having engaged in “abnormal” relations with her senior clerk, 
despite repeated reprimands. The order against her does not spell out the 
abnormality, but stresses that as a woman judge she had a particular 
responsibility to keep her marital affairs in order.35 The inference is that in the 
discourse on orderliness, whereas men by their nature are prone to bad conduct, 
and require supervision, women are supposed to know for themselves how to 
behave. Women are paragons of morality, the ones who set the standard for the 
menfolk to follow, and when they fail in this role that has been assigned to them, 
their failure is more damaging to the public transcript than a man’s failure—a 
point to which I return, in a somewhat different context, in the next chapter.  
 
The counter-corruption narrative also encourages orderliness specifically in the 
making of money. Its subtext consists of advice to judicial personnel on how to go 
                                                        
29 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၉၇/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 97/2006, 17 Nov. 
2006.) 
30 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၀၀/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၉ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 100/2006, 29 Nov. 
2006.) 
31 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၈၅/၂၀၀၃၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၃၀ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 185/2003, 30 
Oct. 2003.) 
32 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၄/၉၅၊ ၁၉၉၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၅ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 44/95, 15 Sept. 
1995.) 
33 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၅/၂၀၀၁၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၂၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 45/2001, 27 June 
2001.) 
34 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၂၁၇/၂၀၀၃၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 217/2003, 2 Dec. 
2003.) 
35 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၈၉/၂၀၀၇၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္ာလ ၁၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 89/2007, 17 Aug. 
2007.) 
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about earning appropriately, and what lines they ought not cross when profiting 
from their positions. By reprimanding certain types of wrongdoing, it reminds 
judges to stick strictly to the business of criminal justice. They ought not socialise 
with parties to cases, at least not in public. A few orders against judges specify 
that they had been seen having meals with people whose cases they were hearing, 
and at least one enjoyed karaoke and slept with a woman who had come along for 
the evening.36 Moneymaking also ought to be restricted to the business of cases in 
court: a judge in Kachin State received a warning for allegedly being in the habit 
of impounding motorcycles parked at the front of his house and then demanding 
money from the owners to get them back.37 The implicit message is that ample 
opportunities exist for personnel to make money in their routine activities, and 
they should not be so bold as to think that their authority gives them a licence to 
make money off whoever they like, wherever they like.  
 
The public transcript on corruption also encourages close compliance with orders 
from above. Any judge, judicial bureaucrat or lawyer can lose his job or licence for 
being uncooperative. Judges come under the same general code of conduct as 
other civil servants, and non-judicial personnel can and do initiate investigations 
to remove judges from office.38 According to the professional who attended the 
legal refresher programme which I mentioned at the start of the chapter, the 
helpful trainer with words of advice also encouraged attendees to “get along well 
with relevant departments; if they instruct to jail someone, don’t come back at 
them with the contents of law books. Just jail them, and set a price in the 
future.”39 In other words, bargaining power is to be had in cases where 
cooperation is needed, and conversely, judicial officers ought not oppose 
demands from other parts of government—a message that reflects the 
requirements for administrative continuity and cooperation between one part of 
the apparatus and the next. The same trainer’s more general piece of advice was 
                                                        
36 As for example in တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမနိ္႔အမွတ္ ၁၀၁/၂၀၀၄၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order 
No. 101/2004, 16 Sept. 2004.) 
37 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၈၆/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 86/2006, 11 
Oct. 2006.) 
38 As for example in တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၆/၂၀၀၇၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၇ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 
16/2007, 7 Mar. 2007.) 
39 “သက္ဆိုင္ရာဌာနတို႔ႏွင့္ အစဥ္ေျပေအာင္ေပါင္း၊ သူတို႔ကေထာင္ခ်ရန္ ညႊန္ၾကားလာပါက ဥပေဒစာအုပ္ကို ျပန္လွန္မေနန႔ဲေတာ့၊ 
ခ်သာခ်ပစ္လိုက္၊ ေနာင္ခါလာေနာင္ခါေစ်းဘဲ။” The last part of the expression is imprecise. It could mean that the 
judge should expect that in exchange for cooperating with other departments, she can demand that 
a profitable case be sent her way at a later time, or it could simply mean that the judge will not make 
money off this case, but other cases will come in which she will have the opportunity to do so, and 
be entitled to do so because of her cooperation when required.  
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that a judge having good relations with other departments of government would 
have friends who could help any time that a complaint came against her: 
Above all, follow orders from above. If a complaint comes about bribery, you’ll be able 
to clear it up. That’s because, it’s not just the legal branch that’s taking bribe money; 
the whole country’s on the take.40 
 
We cannot know from the official records how many judges are disciplined for 
reasons of non-compliance with orders from above, since many sanctions lack 
details, and others presumably consist of reasons for dismissal or demotion that 
are not the real causes for disciplinary action. However, some records do give 
clues. A 2006 order removing a judge in Sagaing from his post, for example, 
described him as frequently going out to drink during court sessions; however, 
what seems to have brought retribution upon him was that just three weeks 
earlier he had in a meeting at the township council office “spoken disrespectfully 
to the township police commander, damaging interpersonal relations”.41 The 
Supreme Court in 1994 reprimanded a judge in the delta for thumping the table 
and exchanging words with his superior at a meeting where the latter was 
delivering “guidance” from the Southwest Region Army Command concerning the 
handling of cases under the 1947 Immigration (Temporary Provisions) Act.42 
 
The Supreme Court does sanction judges who for whatever reasons have made 
the mistake of thinking they have authority and independence that they do not. A 
judge in 2002 failed to attend a ceremony organised by the executive council of 
his district, and did not send anyone in his stead, or offer a reason for non-
attendance. The terseness of the order against him suggests that he was 
deliberately causing an affront to local officials with more authority than he, and 
with whom he was obligated to maintain cordial relations. The Supreme Court 
added pointedly, as a reminder to all, that,  
In order for judges of courts at various levels to be continuously aware of the policies 
that the state has put in place and its work programmes for their practical 
implementation and so as to be able to work in unison with other relevant departments 
so far as necessary, they must attend without fail the meetings and ceremonies that 
Peace and Development Councils organise.43 
                                                        
40 “အထက္ကေပးတဲ့အမိန္႔လိုက္နာရန္အဓိကထား၊ လာဘ္ေပးလာဘ္ယူမႈန႔ဲတိုင္ၾကားလာရင္ ရွင္းလို႔ ရတယ္။ ဘာေၾကာင့္လည္းဆိုရင္ 
လာဘ္ေငြယူဒါက တရားေရးဌာနတစ္ခုတည္းမဟုတ္ဘူး၊ တစ္တိုင္းျပည္လံုးယူေနၾကဒါဘဲ။” 
41 “ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ရဲတပ္ဖြဲ႕မွဴးအား တစ္ဦးႏွင့္တစ္ဦး ေလးစားမႈမရွိဘဲ ပုဂိၢဳလ္ေရးအရ ထိခိုက္ဖြယ္ရာ ေမးျမန္းေျပာဆိုခဲ့ေၾကာင္း”။ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ 
၉၉/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိဝုင္ဘာလ ၂၉ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 99/2006, 29 Nov. 2006.) 
42 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၅၂/၉၄၊ ၁၉၉၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၄ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 52/94, 4 July 1994.) 
43 “အဆင့္ဆင့္ေသာတရားရံုးမ်ားမွ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားသည္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္မွ ခ်မွတ္ထားသည့္ မူဝါဒမ်ား၊ လက္ေတြ႔အေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္ 
ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနသည့္ လုပ္ငန္းစဥ္မ်ားကို မ်က္ျခည္မျပတ္ ေလ့လာသိရွိထားရန္ႏွင့္ အျခားဌာနဆိုင္ရာမ်ားႏွင့္ တက္ညီလက္ညီပူးေပါင္းပါဝင္ 
ေဆာင္ရြက္ရန္လိုအပ္သည့္ အေလွ်ာက္ အဆင့္ဆင့္ေသာ ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီမ်ားက ဦးေဆာင္က်င္းပသည္ ့
အစည္းအေဝးမ်ား၊ အခမ္းအနားမ်ားသို႔ မပ်က္မကြက္ တက္ေရာက္ရမည္ ျဖစ္ပါသည္။” တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၀၅/၂၀၀၂၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ 
၁၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 105/2002, 18 June 2002.) 
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Similarly, in 1998 a deputy divisional judge in Shan State lost his job for a ruling 
in which according to the order issued against him he had failed to take into 
account the executive plan for the development of Taunggyi and had acted 
contrary to the work programme of the regional authorities.44 And a judge in 
Kachin State during 2004 who had some kind of falling out with the local power 
elite received a reprimand after he “failed to coordinate with the relevant 
Township Peace and Development Council” concerning a trespassing charge 
lodged against a council official; issued a warrant for the official’s arrest, and did 
not comply with an instruction sent from a higher-up executive council to attend 
its office and explain himself.45 The reprimand continues that he had in another 
case exceeded his authority and had been warned concerning his use of certain 
inappropriate language towards personnel of other departments.  
 
The admixture of publicity and ambiguity in these orders speaks to the manner in 
which political power is exercised in the system. On the one hand, judicial 
personnel are routinely reminded that failure to comply with instructions from 
above can lead, at very least, to chastisement before one’s peers, and at worse, 
criminal prosecution. On the other, the lack of clarity about the actual reasons for 
the dismissal of personnel in many of these cases, together with the vagueness of 
what constitutes immoral conduct that might incur sanctions, mean that nobody 
can ever be certain that his job and reputation are secure. Through these sub-
textual signals judges are reminded that their moneymaking activities are 
tolerated and to an extent encouraged, provided that such activities are orderly, 
and done in exchange for compliance with orders from above. As Fuller has 
pointed out, this sort of managerial method over a bureaucratic system somewhat 
counter-intuitively increases a superior’s power by allowing him opportunities “to 
obtain gratitude and loyalty through the grant of absolutions, at the same time 
leaving him free to visit the full rigor of the law on those he considers in need of 
being brought into line”.46 Obscurity about what actually constitutes an offence 
and inconsistency in enforcement of the rules are not simply the consequences of 
                                                        
44 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၂၀၉၆/စု ၁၄/၈၇/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Letter No. 2096/Su 
14/87/98, 22 Apr. 1998.) Coincidentally, before the end of that year five out of the six Supreme 
Court judges—the full bench excepting the chief justice—were “permitted to retire from duties”. 
“တာဝန္မွ အနားယူခြင့္ျပဳလိုက္”။ ႏိုငင္ံေတာ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ ဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၅/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၄ ရက္။ 
(State Peace and Development Council Order No. 5/98, 14 Nov. 1998.) Other officials “permitted to 
retire” on the same date were the foreign minister, two deputy ministers, and five members of the 
public service board. 
45 “သက္ဆိုင္ရာၿမိဳ႔႕နယ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏွင့္ဖြံ႕ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီႏွင့္ ညႇိႏိႈင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈ မရွိျခင္း”။ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၁၁/၂၀၀၄၊ ၂၀၀၄ 
ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၃ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 111/2004, 13 Nov. 2004.) 
46 Fuller, The Morality of Law 213. 
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an imperfect system. They are essential to the exercise of political power in a 
system organised on the principle of law and order.  
 
Seen against this backdrop, the announcement at the end of 2011 by a new 
legislative committee on legal and judicial affairs that it will in 2012 put to the 
legislature a bill for the taking of legal action against judges accused of corruption 
is not at all reassuring.47 Far from suggesting a more considered approach to the 
incidence of moneymaking through the buying and selling of cases, it suggests 
continuity of the public transcript on corruption as essentially a problem of 
individual responsibility, and continuity in practices aimed at denying judges the 
security of tenure that they need to issue verdicts without fear of repercussions. 
The politics of disguise 
The hidden transcript of legal professionals in Myanmar in many respects 
accommodates and adapts to the public transcript, in tacit acknowledgement that 
the latter conditionally concedes to professionals’ interests. But in doing this it 
also inverts the moralistic tone of the public transcript, and invites sardonic 
humour by poking fun at its figureheads. For instance, lawyers used to refer to the 
former chief justice, U Aung Toe as “U Toe Aung”, or roughly, “Mr Push ‘n’ Win”, 
meaning that if someone with real authority gave him a shove, they would get 
whatever verdict they wanted. The joke is of the same sort as that found in the 
spelling out of the word for “judge” in Indonesian as an acronym for “contact me 
if you want to win”.48 These kinds of jokes are simple and seemingly light-hearted, 
yet they are also indicative of a deep disrespect for the judiciary shared by people 
in both Myanmar and Indonesia.  
 
Disrespect that cannot be shown openly is among factors that motivate the 
politics of disguise, which Scott describes as those day-to-day activities in which 
subordinates “test and exploit all the loopholes, ambiguities, silences, and lapses 
available” to them.49 In other words, the politics of disguise are antithetical to the 
                                                        
47 ဥပေဒႏွင့္ မညီညြတ္ဘဲ အဂတိလုိက္စားၿပီး စီရင္ခ်က္ခ်မွတ္သည့္ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားကို အေရးယူႏိုင္မည့္ ဥပေဒကို ျပည္သူ႔လႊတ္ေတာ္သို႔ တင္ျပ 
ျပ႒ာန္းႏိုင္ရန္ စီစဥ္ေနေၾကာင္းသိရ၊ Weekly Eleven ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၁ ရက္။ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂ ရက္ 
<http://www.weeklyeleven.com>။ (“Plan to Submit [Draft] Law to Pyithu Hluttaw for Action on Judges 
Handing Down Verdicts Not in Accordance with Law, Due to Corruption,” Weekly Eleven 1 Jan. 
2012, 2 Jan. 2012 <http://www.weeklyeleven.com>.) 
48 “The Indonesian joke—which even judges tell—has the word hakim (judge) as short for hubungi 
aku kalau ingin menang (contact me if you want to win).” Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, “Judicial 
Mafia: The Courts and State Illegality in Indonesia,” The State and Illegality in Indonesia, eds. 
Edward Aspinall and Gerry Van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011) 189. 
49 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 138. In this section, I am exploring the idea of lower 
ranked judicial personnel, lawyers and others involved in the day-to-day work of the criminal 
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politics of law and orderliness contained in the official narrative. Here, I am going 
to describe just a few types of elementary forms of disguise. These activities vary 
from the most innocuous-sounding exchanges, such as when a judge asks a 
colleague which hotel he stayed at on a recent trip—by which he means to invite 
the fellow to indicate how much money he is making on the side—to euphemisms 
and techniques for fixing a price of a verdict or sentence. But before getting to the 
euphemisms, I begin with a few remarks on some categories of persons who use 
these forms of disguise.  
 
As I discussed in the previous section, for all criminal juridical personnel, making 
money requires an appearance of orderliness, of propriety even when engaging in 
the criminal justice business. For some personnel, maintaining appearances is 
easier than others. The police have many more opportunities to come into direct 
physical contact—often literally—with accused persons, and with their lawyers 
and relatives, and in these exchanges they negotiate deals. As de facto guardian of 
sovereign power and the brother of the armed forces, the police force also is not 
subject to the same type of sustained corruption critique as are lawyers, judicial 
bureaucrats, and especially judges.50 But when coordinating cases with other 
agencies, police officers often find it convenient to work with lawyers whom they 
know well and with whom they have regular dealings, lawyers whom I will refer to 
here as “in-house lawyers”.  
 
These in-house lawyers are known literally as “territory occupants”, or “unit 
occupants”, in the sense of the court as an administrative unit.51 They do not 
move around dealing with cases in different jurisdictions, but are intimate with all 
of the court staff, judges, prosecutors, police officers and other officials in a single 
township or district, and are trusted to make deals confidentially. Sometimes 
these lawyers are relatives of police officers. The police nominate in-house 
                                                                                                                                                        
juridical system as insiders and power-holders but also subordinates within the system’s hierarchy, 
which is to say, within a system that is itself subordinated to other parts of the state apparatus. This 
type of subordinate is somewhat different from those with whom Scott is primarily concerned in his 
study of hidden transcripts—people whom he describes by analogy as the worker to the boss, the 
tenant to the landlord, the serf to the lord, and the slave to the master—since lawyers, prosecutors, 
clerks and bottom-rung judges are at once part of the structure for social domination and also are 
subjected to its exercise of power. Notwithstanding, my reading of the hidden transcript among 
these persons is that it reflects a keen awareness of subordinate status, a cynicism about the legal 
profession, and resentment at the hypocritical behaviour of higher-ups, all of which give the hidden 
transcript among these persons qualities that are usefully examined with reference to Scott’s study.  
50 The absence of a sustained critique on police corruption in the contemporary period is in marked 
contrast to the colonial and parliamentary periods. Cheesman, “Policing Burma,” 43-48.  
51 In Burmese: နယ္စားေရွ႕ေန (or) နယ္စားပယ္စားေရွ႕ေန။ The reference to “occupant” here is literally the word 
for “eating”, although the term is not intended literally. The word used to consume something here 
when suffixed to another verb can convey the meaning “to possess” or “to occupy”. See Okell and 
Allott 50. 
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lawyers to accused persons who do not already have legal counsel and who appear 
to have the means to pay. In exchange, in-house lawyers return roughly thirty per 
cent of case fees earned from nominated clients to the police, as a commission. In 
a 1992 instruction concerning the prevalence of in-house lawyers, Aung Toe 
described their practices in the following terms: 
Among the lawyers working in each court there are some so-called in-house lawyers 
who have close relations with the judge and they work so that the court gives priority to 
their cases, so that their cases win, that if they look likely to lose they drag out 
proceedings through every available means, etc., so that the opposing parties will 
become demoralised…. Furthermore, in some courts even the judges and court staff 
themselves give guidance on which lawyer to hire….52 
 
Where judges and court staff nominate in-house lawyers, they also get a 
percentage of the lawyer’s earnings as a commission. According to professionals, 
where a judge nominates an in-house lawyer, the rate of commission is higher 
than that of the police. Either way, judges prefer in-house lawyers because they 
can work with them safely. Some judges who do not use them but deal with 
parties directly get reputations for buying and selling cases, for which they risk 
being sanctioned.53 They may be conducting their business the wrong way, such 
as by doing deals at home, where people can see parties to cases going in and out, 
or in their chambers, where they are also too easily observed.54 In-house lawyers 
work with the judge aiming to ensure that such problems do not arise.  
 
Another option for judges is to use case brokers, as described by Kyaw Min San: 
The clear phenomenon in the courts showing that bribery is rife is that some lawyers 
and public prosecutors and clerks work as brokers (pwe sar in Burmese). Court clerks 
also engage in this work, serving as buffers between clients and judges for the purpose 
of bribery, so that judges can abstain from risk by using others to take money.55 
 
The use of brokers is, as with in-house lawyers, acknowledged in official 
documents, and here and there in speeches, as in that of Khin Nyunt, quoted 
                                                        
52 “တရားရံုးအသီးသီးတြင္ လိုက္ပါေဆာင္ရြက္ေနၾကသည့္ ေရွ႕ေနမ်ားအနက္မွ နယ္စားေရွ႕ေနဟုဆိုေသာ ေရွ႕ေနအခ်ဳိ႕သည္ တရားသူႀကီးႏွင့္ 
နီးစပ္မႈ ရယူ၍ ၎တို႔လိုက္ပါေဆာင္ရြက္သည့္အမႈမ်ားကို တရားရံုးက ဦးစားေပးေဆာင္ရြက္ေစျခင္း၊ အႏိုင္ရေအာင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ေပးေစျခင္း၊ 
ရွံဳးနိမ့္ေခ်ရွိလာလွ်င္ နည္းမ်ဳိးစံုျဖင့္ အခ်ိန္ဆြဲေနျခင္းစသည္တို႔ကို ျပဳလုပ္ျခင္းျဖင့္ တစ္ဖက္အမႈသည္မ်ား စိတ္ဓာတ္က်ဆင္းေအာင္ေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ား 
ရွိေနေၾကာင္း xxx ၎အျပင္ အခ်ဳိ႕တရားရံုးမ်ား၌ တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားႏွင့္ တရားရံုးဝန္ထမ္းမ်ားကိုယ္တိုင္ မည္သည့္ေရွ႕ေနကိ ုငွားပါဟူ၍ပင္ 
လမ္းညႊန္မႈျပဳေနေၾကာင္း”။ တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၁/၉၂၊ ၁၉၉၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၂၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Instruction No. 
1/92, 21 May 1992.) 
53 As for example in တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၄/၂၀၀၃၊ ၂၀၀၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၀ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 
44/2003, 20 Mar. 2003.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၁၈၀/၁၀၆-ရန (၂၀၀၁) ၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂ ရက္။ [Supreme Court 
Letter No. 180/106-YaNa (2001), 2 Apr. 2002.] 
54 As in တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၁/၉၇၊ ၁၉၉၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၄ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 11/97, 4 Feb. 
1997.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၁/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၃ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 41/98, 23 Apr. 1998.) 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၇၂/၉၈၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 72/98, 28 Sept. 
1998.) တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ ္၉၇/၂၀၀၂၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၁၁ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 97/2002, 11 June 
2002.) 
55 Kyaw Min San 11-12. 
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above. Like in-house lawyers, brokers are a very thinly disguised group with a 
longstanding role in the system, going back to the colonial period, as attested to 
by the contents of a 1940 committee report: 
Magistrates and judges not infrequently receive money in person, or through their 
wives or mistresses, or through friends at clubs; professional touts, clerks, servants, 
and village headmen are often used as intermediaries…. In one district, we were told 
that frequent meetings of the Infant Welfare Society were called because the agent who 
was employed by the bribers could there conveniently meet the wives of magistrates 
and arrange matters with them.56 
 
The chief justice in 2008 issued an instruction condemning, not for the first time, 
the prevalence of brokers in and around court premises, describing them as 
hanging around waiting for people to offer advice “from hiring a lawyer, laying 
charges, applying for bail, submitting evidence, up to who to approach and how to 
do it to win a case” or how to delay and despoil a case that cannot be won.57 And 
as in the colonial period, brokers are, like in-house lawyers, sometimes spouses or 
other relatives of people who are working in the courtroom, since their familial 
relationship enables them to interact freely with the person concerned, be they at 
home, in a restaurant or elsewhere.  
 
Brokers, in-house lawyers, other lawyers, prosecutors and court clerks all employ 
a wide variety of euphemistic language when discussing the justice trade in their 
daily work. Some of it is generic slang, such as the expression “to water” 
something as a reference to the giving of a bribe. For instance, if somebody loses a 
case, his friend may observe, “You’ve lost the case! You didn’t water it!” Or, a 
lawyer may advise a client that if she wants to win a case then, “You’ll have to 
water it well.”58 Other expressions like “no oil without beans” are used to stress to 
a client that without money being put into a case, it will not get resolved 
favourably. Some popular maxims also circulate, such as, “To avoid problems in 
court, feed your clerks and staff,” the meaning of which is self-explanatory, and, 
“When eating figs, listen for the sound of the slingshot”.59 The latter means that 
just as an inattentive bird can get hit while enjoying the fruit off a tree, an 
inattentive official who is too busy “eating” and not paying close enough attention 
                                                        
56 Report of the Bribery and Corruption Enquiry Committee, 1940 (Rangoon: Superintendent, 
Government Printing & Stationery, Burma, 1941), 11. 
57 “ေရွ႕ေနငွားရမ္းသည့္ကိစၥ၊ တရားစြဲဆိုသည့္ကိစၥ၊ အာမခံေလွ်ာက္ထားသည့္ကိစၥ၊ သက္ေသခံပစၥည္းေလွ်ာက္ထားသည့္ကိစၥမ်ားမွအစ အမႈ 
အႏိုင္ရရွိေရး အတြက္ မည္သူထံ မည္သို႔ဝင္ထြက္ရမည္အထိ”။ တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္အမွတ္ ၃/၂၀၀၈၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၂၃ ရက္။ 
(Supreme Court Instruction No. 3/2008, 23 Sept. 2008.) 
58 “မင္းအမႈရွံဳးမွာေပါ႔၊ မင္းေရမွမေလာင္းတာ” ၊ “အမႈႏိုင္ခ်င္ရင္ေရမ်ားမ်ားေလာင္းရတယ”္။ 
59 “မိမိတရားရုံးမွာ ျပႆနာမေပၚေအာင္ စာေရး၊ ဝန္ထမ္းမ်ားကိုလည္းေကၽြး” ၊ “ေညာင္သီးလည္းစား ေလးသံနားေထာင”္။  
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to the types of signals I described in the previous section can get hit by a 
complaint.  
 
Professionals also use perverted legalese, what Scott calls the language of “a 
politics of disguise… that takes place in public view but is designed to have a 
double meaning”.60 Although the bending and inverting of legalese for the most 
part accommodates the public transcript, it is subversive inasmuch as it mocks 
the legality that is the defining quality of the lawyers’ profession. Among this type 
of legalese, a good example is “section 870”. A lawyer talking with another in 
front of a courthouse might suggest section 870 as a means to get the client 
released from the charges against him. To the passer-by unversed in law, it 
sounds as if the two are talking about some technical and learned matter. To 
anyone familiar with the statute books, there is no section 870 anywhere to be 
found, the highest being section 565 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 870 
is a different type of code: code for three letters of the alphabet that resemble the 
three Burmese numerals for 8, 7 and 0, which when spelled out mean “to pay 
respects”, a euphemism for a pay off.61 Section 870 thus precisely captures the 
simultaneously integrative yet subversive quality of the hidden transcript among 
legal professionals, since it inverts the notion of respect for a superior, and 
respect for the law, by situating both in a moneymaking discourse that feigns 
legality. It gives the appearance of respectful adherence to the contents of law 
although in fact ridiculing them.  
 
Similarly, personnel refer to “part four”. Many forms and documents consist of 
parts that must be completed for the purposes of the criminal case. A police 
officer or court clerk filling out a form may instruct the defence lawyer that parts 
1, 2 and 3 are completed, now it is time to do part four. This “part” is not in the 
documents. Rather, it is word play in which the vowel sounds associated with the 
words “part” and “four” in Burmese are swapped with one another to take on the 
meaning that it is time to give something.62 In this usage the numerical reference 
                                                        
60 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 19. 
61 The numerals 8-7-0 in Burmese are ၈-၇-၀ which closely resemble three letters of the alphabet ဂ-ရ-ဝ, 
which spelled out become ဂါရဝျပဳ, or “pay respects”. 
62 “Part four” is အပိုင္းေလး. When the vowels are switched it becomes အေပးလိုင္း, or literally, “giving line”, 
where “line” connotes an illicit method of working or gaining something, as discussed in ေဒါက္တာ 
ေအာင္ျမင့္ဦး၊ ဘာသာစကားသုေတသန (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဓူဝစာေပ၊ ၂၀၁၀) စာ ၁၅၈။ [Dr Aung Myint Oo, Linguistic Research 
(Yangon: Duwa Press, 2010) 158.] So far as usage in the courts is concerned, some lawyers also 
interpret parts 1 to 3 as the investigation; the laying of charges; and submissions to the court, part 4 
being payment of money for the desired verdict.  
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also can be dropped so that the officer requesting payment can simply say 
something along the lines of, “My part is done; only your part is needed.”63 
 
Sometimes, a euphemism describes a particular practice that enables the making 
of money in a specific manner. “Double cropping” is a good example.64 This term 
comes not from the law but from paddy farming, when cultivators follow a 
monsoon crop with an irrigated one. In trial, the term designates the practice of 
lower court judges accepting payments not to acquit but to impose a lesser 
sentence on conviction and to arrange for the sentence to be overturned or 
revised upon further payments made on appeal in a higher court. As both the 
court of first instance and the appeal court make money from the same case, it is a 
double crop. Simultaneously, both boost statistics on cases handled, and even on 
appeal a judge may have some way to collect money and also see that someone 
still serves some time, so as to keep up statistics on convictions and sentencing.  
 
“Sentence-release” pithily designates a similarly useful method.65 Sentence-
release, like double cropping, enables judges to satisfy competing demands of 
police and marketplace by giving the appearance of efficiency while also making 
money. Using this technique, judges convict accused persons but pass sentences 
that come to less than or equal to the total amount of time that the accused has 
already been in custody awaiting trial. For example, an accused may be brought 
before a judge charged with a minor theft. From the date of arrest, he may be 
remanded for two weeks before the case is heard, and then again while the case is 
tried, which may come to another couple of weeks. If his lawyer has watered the 
case but the judge for whatever reason does not want to acquit, she can add up the 
total number of days that the accused has been in custody already, which in this 
scenario comes to 28, and then convict the defendant but impose a four-week 
sentence with time served deducted, so that the accused is immediately released. 
The accused goes home, the judge and prosecutor both make money and obtain a 
conviction to add to their statistics, and the defence lawyer has a satisfied client.  
 
As the counter-corruption discourse proceeds from the singular assertion that 
legal professionals are unethical because they make money illicitly from their 
positions, the hidden transcript retorts that the taking of money in exchange for 
                                                        
63 “ငါ႔အပိုင္းေတာ့ၿပီးၿပီ၊ မင္းရဲ႕အပိုင္းသာလိုေတာ”့။ 
64 ႏွစ္သီးစား။ The term is also used to refer to cases where accused persons have to pay twice to 
complete the process in the lower court: i.e., once to obtain bail and once to obtain an acquittal.  
65 ခ်လြတ္ (pronounced “ခ်လြတ္” not “ခ်-လြတ္”), as in အမိန႔္ခ်ေသာေန႔လြတ္လာျခင္း။  
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verdicts is sometimes morally superior to the applying of law. For example, one 
lawyer explained in 2011 how he had helped a poor client charged over hitting his 
wife, under section 323 of the Penal Code. According to him, on the facts of the 
case the man should have received a prison term, the family would have been 
broken and would have lost its breadwinner. Ordinarily the case would have cost 
the equivalent of around a hundred US dollars. He went to negotiate with the 
police and court clerks, telling them that the man had no money, to go take a look 
at his house, that he had a school-age child, and so on, and finally was able to 
have the case settled for about one-tenth of what it would have cost ordinarily.  
 
In another case that a lawyer was handling when we met in 2010, the police had 
charged the defendant with attempted suicide, which remains an offence under 
the Penal Code. The lawyer went to see the judge assigned to hear the case, and 
the latter warned that he would probably have to impose a prison term. The 
lawyer explained that the defendant had attempted suicide because she has seven 
children whom she could not feed. The judge, who had evidently threatened to 
imprison the accused so as to open negotiations with the lawyer, agreed to release 
the accused with a fine, in exchange for a payment equivalent to around thirty US 
dollars. Because the client had attempted suicide for want of money to feed her 
children, not surprisingly she could not come up with the money for the judge. 
Subsequently, the lawyer—who was handling the case without charge—again went 
to talk with the judge, who advised that he would release her on a fine for 
“however much she can give”, which came to the equivalent of a few dollars.  
 
This judge if asked would perhaps justify the taking of a small amount of money 
for the release of the accused on grounds that he took pity on her: that this course 
of action was better than to apply the law strictly, but also that he cannot just give 
cases away for nothing, as it will create problems in negotiations with defendants 
who can afford to pay but who may pretend otherwise. Another judge reasoned 
along similar lines that he took money for rulings because of pity for the accused 
or family, compounded by the insistent nagging of lawyers or prosecutors: 
As for bribe money, we don’t want to take it. But how can we survive on the monthly 
salary? I sometimes don’t take it…. They [the defence lawyer] say, “Sir, if the accused 
goes to jail, his whole family will be in trouble. If he goes to jail, his wife will have to 
prostitute herself. It’s already sorted out with the prosecutor. The prosecutor said that 
if sir says okay then he’ll okay it too. He won’t go up for revision or appeal,” and so on, 
and so I have to release the accused….66  
                                                        
66 “လာဘ္ေငြကိစၥက ငါတို႔လည္းမယူခ်င္ပါဘူး။ ဒါေပမဲ့ ရရွိတဲ့လစာန႔ဲေတာ့ ဘယ္ရပ္တည္ႏိုင္မလဲ။ တခါတေလ ငါမယူပါဘူး။ xxx သူတို႔က 
ဆရာရယ္၊ တရားခံက ေထာင္က်သြားရင္ တရားခံမိသားစုအားလံုးဒုကၡေရာက္သြားလိမ့္မယ္၊ သူေထာင္က်သြားရင္ သူ႔မိန္းမက ဖာသယ္ 
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In the hidden transcript, in contrast to its public counterpart no moral question 
adheres to whether or not to buy and sell cases, only to how best to conduct 
transactions. Some lawyers speak favourably of judges who try to identify the 
party who in their opinion should win a case according to law, and then invite that 
party to offer something for the correct verdict. One remarked fondly of a judge 
who refuses to accept bribes when deciding a case, but afterwards is open to the 
receipt of gifts from the winning side. Through the filter of the hidden transcript, 
her behaviour does not for this lawyer constitute unethical conduct of the sort 
condemned in the public transcript, since she decides cases fairly, even if she 
expects the successful party to know that she should obtain a reward for doing so.  
 
To the extent that a moral component does enter into the hidden transcript 
among judges themselves, it can be found in the throwing of the hypocritical 
contents of the public transcript back at their authors. The judge who said that he 
takes money after nagging from lawyers added acerbically:  
The Supreme Court and ‘big men’ say, “Don’t take bribes. If you don’t have enough 
food, rear livestock, cultivate crops.” How can we do that kind of work in Yangon? … 
The Supreme Court says don’t take bribes. They take hundreds of millions, thousands 
of millions.67  
 
Lawyers privately express similar sentiments, albeit ones framed by their 
perspective in the courtroom. One said that in his opinion a legal education was 
meaningless, as lawyers had become nothing other than brokers between judges 
and their clients.68 Another put it that: 
We know in advance who is going to win and who is going to lose a case. It is clear. 
Whoever does not pay the judge will lose. However many precedents you rely on in 
your application, however many legal texts you cite, if you do not pay, you will just lose. 
That is why in the courts of the military government era, lawyers earning a living from 
a legal education no longer closely study the law.69  
 
Statements like these would appear to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 
public transcript. After all, if the official narrative is widely disbelieved and 
                                                                                                                                                        
လုပ္စားရေတာ့မယ္၊ ဥပေဒအရာရွိကိုလည္းညိႇထားၿပီးၿပီ၊ ဥပေဒအရာရွိက ဆရာ OK ဆိုရင္သူလည္း OK ပါဘဲတဲ့၊ သူလည္းျပင္ဆင္မႈေတြ၊ 
အယူခံမႈေတြ မတက္ဘူးတဲ့ စသျဖင့္ လာေျပာေတာ့ တရားခံကို လႊတ္လိုက္ရတယ္ေလ။”  
67 “တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္က လူႀကီးေတြက ေျပာတယ္။ လာဘ္မယူပါန႔ဲ၊ စားမေလာက္ရင္ ေမြးျမဴေရး၊ စိုက္ပ်ဳိးေရးလုပ္တဲ့။ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕ေပၚမွာ ဒီအလုပ္ေတြ 
ဘယ္လုိလုပ္လို႔ရႏိုင္မလဲ။ xxx ရုံးခ်ဳပ္ကသာ လာဘ္မယူန႔ဲလုိ႔ ေျပာတယ္။ သူတို႔ယူဒါ သိန္းေထာင္ခ်ီ၊ ေသာင္းခ်ီယူတယ္။” The monthly 
salary for a township judge at time of research was 100,000 to 110,000 and for a district court judge 
from K.120,000 to 150,000 per month; the equivalent of US$3-4 and 4-5 per day respectively. 
68 “တရားသူႀကီးန႔ဲအမႈသည္ၾကားမွာ ေရွ႕ေနက ပြဲစားျဖစ္လာတယ္။” 
69 “မည္သူအမႈႏိုင္မည္၊ မည္သူရွံဳးမည္၊ ဘာျဖစ္မည္ကို ႀကိဳတင္သိရွိၿပီးျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ရွင္းပါသည္။ တရားသူႀကီးအား ေငြမေပးသူသည္ အမႈရွံဳးမည္ 
ျဖစ္သည္။ ေလွ်ာက္လွဲခ်က္တြင္ စီရင္ထံုးမည္မွ်ကိုးကားကုိးကား၊ ဥပေဒစာအုပ္မ်ားမည္မွ်ညႊန္းညႊန္းေငြမေပးပါက တရားရွံဳးမည္သာျဖစ္သည္။ 
ထို႔ေၾကာင့္ စစ္အစိုးရေခတ္တရားရံုးတြင္ ဥပေဒပညာျဖင့္ အသက္ေမြးဝမ္းေၾကာင္းျပဳေနေသာေရွ႕ေနမ်ားသည္ ဥပေဒကို ေသခ်ာ 
မေလ့လာၾကေတာ့ပါ။” 
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ridiculed by the system’s functionaries, why does the power elite bother with it? 
This question goes to the purpose of the public transcript, which is not, after all, 
actually to be believed. The public transcript does not need to convince people of 
its contents. What matters is that it keeps the hidden transcript hidden. The 
public transcript aims to prevent the judge whom I have cited above from coming 
out and saying that, “I take bribes because superior judges who lecture us about 
not taking bribes take vast amounts more.” The point of the public transcript is to 
force the system’s participants, like the French tenant farmer whom Scott quotes 
at the opening of his study, to appear amiable towards the dominant group—in 
the farmer’s case, represented by his landlord—in spite of the contempt that they 
feel for them.70 The public transcript has as its purpose the suppression of 
critique that would place blame for corruption on the sovereign, on senior 
officials, and on the system itself, critique that is incompatible with the 
commentary of official mouthpieces.  
 
To review, the public transcript does not deny the existence of the marketplace 
but instead denies systemic responsibility for it. The hidden transcript, by 
contrast, enables officials to engage in the business of criminal justice while 
avoiding possible confrontation with its public counterpart. As against the public 
transcript, it attributes the marketplace to systemic causes, and holds in contempt 
the self-portraiture of the elite responsible for the official narrative. Each lays 
blame on the other for the marketplace. But where they agree is that money does 
animate the system. And so it is to the methods and mechanics of the business 
that I turn in the final section of this chapter.  
The business of criminal justice 
Every official, no matter their level in the criminal juridical system, at some point 
has some amount of control over a case that they can use to obtain a payment. 
The forms of control are varied. For the purposes of this section, I propose to 
discuss three forms of control: control over the physical body of the accused—a 
form of control that I looked at in the last chapter with reference to the use of 
confession and torture, and here will extend to the practices of the marketplace—
control over the charge brought against the accused, and control over the material 
evidence of a crime.  
 
                                                        
70 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 2. 
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The most important means to obtain control over a person in a criminal case is 
through control over the body: through confinement or the prospect of 
confinement. Any government office in Myanmar is in a sense a place of latent 
confinement, a place for the ordinary person to avoid unless necessary, a place 
that one has to struggle to pull free from if brought inside.71 And the longer that 
one stays inside, the harder it becomes to pull free. As more officials and agencies 
get involved everybody wants something to let you go, and the transactions 
become more numerous and more complicated. 
 
Here is one example of a successful effort to get a person out of custody quickly, 
but also one that illustrates how the business of criminal justice starts from the 
moment that the police appear on someone’s doorstep. The story is from 2005, in 
a northern town where narcotics are rife, and criminal cases for possession of 
narcotics are commonplace, not just because of the quantities of drugs but also 
because of the need for high numbers of convictions and deterrent sentencing, 
which I mentioned in chapter four. According to the brother-in-law of the person 
arrested, policemen came to a shop where the young man was working and 
accused him of having some drugs. The brother-in-law, who was present at the 
time, asked the police if at the station the accused man would be released, and the 
police inspector leading the arrest replied that, “We’ll give you an answer at the 
station. We’ll let you know what needs to be done for our side to settle the case.” 
The quick-thinking brother-in-law went to get a local official to play the role of 
broker. The official went to the station with the brother-in-law and then took the 
inspector to an eatery nearby. Subsequently, the official went home and when the 
family of the detainee came he reassured them that everything would work out: 
“I have negotiated it. Inspector Khin Yi asked for twelve lakhs [1,200,000, around 
US$1,200]. I negotiated for six. So, you look for six. He will come get it in the evening,” 
Around 3 p.m., my sister-in-law and I took five lakhs to U Maung Maung’s house. 
Inspector Khin Yi was sitting in the kitchen. “Will he take five?” my sister-in-law said. 
U Maung Maung took the money to Khin Yi in the kitchen. He came back and said, “He 
won’t take five.” “My sister-in-law needs to find another lakh. Set a time for it,” I said. 
“Give it now,” Khin Yi said. “We’ll go find it,” we said, and departed. We left the five 
lakhs. We borrowed a lakh from a neighbour, and then went back to U Maung Maung’s 
house. We gave the whole amount, exactly six lakhs. When we gave it, Inspector Khin 
Yi threatened us that, “Make sure news about this doesn’t get out. If it gets out, I’ll have 
you in jail.”72  
 
                                                        
71 This is a wordplay a lawyer mentioned to me. In Burmese, words for “office” (ရုံး) and for “struggle” 
(ရုန္း) are spelled differently but pronounced the same. The first word when suffixed to a word for 
“law” denotes a courthouse (တရားရုံး).  
72 Copy of signed narrative on file; names of the police officer and official changed. Here the word 
for “negotiate” is the same as the word to “coordinate” in the public transcript (ညႇိႏႈငိ္း), as in the sense 
of coordination between the courts and government departments. 
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The policeman released the detainee from the lock up that day, and having 
surrendered his control over the body had only the threat of future impending 
action with which to keep the young man and his family from lodging complaints 
about the transaction.  
 
Control over the body carries with it the threat of torture and forced confession, 
but it also carries with it a variety of other mundane problems for the detainee. 
Apart from the simple discomfort of being in custody, lock-ups stink of urine and 
sweat, and if they are full, police officers may lock detainees in even smellier 
toilets or in musty storage rooms. Detainees are not routinely fed or allowed to 
bathe. When family or friends come, they must pay to meet the accused, to give 
them food or medicine and talk for a few minutes. In 2009-10, the standard rate 
for a visit was a thousand Kyat—around one US dollar. However, with a lawyer 
present, police officers could ask for less, or sometimes not ask at all. Someone 
without a lawyer who could not afford that much could pay half and deposit food 
or other items with the duty officer, who could help himself to the contents and 
give the remainder to the detainee. Some families with the means also pay the 
station chief and investigating officer not to assault or needlessly abuse the 
detainee, and then pay the crime reporting officer to put the case to the top of the 
list that the police are submitting to court, so that the detainee can be more 
speedily released.  
 
For wealthy and influential VIP detainees the criminal juridical system can offer a 
custodial experience that is different from that of everyone else. Here is one case 
recounted to me by a lawyer familiar with the details, concerning the son of an 
army officer and a friend who in 2008 were charged with attempted rape of a 
classmate.73 As the victim was from a well-known family in her locality, she 
pressed a complaint strongly, and had the backing of some council officials. The 
police had little choice but to arrest and open cases against the two alleged 
perpetrators. But once in custody, the two young men did not expect to stay in the 
cells with other detainees. The police chief put them in a room next to his office 
that he normally uses for playing cards and drinking with his men. Both of the 
accused reportedly had access to whatever food and drink they required, as well 
as to visits by women, and from whomever else they wanted to meet. The court 
quickly let the officer’s son out on remand, on account of a supposed medical 
condition. The accused men’s families paid to get the charges shifted from 
                                                        
73 Case details on file.  
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attempted rape under section 376/511 of the Penal Code, which is an offence for 
which the accused cannot routinely get bail, to the relatively minor offence of 
assault on a woman under section 354, for which bail is routinely granted under 
section 496 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judge later acquitted both men 
for lack of evidence.  
 
Because people with the means to pay their way out of cases anecdotally tend to 
succeed in doing so, officials need poor people to make up the statistics required 
to show that they have been performing their tasks assiduously. In visits to the 
Insein and Hpa-an prisons in February 2009, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar observed that in both prisons he “spoke 
at random with the inmates to check their ages, the reason for which they were 
detained, if they had been brought before a court, if they had access to legal 
counsel, and so on…. None of the prisoners with whom the Special Rapporteur 
spoke had been represented by legal counsel. Many did not even know the 
definition of the word ‘lawyer’”.74 This account is consistent with the system as 
marketplace, since we would expect defendants unable to pay for lawyers or 
brokers to be in the majority of those imprisoned, in order that the system have 
the statistics that it needs to satisfy the demands of police.  
 
Officials have numerous techniques at all levels to balance the requirements of 
police with the opportunities of the marketplace. Here is one scenario that a 
lawyer sketched for me. Suppose that four persons, A, B, C and D, are arrested for 
gambling, for which they should be listed as co-defendants and charged in a 
single case. But among them, B and D have money, whereas A and C do not. The 
police lodge two cases, one against A and B, the other against C and D. The 
lawyers for B and D negotiate to secure the release of their clients on appropriate 
payment. The judge acquits B and D, and convicts A and C. All personnel make 
money from B and D, both cases are recorded as convictions, through the 
sentencing of A and C, and two convictions are recorded instead of one. The 
criminal juridical system at once performs as police and as marketplace.  
 
Because control over the body is the most effective form of control over an 
accused person under trial, where officials let him go, as in the story of the young 
man I narrated at the start of this section, they lose some power, even if charges 
                                                        
74 Tomás Ojea Quintana, Human Rights Situations That Require the Council’s Attention: Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (Advance Copy) (United 
Nations Human Rights Council, 2009), 6-7. 
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have been lodged. Where they have agreed to negotiate a price for a case, they 
need to let the detainee go as part of the deal, or sometimes so that he can raise 
money. But once the accused is released on bail, one lawyer explained, he does 
not think about the case in the same way as when he was detained. Inside, he just 
wanted to get out. Whatever it took, he agreed to it if it was possible. Outside, he 
starts to reconsider. He now thinks that the amount is high, that the judge is 
greedy, and begins to argue with the lawyer about the price. Some accused also 
misunderstand the purpose of payments, and think that the money they are 
giving for bail will see them through to acquittal. When they find out that the 
amount demanded is just a down payment, they are unwilling to pay more. 
Attorneys have to renegotiate with prosecutors and judges, or through their 
brokers, when clients become obstinate. And although it is the judge, prosecutor 
and the police who have the accused in their hands, they can ill-afford to refuse to 
renegotiate. The rhetoric of anti-corruption encourages some defendants to 
threaten to lodge complaints if officials are not reasonable, as some do—a topic to 
which I will turn in the next chapter. Others find ways to get their grievances 
aired by sending letters to overseas broadcasters, like the BBC and VOA, who read 
out complaints, which higher authorities do investigate.75 And anyone can spread 
stories through their local community that may upset judges and prosecutors who 
need to maintain their appearances of orderliness.  
 
After bail is arranged and any outstanding matters or disputes over the amounts 
involved are settled, control of the body shifts from immediate physical control to 
the threat of future imprisonment. Depending on the charge and the type of case, 
negotiations may turn either to payments for acquittal, or for a minimal custodial 
sentence, perhaps using the sentence-release method, if the judge cannot acquit. 
The following scenarios illustrate the difference between cases where payment is 
made for acquittal as against where it is made for a minimised custodial sentence.  
 
In rape cases, defendants like the two VIP detainees in the case mentioned above 
aim to pay for acquittal. The threat of a 10-year sentence under section 376 of the 
                                                        
75 As admitted by the chief justice in a March 2010 circular, in which he also acknowledged that 
those allegations investigated were found to be correct: တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမွာစာ၊ စာအမွတ္ ၃၆၁/စု ၁၂/၈၄/၂၀၁၀၊ ၂၀၁၀ 
ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၉ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Memorandum, Letter No. 361/Su 12/84/2010, 29 Mar. 2010.) In 
April 2012 a member of the new legislature referred directly to a complaint against prosecutorial 
staff in Thaton that had been broadcast on the BBC the night before. တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားအေပၚတြင္ ျပည္သူလူထု 
တိုင္ၾကားမႈ ၇၇ မႈရွိခဲ့ကာ တိုင္ၾကားမႈ၏ ၈၀ ရာခိုင္ႏႈန္းမွာ မွန္ကန္မႈရွိခဲ့ၿပီး အေရးယူမႈေလ်ာ့ရဲျခင္း အေပၚ ေဝဖန္မႈမ်ားရွိေန၊ Weekly Eleven 
၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၉ ရက္။ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၂ ရက္ <http://www.weeklyeleven.com>။ (“Criticism of lenient action 
taken over 80 per cent of true public complaints brought against judges in 77 cases,” Weekly Eleven 
29 Apr. 2012, 2 May 2012 <http://www.weeklyeleven.com>.) 
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Penal Code makes the cost of getting off a charge high; however, according to 
professionals, acquittal is relatively easy since the offence is difficult to prove. The 
paucity of forensic analysis in Myanmar and the heavy emphasis upon witness 
testimonies, which may be unclear, incomplete and contradictory, makes it easy 
for a judge to release an accused upon receipt of appropriate payments. At time of 
research, the cost of acquittal from a single charge of rape in a court of first 
instance situated in a large town ranged from 1,200,000 to 3,000,000 Kyat, or 
about US$1,200 to 3,000. From information provided by a professional familiar 
with rape cases, payments are made roughly as follows: 200,000 to 300,000 to 
the crime recording officer for speedy processing of the case; 500,000 to 
1,000,000 for the district judge to acquit; 200,000 to 300,000 to the prosecutor, 
paid so as not to examine the case thoroughly in court; K.1,000 to register defence 
counsel’s power of attorney with the police station where the defendant is held; 
K.3,000 to 4,000 to the bench clerk each time the case is heard, which may come 
to fifteen times, paid so as to make sure that it is heard at the appointed time; 
K.3,000 to the police transporting the accused to and from the court each 
hearing, so as not to assault or abuse the accused; K.1,000 to the police guarding 
the accused in the court, for the family to meet with him and give food and words 
of encouragement, and the same amount again for the defence lawyer to meet and 
discuss the case before each hearing; K.1,000 each time family take food to the 
accused in the lock-up, and 3,000 to do the same each time that the accused is 
inside prison, or 500 just to see the person for a couple of minutes through the 
bars, without giving anything. In addition to the above are the expenses of the 
defence lawyer, which will be 500,000 or more, and other expenses for travel, 
food and so on. Also, in some instances the defendant may be advised or expected 
to pay off officials at the next level up in the hierarchy so as to deter any appeal or 
so as to ensure that in the event an appeal is not successful.  
 
The section 376-354 technique used in rape cases is an example of how control of 
a charge can dramatically alter the outcome of a case, but every technique has its 
limit, and judges need to be sensitive to the peculiarities of a case and when 
negotiating take into account the possibility of public backlash or other factors. A 
judge in the delta evidently failed to do this and earned himself a reprimand for 
using exactly this technique in 2002, so as to hand the accused a sentence of only 
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four months.76 The reason for the reprimand was apparently that the victim was 
just five years old.  
 
Car crashes that result in death carry custodial sentences for the negligent 
driver—or someone put forward as the driver on the real driver’s behalf—but 
according to professionals, unlike rape cases it is not easy to pay for acquittal. 
Somebody has died publicly, and somebody else needs to be held responsible. A 
driver charged under section 304A of the Penal Code with “doing any rash or 
negligent act” that causes death faces a maximum period of seven years’ 
imprisonment. The section does not stipulate a minimum period. Therefore, 
negotiations under this charge usually concentrate on minimising the amount of 
time to serve. Payments to the judge for reduction of sentence are annualised, at a 
rate in 304A cases during 2009-10 of around K.100,000 to 200,000 per year. 
This process can also, incidentally, work in the opposite direction for someone 
with money wanting to imprison someone else. According to a lawyer familiar 
with a case in the Supreme Court at time of research, an appellant paid 
K.10,000,000 to a judge for the satisfaction of having the respondent imprisoned 
for five years: the rate of payment in this case too was annualised, at 2,000,000, 
around US$2,000, per year of sentence added. 
 
The process of reaching a price and fixing the sentence in a car crash resulting in 
death works roughly like this: the judge hearing a 304A case informs the defence 
lawyer that the accused will be sentenced to six years in prison; the defendant 
arranges through the lawyer to pay K.1,000,000 to the judge, and, at a rate of 
200,000 per year, the sentence is reduced to a single year. The defendant may 
have been in remand for six months from the time of arrest to the court verdict, 
and when this period is deducted from the sentence, he has to serve only six 
months before release; or, if pressure from the relatives of the victim is less and 
the court only needs the conviction for the purposes of paperwork—to maintain 
the appearance of efficiency—he might be released on the day that the verdict is 
read out in court through the “sentence-release” method.  
 
The annualised fee to reduce the sentence is only the fee for the trial judge, and 
numerous other payments remain that an accused in a vehicle accident case must 
make to get free. I will illustrate with reference to an accident where someone 
                                                        
76 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၉/၂၀၀၂၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 49/2002, 12 Mar. 
2002.) 
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does not die but where one party suffers hurt or grievous hurt. Such accidents fall 
under sections 337 or 338 of the Penal Code and like 304A cases there is a 
possibility of imprisonment, which in these offences can be for a maximum of two 
or five years respectively. In the former case, it is possible to negotiate with the 
police and with the injured party, to settle the matter without it going any further. 
If one party is hospitalised with serious injuries then the case should be recorded 
by a duty police officer attached to the hospital and it will go into the paperwork. 
The party that has been blamed for the accident will then have to pay officials to 
escape imprisonment. Here is an example of the expenses for the defence arising 
from a specific accident that occurred at a town in the upper part of the country 
during 2009: K.50,000 to be on good terms with the chief of the police station 
that recorded the case, the same for the traffic policeman who came to the scene, 
and another payment of the same amount for bail and for the vehicle involved in 
the accident not to be impounded; 500,000 for the investigating officer, who 
arranged for the case to be resolved at a single sitting in court; 100,000 for the 
judicial medical officer recording details of the injuries to the victim, to write 
something favourable for the defence, and another 50,000 to say something 
favourable in court; 10,000 for court clerks; 5,000 for law office staff; 6,000 for 
the crime recording officer at the police station; 20,000 for the traffic police first 
on the scene; and, 87,000 to the injured party as settlement. The total cost of 
direct payments in this case was K.928,000, nearly US$1,000.  
 
In each of the case scenarios described above, the primary objective of the payees 
was to pay for release from the control that criminal juridical personnel exercised 
over the body of the accused. But what each also reveals is the linkage between 
control of the body and control over the criminal charge. By shifting a case from 
one charge to another a defendant may have a better chance of getting bail, and 
may escape a severe sentence, if conviction is unavoidable. For instance, in a car 
crash resulting in injury, the accused will seek to shift the charge from grievous 
hurt under section 338 to ordinary hurt under section 337, and then try to 
negotiate to get the charge lifted completely. The police for their part will seek to 
lodge a case under section 338 wherever possible, and then negotiate downwards 
to section 337 in exchange for payment.  
 
This practice of the police lodging or threatening to lodge cases initially under 
sections of law that carry heavy penalties and then negotiating downwards to 
lesser offences, or where possible negotiating to drop the charges altogether, is 
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one of the common methods through which the business of criminal justice is 
conducted in Myanmar. In my first years of research, among the most popular 
types of cases that were negotiated in this manner, particularly in commercial 
centres, were cases under sections 406 and 420 of the Penal Code. Section 406 is 
criminal breach of trust. Section 420 is cheating. The legal difference between the 
two is beyond the scope of this discussion, and for practical purposes it is beyond 
the scope of most cases lodged under these sections in Myanmar.77 In fact, that 
the legal difference between the two is imprecise or not well understood among 
professionals is exactly the point. The actual elements of a charge or the 
likelihood of a conviction according to law are irrelevant where the purpose of 
bringing the charge is not to make a case in court but to enter into a series of 
negotiating games in which all criminal juridical personnel can make money.  
 
Here is a scenario to illustrate the section 406-420 method that one professional 
sketched. Suppose a businessman has a conflict with another businessman: a 
former partner with whom he has had a falling out or a competitor—a building 
contractor, land speculator or importer-exporter. He goes to the police and pays 
them to open a case against the other businessman under section 406 on an 
allegation of some sort. This section carries no more than three years’ 
imprisonment, whereas section 420 carries up to seven. On the basis of the 
punishment alone, section 420 would be the more onerous offence. But, 
complainants lodge cases under section 406 because under schedule II of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, an accused cannot automatically get bail, whereas 
under section 420 he can. Under the schedule, the police can arrest accused 
persons without a warrant from a court in either case, but whereas an accused 
with a case lodged against him according to section 420 ordinarily will be released 
from custody after the charge has been laid, under section 406 bail can be 
obtained only at the discretion of the officer in charge of the police station where 
the case is lodged, or from a court, as set out in section 497(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
 
If the defendant is taken into custody under section 406, then he will immediately 
want to make payments and other arrangements to get the case shifted to section 
420, if he cannot get out of the case altogether. There are a few ways to do this. 
The best way is for the police to record the case under section 420 immediately, 
                                                        
77 For a legal analysis of the two sections and the circumstances under which one or the other 
formally applies see ဦးဗႀကိဳင္၊ ဥပေဒေဆာင္းပါး ေပါင္းခ်ဳပ၊္ အတြဲ (၁) (ရန္ကုန္၊ တိုင္းလင္းစာေပ၊ ၂၀၀၀) ၊ စာ ၇၁-၈၀ [U Ba 
Kyaing, Collected Legal Articles, vol. 1 (Yangon: Tainglin Press, 2000) 71-80.] 
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once some agreement is promptly reached. If not, the defence lawyer can go to the 
prosecutor and again negotiate for the same arrangement. If that still does not 
work, the detainee can try paying the police to falsify documents so that he can 
get out and try to make other arrangements. He can also try to set something up 
directly with the judge, which seems to be what happened in a case heard in 
Kachin State during 2005 where the police brought a charge under section 406: 
the judge added a section 420 charge, then put the defendant in remand for three 
successive periods, whereupon he suddenly decided that the detainee had no case 
to answer and let him go scot-free. The case attracted interest from some quarter, 
perhaps because of the parties involved, perhaps because the judge cut someone 
out of the loop who had expected to make money from the case, and the judge 
received a two-year suspension of promotion as punishment.78  
 
A professional who works on commercial criminal cases in Yangon gave the 
following estimates of costs in 2009-10 for someone lodging a complaint over 
unlawful possession of a car in a hypothetical section 406-420 case, the car 
valued at around K.30,000,000, or a bit more than US$30,000. To begin, there is 
the cost for the complainant to open the case at the police station, paid to the 
police, which can be from 500,000 to 1,000,000. Another amount of 200,000 to 
400,000 is paid to the investigating officer to recover the car from the other party 
as quickly as possible. As the car will initially be impounded, the complainant will 
have to pay to get it out. If it is impounded, not only will the complainant be 
unable to use it, but also it will either deteriorate sitting in an open compound, or 
will be used by the police or court staff themselves. The judge should accept a 
reasonable amount if offered, and not sit on a vehicle in a manner that may lead a 
disgruntled party to complain elsewhere.79 To continue with the scenario, a 
further 100,000 to 200,000 should be paid to the crime-recording officer at the 
police station to submit the case to court promptly. Half a million to 1,000,000 is 
paid to the prosecutor to give the necessary advice for the case to proceed as a 
criminal case, and about the same amount is paid to the defence lawyer; or if to a 
well-known lawyer, up to 2,000,000 for this type of case. The judge will get 
3,000,000 to 4,000,000 to decide the case in the plaintiff’s favour. Once the case 
                                                        
78 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၉၆/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၆ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 96/2006, 16 Nov. 
2006.) The correct procedure, so far as the business of criminal justice is concerned, would probably 
have been to drop the section 406 charge, retain the section 420 charge as the judge initially seemed 
to be intending to do, and then go step by step from there. 
79 As apparently happened in a case in Mandalay over which a judge was removed from office: 
တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၀၆/၂၀၀၂၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၁၈ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 106/2002, 18 June 
2002.) 
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is decided, another amount of 200,000 to 500,000 is paid to the prosecutor not 
to take the case to a higher court for revision. And on top of all the above expenses 
there are a variety of smaller expenses that run throughout the trial process, such 
as that the plaintiff should make some voluntary donations to whatever funds and 
causes are being promoted at the court and police station, should help to pay the 
costs of the judge’s recreation travel and other leisure activities during the period 
that the case is being heard, should buy various small presents for each of the 
officials working on the case, should pay small amounts of money to the court 
clerks on each day that the case comes up on the docket, and should pay for the 
travel expenses and food for any witnesses whenever they come to the police 
station or court, all of which will typically come to another 2,000,000 to 
3,000,000. Therefore, in total the cost to recover the car, assuming that 
everything goes to plan, will be the equivalent of from US$7,000 to over 12,100, 
although typically the amount should not exceed about one-third of the vehicle’s 
market value.  
 
According to one lawyer in Yangon to whom I spoke in mid-2011, the section 406-
420 method became so popular that the Supreme Court and attorney general’s 
office had to issue some kind of notice instructing judges and prosecutors not to 
have the accused automatically taken into custody, and requiring that the 
prosecutor first examine the case and advise the court on how to proceed.80 The 
lawyer said that thereafter the use of these sections for this sort of moneymaking 
had become much less efficacious than earlier. This shift in practices illustrates 
how specific instructions and warnings on certain practices can have a dampening 
down effect on some aspects of the business of criminal justice, although they do 
not have a discernible effect on the operating of the marketplace as a whole.  
 
In cases that for one reason or another may attract attention from above, more 
creative techniques may be necessary, but participants in the marketplace still 
find ways to make money and satisfy seemingly competing demands. One method 
that has a long pedigree is by double cropping through the appeal process, as 
described in the 1940 committee report that I cited above: 
Most of the decisions of Magistrates and Judges are appealable, and it may be asked 
how the payer can be sure that judgment for which he has paid will not be reversed. To 
begin with, the Court may deliberately give judgment against the bribe giver, knowing, 
and explaining to him, that it will be reversed on appeal. Moreover, in many cases the 
                                                        
80 I checked the Supreme Court gazette up to the end of 2010 but could not find any notice of the 
sort to the end of that year; however, not all notices are included in the gazette, and the notice might 
also have been made in early 2011. 
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evidence is such that the case can be plausibly decided either way. Where this is not so, 
the Bench may bully the witness so as to get on the record what is desired, or note on 
the deposition that his demeanour is such that is evidence is to be treated with 
suspicion, or not record his statement correctly. We have been told of cases where 
evidence has been re-written afterwards.81  
 
In the course of research, I learned of a case in which officials used some of these 
techniques, motivated out of concern that to acquit the accused in the court of 
first instance was untenable. In this case, a special drug squad in the north during 
2007 arrested an influential and wealthy dealer who was in league with the local 
township police.82 According to a person involved, in the township court, the 
question was not the guilt or innocence of the accused, about which nobody had 
any doubt, but how to get him off the hook. The case involved an outsider police 
unit, and also had attracted local curiosity. Consequently, the judge explained to 
the defendant’s lawyer and prosecutor that he could not acquit as it would attract 
public ire and raise problems for everyone involved. Instead, they agreed that he 
would convict the accused, but prepare a flawed verdict with the abetment of the 
prosecutor. The judge allowed the defence attorney to ask leading questions; and 
the prosecutor arranged for some witnesses to turn hostile, asked questions which 
supported the defence, and failed to cross-examine witnesses. The appellate 
judge, who had been notified to look forward to the profitable case—a double-
crop—quietly released the accused because of the flaws in the verdict from the 
lower court. The prosecutor did not appeal the acquittal. The dealer settled down 
in some other township.  
 
One factor in narcotics cases that makes them more complicated for personnel in 
courts looking to manipulate evidence is that these cases may involve chemical 
analysis of seized drugs, or in the case of users, urine—and it is with this subject 
that we come to the question of control over material evidence. As cases against 
users are the most common, I will start with them. A professional working in the 
north of Myanmar, near the China border, estimated in 2009 that in some 
township courts, three quarters of all cases were drug-related. About two thirds of 
those, or about half of the total number of cases in the courts, the person 
estimated were against alleged users. Under section 15 of the 1993 Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances Law, a drug user who fails to register voluntarily for 
rehabilitation can go to jail for at least three to at most five years. Police officers 
collect urine from accused users and send it to one of two chemical analysis labs, 
                                                        
81 Report of the Bribery and Corruption Enquiry Committee, 1940 11-12. 
82 Case details on file.  
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in Mandalay and Yangon, managed by the Chemical Examiner, Department of 
Health. The lab tests the urine and sends a result to the court where the case is 
posted. Depending on the positive or negative finding, the judge convicts or 
acquits the accused. 
 
In effect, the finding of guilt or innocence in these cases is made at the lab. The 
judge is left to decide on the sentence, over which there is very limited discretion, 
unless he tries to be clever, like a judge in Shan State who in 2004 acquitted an 
accused that the examiner reported had traces of marijuana in his urine because 
the defendant was a traditional medicine practitioner. The Supreme Court 
imposed a three-year sentence on the practitioner and a warning on the judge.83 
So in cases lodged against alleged drug users, unlike many other cases where 
confession is the best evidence, control over the outcome of the case is largely 
contingent on control over the evidence, which lies with the police taking samples 
and the lab staff sending results to the courts.  
 
According to professionals who work on narcotics cases, the chemical analysis 
labs interpret government policy on deterrence to mean that the default result for 
urine analysis should be positive. They offer negative results in exchange for 
payment. In other words, police and marketplace meet in the urine of the drug 
user. The 2009-10 starting figure in Kyat for a negative result was around 
100,000 per urine sample, and 1,000,000 per sample in the case of seized drugs. 
At roughly US$100 and 1,000 respectively, these are small prices to pay for those 
who can afford them, who include persons actually trading in drugs. They are not 
affordable for persons with no money, contacts and knowhow, like an alleged user 
brought to one station in the north during 2007 whom a court sentenced to five 
years’ imprisonment for a positive test result taken from a sample of dirty water 
that he had provided the police from the toilet bowl where he was unable to 
urinate due to an infection. And with no shortage of broke and ignorant drug 
users available to pull off the streets and charge with something, police officers 
can easily fill their quotas for arrests of traffickers. Sometimes traffickers help the 
police by nominating easy targets for arrest. These targets include infrequent 
clients, regular clients who are heavily in debt and cannot pay back what they 
owe, and addicts who have contracted diseases and whose health has deteriorated 
to a point that they will not survive much longer anyhow. The lawyer working in 
                                                        
83 တရား႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၅၅/၂၀၀၄၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၀ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 55/2004, 10 May 
2004.) 
 191 
the north told me that he had seen accused persons belonging to the last category 
even being brought to court on stretchers, too weak from illness and confinement 
to walk. 
 
Chemical analysis plays an important part in other types of cases, such as murder, 
grievous bodily harm and rape cases. In these types of cases, lab results are 
relevant, but the cases do not hinge upon them. The courts can also call for expert 
witnesses, as provided in sections 45 to 49 of the Evidence Act, such as where 
persons are accused of trafficking items other than narcotics. Some parties pay 
expert witnesses to provide false evidence: for instance, that tiger bones found in 
baggage on a train and apparently being taken to be sold for medicines were not 
tiger bones but the bones of another animal; and that jade being smuggled 
illegally was not jade but some other non-valuable stone. The police also can 
switch real evidence for fake evidence, either with the complicity of the expert 
witness or without the expert’s knowledge, since township courts lack special 
arrangements for the keeping of evidence during trial. Material evidence is 
typically held at the bailiff’s quarters on the court premises or at the police 
station. Either way, police officers have ample opportunities to tamper with or 
misplace evidence. 
 
In cases concerning possession, trafficking and cultivation of narcotics too, 
chemical labs’ findings are important, but unlike in users’ cases, courts can admit 
and interpret a range of evidence to reach a verdict. One professional who handles 
narcotics cases said that the range of prices for acquittal under different offences 
in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law is wide. There are many 
variables in such cases, including the severity of the alleged crime, the number of 
persons involved in the case, and also the police units investigating. For example, 
a township or district judge in the north of the country might be paid anywhere 
from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 for acquittal in cases where the defendant is 
charged with possession of prohibited materials or implements under section 
16(b) of the law, which carries a sentence of five to ten years in jail. In 2009-10 
prices, for a charge of possession with intent to sell under section 19(a), which 
carries a minimum sentence of ten years, an acquittal can cost up to 20,000,000 
in payments to judges alone. Another professional remarked that the most 
important factor is the capacity of the accused to pay, which is carefully noted 
before a case begins, as anyone who cannot pay will be convicted and jailed in 
accordance with policy dictates on deterrent sentencing. In other words, in 
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narcotics cases we see many meeting points between the criminal juridical system 
as police and as marketplace. It is not simply that one gives way to the other. 
Rather, the two bisect and complement one another, communicate with one 
another and reinforce each other throughout the criminal juridical process.  
Conclusion 
In December 2011, as I was revising this chapter, a feature article in a Yangon 
news weekly addressed problems with the judiciary, and how they may present 
obstacles to hoped-for democratic change.84 The article contained some data from 
an online poll that the periodical conducted on what people thought of the judicial 
system. Of the 2,025 respondents, 38 selected the first option, that the system is 
fair and suited to current social conditions. Of the remainder, 407 selected that 
the system was not fair mainly due to weaknesses in laws; 1,580 that it was due to 
judicial bias and corruption.  
 
Leaving aside methodological problems associated with this type of online survey, 
what interests me is that the overwhelming majority went with the option that the 
problems of the system are to do with corruption. This option is essentially an 
endorsement of the public transcript. Of course, it reflects people’s personal 
experiences, the stories they tell, and a lack of knowledge among respondents 
about the contents of laws—which was the only other option open to respondents 
with a low opinion of the judicial system. But both the design and results of the 
poll are striking in their consonance with prevailing official discourse, with the 
rhetoric that injustice is the consequence of corrupt individuals, and that the way 
to address it is through administrative measures to train, track and punish them.  
 
As I have argued in this chapter, in reality the public transcript aims not primarily 
to address practices identified as corrupt but to affirm law and order through a 
model of probity in which personnel follow orders as required, pretend to 
subscribe to the values of official propaganda, and maintain an appearance of 
orderliness. Because the system as police is pragmatic, in exchange for 
compliance it concedes to the making of money through its offices. Subordinates 
interpret and accommodate its concession through the language and practices of 
the hidden transcript, which help them to filter and determine which cases 
                                                        
84 လက္ရွိ တရားစီရင္ေရးစနစ္ျဖင့္ ဒီမိုကေရစီေဖာ္ေဆာင္ရန္ ခက္ခဲႏိုင္၊ Weekly Eleven ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၆ ရက္။ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္ <http://www.weeklyeleven.com>။ (“Could Be Difficult to Realise Democracy with the 
Current Judicial System,” Weekly Eleven 6 Dec. 2011, 11 Dec. 2011 
<http://www.weeklyeleven.com>.) 
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require what practices of them. In certain types, the marketplace concedes to 
police, and in other types, the marketplace prevails. Sometimes the two conjoin, 
as in narcotics cases, or where policy demands high numbers of deterrent 
sentences. In short, the marketplace accommodates and shapes police, and vice 
versa. Moneymaking arrangements are complex and multi-layered, aimed at 
meeting a variety of objectives and satisfying the needs of a variety of personnel.  
 
The business of criminal justice is insulated because the system is structured so as 
to enable its personnel to police themselves hierarchically. Where hierarchical 
arrangements exist to earn money, senior personnel protect their subordinates. 
To the extent that disciplinary action occurs, it is concentrated in the lower tiers. 
Senior officials are protected from sanction, unless initiated from other more 
powerful parts of the state apparatus. As top judges are responsible for the 
management of the whole system, their own integrity cannot be cast into doubt 
without it constituting a systemic critique. Consequently, complaints against 
senior judges are highly risky, whereas at lower levels, complaints are possible 
and to an extent encouraged, provided that they are individualised, as I will 
discuss in the next chapter.  
 
But although my findings suggest a symbiosis of some sort between police and 
marketplace, I do not think that the relationship between the two is vital. History 
and comparison with other countries today leave little room for doubt that the 
marketplace may be able to sustain itself, to adapt and evolve in confounding 
ways, in markedly different political environments. Writing about Africa, Jean-
Pierre Olivier de Sardan has observed that, “There is no obvious correlation 
between the extent of corruption, on the one hand, and the types of political 
regime, their degree of despotism and their economic effectiveness on the 
other.”85 In Asia too the business of criminal justice is found in most jurisdictions 
in the region, irrespective of political system.86 Although some of the most 
pronouncedly corrupt governments in Asia have been military or military-backed 
regimes, the variance among these regimes and the existence of other highly 
corrupt non-military regimes raises difficulties for anyone trying to make sense of 
the institutions and structures that engender moneymaking from official 
positions.  
                                                        
85 J. P. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 37.1 (1999): 33. 
86 As discussed in The Asian Charter on the Rule of Law: Consultation on Executive Control of the 
Judiciary and Judicial Corruption (Hong Kong: Asian Human Rights Commission, 2008).  
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Some of the specific forms of behaviour in the marketplace may be due to shared 
history. I have remarked in this chapter of how some practices of the business of 
criminal justice have passed down through the system since the colonial period to 
the present day. It is therefore not surprising to find that in Bangladesh, which 
shares Myanmar’s juridical heritage from colonial times—and adheres more 
closely to its original design—the business of criminal justice also goes on in a way 
that in many respects resembles that in its eastern neighbour, despite the two 
having markedly different political systems.87 Likewise, police in Sri Lanka admit 
to torturing and imprisoning poor people to make up for the numbers of people 
with money and influence who escape trial or punishment. In the assessment of 
one senior policeman there, most accused people who go to jail, as in Myanmar, 
do so for want of legal representation.88 Nor does a shift away from military 
authoritarianism to democratic government automatically inhibit the 
marketplace, as the experience of Indonesia shows. According to Simon Butt and 
Tim Lindsey, illegality in the Indonesian judiciary—including corruption—since 
the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 has probably not decreased and may be on 
the rise.89 Increases in salaries have not apparently offset the level of 
moneymaking in the Indonesian system—a pertinent issue for the courts in 
Myanmar, where many people attribute, with good cause, the size of the 
marketplace to low rates of pay.  
 
What these brief comparisons suggest is that any significant political change in 
Myanmar away from military control and towards civilian government will not in 
itself constrain the marketplace, and quite possibly the moneymaking function of 
the criminal juridical system could become even more pronounced, as the 
economy grows and moneyed interests bring more and more matters to the courts 
for which they are prepared to pay handsomely for the desired outcome. The 
symbiotic relationship between police and marketplace is distinctive but not 
essential.
                                                        
87 See Md. Shariful Islam, Politics-Corruption Nexus in Bangladesh: An Empirical Study of the 
Impacts on Judicial Governance (Hong Kong: Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2010) ch. 3. 
88 See Jayakumar Thangavelu, “Equal Access to Justice: Where Should It Begin to Ensure Human 
Rights?” An X-Ray of the Sri Lankan Policing System and Torture of the Poor, eds. Basil Fernando 
and Shymali Puvimanasinghe (Hong Kong: Asian Human Rights Commission, 2005) 52-59. 




COMPLAINANTS, WORKING THE SYSTEM 
 
In the last two chapters I examined the contemporary criminal juridical system of 
Myanmar as police, and as marketplace. In this chapter and the next, I explore 
what animates the system in response to specific challenges to the authority of the 
state and its personnel. In the next chapter, that challenge comes in the form of 
unauthorised assembly, a challenge from outside the system, but one with which 
the system’s personnel are obligated to deal. In this chapter, the challenge comes 
from complaints lodged against government officials, which is to say, a challenge 
made from within the parameters of the system, although as we shall see, not 
necessarily according to its terms. 
 
In their study of rural resistance to state programmes in China, Kevin O’Brien and 
Liangiang Li observe that complainants “shape their challenges from materials 
made available by the structure of domination”.1 This characterisation attracts 
me, since in this chapter I am concerned with how complainants take and shape 
the materials available to them in Myanmar, and specifically, with how they do so 
through the shaping of materials into complaint letters. In the contents and 
contours of these letters we can see the features of the system itself, since 
complainants are working with its materials and using them to make claims that, 
generally speaking, they hope will be efficacious. However, the manner in which 
complainants shape their challenges from available materials varies enormously.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, I am going to draw a very rough line between 
two general types of complaint, adopting a dichotomy that Sheila Fitzpatrick used 
in a study of letters to the authorities in Soviet Russia during the 1920s, between 
supplicants and citizens. She explains: 
The supplicant was implicitly a subject rather than a citizen. He sent his private 
complaints, requests, petitions and confessions to an authority figure imagined as a 
benevolent father…. Supplicants’ letters might ask for justice as well as mercy, but they 
did not invoke rights. They portrayed their authors as victims and dwelt on their 
miseries and misfortunes. Supplicants’ letters, though sent to public figures requesting 
them to act in their official capacity, dealt with private and personal concerns…. The 
citizen was a more “modern” figure than the supplicant. Citizens wrote letters to the 
                                                        
1 Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 14. 
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editor or the Politburo to state opinions, criticize policies, suggest improvements, blow 
the whistle on corrupt officials, point out miscarriages of justice and denounce 
wrongdoers as their “duty as a citizen”. They acted, or claimed to act, in the public 
interest; if they had private motives for writing, they concealed them. They used the 
language of rights and among the rights they implicitly claimed the right to be heard….2 
 
To broaden this dichotomy and situate it in the terms of the current study, the 
supplicant seeks to align her complaint with the language and policies of the state. 
She acknowledges and appeals to sovereign will, and sets out her claim as a form 
of entitlement—in accordance with the reformulating of rights that I described in 
chapter three—hoping to enlist the support of persons to whom the complaint is 
addressed, on the basis of eligibility. She aims to demonstrate that she qualifies 
for the assistance and support of power-holders by satisfying certain criteria, 
which official discourse advises are criteria that if satisfied will better enable her 
both to have a complaint heard and to have it addressed. In other words, the 
supplicant is engaged in another form of politics of disguise—not the politics of 
disguise found in the buying and selling of cases, but in the feigned deference to 
authority and posing that she hopes will generate some kind of response.  
 
By contrast, the citizen-complainant bothers much less to conceal her true 
opinions. Although in making a complaint she implicitly recognises sovereign 
will, she does not bow to it. Instead, she asserts her rights independently of any 
parameters that the state has set down for her. She uses the language of 
propaganda provocatively, challenging officialdom to live up to high-sounding 
rhetoric, sometimes inverting or breaking open the meanings of official discourse 
in deliberately confronting ways. In short, whereas the supplicant goes along with 
the pragmatic and particularistic form of the juridical system, the citizen does not. 
Even when appealing within the administrative parameters of the system, she 
makes a rights-based claim, a claim that in some way or another transcends the 
parameters set for authorised complaint.  
 
Beginning with some preliminary remarks on the authorising of complaint, the 
next two sections of this chapter deal with complaints lodged by supplicants and 
citizens respectively. The third section deals with responses to complaints, and 
specifically, with complaints that invite retribution from power-holders. To be 
clear, many, probably most complainants do not suffer repercussions for making 
                                                        
2 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” 
Slavic Review 55.1 (1996): 103-04. See also Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks! Identity and 
Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005)   
ch. 9. 
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complaint. Some are ignored; others meet with some officials making inquiries 
but do not obtain any satisfaction, whereas others still do obtain some kind of 
redress. According to the government in a report to the United Nations in 2010,  
With regard to the accusations of the violation of human rights, if there be complaints, 
the competent authorities will investigate and take the necessary measures to enforce 
the law. For instance, between 1 January and 31 August 2010, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs received 503 complaints…. Of the 300 letters of complaint examined, 101 were 
dismissed as false complaints and 199 were found to be genuine, and remedial 
measures have therefore been taken. The remaining 203 complaints are still under 
investigation.3  
 
These figures may be accurate, although what “remedial measures” constitute the 
government did not explain, and attempts by the Special Rapporteur on human 
rights in Myanmar to obtain further details did not yield any.4 However, it is not 
the reference to remedies but two other aspects of this paragraph that are of 
particular interest to me for the purposes of the third section in this chapter: that 
officials who undertook to examine complaints of human rights abuses were 
officials of a government ministry; and, that 101 complaints were not just 
dismissed as groundless, but were dismissed as “false complaints”. These aspects 
speak to an understanding of complaint as an administrative problem. Since no 
right to complain exists that transcends the boundaries of the pragmatic system, 
any complaint is potentially subject to sanctions when declared “false”, since a 
false complaint is implicitly a complaint made with malice. 
 
The contents of this chapter are based on a variety of complaint letters, case 
records and other materials collected during research conducted from 2008 to 
2011 concerning alleged criminal misconduct of government officials, including 
police and judicial officers.5 Most of these complaint letters were not lodged 
directly in courts or with the police, although some were copied to these 
institutions as a way of putting them on notice that a complaint had been made. 
Rather, like Fitzpatrick’s Russian letter-writers, complainants in Myanmar send 
their letters everywhere that they think efficacious, and because those persons 
                                                        
3 Annexed to, Tomás Ojea Quintana, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (New York: United 
Nations General Assembly, 2010), 25.  
4 Tomás Ojea Quintana, Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana (New York: United Nations General Assembly, 2011), 7. 
5 For this chapter, I examined ninety-six complaint letters in addition to a variety of case documents 
of the same types as in chapter four, pertaining to a total of ninety-four cases, involving twenty-two 
courts at all levels. As in chapter four, the figure does not include those cases cited from the official 
law reports or other publications. Again, supplementary secondary material includes comments and 
analysis by persons familiar with the cases and reports from state and non-state media inside and 
outside the country. And as in previous chapters, where cases have already been publicised or 
pertain to political activists or others who seek publicity for their cases, I have cited them directly. 
Otherwise, I have referred to the contents anonymously. 
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with the greatest amounts of power to intervene into cases have been in the 
executive branch, complainants have tended to direct their letters towards 
executive officials, from the head of state down to administrators at local levels. 
Notwithstanding, the making of these complaints goes to the question of what 
animates the criminal juridical system because they constitute petitions for action 
in matters of alleged criminal offences, or abuses of authority, made through the 
larger apparatus of state. Complainants respond to the system as police, as a 
continuum of discretionary administrative power in which police officers, judges 
and prosecutors are expected to intervene quickly, cooperatively and effectively in 
response to commands from the relevant persons in other parts of the system.  
Authorised complaint 
No single, centralised mechanism exists in Myanmar for the invitation and receipt 
of complaints comparable to, for instance, the Letters and Visits Bureau in 
China.6 Generally, the government has in the contemporary period invited 
citizens to complain to a specific ministry, department or agency about personnel 
of that ministry or department. For example, in 2007 state newspapers ran 
announcements inviting complaints against staff of the Supreme Court, the Office 
of the Attorney General, and members of the Bar Council.7 The first of these ran 
in part that if 
[Anybody] among serving civil service personnel at any grade in the Supreme Court 
and courts at various levels who in doing their duties and exercising authority is taking 
bribes, whether money, material goods or favours, or is self-seeking or acting high-
handedly, or is not working in compliance with established procedures, the aggrieved 
persons can themselves make a report and complain by letter, telephone or fax to the 
addresses and phone numbers as provided [below]…. The Supreme Court will promptly 
and effectively investigate and take action on these complaints. People also are 
reminded to cooperate by complaining truthfully.8  
 
                                                        
6 For short discussions on the bureau, see Dingjian Cai, “The Development of Constitutionalism in 
the Transition of Chinese Society,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 19.1 (2005): 5. Randall 
Peerenboom, “Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or Paradigm?” 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 19.1 (2005): 222-23.  
7 The Bar Council is not an independent body but is headed by the attorney general and his deputy, 
and comprises one Supreme Court judge appointed by the chief justice, six lawyers selected by the 
Supreme Court, and the directors general of the Supreme Court and Office of the Attorney General. 
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8 “တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ႏွင္ ့တရားရံုးအဆင့္ဆင့္တြင္ တာဝန္ထမ္းေဆာင္လ်က္ရွိေသာ ျပည္သူ႔ဝန္ထမ္းအဆင့္အတန္းအားလံုး အနက္ တစ္ဦးဦးသည္ မိမိ၏ 
တာဝန္ႏွင့္လုပ္ပိုင္ခြင့္ကို က်င့္သံုးရာတြင္ ေငြေၾကး၊ ပစၥည္း၊ အခြင့္အေရးတို႔ကို လက္ခံရယူ၍ လာဘ္ေပးလာဘ္ယူမႈ ျပဳလုပ္လွ်င္ေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း၊ 
ကိုယ္က်ဳိးရွာမႈ၊ အႏိုင္အထက္ျပဳမႈမ်ား ျပဳလုပ္လွ်င္ေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း၊ တည္ဆဲလုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းမ်ားႏွင့္ မကိုက္ညီေသာ ျပဳလုပ္မႈမ်ားကိ ု
လုပ္ကိုင္လွ်င္ ေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း ထိခိုက္နစ္နာသူကိုယ္တိုင္ စာျဖင့္ျဖစ္ေစ၊ တယ္လီဖုန္းျဖင့္ျဖစ္ေစ၊ ဖက္(စ)္ျဖင့္ျဖစ္ေစ ေဖာ္ျပပါ လိပ္စာမ်ားႏွင္ ့
ဖုန္းနံပါတ္မ်ားသို႔ သတင္းေပးတိုင္ၾကားႏိုင္သည္။ xxx ယင္းသို႔တိုင္ၾကားလာလွ်င္ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္က ျမန္ဆန္ထိေရာက္စြာ စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးေဖာ္ထုတ ္
အေရးယူသြားမည္ ျဖစ္သည္။ ျပည္သူမ်ားကလည္း မွန္မွန္ကန္ကန ္တိုင္ၾကားျခင္းျဖင့္ ပူးေပါင္းကူညီေဆာင္ရြက္သြားၾကရန္ ႏိႈးေဆာ္ထားေၾကာင္း 
သတင္းရရွိသည္။” တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ဝန္ထမ္းမ်ား မမွန္မကန္ေဆာင္ရြက္မႈရွိပါက မည္သူမဆို တိုက္ရိုက္တိုင္ၾကားႏိုင္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၇ ရက္၊ စာ ၉။ (“Anyone Can Complain Directly If Supreme Court Personnel Commit 
Malpractice,” Myanma Alin 7 Feb. 2007: 9.)  
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Such announcements have appeared sporadically, sometimes in response to 
specific events or concerns, like the alleged theft of relief supplies intended for 
cyclone victims in 2008.9 Additionally, the government has since 2004 permitted 
the International Labour Organisation, or ILO, to receive complaints of forced 
labour, and later, of recruitment of child soldiers.10 In 2011 a new national human 
rights commission began operations and also invited the making of complaints.11 
It is too early to offer any assessment of its work, or to comment on whether or 
not the commission might in some way alter the manner and characteristics of 
complaint described in this chapter. The new legislative committee for legal and 
judicial affairs in 2011 likewise invited complaints of injustice in specific cases, 
with a familiar-sounding piece of advice to complainants also to send their letters 
to a benevolent father-figure, in this case the speaker of the legislature “because 
the speaker takes an interest in every matter of concern to the public”.12 
According to its chairman, Thura U Aung Ko, in January 2012 alone it had 
received over three hundred complaints from all over the country of cases 
allegedly decided for reasons of corruption and bias. He said that the committee 
was working with relevant ministries to assess the cases before considering 
whether to refer them back to the relevant courts, and added that the committee 
needed the assistance of the media “so as to protect the people with the rule of 
law”.13 Meanwhile, according to a member of the upper house in the new 
                                                        
9 See for instance ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၀ ရက္၊ စာ ၂၀။ (Myanma Alin 10 July 2008: 20.) 
10 For a definitive account of the ILO complaint mechanism see Richard Horsey, Ending Forced 
Labour in Myanmar: Engaging a Pariah Regime, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Ser. 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2011). 
11 “Myanmar National Human Rights Commission: Accepting of Complaint,” New Light of Myanmar 
7 Oct. 2011: 7. 
12 Soe Than Lynn, “Committee Assessing Old Cases for Bias,” Myanmar Times 9-15 Jan. 2012, 19 
Jan. 2012 <http://www.mmtimes.com>. The continuance in the new administration of the same 
essentially administrative mentality towards complaint as its predecessor is also suggested in the 
response of the home affairs minister, Lieutenant General Ko Ko, to a question in the legislature 
“that with regards to action taken where disputes and complaints occur between civil servants and 
the public, the assignment of responsibilities and investigations are those of the relevant 
departments and heads of local administrative councils”. (“ဝန္ထမ္းႏွင့္ ျပည္သူတို႔အၾကားတြင္ ေပၚေပါက္လာသည့္ 
အျငင္းပြားမႈ၊ တိငု္ၾကားမႈမ်ားႏွင့္ ပတ္သက္ၿပီး အေရးယူေဆာင္ရြက္ရာတြင္လည္း သက္ဆိုင္ရာဌာန၊ ေအသဆိုင္ရာအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးအဖြဲ႕ 
အႀကီးအကဲမ်ား၏ ဖဲြ႕စည္းတာဝန္ေပးအပ္မႈမ်ားႏွင့္ စံုစမ္းစစ္ေဆးမႈမ်ားကို ျပဳလုပ္လ်က္ရွိပါေၾကာင္း”။) ပထမအႀကိမ္ အမ်ဳိးသားလႊတ္ေတာ္ 
ဒုတိယပံုမွန္အစည္းအေဝး အ႒မေန႔ ဆက္လက္က်င္းပ၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁ ရက္၊ စာ ၈။ (“First Amyotha 
Hluttaw Second Regular Session Held for Eighth Straight Day,” Myanma Alin 1 Sept. 2011: 8.) The 
minister did note later in his reply that so far as the power to pursue criminal matters was 
concerned, matters lie with the courts, police, and Bureau of Special Investigation. The Amyotha 
Hluttaw is the upper chamber of the new legislature, the Pyithu Hluttaw its lower chamber.  
13 “ျပည္သူလူထုကို တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးမႈျဖင့္ ကာကြယ္ေပးႏိုင္ဖို႔အတြက္”။ မွန္ကန္ပါလ်က္ အဂတိလိုက္စားစီရင္ခ်က္ခ်မွတ္ျခင္းခံခဲ့ရေသာ 
နစ္နာသူမ်ားထံမွ အမႈေဟာင္း ၃၀၀ ေက်ာ္ ျပည္သူ႕လႊတ္ေတာ္သို႔ ေရာက္ရွိ လာ၍ အခ်က္အလက္ ျပည့္စံုခိုင္လံုေသာ အမႈမ်ားကို ျပန္လည္ 
စိစစ္မည္၊ Weekly Eleven ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၁၂ ရက္။ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာဝ္ါရီလ ၁၇ ရက္ <http://www.weeklyeleven.com>။ 
(“Old Cases among over 300 Sent by Aggrieved Persons to Pyithu Hluttaw in Which Corrupt 
Although [Legally] Correct Judgements Passed Will Be Reexamined Where Facts Sufficient,” 
Weekly Eleven 12 Feb. 2012, 17 Feb. 2012 <http://www.weeklyeleven.com>.) 
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legislature, the president himself in 2011 received 6660 complaints, many of 
which related to the judiciary, and to all types of cases in the courts.14  
 
Although official announcements authorising the making of complaint tend to 
direct complainants to administrative, and now also legislative bodies, nothing 
prohibits complainants from going to a police station directly. Some people do. 
Some go and also write letters to various authorities, as in the case of a market 
vendor who in October 2011 wrote a letter to judicial officials concerning an 
alleged assault by municipal officials, who are city government employees: 
On xx-9-2011, the deputy chief municipal administrator of the market and three 
subordinates came through the itinerant vendors area where like others I was selling, 
and went to clear away the items I had on display, and when I begged them not to do it, 
he gave an order that, “This woman is insolent, do it,” and then two of them held my 
arms and the other one beat me. When I told them “enough” they pushed hard in my 
back and I lost consciousness. The nearby vendors gathered around and I regained 
consciousness. I was out for about 30 minutes.  
I went with my daughter to the hospital and after getting treatment the duty policeman 
at the hospital made inquiries. When I came back I opened a case at the police station. 
My body is hurting all over, my face is swollen and one of my teeth is almost dislodged. 
I cannot eat. I have retained the hospital records. I had an appointment on xx-10-2011 
at the police station and they said they will open a case at the township court and that I 
have an appointment on xx-10-2011 with the judge.  
As all of my family and I earn our livelihoods as itinerant green grocers we have 
repeatedly been pushed about and have had our produce kicked, tossed away and 
confiscated. I and other vendors are dissatisfied at daily having to experience unlawful 
maltreatment…. 
Therefore I respectfully request for the persons of high position in the judiciary to give 
assistance in accordance with the law to uncover the truth and take action [against the 
perpetrators] so as to rescue we lower classes from our lives of maltreatment.15  
 
The letter contains a number of characteristics that are recurrent in supplicatory 
complaints. First, the letter’s author is evidently not the complainant herself. As 
such, the letter constitutes a form of communication between persons who are 
adept at administrative and legal language, rather than one from someone talking 
to the system as an outsider. It sketches a stereotype of the downtrodden 
greengrocer through the eyes of the educated professional letter writer. Second, 
its contents are narrow and factual. It keeps to the point with the expectation that 
the facts will carry the case. It may incorporate official rhetoric, but will do so 
sparingly. It need not lay it on thickly. Third, it stresses the victimhood of the 
complainant, and of her need for the protection of influential people higher up in 
the system of authority. It emphasises her simplicity and innocence, in sharp 
                                                        
14 BBC Burmese Service evening programme, 23 Feb. 2012. No information is available publicly on 
how this compares with letters sent to the head of state in previous years.  
15 Copy of signed complaint letter on file. Translation omits the dates, names of persons and places 
contained in the original text.  
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contrast to the character of the perpetrators. In other words, it presents a set of 
credentials with which the complainant lays a claim to an entitlement for 
protection, which is to say, a claim to a conditional right, not one that 
automatically accrues, but one to which a person needs to demonstrate that she 
qualifies. Fourth, the letter also suggests that the complainant has allies in the 
making of her petition, which gives it more impetus. In this section, I will look 
briefly at each of these characteristics.  
 
Letters of supplication often come not from the penmanship of the person or 
persons affixing a signature or thumbprint, but rather from that of a lawyer or 
other person trained in the drafting of complaints. As such, they contain language 
and views that may be inconsistent with those of the signatory herself. In the 
above letter, the reference to the suffering of “we lower classes” is an example of 
the voice of a person looking down sympathetically upon someone in need of 
assistance.16 That the author’s voice emerges in this way is somewhat odd, given 
that the letter is written in the first person of “I the market vendor”; however, it is 
not necessarily problematic, unless it attracts doubts about the authenticity of the 
complaint. In 1998, the chief justice in a speech explicitly noted that, “In some 
complaint letters the terminology consists of legal usage with which ordinary 
civilians are unfamiliar, and it can be inferred that they are probably of the type 
that individuals with legal expertise have written, that a lawyer has written for a 
client.”17 The chief justice seems to have been implying that poor people ought not 
have lawyers, or where they do, they—or the complaints in their names—are 
suspect. In any event, that a lot of complaints do appear to be drafted by lawyers 
or other people with some relevant training suggests that having a professional 
letter-drafter might be more efficacious than writing by oneself, and that in any 
event, this method of complaint making is an established part of the system.18  
 
                                                        
16 It is possible that the complainant expressed something along these lines to the letter writer, who 
re-expressed it in the terms found in the letter; however, as references to low social status, humility 
and poverty tend to be features common to letters of supplication that I have read, I am inclined to 
think that such expressions are important ingredients in the contents of a supplicatory complaint 
that professional writers will incorporate on the basis of their own experience and expectations of 
what attracts the attention and sympathy of addressees.  
17 “အခ်ဳိ႕တိုင္စာေတြထဲမွာပါတဲ့ အသံုးအႏႈန္း စကားရပ္ေတြဟာ သာမန္အရပ္သားေတြ မသိႏိုင္တဲ့ ဥပေဒအသံုးအႏႈန္းေတြျဖစ္ေနေတာ့ 
ဥပေဒနားလည္ တတ္ကၽြမ္းတဲ့ ပုဂၢိဳလ္ေတြက ေရးေပးတာမ်ဳိး၊ အမႈသည္က တိုင္တာဆိုရင္ ေရွ႕ေနက ေရးေပးတာမ်ဳိး ျဖစ္ႏိုင္တယ္လို႔ 
ေကာက္ယူလုိ႔ရတယ္။” တရားသူႀကီးခ်ဳပ္က အမွာစကားေျပာၾကားျခင္း၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ျပန္တမ္း၊ ၁၉၉၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၄ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၃။ (“Chief 
Justice’s Address,” Supreme Court Gazette 14 Aug. 1998: 13.) 
18 Writing a letter oneself may not only be less efficacious but also may cause inconvenience. 
According to one legal professional in private communication during October 2011, after the new 
human rights commission began receiving complaints, some farmers who themselves wrote and 
sent a handwritten letter about land confiscation received a curt reply from the commission to 
please type the letter on computer and resend it, as the commission would only take action on a 
typewritten complaint. 
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Letters of supplication tend to let the facts of a case speak for themselves. They 
have few embellishments. For example, the wife and mother of a person whom a 
ceasefire group—a group of former insurgents who had entered into an agreement 
with the military government to stop fighting but who had retained their arms 
and uniforms—abducted in early 2010 wrote a letter to a regional army 
commander that set out in a few sentences the circumstances of the man’s 
kidnapping, the reasons for suspecting the people named as perpetrators, and a 
brief request that he be safely returned.19 A 2007 letter to another army officer 
alleging that soldiers abducted a man from his farm had a similar tone, 
concluding with the hope that he would still be alive and that he too might be 
returned.20 These letters are eloquent in their brevity and simplicity. On the two 
sides of a single sheet, they set out what has happened, who is believed 
responsible, and what is sought of the addressee. 
 
One advantage of sticking to the facts is that it avoids the possibility that a 
complainant might accidentally make enemies among persons with whom she has 
no argument. A supplicant’s concern is to keep the complaint narrowly directed. 
The greengrocer wants action versus a small group of abusive officials, not the 
market administration or town hall. A letter of complaint in 2007 from a market 
gardener explains how the chairman of her village tract council had led a group of 
men onto her property, cut down trees and made charcoal out of them. It stresses 
that her complaint of criminal trespass and damage is against the chairman alone 
and that “the [land] registrar and council members had absolutely no 
involvement”.21 The quarrel, the letter makes clear, is not with officialdom, just 
with one official who has abused his powers.  
 
Sometimes letters that are essentially supplicatory will end with a nod towards 
the contents of the public transcript. In a case during 2010 where police officers 
arrested a group of men for accusing officials of corruption, relatives lodging a 
complaint described how the efforts of the military commander then in charge of 
their division to develop the area were being undermined by his subordinates. 
They concluded that, “At this important time that the state and Defence Services 
leadership are endeavouring for the emergence of a new democratic nation which 
the people desire, self-seeking persons are causing the national government and 
                                                        
19 Copy of signed letter on file.  
20 Copy of signed letter on file. I have briefly described the case in Cheesman, “The Incongruous 
Return of Habeas Corpus to Myanmar,” 97-98. Unfortunately, neither of these two missing men did 
return to his family. 
21 Copy of letter on file.  
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Defence Services to suffer lost esteem.”22 The complainants on the one hand do 
their best to align themselves with the interests of the national leadership through 
affirmations of its policies and objectives while at the same time pointing out that 
these interests are not shared by the state’s own representatives. Others give parts 
of the transcript a little twist, such as by playing on the “may I help you” slogan 
posted or painted at the gates of police stations. In a 2005 letter complaining of 
police force corruption in a northern town, for instance, the author closed with: 
We observe that Myanmar Police Force members ought to be in keeping with the 
[police] slogan, “May I help you”. Furthermore, we believe that they must protect the 
lives and property of law-respecting, law-abiding, non-offending people. Truly, we 
respectfully submit that action be taken and blame laid against those who instead of 
being on the side of the law are behaving like licenced bandits, intimidating and 
extorting money from innocent people.23 
 
The writer of a letter from relatives of persons arrested in Yangon during 2007 for 
staying in a certain locality in which they were not registered to reside remarked 
that they had heard a senior official on television and radio saying that “nobody is 
above the law”, and that “the law does not discriminate”, for which the writer 
used an idiomatic expression for discrimination, that the law ‘does not 
differentiate the back from the chest’.24 Evidently, the letter concluded, this was 
not true of the unjust officials concerned, since for them the people with property 
and money were the chest whereas those without were the back.25 
 
Letters of supplication emphasise the credentials of the complainant, those 
qualities that make her deserving of assistance. Fitzpatrick describes how in 
Russia these drew on stereotypes and rhetorical conventions of the orphaned 
child, the mother, or patriot.26 Similar rhetorical practices and categories of 
supplicant are found in letters submitted to the authorities in Myanmar. 
Sometimes these credentials are innate, arising at birth or due to other qualities 
of the person that inhere in her naturally. For example, in 2007 a lawyer 
representing a juvenile whom a landlord confined, repeatedly raped, and 
physically abused while she was working in his service wrote a series of complaint 
letters to various authorities about the case.27 The accused person was not a 
government official but an influential businessman with connections among local 
officials whom the lawyer feared the authorities would protect, and it was with 
                                                        
22 Copy of signed letter on file.  
23 Copy of signed letter on file.  
24 ေက်ာသားရင္သားမခြဲျခား။ 
25 Copy of signed letter on file.  
26 Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks! 172. 
27 Copies of signed letters on file.  
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this aspect of the case in mind that the lawyer appears to have drafted the letters. 
Each sets out the girl’s qualities which entitle her to assistance in accordance with 
state policy, including her tender age and gender. The writer emphasises that she 
is a minority national, speaking to the public transcript on the unity of officially 
recognised national races, whereas in contrast the alleged perpetrator is a 
“genuine ethnic Chinese”, that is, not even a Chinese born in Myanmar. One of 
the letters signed by a local official, but apparently written by the same lawyer, 
refers to the victim and her father as “extremely poor people living from hand to 
mouth and furthermore also not people who can speak proficiently in Burmese”. 
All in all, the letters are written to maximise the reader’s sense of pathos 
regarding the victim. They parallel the types of oral arguments made on behalf of 
indigent defendants in criminal cases that I described in the last chapter, when 
lawyers negotiate for discounts on the usual rates to secure a favourable outcome 
to a case by pointing to the miserable circumstances of the accused.  
 
A young villager who submitted a complaint letter that she was raped along with 
another woman and forced to marry her assailant in 2008 and that a retired army 
officer and a policeman were complicit in trying to cover up the offence signed a 
letter which rather incongruously urged that the police officer be punished so that 
in the future he “cannot misuse the power of his authority against the victims and 
villagers, who are ignorant of the law”.28 Like the reference to “we lower classes” 
in the letter of the market vendor, this closing statement reflects the view of the 
letter’s author that an ignorant young girl is more likely to attract the sympathy of 
the older men who will receive the letter and appeal to their self portraits as 
benevolent father-figures. What the letter’s author offers is a highly stylised and 
crafted image of helplessness, sincerity and subservience, a posed snapshot of the 
young girl as vulnerable victim in need of protection. The stereotype of young 
female villager as ignorant supplicant corresponds with an official, paternalistic 
construct of womanhood as submissive and dependent—a point to which I will 
return in the next section. Yet in this case it is belied by the fact the complainant 
had shown tremendous personal fortitude to stand up not only to a rapist but also 
to the police and military officers protecting him. 
 
The use of credentials in Myanmar refers not only to social conventions and 
stereotypes but also to the specific requirements of the system in which rights 
have been reformulated as entitlements. In appealing to officialdom in a system 
                                                        
28 Copy of signed letter on file.  
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organised according to the principle of law and order, supplicants need to 
demonstrate a shared commitment to that principle. Sometimes they cite their 
general good conduct as evidence. The market vendor makes clear that she and 
her family earn their living honestly and simply, through the selling of green 
groceries, and they do not deserve to be the subject of constant abuse by petty 
officials. Relatives of 35 political detainees who signed a letter in 2008 requesting 
that they be allowed to attend hearings going on inside the central prison stressed 
that they were “persons with dignity and class” who would not in any way disrupt 
the proceedings if they were allowed to attend.29 The letter is supplicatory in 
character, and rests not on a claim that those submitting it have any right to 
attend the trials, but that they are polite and disciplined individuals who ought to 
be entitled to attend.  
 
Some complainants back their assertions of good conduct with specific evidence. 
A husband and wife working as vendors described how in 2009 they were simple 
upright folk who were going to make a food donation to a school for orphans 
when they were waylaid and assaulted by a group of business competitors, who 
then paid the police to lay a false case against the husband.30 The ugly description 
of the assault is further enhanced by the fact that, according to the complainants, 
they were on their way to do a meritorious deed when they were set upon. A 
father who submitted a complaint that ward council officials in Yangon during 
2007 beat his son to death after detaining him for allegedly being drunk and 
disorderly begins by insisting that far from being inebriated, the young man had 
left the house in order to go and do voluntary labour on a local road project.31 In 
this case, the officials allegedly responsible for the killing promptly disposed of 
the body. The family was unable to get copies of the autopsy records from the 
hospital involved, and the father was threatened with the loss of his government 
job if he did not desist with the complaint.  
 
Letter writers express other credentials in transactional terms. The signatory or 
author explains how he or his family members have participated in state projects 
for the good of the nation, and therefore his complaint is worthy. A father lodging 
a complaint that his son was in 2010 wrongfully imprisoned for being an alleged 
rebel sympathiser signed his letter as a retired serviceman. He strengthened the 
claim by adding that two of the boy’s uncles also had served in the army, and 
                                                        
29 Copy of letter on file.  
30 Copy of signed letter on file.  
31 Retyped transcript of letter on file.  
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therefore that his son “would not blacken the name of his uncles and father, who 
are members of the military family, by having anything to do with insurgents”.32 A 
farmer complaining to senior officials about threat of eviction from his land in 
2008 documents how he had always dutifully paid his taxes; had double cropped 
rice in accordance with state directives, and had made donations to public 
projects, including to the local primary school and clinic, for an irrigation project, 
and for township sports competitions.33 Representatives of a community writing 
to the head of state in 2007 to explain that they had been wrongly designated as 
illegal migrants stressed that because they had participated in road-building 
projects in accordance with the head of state’s instructions, they must be genuine 
citizens deserving of a hearing.34  
 
Letters of supplication sometimes invoke respected or official allies who support 
their cases, such as village or ward council members, representatives of 
government-established groups, schoolteachers or religious figures. This practice 
is analogous to the use of such officials as brokers in negotiations for deals in 
exchange for cash of the sort that I described in the last chapter. Having allies 
helps, but provides no guarantees. Accused persons may have more allies or be 
too highly connected. Officials sympathetic to the victim may not want to get 
involved. In a case from 1999, a girl who left her village to work as a domestic 
helper lost contact with her family for more than two years, whereupon the 
parents sought the help of a charitable group.35 With the assistance of a police 
station chief, a worker for the group was able to locate the girl working at 
someone’s house. Although she was unharmed, the worker learned of another girl 
who had allegedly been murdered in a case that was made to look like a suicide, 
while a second girl at the same premises had attempted unsuccessfully to poison 
the employer and had been jailed. When the worker sought to get a criminal 
inquiry opened, hitherto supportive council members warned her that if she 
wanted to go home alive then she ought to leave the matter alone, since the police 
were protecting the employer. Although the council members were ready to help 
get girls back to their families, they were unwilling to go up against the police.  
 
Sometimes complaints are made in groups of five, ten, twenty or hundreds of 
signatories. Farmers seem to complain in groups more often than other people. 
                                                        
32 Copy of signed letter on file.  
33 Copy of signed letter on file.  
34 Copy of letter on file.  
35 Case described in an internal document of the agency, on file.  
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According to Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, they do so particularly when 
individual farmers have raised complaints with local authorities without success 
or satisfaction.36 From the contents of letters by farmers that I have read, another 
reason is that farmers are often collectively threatened by actions like illegal land 
grabbing and other intrusions into their lifestyles by coercive agencies, and 
therefore they are also more often motivated to fight back in groups. For example, 
in January 2011 farmers in Magway, part of the central dry zone, refused to sign 
documents to surrender cultivated land to a company under licence from a 
military-owned holding firm, which had begun to construct a caustic soda factory. 
After they refused to sign, the farmers jointly lodged complaints against the 
company’s illegal attempts to force them off their land. Two former army officers 
attached to the company came with local administrators to the village and one, a 
retired major, threatened them “that whether or not you take the compensation 
[offered for the land], you have to sign, that the project is a state project for 
regional development, and that if [children, i.e. the farmers] do not comply with 
parents’ assignments given for their own good, they must be scolded”.37 In this 
case, the scolding came in the form of fabricated criminal cases lodged against six 
of the farmers. A local court sentenced all six to imprisonment. After the 
community rallied around them strongly and the case received wide publicity, a 
higher court used the “sentence-release” method mentioned in the last chapter, 
freeing the men not by acquittal but by reducing their sentences on appeal to 
cover time served.38  
 
Larger numbers of complainants can strengthen a case, but can also be 
dangerous. In Myanmar as in China, senior officials use complaints against 
subordinates where it suits their purposes, but have long been suspicious of 
organised collective action, which they may blame on one or more participants 
having ulterior motives.39 In the abovementioned case, that the community fell in 
together against the factory plan made it more difficult for the ex-army men to 
push ahead with the project; however, it also upped the ante. Where groups 
                                                        
36 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Behind the Teak Curtain: Authoritarianism, Agricultural Policies 
and Political Legitimacy in Rural Burma/Myanmar, Studies in Anthropology, Economy and Society 
Ser. (London: Kegan Paul, 2004) 193-95. 
37 “ေလ်ာ္ေၾကးယူယူ မယူယူ လက္မွတ္ထိုးရမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ ထိုစီမံကိန္းမွာ ေဒသဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးတိုးတက္ေရးအတြက္ ေဆာင္ရြက္သည့္ ႏုိင္ငံေတာ္စီမံကိန္း 
ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ မိဘက ေကာင္းေစခ်င္လို႔ စီမံတာ မလိုက္နာလွ်င္ အျပစ္ေပးဆံုးမရမွာပဲ”။ လယ္ယာေျမအဓမၼသိမ္းယူမႈမ်ားႏွင့္ ေအာင္ပြဲ 
အပိုင္းအစမ်ား၊ (လယ္သမားအခြင့္အေရးကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္သူမ်ားကြန္ယက္၊ ၂၀၁၁?) စာ ၁၅။ [Expropriations of Farmlands 
and Partial Victories (Farmers’ Rights Defenders Network, 2011?), 15.] 
38 ဦးသန္းဦး ပါ ၅ ႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ (ဗိုလ္မွဴးဝင္းျမင့္၊ ၿငိမ္း) ၊ ၂၀၁၁၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအယူခံမႈအမွတ္ ၁၉၊ မင္းဘူးခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၃၀ 
ရက္၊ ခရိုငတ္ရားသူႀကီး ေအးလြင္။ (U Than Oo & 4 v. The State [Major Win Myint (retd.)], 2011 Criminal 
Appeal No. 19, Minbu District Court, 30 June 2011, District Judge Aye Lwin.) Also, case numbers 
20, 21 and 23/2011. 
39 O’Brien and Li 32-33. 
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gather around an issue that begins in the form of supplication, it may slip into a 
more assertive citizenship-type complaint, as in the case just described, or even 
further, into unauthorised assembly. Thus, a man who had more than a hundred 
people in his village sign a petition against local authorities a Supreme Court 
ruling in 1999 described as “causing disturbances in the village [and] cooperating 
with political party organisations, making false accusations to higher authorities” 
which he did not first take to the township and district levels.40 His crime rested 
both on the manner in which he organised people around an issue and in which 
he took his complaint to the top, suggesting that it was aimed at making some 
kind of political point: in other words, his complaint, which may have started out 
as a simple act of supplication, had evolved into something more assertive—a 
demand that as a citizen, he has rights, and that these rights have to be respected. 
And it is to that type of complaint, and complainant, that we now turn.  
A lexicon of citizenship 
In chapter three I argued that through the rhetoric of sovereign cetana the state 
in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s reconfigured both the notion of citizenship and the 
attendant notion of the rights of citizens to correspond with its pragmatic 
objectives. Henceforth, rights were reconstituted as entitlements, which could be 
extended or withdrawn according to circumstances. In the lexicon of rights that 
remained in the public transcript, no rights existed that could not be delimited in 
accordance with policy or be made subject to some higher imperative.  
 
As against that official lexicon of qualified rights and reduced citizenship, people 
still assert rights for their own purposes, and many of these people re-invest the 
lexicon with normative contents that the state denies. It is with the type of 
complainant who does this, the complainant who asserts her rights as a citizen, as 
a holder of rights in a political community rather than a subject of sovereign 
cetana, a bearer of entitlements, with which this section is concerned.  
 
In contrast to letters of supplication, in the letters of citizens the complainant’s 
own voice comes out distinctly. Sometimes, within a series of letters on the same 
matter a complainant can shift from supplication to stridency. In 2006, for 
example, a woman in the north of the country sent letters to the regional army 
commander alleging that officers of the police special drug squad manning a 
                                                        
40 “ေက်းရြာအတြင္း ဆူပူမႈမ်ားျဖစ္ေစရန္ဖန္တီးျခင္း၊ ႏိုင္ငံေရးပါတီအဖြ႔ဲအစည္းမ်ားႏွင့္ ပူးေပါင္းကာ အထက္အာဏာပိုင္အဖဲြ႔အစည္းမ်ားသို႔ 
မမွန္မကန္စြပ္စြဲျခင္းတို႔”။ ဦးျမင့္သိန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၁၉၉၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၆။ ၆၉။ [U Myint Thein v. Union of 
Myanmar, 1999 MLR (SC) 66, at 69.]  
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roadside checkpoint had stopped her son and two friends, had assaulted him and 
that he died in custody.41 Evidently, she wrote the letters to the army commander 
because he was the most politically powerful person in the region at the time, and 
because she saw no prospect of advancing a complaint through the police or other 
channels of the sort that the government had advertised. The first letter she sent 
was a narrow, legalistic supplication, emphasising the victim’s innocence, noting 
the lack of drugs found in his urine, and concluding with a request for action in 
accordance with the law. But a month later the case had made no progress and, 
finding herself under serious threat from the police, in the second letter the 
mother’s voice can be heard loud and clear: 
I am a person who speaks and lives truthfully, who works and earns honestly. My son 
and his two friends also were well-behaved and honest youths. As for drugs, they did 
not even smoke…. However, the Special Drug Inspector and four police force personnel 
fabricated an unlawful case and brought these youths to face court on a narcotics 
offence. They also suffered savage assaults. My son died as a result. His friend got 6 
years in jail too.  
These are nothing other than the undignified, lawless and unjust deeds to oppress the 
people of Special Drug [Inspector] and 4 police force personnel. We the people have 
become prey for Special Drug Squad members to extort and oppress. Because of these 
persons’ deeds, not only have the people become property-less, homeless and landless, 
but also they are living lives of misery and poverty. Just as we cannot estimate how 
many people these persons have in the past arrested on fabricated cases to demand 
money and put up on narcotics charges, we cannot know how many against whom they 
will yet lodge narcotics charges, extort and unlawfully assault. 
Accordingly, I submit this complaint to [you] father regional commander, with reliance 
and trust that action will be taken in accordance with commensurate law so that [the 
accused police] will not again be able to detain, prosecute, charge and extort money 
from the people in fabricated narcotics cases. 
I am a person who respects the integrity of the Defence Services. I believe that [you] 
regional commander, are a person who will stand truly on the side of the people. I do 
not accept communications coming from political parties or whichever radio stations 
abroad. I believe that internal problems should only be solved internally. Accordingly, 
this complaint is made as a mother and a citizen who respects the integrity of the 
Defence Services and trusts in [you] father regional commander.42  
 
This appeal is not at all like a cry for help from a supplicant. The complainant is a 
strong and assertive woman, and she lets it be known. Furthermore, she speaks 
not only on her own behalf or on behalf of a small peer group—fellow vendors in 
the market, fellow townsfolk—but for a wider community of persons, the political 
community of the nation, of fellow citizens and rights-bearers. Her community is 
“we the people”, not “we the vendors” or “we the villagers”.  
 
                                                        
41 Copies of letters and transcript of interview conducted during 2007 on file.  
42 Translation of letter modified to omit names of persons and places.  
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In a similar letter to the secretary-1 of the ruling council during 2004, another 
mother set out how her son was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for 
absconding from the police force. She does not quibble with his offence but 
explains that the time he spent in custody before the case came to court was not 
deducted from the sentence. Subsequently, he died from illness some three to 
four months after the date that he should have been released, while still serving as 
a prison labourer attached to an army unit in a remote region. The mother 
concludes by stating that she was submitting the complaint to ask “in order that 
no mother in the future would feel this type of loss and heart-rending grief, in 
order that the responsible persons at respective levels not keep anyone in 
detention beyond date of release—that detainees not lose their entitlements, that 
each and every responsible person carry out his duties correctly”.43 As in the letter 
above, this mother is shifting the character of her complaint, moving it from her 
own personal tragedy to emphasise that she is motivated by a desire to protect the 
lives of other children and spare other mothers from the burden of misery placed 
upon her due to the wrongful handling of her child’s case.  
 
Another striking feature of the letter cited above is that the author concludes by 
invoking strongly the official narrative of the benevolent, guiding role of the 
armed forces in national affairs. She extolls the virtues of the letter’s recipient as a 
senior representative of that institution. It would seem counter-intuitive that 
citizen complainants are sometimes more likely to cite state propaganda and co-
opt official rhetoric than supplicants. But I think the reason is not so mysterious 
when we consider the practice in terms of O’Brien and Li’s remark about how 
complainants shape their challenges from the materials of the structure of 
domination. Citizen complainants are more conscious of the structure as a whole, 
and are thinking more about how they can use its materials, compared with 
supplicants. And that they use those materials well matters more to them too, 
since they are invariably challenging the structure more assertively and more 
fundamentally than supplicants. Therefore, when our complainant characterises 
the army in glowing terms, she does so in a way that contains an implicit warning: 
her acceptance of the army’s claims to authority hinges upon its capacity to 
provide her with redress. Her purpose is to invert, critique and use the official 
narrative directly against its creators. The letter writer in using the rhetoric is 
putting the onus on the addressee to prove that the contents of the public 
transcript mean something. Thus, in a complaint letter lodged with the new 
                                                        
43 Retyped copy of letter on file.  
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president in late 2011 concerning the circumstances of a detainee whom jailors 
allegedly assaulted repeatedly after he was transferred to a remote prison, the 
author plays up the language of the old government versus the new: 
I have seen and heard that the President’s new government is remedying the human 
rights abuses and acts of impunity committed under the former government. The 
things that were done to [the detainee] are inhuman, lawless things that should 
absolutely never have been done. On behalf of all citizens of Myanmar, for the 
emergence of genuine democracy, the emergence of just law, and the emergence of law 
to enable the defence of the individual, without malice I respectfully request sanction of 
the President to prosecute the head wardens of [two prisons] for the violations they 
have committed and all persons who committed violations in this case.44 
 
The contents of the letter are throughout assertive of rights, of the right of the 
victim to justice, of the right of the complainant to complain, while also 
connecting these assertions to larger political developments and to the hopes and 
expectations of the entire political community. The last part of the letter where 
the writer calls for “just law”, or law with justice, captures the essence of the 
complaint.45 The writer does not just want law. She has had enough of plain old 
“law”. Her call is for an altogether different type of law from the absent law of 
“law and order”, ngyeinwut-pibyaye, one with an essentially normative basis.  
 
In this letter we can see a distinction between the contents of the letters of 
citizens, however they are expressed, and those of supplicants. The supplicant 
concedes to the notion of taya-ubade-somoye as law and order so as to advance 
her specific complaint within the parameters more or less as set by the power 
holders. She acknowledges the discretionary power of the pragmatic state, its 
situation-specific practices, and asks that the power-holders extend that 
discretion to her. The citizen-complainant does not do this. Although superficially 
the citizen’s letter may make certain concessions, and may even appear to extol 
the virtues of the state through recitation of its own rhetoric, the citizen’s 
complaint is a rights-based complaint, made within the parameters of the system, 
but not recognising those parameters. In short, whereas the supplicant’s 
complaint is essentially administrative in its character, the citizen’s complaint is 
at once political and juridical. The citizen’s complaint is grounded in a notion of 
taya-ubade-somoye as rule of law.  
 
                                                        
44 Copy of text of letter on file. The letter does not make clear what sanction is required, but 
presumably it would be under section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, that sanction of the 
head of state be given before civil servants over a certain level of authority be prosecuted criminally.  
45 The expression used in the letter is တရားနည္းလမ္းက်ေသာဥပေဒေပၚေပါက္ေရး။ 
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Citizen-complainants while utilising the language of law invest it with meanings 
that run contrary to those of the official narrative. For example, a letter written by 
the brother of Phyo Wai Aung, the young man accused over a fatal bombing about 
whose case I wrote in chapter four, admonishes the head of state as the person 
“responsible for the rule of law” to take action against jail officials for a variety of 
unlawful punishments imposed on the prisoner.46 The brother while apparently 
going along with the head of state’s claims to be a head of a state for which the 
rule of law matters is in fact talking back to him of a completely different rule of 
law, one in which the police and other officials who torture people in their custody 
are not thereby invested with power, but are themselves subject to punishment. 
Similarly, a 2011 complaint by over forty cultivators against land confiscation is 
signed off as “farmers together seeking implementation of just rule of law”.47 
Their rule of law is not the rule of law of the police state: it is the rule of law based 
on an explicit claim to justice. It implicitly challenges the rule-of-law as law-and-
order idea by distinguishing it from the rule of law with justice that the farmers 
seek. And, near the far end of the spectrum of complaints, a scathing letter by four 
wives and two other female relatives of imprisoned leaders of the Shan 
Nationalities League for Democracy describes Myanmar as a country founded on 
“lawless acts and human rights abuses through misuse of the judiciary”. 
Addressing the new human rights commission, its authors ask if the gradual 
“extinguishing of the rule of law” through the use of the courts to realise executive 
whim under military rule is not a matter with which the commission will have to 
contend if it is to amount to anything.48  
 
This last letter brings us to political protest disguised as complaint, which is the 
most assertive type of complaint making, since it is not really seeking redress, but 
seeking to make a point. To illustrate, a young activist named Thant Zin Oo in 
2008 authored a letter concerning the jailing of his brother, which opens with a 
quotation from the head of state on the importance of good health. But rather 
than serving as an introduction to a cautiously worded comment on prison 
                                                        
46 “တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးမႈအား တာဝန္ရွိပါေသာ (ဥကၠဌႀကီး)”။ ေဒါက္တာထက္ေဝေအာင္၊ တရားဥပေဒမဲ့ တာဝန္ကင္းမဲ့စြာျပဳမူေဆာင္ရြက္ေနေသာ 
အင္းစိန္ေထာင္တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားအား စံုစမ္းအေရးယူေပးပါရန္၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၁၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၅။ (Dr Htet Wai Aung, 
[Request to] Investigate and Take Action Against Insein Prison Personnel Acting Lawlessly and 
Arbitrarily, 16 Feb. 2011: 5.) 
47 “တရားမွ်တေသာ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး ဝိုင္းဝန္းအေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ္လိုသူ လယ္သမားမ်ား”။ Copy of letter on file; my 
emphasis.  
48 “ဥပေဒမဲ့ျပဳလုပ္မႈမ်ား၊ တရားစီရင္ေရးကို အသံုးခ်၍ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ခံရမႈမ်ား” ၊ “တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးဆိုသည္မွာ ဆိတ္သုဥ္းလ်က္ 
ရွိေန”။ Signed copy of complaint letter on file. The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy won the 
second-largest number of seats in the 1990 general election, after the NLD. The party’s leaders were 
among persons who walked from prison in the 13 January 2012 amnesty. They subsequently re-
registered the party but not in time to contest the 2012 by-elections.  
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conditions, the quotation is juxtaposed with a searing critique of systemic 
custodial abuses, describing police brutality and inhuman torture of his brother 
that caused injuries requiring medical treatment, and indicting the corrections 
department for the conditions in which his brother is held. The letter continues 
that, “This behaviour, it must be said, has in it the objective of torture and human 
rights abuse. It is widely known that this type of behaviour is present in each and 
every Myanmar prison.”49 Having written the letter, rather than merely post it, 
Thant Zin Oo came to the prison during visiting hours, and according to a warden 
“without obtaining permission from the duty officer brought [the] complaint 
letter and read it out in the prison visitor meeting hall”.50 For this unsought 
commentary—which guards swiftly truncated—Thant Zin Oo and his brother’s 
wife, who came with him, were themselves sentenced to six months in prison each 
under section 42 of the Prisons Act, 1894, for bringing unauthorised materials 
into the facility.51  
 
Thant Zin Oo’s letters, although framed as complaints, did not respect any of the 
conventions for the making of complaint because they were not really intended 
for their addressee but for a wider audience of fellow citizens, of fellow rights-
holders. They were statements of political positions framed as complaints, written 
to affirm the distance between him and the state’s coercive apparatus. In a less 
invective and more inventive letter of this sort, democracy campaigner Naw Ohn 
Hla lodged a complaint both with the head of state and against the publishers of 
thirty private serials whom she alleged had defamed her for running an article 
which implied that she was a prostitute. The reason so many publications ran the 
article is that it was a regular official opinion piece that the state circulated to all 
media outlets, which were obligated to print it. Ohn Hla could hardly have 
expected the state to take action on an article that had its origins within the state 
apparatus. The complaint could not be remedied, but it could be used to make 
clear that its author was not intimidated, and to restate her own position that, “I 
am simply trying to do what things I can for the emergence of a democratic 
                                                        
49 “ဤအျပဳအမူမွာလည္း တာဝန္ရွိသူတို႔၏ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ရွိရွိ ညႇင္းပန္းႏွိပ္စက္ျခင္း၊ လူ႔အခြင့္အေရးခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ျခင္းဟု ဆိုရေပမည္။ 
ဤအျပဳအမူမ်ဳိးကို ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံအက်ဥ္းေထာင္အသီးသီးတြင္လည္း ျဖစ္ေပၚေနသည္ဟု က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔ၾကားသိရပါသည္။” Copy of signed 
letter on file. 
50 “တိုင္ၾကားစာတစ္ေစာင္အား တာဝန္ခံအရာရွိ၏ ခြင့္ျပဳခ်က္မရရွိဘဲ ယူေဆာင္လာ၍ ေထာင္ဝင္စာဧည့္ေတြ႔ေဆာင္အတြင္း ဖတ္ၾကားျပသခဲ့”၊ 
ေထာင္မွဴးေဇာ္ေဇာ၊္ တာဝန္ခံအရာရွိရံုး၊ ဗဟိုအက်ဥ္းေထာင္အင္းစိန္ၿမိဳ႕၊ စာအမွတ္ ၁၀၄၉/၃၈၅/ဦး-၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၃၁ ရက္။ 
(Prison Officer Zaw Zaw, Office of the Duty Officer, Central Prison, Insein, Letter No. 1049/385/Oo-
1, 31 Jan. 2008.) 
51 ေထာင္မွဴးေဇာ္ေဇာ္ ႏွင့္ သန္႔ဇင္ဦး ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၅၅၅၊ အင္းစနိၿ္မိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ တြဲဖက္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး 
(အထူးအာဏာ) ေဒၚေဘဘီ။ [Prison Officer Zaw Zaw v. Thant Zin Oo & Another, 2008 Criminal Case No. 
555, Insein Township Court, Additional Township Judge (Special Power) Daw Baby.]  
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country fully guaranteeing fundamental human rights.”52 Throughout the letter, 
her tone is that of a citizen addressing another, signalling to its wider audience 
that the author’s view of the addressee is democratic, even if his government was 
not. 
 
Ohn Hla represents an important category of complainant about which I have 
been writing throughout this chapter and on which I remarked briefly in the last 
section, but of which I have not so far spoken directly. Both the manner of 
complaint making in Myanmar and also the manner and motivation of counter-
complaint, which is the subject of the next section, are gendered. Whereas 
counter complaints against male activists tend to be concerned with the 
dangerous and illegal things that they have allegedly done or have plotted to do, 
those against women, and especially younger women, concentrate much more on 
their character. They evoke the same type of moralistic quality as in the cases 
brought against judges that I described in the last chapter, in which the public 
transcript not only sanctions a woman judge for her sexual liaisons but also 
shames her by pointing to the age gap between her and her lover, or makes a 
general assertion that as a woman she ought to know better how to conduct 
herself.  
 
In Ohn Hla’s case, having failed predictably in her defamation bid, she learned 
that officials obtained a one-year restraining order, prohibiting her from leaving 
her township and requiring her to report weekly to the local police station. The 
introductory paragraph of the order imposed on her implicitly reinforces the 
message of the news article to which she had first objected, that she is useless and 
immoral, a woman having “no fixed abode in her village and no fixed occupation 
who weekly goes each Tuesday to the Tuesday corner of Shwedagon Pagoda, 
Yangon and prays so as to attract a crowd”—a reference to the prayer campaign 
she was leading at the time for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political 
prisoners.53  
                                                        
52 “က်မသည္ အေျခခံလူ႔အခြင့္အေရးမ်ားကိ ုအျပည့္အဝအာမခံေသာဒီမိုကေရစီႏိုင္ငံတစ္ခုျဖစ္ထြန္းလာေရးအတြက္ က်မတတ္ႏိုင္သည့္ဘက္မွ 
ေဆာင္းရြက္ႏိုင္သည္မ်ားကို ႀကိဳးစားေဆာင္ရြက္ေနျခင္းသာ ျဖစ္ပါသည္။” Copy of signed letter dated 23 January 2007 on 
file. Ohn Hla also unsuccessfully lodged a complaint in court, in which the number of respondents 
had blown out to 122. ေဒၚေနာ္အုန္းလွ ႏွင့္ ဦးျမတ္ခိုင္ (အယ္ဒီတာခ်ဳပ္) ပါ ၁၂၂၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ -- ၊ စမ္းေခ်ာင္းၿမိဳ႕နယ ္
တရားရုံး၊ ေလွ်ာက္လႊာ၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇန္နဝါရီလ ၂၆ ရက္။ [Daw Naw Ohn Hla v. U Myat Khaing (Editor in Chief) & 
121, 2005 Criminal Case No. --, Sanchaung Township Court, application, 26 Jan. 2007.]  
53 “ေက်းရြာအတြင္း အတည္တက် ေနထိုင္ျခင္းမရွိ၊ အလုပ္အကိုင္ အတည္တက် လုပ္ကုိင္ျခင္းမရွိဘဲ အပတ္စဥ္ အဂၤါေန႔တိုင္း ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕၊ 
ေရႊတိဂံုဘုရားအဂၤါေဒါင့္တြင္ သြားေရာက္ ဝတ္ျပဳဆုေတာင္းလ်က္ လူစုလူေဝးျဖစ္ေအာင္ ျပဳလုပ္ျခင္း”။ ရဲအုပ္ဝင္းလြင္ ႏွင့္ ေနာ္အုန္းလ၊ွ ၂၀၀၇၊ 
ျပစ္မႈေသး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၅၇ ၊ ေမွာ္ဘၿီမိဳ႕နယ္ တြဲဖက္ၿမိဳ႔နယ္တရားသူႀကီးရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၂ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး 
(အထူးအာဏာ) ေအးေအးမ။ူ [Inspector Win Lwin v. Naw Ohn Hla, 2007 Misdemeanour Case No. 157, 
Hmawbi Additional Township Judge’s Court, 12 Oct. 2007, Township Judge (Special Power) Aye 
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The portrayal of Ohn Hla as immoral, as a prostitute, a fallen woman goes to the 
politics of gender in the making of complaints. Women complainants in Myanmar 
are supposed to be seen but not heard, or, as anthropologist Monique Skidmore 
has put it, they should be visually present but politically absent.54 Skidmore 
divides female stereotypes between “Buddha’s mother and billboard queens”, a 
variant upon a division that Melford Spiro made some years earlier, when he 
described Burmese women as “dichotomized into a pure, or asexual class 
(mother, sister, wife) and an impure or sexual class (mistress, prostitute)”.55 
Dichotomised for juridical purposes, the innocent supplicant falls into the former 
category, whereas the young woman complainant who asserts herself 
independently from men and as an equal to men falls into the latter. It is the 
former type, a male bureaucrat’s imagined version of youthful femininity that is 
demure, innocent, helpless, ignorant and silent for whom the state has 
established laws and agencies to protect the rights of women, and over whom 
fatherly officials watch from a suitable distance.  
 
The contrasting stereotype, the young citizen complainant, is a loud-mouthed, 
uncouth, hysterical and sexually provocative antithesis of Myanmar womanhood, 
as embodied in the criminalising of a local human rights defender and activist, 
Ma Sandar. Over a number of years, Sandar had accused authorities in her 
locality of Yangon of an array of illegal or inappropriate activities.56 In 2008 the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Aye Mu.] The reference to the “Tuesday corner” is that in Myanmar, pagoda bases are octagonal, 
with each corner assigned a different day of the week; Wednesday is divided into morning and 
afternoon for geometrical purposes. Someone attending the pagoda will pray at the day of the week 
on which she was born, or if praying for someone else go to that person’s birthday: Aung San Suu 
Kyi is Tuesday born.  
54 Monique Skidmore, “Buddha’s Mother and the Billboard Queens: Moral Power in Contemporary 
Burma,” Women and the Contested State: Religion, Violence, and Agency in South and Southeast 
Asia, eds. Monique Skidmore and Patricia Lawrence, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2007) 175. 
55 Melford E. Spiro, Kinship and Marriage in Burma: A Cultural and Psychodynamic Analysis 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1977) 244. Spiro acknowledges that 
the dichotomy is to one degree or another found everywhere, and that he is not singling out 
Burmese society for this tendency but merely is interested to explore what it means in the context of 
that society.  
56 In a letter to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other regional and international 
rights bodies of 6 May 2010 Ma Sandar and her husband list fifty-four activities in which they had 
been involved between 2004 and 2010, among them lodging complaints against three judges for 
malpractice and abuse of judicial authority, one of whom was the judge who subsequently heard 
charges against her; against a member of the ward council and a police officer for unlawful 
oppressive acts towards the public; against the same ward council member, two police officers and 
another official for criminal trespass, assault and unlawful arrest of four persons; against the same 
ward council member and a policeman for the arrest of innocent persons accused of bicycle theft; 
against a ward chairman, police station chief and two of his men for production of a falsified search 
warrant; against a ward chairman and policeman for unlawful use of policing powers; against a 
different ward chairman for illegal gambling; against ward officials for misappropriation of supplies 
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local administrative council initiated a criminal complaint against her in revenge. 
The case ostensibly related to a routine police officer’s inquiry over the ownership 
of a car battery—with which people in Myanmar power lights and small 
appliances in houses. According to the verdict against her, when called to ask 
simple questions Sandar abused the police, “I’m selling my battery, what do you 
want to do about it? Who the fuck are you? Your type of guy I wouldn’t stick in my 
cunt…. I don’t care about any ward council, township council or township 
officer.”57 This language, which is iterated throughout the record, closely 
resembles that which another young woman complainant, Ma Su Su Nwe, 
supposedly uttered a few years earlier in another part of the country, suggesting 
that officials have some kind of template for vulgarities that a young woman will 
utter to constitute obscenity under the Penal Code. In January 2005 Su Su Nwe 
was the first person to win a case brought against officials in Myanmar for use of 
forced labour. In an act of vengeance, the replacement for one of the officials 
lodged a case against her on an allegation that as she walked past his house, she 
called out, “I couldn’t fucking care about the fucking worthless council. The last 
council has been jailed. I couldn’t fucking care about your council either…. I 
wouldn’t even stick the entire PDC between these thighs.”58 For this alleged 
affront a court jailed Su Su Nwe later in the year. Pressure from the ILO 
succeeded in getting her released. Richard Horsey, who was the ILO 
representative in the country at the time and who dealt with Su Su Nwe 
personally, writes of the case that  
This was clearly retaliation against Su Su Nwe. To anyone who had met her, the idea 
that this devout Buddhist would shout obscenities in public was ludicrous. And the idea 
that a frail young woman could intimidate a powerful local official was equally 
preposterous. But, although unacceptable, the reaction of the authorities was not very 
surprising. The reason was not only that she had landed influential people in prison. 
Her reaction to the success of her court case had also undoubtedly angered local 
officials and the regime itself as well. She was very outspoken about her success in the 
court case, to the point that many in the regime would have felt that she was 
deliberately embarrassing them.59 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
for victims of Cyclone Nargis; and, against a number of ward officials, police officers and a township 
land registrar for illegal taxation, intimidation and extortion. Copy of signed letter on file. 
57 “ငါ႔ ဘက္ထရီအိုးငါေရာင္းတာ ဘာလုပ္ခ်င္လို႔လဲ၊ နင္ဘာေစာက္အဆင့္ရွိလို႔လဲ၊ နင္လိုေကာင္ေစာက္ပတ္ၾကားမညႇပ္ဘူး xxx ဘယ္ ရယက၊ 
မယက၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္မွဴးတိုင္တိုင္ ဂရုမစိုက္”။ ဒုတပ္ၾကပ္စိုးဝင္းေအာင္ ႏွင့္ မစႏၵာ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၁၇၊ တြံေတးၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရံုး၊ ၂၀၀၈ 
ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၆ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေအးကိုကို၊ စာ ၂-၃။ [Police Corporal Soe Win Aung v. Ma 
Sandar, 2008 Criminal Case No. 117, Twante Township Court, 26 Aug. 2008, Township Judge 
(Special Power) Aye Ko Ko: 2-3.] After her release Ma Sandar was subsequently again imprisoned 
for allegedly uttering abuse, this time at doctors of the local hospital.  
58 “ေစာက္အဆင့္မရွိတဲ့ ရယက ေတြ ေစာက္ဂရုစိုက္စရာမလိုဘူး၊ ယခင္ ရယက အဖြ႔ဲကိုလည္းေထာင္ခ်ၿပီးၿပီ၊ နင္တို႔ ရယကအဖြ႔ဲကိုလည္း 
ေစာက္ဂရုစိုက္စရာ မလိုဘူး xxx ရယကေတြ တဖြ႔ဲလံုးကို ငါေတာ့ ဒီေပါင္ၾကားထဲေတာင္မညႇပ္ဘူး”။ ဦးတင္ေအး ႏွင့္ မစုစုေႏြး၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး 
မႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၁၊ ေကာ့မွဴးၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရံုး၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၃ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဒၚေဌးေဌးဝင္း၊ စာ ၁။ 
[U Tin Aye v. Ma Su Su Nwe, 2005 Criminal Case No. 131, Kawmhu Township Court, 13 Oct. 2005, 
Township Judge (Special Power) Daw Htay Htay Win: 1.] (Retyped transcript.)  
59 Horsey 139. 
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Horsey is right that the manner in which she promoted her success would have 
embarrassed people in government, but the point is also that a young woman who 
embarrasses elderly male power-holders causes an acutely different type of 
embarrassment from that caused by a man, or for that matter, an older woman. 
The embarrassment comes from the admixture of political savvy and courage that 
these complainants carry in physiques, which are sexually and also politically 
threatening to men. Whereas men can challenge power only through what they 
do, these young women threaten it through what they are, as illustrated also in 
each of these cases, where the court records describe the accused woman not only 
as having spoken in a vulgar sexual manner but also as having had a physically 
aggressive sexuality as well, Su Su Nwe slapping her groin, Sandar pushing her 
breasts and pulling her sarong tight between her thighs. The crime of each is not 
what she is alleged to have done, which even on the official record amounts to 
nothing, but what she is: an embodiment of Myanmar womanhood that does not 
conform to paternalistically imposed stereotypes; a woman who asserts herself 
independent of male authority figures, who does not rely upon men, and on the 
contrary, who challenges the masculinity on which the system of political power 
itself has been built. She is innately a threat to law and order, and it is therefore 
not surprising that reprisals too may be sexually explicit in their contents. And so 
having reached the subject of reprisals in the cases of these women complainants, 
in the next section I turn to the topic of reprisals generally.  
Rebuttals and reprisals 
At the start of this chapter I referred to Fitzpatrick’s work on the characteristics of 
public complaint in Russia during the 1920s. Golfo Alexopolous has also studied 
the making of complaint in this period in Russian history, looking specifically at 
the risks it entailed. Central authorities encouraged complaint making as a civic 
duty, he notes, with promises that grievances would be addressed,  
Yet those who filed complaints exposing the misconduct of their local officials were not 
necessarily empowered. For in reporting cases of official misconduct, the writer 
exposed himself or herself as an accuser and assumed a degree of risk. He or she could 
face harm in the form of reprisals from the subject of the complaint, as well as reproach 
from outside investigators.60 
 
This description is consistent with the manner in which complaints have been 
authorised, and rebutted, in Myanmar in the contemporary period, such as those 
                                                        
60 Golfo Alexopolous, “Exposing Illegality and Oneself: Complaint and Risk in Stalin’s Russia,” 
Reforming Justice in Russia, 1864-1996, ed. Peter H. Solomon (Jr) (Armonk, New York & London, 
England: M. E. Sharpe, 1997) 168. 
 218 
cases described towards the end of the last section. As we have seen, the official 
narrative has encouraged the making of “genuine” complaint. Implicit in this 
invitation is the threat, which goes back to the concern of colonial government to 
prevent complaints motivated for political purposes, of action against persons 
whose complaints are found to be ‘false’—a question regarding which the state, or 
rather, its personnel, reserve the right to decide. The other concern that the threat 
of reprisals evidently aims to address is to keep complaints to a manageable level: 
sufficient in number to give senior officials some reliable feedback on what their 
subordinates are up to, but not too many that they overwhelm the system.  
 
It is with reprisal and the threat of reprisal that this section is largely concerned; 
however, I begin with a few comments also on public rebuttals of complaints. 
Complainants who have refused to relent in making of complaints, especially 
those that suggest serious systemic and institutional problems, have in the past 
been subjected to attacks in the public media. One high-profile case in which 
senior officials made an effort to rebut allegations of wrongdoing was the 2006 
killing of Thet Naing Oo, whom onlookers alleged municipal authorities and 
auxiliary fire brigade personnel beat to death on a busy street. The police chief, 
Khin Yi, raised the case of his own accord at a press conference, in response to a 
general question about accusations from the media abroad that the police torture 
and bully people: 
At a time that I honestly believe we have had these successes [in suppressing crime] 
because of public support, because of people giving information, Internet websites give 
an impression that we are persecuting people, and that people do not support us. When 
I reconsider why this is the case, I think that it is because of the reports of some news 
media intended to turn truth into falsehood… for example, we all know of the Ko Thet 
Naing Oo affair. Ko Thet Naing Oo’s incident was straightforward…. There was he and 
his friend, Ko Win Myint, who around 4 p.m. on March 17 were drinking at his house…. 
It is known that these two youths drank a small bottle and a half of Myanmar Whisky…. 
After that, these two kids went out, and bought and ate eggs. At about nine o’clock they 
went by the municipal office on Sinodan Road and urinated. A municipal 
administration officer stopped them. Then there was an exchange of words. Thet Naing 
Oo threw stones and then went home dissatisfied…. With premeditation he fetched a 
sword of around 18 inches…. The kid called Ko Win Myint stopped him. Another kid 
was with them and he also stopped him. However, as he was worked up, had been 
drinking and had a sword, he threatened them with the sword. While making threats he 
ran into two fire brigade members out on patrol and exchanged words. As he was 
striking out with the sword this fire brigade unit junior officer and sergeant were cut on 
the arm and right forearm. Then he fled. They pursued, and he took a trishaw that he 
saw on the road and pedaled to get away.61  
                                                        
61 “ကၽြန္ေတာ္ကေတာ့ ဒီေအာင္ျမင္မႈေတြဟာ ျပည္သူေတြ ေထာက္ခံလို႔၊ ျပည္သူေတြရဲ႕ သတင္းေပးမႈေၾကာင့္ ျဖစ္ခဲ့တယ္လို႔ ရိုးသားစြာ 
ယံုၾကည္ေနတယ္ဆိုတဲ့အခ်ိန္မွာ အင္တာနက္ဝက္ဘ္ဆိုက္ေတြမွာ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔က ျပညသ္ူေတြကို ႏွိပ္စက္က လူျပဳေနလို႔ ျပည္သူေတြက 
မေထာက္ခံဘူးဆိုရင္ ဒါအဓိပၸာယ္တစ္မ်ဳိးျဖစ္ေနတဲ့ သေဘာမ်ဳိးျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အဲဒီေတာ့ ဒီေနရာမွာ ဘာေၾကာင့္ ဒီလိုျဖစ္ရသလဲလို႔ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ 
ျပန္ၿပီးေတာ ့သံုးသပ္ၾကည့္တဲ့အခါမွာ အမွန္ကို အမွားျဖစ္ေစတဲ့ သတင္းမီဒီယာအခ်ဳိ႕ရဲ႕ ထုတ္လႊင့္ခ်က္ေၾကာင့္လို႔ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ ဒီလိုပဲထင္ပါတယ္။ xxx 
ဥပမာျပရမည္ဆိုရင ္အားလံုးလဲသိေနၾကတဲ့ ကိုသက္ႏုိင္ဦးတို႔ ကိစၥပဲ။ ကိုသက္ႏိုင္ဦးရဲ႕ ျဖစ္စဥ္ဟာ ဒါရိုးရိုးေလးပါ။ xxx သူန႔ဲ သူ႔သူငယ္ခ်င္းျဖစ္တဲ့ 
ကိုဝင္းျမင့္ေပါ႔၊ အဲဒီ ကိုဝင္းျမင့္က မတ္လ ၁၇ ရက္ေန႔မွာ သူ႔အိမ္မွာ ညေန ၄ နာရီေလာက္မွာ အရက္ေသာက္တယ္။ xxx ဒီလူငယ္ႏွစ္ေယာက္ 
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To cut a long narrative short, according to Khin Yi a crowd of trishaw drivers and 
others joined the pursuit and cornering Thet Naing Oo in the melee one of them 
hit him on the head with a stick. The police made a timely arrival and took him to 
hospital, but he died the next day. Then he returned to his earlier point,  
But after this incident occurred I was quite surprised at what came out on the Internet, 
which was that police and fire brigade personnel unlawfully bashed a former political 
prisoner to death. What I said now is not from a police report. I compiled it from the 
testimonies of both sides in court. That’s the truth. The police had nothing in any way 
to do with it.62  
 
Khin Yi’s buttressing of his argument with insistence that he had gleaned the facts 
from the court record was unusual, but even more revealing is the manner in 
which he had obviously prepared to bring up the case in a press conference on an 
unrelated manner. His statement that “we all know of the Ko Thet Naing Oo 
affair” was striking, given that the only way that people could have known about it 
would be for them to have listened to the radio broadcasts from abroad, speaking 
to the influence that these broadcasters have on public opinion—which in 2011 
officials themselves acknowledged by at last coming onto the broadcasts to give 
interviews and join the debate, rather than rebut it from a distance, as they had 
done previously. 
 
With the emergence of more private media domestically, officials have also 
sometimes countered the alleged wrongdoing of government personnel through 
other channels. For instance, in 2009 a crime news periodical ran a story in which 
the author began by writing that radio broadcasts from abroad had alleged that 
officials had beaten someone to death, and so he wanted to put the facts straight 
and clarify the views of people who too easily believe the accusations of political 
                                                                                                                                                        
အရက္ေသာက္တာဟာ ျမန္မာဝီစကီအရက္ပုလင္းအျပားေလးတစ္ျပားခြဲေသာက္တယ္လို႔ သိရတယ္။ xxx ေသာက္ေတာ့ ဒီကေလးႏွစ္ေယာက္က 
အျပင္ကို ထြက္တယ္။ ၾကက္ဥဝယ္စားတယ္။ ညကိုးေနရီေလာက္မွာ စဥ္႔အိုးတန္းလမ္းမွာရွိတဲ့ စည္ပင္သာယာရံုးေရွ႕မွာ သြားၿပီးေတာ ့အေပါ႔စြန္႔တယ္။ 
အဲဒီမွာရွိတဲ့ စည္ပင္သာယာအုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးမွဴးက တားတယ္။ အဲဒီေတာ႔ ကေတာက္ကဆျဖစ္တယ္။ သက္ႏိုင္ဦးခဲန႔ဲေပါက္တယ္။ ေပါက္ၿပီးေတာ႔ 
မေက်မနပ္ အိမ္ကို ျပန္သြားတယ္။ xxx သူက တင္ကူးၾကံရြယ္ခ်က္န႔ဲ ၁၈ လက္မေလာက္ရွိတဲ့ ဓားကိ ုယူလာတယ္။ xxx ကိုဝင္းျမင့္ဆိုတဲ့ကေလးက 
တားတယ္။ ေနာက္ထပ္ကေလးတစ္ေယာက္ ပါေသးတယ္။ သူကလဲ တားပါတယ္။ သို႔ေသာ္လဲ သူက ေသြးကလဲ ႂကြေနတယ္။ အရက္ကလဲ 
ေသာက္ထားတယ္။ ဓားကလဲ ပါတယ္ဆိုတဲ့အခါ က်ေတာ႔ သြားၿပီးေတာ့ ဓားႀကိမ္းႀကိမ္းတယ္။ ႀကိ္မ္းတဲ့အခါမွာ လမ္းမွာ ကင္းလွည့္ေနတဲ့ 
မီးသတ္တပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္ႏွစ္ေယာက္န႔ဲ ေတြ႔တဲ့အခါမွာ ကေတာက္ကဆျဖစ္ၾကတယ္ေပါ႔။ အဲဒီမွာ သူပါတဲ့ ဓားန႔ဲခုတ္လိုက္တဲ့အတြက္ေၾကာင့္ 
ဒီမီးသတ္တပ္ဖြ႔ဲရဲ႕တပ္စုမွဴးေလးန႔ဲ တပ္စုတပ္ၾကပ္ႀကီးဟာ လက္ေမာင္းမွာ၊ ညာဘက ္လက္ဖ်ံမွာ ျပတ္ရွဒဏ္ရာရပါတယ္။ အဲဒီေတာ႔ သူက 
ထြက္ေျပးတယ္။ ေနာက္က လိုက္တယ္။ လိုက္တဲ့အခါမွာ သူက လမ္းမွာ ေတြ႔တဲ့ ဆိိုက္ကားတစ္စီးကို ယူၿပီးေတာ႔၊ နင္းၿပီးေတာ႔ ေျပးတယ္။” KNU ၏ 
အၾကမ္းဖက္ေဖာက္ခဲြဖ်က္ဆီးမႈမ်ားကို ေဖာက္ထုတ္ရရွိထားခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၁၀ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၃-၁၄။ (“The KNU’s 
Destructive Terrorist Bombings Revealed,” Myanma Alin 10 Apr. 2006: 13-14.) 
62 “ဒါေပမယ့္ ဒီျဖစ္စဥ္ ျဖစ္ၿပီးတဲ့အခါမွာ အင္တာနက္မွာ ထြက္လာတဲ့ အခါက်ေတာ့ ကၽြန္ေတာ္အံ့ၾသသြားတယ္။ ဘာေတြပါလာလဲဆိုေတာ႔ 
ေထာင္ကထြက္လာတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအက်ဥ္းသားတစ္ေယာက္ကို ရဲန႔ဲ မီးသတ္တပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားက မေတာ္မတရား ဝိုင္းဝန္းရိုက္ႏွက္ ေသဆံုးဆိုတဲ့ဟာႀကီး 
အင္တာနက္မွာ ေတာက္ေလွ်ာက္ထြက္လာတယ္။ အခုကၽြန္ေတာ္ေျပာတဲ့ဥစၥာက ရဲ Report မဟုတ္ပါဘူး။ တရားရံုးမွာ ႏွစ္ဖက္တရားလို၊ တရားခံ 
ထြက္ခ်က္ေတြကို ကၽြန္ေတာ္စုစည္းေဖာ္ျပတာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ဒါအမွန္တရား ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲေတြက ဘယ္လိုနည္းန႔ဲမွ ပါဝင္ပတ္သက္မႈ မရွိဘူး။” 
KNU ၏ အၾကမ္းဖက္ေဖာက္ခဲြဖ်က္ဆီးမႈမ်ားကို ေဖာက္ထုတ္ရရွိထားခဲ့ၿပီးျဖစ္၊ စာ ၁၄။ (“The KNU’s Destructive Terrorist 
Bombings Revealed,” 14.) 
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opportunists.63 The article continued that the facts were not as reported on radio 
or as complained by the victim’s family—that he had laughed at local officials who 
were undertaking some work incompetently, that they brought him back to their 
office with a companion, beat them up and let the companion go to collect some 
money to pay for their release, after which the victim died—but that the victim 
had been fishing illegally and having ignored warnings, was taken back to the 
council office where “somewhat drunk” he became rowdy, and in an effort to 
control him one official gave a little tap with a bamboo rod, whereupon he fell 
quiet. Only later when he did not answer to them did they find that he had 
collapsed. A number of junior officials were being charged for causing death by 
negligence, the article added. 
 
Certain facts as reported in this case correspond with those in the official account 
of the death of Thet Naing Oo. Whereas young women are assigned sexualised 
stereotypes, young men are assigned moralistic ones that usually relate to the 
sorts of vices that moralists preach against everywhere—drink, drugs, gambling 
and so on. The woman troublemaker is a foulmouthed slut, the male 
troublemaker is a bum or druggie, probably short tempered, armed or violent: not 
a person who was contributing to society or whom anyone should feel sorry about. 
To the extent that events take a wrong turn, it may be because of honest mistakes 
by officials, who have usually exercised restraint and used minimum force. A man 
found hanged in a prison lockup during 2006, for instance, the state newspaper 
reported had tattoos all over his body, appeared to be on drugs, and was an 
alcoholic, “a delinquent youth who did not heed the admonitions of his parents”, 
whom police officers could not save despite their best efforts.64 The article 
recounts the procedurally correct responses of the police in detail, and how an 
autopsy report cleared them of any responsibility.  
 
The work of the police in the above case was beyond reproach, although it need 
not always be so—that the victim be stigmatised is more important than that the 
perpetrators be cleared of responsibility, since the system as police may require 
action to be taken against someone for the sake of good order. For instance, 
                                                        
63 ပုသိမ္လွၾကည္၊ အဓမၼေစခိုင္းလို႔ လူတစ္ဦးေသဆံုးသြားရေၾကာင္း ျပည္ပအသံလႊင့္ဌာနတို႔က မွားယြင္းစြာ ေၾကညာခဲ့တဲ့ ပုသိမ္ၿမိဳ႕က ျဖစ္ရပ္မွန္ 
လူေသဆံုးမႈ၊ ႐ ႈေထာင့္မႈခင္းသတင္း၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၃ ရက္၊ စာ ၄။ (Pathein Hla Kyi, “The True Story of a Death in 
Pathein Town That Foreign Radio Stations Wrongly Announced Was Caused by Unlawful Force,” 
Shutaunt Crime News 13 July 2009: 4.)  
64 “မိဘမ်ား ေျပာဆိုဆံုးမမႈကို မနာခံဘဲ ဆိုးသြမ္းလူငယ္တစ္ဦး”။ မႏၱေလးမွေမွာင္ရိပ္ခိုသူ ေဝၿဖိဳးေနာင္ (ခ) ေနာင္ေနာင္ အခ်ဳပ္ခန္းထဲ၌ 
တစ္ေယာက္တည္းရွိစဥ္ႀကိဳးဆြဲခ်ေသဆံုး၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၁၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၄။ [“Mandalay Black Marketeer Wai 
Phyo Naung (a) Naung Naung Dies from Hanging While Alone in Lockup,” Myanma Alin 12 Apr. 
2006: 14.]  
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soldiers who shot at a group of young men in Bago during 2010, killing two, had 
reportedly been drinking. The state newspaper article of this incident stated that 
action was being taken against the soldiers in accordance with the law.65 
However, it went on to emphasise, the victims were not the innocent children that 
some ill-intentioned political types had made them out to be in the foreign news, 
but were drunken troublemakers who had attacked security force personnel.  
 
Although some cases are rebutted through public media, more commonly 
complaint is countered through the threat of, or the making of, counter-
allegations against the complainant of the sort that I mentioned at the end of the 
last section. The use of the criminal juridical system for this purpose is as old as 
the system itself. It is no coincidence that the charges brought against 
complainants to this day tend to be from sections of the Penal Code. As I 
explained in chapter two, the code’s Benthamite designers were keen to see that a 
system for the receipt and investigation of complaints existed, but also that 
sanctions could be imposed on anyone presumed to be needlessly taking up 
government time and money, or failing to comply with official orders when 
required to do so.66 In other words, from the beginning of the system officials saw 
the advantage in enabling complaints, but were concerned also to ensure that they 
be contained through threat of counter-complaint.  
 
The manner in which officials counter complaint depends very much on the 
circumstances of the case: who made the complaint, what it is about, to what level 
the complaint is made, and what the complainant aims to achieve. Sometimes, 
reprisals are initiated from high-up levels of government as a matter of policy. For 
example, a police officer bringing charges in 2008 against a man who had been 
sending information to the ILO testified in court that he had received orders to 
open the case from no lesser person than the deputy home affairs minister, and 
that written authorisation to prosecute was given by the minister, submitted to 
court as evidence.67 More often, counter-complaints are brought at the initiative 
                                                        
65 ပဲခူးၿမိဳ႕၌ လူငယ္အခ်င္းခ်င္း ခိုက္ရန္ျဖစ္ပြားမႈမွတစ္ဆင့္ ေသနတ္ျဖင့္ပစ္ခတ္မႈျဖစ္ပြား၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၀ ရက္၊ 
စာ ၁၂။ (“Fight between Youths in Bago Results in Shooting,” Myanma Alin 10 Sept. 2010: 12.)  
66 An entire chapter of the Penal Code concerns contempt to the lawful authority of public servants. 
Among its provisions are section 186, obstructing a public servant in the discharge of a public 
function; section 187, omission to assist a public servant when bound by law to assist; and, section 
188, disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant. Unless otherwise stipulated, in 
the remainder of this chapter sections of law are with reference to the Penal Code. 
67 ဒုရဲမွဴးသက္တင္ထြန္း ႏွင့္ ဦးေဇာ္ေဌး ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၅၃၊ မေကြးခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဒုရဲမွဴးသက္တင္ထြန္း၏ အဓိကစစ္ေမးခ်က္၊ 
တရားခံသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၂။ (Police Captain Thet Tin Htun v. U Zaw Htay & 
Another, 2008 Criminal Case No. 53, Magway District Court, Testimony-in-chief of Police Captain 
Thet Tin Htun, Prosecution Witness No. 2, 22 Dec. 2008: 2.) 
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of low and medium-level authorities—in urban wards and villages, and at the 
township level above them—sometimes with the intention of preventing a 
complainant from going too far up the hierarchy and bringing unwanted attention 
to them and their locality. But even where cases are initiated locally, they must, I 
think, be understood as part of the systemic response to complainants. That 
officials at all levels bring counter complaints is tacitly if not openly endorsed by 
senior officials, since the process of counter-complaint contributes to the effective 
management of complaint and complainants, which is the top priority of the 
system for the maintenance of law and order.  
 
Like lower-level officials in China, authorities in Myanmar sometimes try to shake 
complainants’ confidence by giving the appearance that they are impervious to 
complaint.68 One complainant in 2010 wrote in her letter that when her husband 
told a police officer he would complain about his maltreatment in custody, the 
latter replied, “Complain as you like, I don’t care.”69 After the police officer and 
some other officials had left, a prison warden made clear to the detainee that 
unlike the policeman he was not about to pretend that he had not taken his 
threats to complain seriously, warning him that, “Now I don’t yet hold a grudge 
against you, but I’ve taken note. We in the prisons department have a lot of dirty 
tricks. Among these dirty tricks, if we send you to a labour camp then your life 
will be very short.” For this official, the possibility of being the subject of 
sanctions was a real one. And even if a complaint does not result in action against 
an official, unwanted publicity can upset smooth operations of the marketplace 
for a time and affect the capacity of the official or his staff to play the marketplace.  
 
Occasionally, reprisal for complaint is extreme and brutal. Authorities in 2010 
accused six men in Bilin of being insurgent supporters and sympathisers. 
According to their relatives, the accusation was motivated by complaints that the 
men had themselves made about the corruption of local officials. Of the six, one 
was tortured to death, another paid to get out of the case, and a third escaped 
capture. The remaining three were imprisoned under the Unlawful Associations 
Act.70 More often, countering of complaint consists of a mix of verbal threats and 
                                                        
68 O’Brien and Li 36-37. 
69 Copy of signed letter on file.  
70 ဒုရဲအုပ္ခ်စ္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ေမာင္လွဖုန္း၊ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၂၄၊ ဘီးလင္းၿမိဳ.နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၃ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဒၚစန္းစန္းေဌး။ [Sub Inspector Chit Swe v. Maung Hla Hpone, 2010 Criminal Case 
No. 624, Bilin Township Court, 23 July 2010, Township Judge (Special Power) Daw San San Htay.] 
ဒုရဲအုပ္ခ်စ္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ဦးေမာင္သိန္း ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၅၃၊ ဘီးလင္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၀ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဒၚစန္းစန္းေဌး။ [Sub Inspector Chit Swe v. U Maung Thein & Another, 2010 
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inducements, which come in a variety of forms, and include offers of money or 
business opportunities, and may be accompanied by partial redress of the 
complainant’s demands, such as transfer, demotion or even dismissal of the 
wrongdoer. In some cases, complainants and officials reach mutually 
advantageous agreements: the mother of a timber miller who lodged a complaint 
in 2006 about a group of policemen who had assaulted her son when taking him 
into custody later dropped her complaint after the police officer who came to 
negotiate invited her to join an illegal lottery syndicate that he was protecting.71  
 
Aside from inducements combined with threats of counter legal action or possible 
violence, local authorities have many other coercive methods to silence a 
complainant. In a small town or village, the administrative complex of state 
agencies has effective control over practically every part of a person’s life. Pushing 
too hard on one part of the system can result in a push back from another part, or 
from the apparatus as a whole. In the course of this research one professional told 
me a story in which a young girl had repeatedly suffered physical abuse while 
working as a domestic employee at the house of an influential family. The girl’s 
relatives learned about the abuse and complained to the local authorities. The 
village tract council negotiated a settlement of eighty thousand Kyat, or around 
eighty US dollars. Later, someone put the family in contact with a lawyer, who 
advised that the settlement was not legally binding as it pertained to an alleged 
criminal offence. The lawyer prepared and lodged a complaint at the township 
police station under section 324, voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons 
or means, which carries a one-year jail term. After that not only the village tract 
council but also the township council put heavy pressure on the family and girl 
not to pursue the case, warning that they would face serious problems if they went 
to court. The family stopped contacting the lawyer.  
 
In cities, the larger number of agencies and more complicated, less intimate 
relationships between officials make such practices more difficult, but the same 
general principle applies. Officials study a complainant’s affairs and locate points 
at which they can apply pressure so as to get the complaint withdrawn, and they 
can use the coercive apparatus of the state at the local level to steadily wear down 
a complainant who cannot afford, financially or emotionally, to fight for a long 
time. To illustrate, a lawyer explained to me how in 2009 local officials in Yangon 
                                                                                                                                                        
Criminal Case No. 653, Bilin Township Court, 10 Aug. 2010, Township Judge (Special Power) Daw 
San San Htay.] 
71 Personal communication with person familiar with case.  
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had brought a charge against a client who was in fact the victim of assault, not the 
assailant.72 The story is worth recounting because it speaks to the complex of 
factors that work against the ordinary complainant from the moment that an 
incident has occurred, and to how only determined complainants can succeed. It 
is also a case that was never publicised, and is indicative of the types of events 
that take place around Myanmar daily but that never obtain attention beyond the 
immediate vicinity where they occur.  
 
According to affidavits, the young man who was later charged had gone to the 
ward council office to record the name of a visitor who would be staying at his 
house.73 When the clerk on duty asked for his identity card and that of the person 
staying as a guest he could produce neither. She ridiculed him and brought him 
inside the office. There she ridiculed him again in front of the ward chairman, 
who verbally abused him and promptly started hitting him. The young man 
escaped and fled to the street where the officials pursued him and continued to 
beat him up. When onlookers tried to come to his aid, policemen stationed 
alongside the ward office threatened them to keep back or face the consequences.  
 
When they were done, the officials left the man in the street. Onlookers and 
relatives revived him and brought him back to his residence. His outraged mother 
went back to the ward office, but stated that some men at the front drove her out 
“like an animal” with warnings that “we’ll have you in the lockup”. After that she 
went to lodge a complaint at the police station. There, after asking some 
questions, one of the officers took her to one side and suggested to her that she 
not do so, advising that if she did, it would be her son, not the assailants, who 
would end up in detention. Despite this, she insisted on making the complaint, 
and then took her son to hospital for treatment. Anticipating where they were 
going, someone from the council or police station appears to have phoned ahead, 
because the doctor who conducted the examination wrote falsely at the top of the 
medical record that the young man said he had sustained his injuries in a fight.74 
 
The young man recovered, but his mother kept following up on her complaint. 
According to her, she kept at the case because the chairman had a long history of 
                                                        
72 Description of case based upon detailed account by lawyer and copies of medical report and 
affidavits.  
73 Under section 10(1) of the Towns Act, 1907 [section 15(1) of the Village Act, 1907 in rural areas] 
people are required to register guests with their local council.  
74 According to the lawyer, having this statement on the medical record reduces its evidentiary value 
against the council officials. It also is not the responsibility of the doctor to record the circumstances 
under which the injuries were sustained but merely to record what he observes in his examination. 
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abusive behaviour, and the treatment of her son was for her the final straw. Her 
perseverance paid off: with the help of other locals who had also had enough of 
the assailant, the chairman and the council member lost their jobs. Their removal 
from office signifies what for the government would presumably constitute a 
remedial measure, and for the system as police too, since the removal of an 
unreliable official from the administrative continuum is in its managerial interest. 
However, for this mother it was not enough. She continued to press for a criminal 
case. Then, about nine months after the incident, a police officer arrived at her 
house and informed her that her son would be required to appear at court and 
present two guarantors to obtain bail. On the designated day, the family and 
guarantors arrived at court and learned that the two assailants had lodged a 
section-353 case against the young man, for assault or criminal force to deter a 
public servant from discharge of his duty. The purpose of the case was to bargain 
for the dropping of the case against the former officials, which by this time had 
been registered for trial under section 325, causing grievous hurt. 
 
The two cases went to court. The same judge heard both. According to the lawyer, 
she did not want to decide either. On the one hand, the case against the two 
former officials was strong, but she was reluctant to pass sentences against them 
for fear that it would look bad on her record. And after all, the officials had 
already lost their jobs, which for her, like most government personnel in 
Myanmar, would be considered more than enough punishment for a few small 
blows to a young man who recovered quickly enough. On the other hand, the case 
against the assault victim obviously had been lodged as a means to negotiate for 
withdrawal of the former case. Therefore, she allowed both cases to drag out, 
giving time to the former officials to harass and cajole the mother, wearing her 
down financially and emotionally. Finally, the mother did what was expected and 
agreed to drop the case against the two assailants in exchange for withdrawal of 
the case against her son, with the ready assistance of the prosecutor and 
investigating police, who also saw no personal advantage in either case.  
 
Although counter-complaints may be initiated for bargaining purposes, as in this 
instance, sometimes they are initiated out of revenge, or as warnings to others not 
to follow the example set by uncompromising complainants. For instance, in 
2005, eight men lodged two written complaints of corruption against local council 
officials in the delta on behalf of some fifty-six farmers. Among the eight, all were 
themselves cultivators but two held quasi-official positions. One was an executive 
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of the government’s Union Solidarity and Development Association, precursor to 
the political party that took the lion’s share of seats in the legislature during the 
2010 elections. The other was a school principal. The township authorities sent a 
team to investigate their complaint, and issued a warning to the council, obliging 
it to return money to farmers who had been unfairly taxed. In response, the 
village tract council went over the township’s heads to the district level, where it 
obtained approval to lodge a criminal case under section 211 for bringing false 
charges with intent to injure the accused. Whether they were ringleaders, or 
because they were impertinent to bring a complaint while holding public offices, 
the council brought the charge against only the executive and the school principal. 
A court convicted the two and sentenced them to two years’ imprisonment each.75 
 
One feature of reprisal cases against citizen-complainants deserving of special 
mention here is that these defendants may use counter complaint as an 
opportunity to press their original complaints further. Rights-based complainants 
not only maintain the rightness of their positions in the face of accusations that 
they are in the wrong, but also use opportunities afforded by the formal system to 
iterate their original complaints. For instance, in a written argument submitted to 
court on behalf of a farmer facing a charge of lodging a false accusation against 
village-level officials, a lawyer began by restating in detail the original allegations 
made against the officials, including that the village chairman and members of the 
village tract council were smuggling cattle; that they had sold public land for 
private profit; and, that they had submitted falsified estimates of summer paddy 
crop output to the government in order to obtain excess diesel fuel and fertiliser—
for distribution on subsidised prices to farmers—which they resold.76 The lawyer 
repeated and expanded upon each claim as he proceeded through the document, 
and then went on to set out how a team that the district council sent to investigate 
the allegations did not in fact investigate. The farmer was convicted but on appeal 
had her sentence reduced to cover time already served.  
 
During trial, citizen-complainants go beyond the simple presentation of facts for 
the purpose of a defence, using the courtroom to spoil the ritual performance of 
officialdom. For instance, a court sentenced twelve farmers in Magway to periods 
                                                        
75 ဦးစံေရႊ ႏွင့္ ဦးဝင္းၫြန္႔ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၃၄၊ ဘိုကေလးၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ၿဗိန္းထြန္းေအာင။္ [U San Shwe v. U Win Nyunt & Another, 2005 Criminal Case No. 
1334, Bogalay Township Court, 2 Dec. 2005, Township Judge (Special Power) Byein Htun Aung.] 
76 ဦးဝင္းရွိန္ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚခင္ဝင္း၊ ၂၀၀၆၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၇၅ ၊ ကြမ္းျခံကုန္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး တရားခံဘက္မွေရးသားတင္သြင္းသည့္ အၿပီးသတ္ 
ေလွ်ာက္လဲခ်က္၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဒီဇင္ဘာလ ၂၀ ရက္။ (U Win Shein v. Daw Khin Win, 2006 Criminal Case No. 275, 
Kunchangone Township Court, Closing written argument for defence, 20 Dec. 2006.)  
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of up to five years in prison for criminal trespass and causing damage because 
they went onto land and harrowed it following an agreement between the ILO and 
top officials from the capital that they were the land’s rightful cultivators.77 In 
their trials, the farmers repeatedly and unanimously referred to a visit by senior 
officers from the labour ministry and ILO staff in March 2009 as entitling them to 
use the land. They cross-examined the plaintiffs on the same, and also 
interrogated the plaintiffs’ identities and claims to be cultivators, since some of 
them described themselves as farmers or peasants, but were in fact officials and 
staff for the army-managed government sugar mill that had taken over the fields. 
In a similar case in the delta during 2004, a defence lawyer turned the tables on 
the prosecution by interrogating the village tract council chairman over whether 
he had not in fact violated the orders issued by senior officials prohibiting the use 
of forced labour, asking if the chairman’s own alleged offence was not the real 
reason for the case brought against his clients.78 The record shows that as the 
chairman floundered under cross-examination, the prosecutor intervened and the 
judge spared any further embarrassment by instructing that no further 
examination of the plaintiff would be allowed.79  
 
Complainants bringing accusations against judges face peculiar difficulties, and 
with these I will conclude this section, first so as to make some connections 
between this discussion and the business of criminal justice that I described in the 
last chapter; and second, so as to make some specific comments about difficulties 
faced by lawyers, which I have not had an opportunity to raise earlier in the study.  
                                                        
77 Township Judge Win Myint convicted all twelve defendants in the Aunglan Township Court on 16 
October 2009 in seven cases as follows, the first four cases under sections 447/427, the remaining 
three under section 447 only: ဦးဝင္ထိန္း ႏွင့္ ဦးသန္းစိုး ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၂၉။ (U Win Htein v. U Thein 
Soe & Another, 2009 Criminal Case No. 329.) ဦးလွေရႊ ႏွင့္ ျမင့္သိန္း ပါ ၅၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၃၀။ (U Hla 
Shwe v. Myint Thein & 4, 2009 Criminal Case No. 330.) ဦးတင္ေမာင္ဗိုလ ္ႏွင့္ စိုးျမင္ ့ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ 
၃၃၁။ (U Tin Maung Boe v. Soe Myint & Another, 2009 Criminal Case No. 331.) ဦးဝင္းေမာင ္ႏွင့္ မေအးဝင္း၊ 
၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၃၂။ (U Win Maung v. Ma Aye Win, 2009 Criminal Case No. 332.) ဦးဥာဏ္ရွိန ္ႏွင့္ 
မေအးဝင္း ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၃၃။ (U Nyan Shein v. Ma Aye Win & 2, 2009 Criminal Case No. 333.) 
ဦးစန္းေမာင ္ႏွင့္ သန္းစိုး ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၃၆။ (U San Maung v. Than Soe & 2, 2009 Criminal Case 
No. 336.) ဦးေအးလြင္ ႏွင့္ သန္းစိုး ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၃၇။ (U Aye Lwin v. Than Soe & 2, 2009 Criminal 
Case No. 337.) ဦးအုန္းခိုင ္ႏွင့္ သန္းစိုး ပါ ၅၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၃၈။ (U Ohn Khaing v. Than Soe & 4, 2009 
Criminal Case No. 338.) Another person was charged for failure to repay an agricultural loan at an 
exorbitant rate. For details see, Developments Concerning the Question of the Observance by the 
Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (Gb.306/6) (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, Nov. 2009), 3. 
78 ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁/၉၉၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၄ ရက္။ (Ministry of Home Affairs Order No. 1/99, 14 
May 1999.) ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန၊ ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန၏ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁/၉၉ ကို ျဖည့္စြက္သည့္အမိန္႔၊ ၂၀၀၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ 
၂၇ ရက္။ (Ministry of Home Affairs, Supplementary Order to Ministry of Home Affairs Order No. 
1/99, 27 Oct. 2000.) 
79 ဦးတင္ထြန္း ႏွင့္ ကိုအုန္းျမင့္ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၄၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၅၃၊ ဟသၤာတၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရံုး၊ ဦးတင္ထြန္း၏ သက္ေသထြက္ခ်က္၊ တရားလို 
သက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၂ ရက္။ (U Tin Htun v. Ko Ohn Myint & Another, 2004 Criminal Case 




In the last chapter I talked about the types of sanctions that judges may face due 
to complaints of alleged wrongdoing—either for reasons associated with alleged 
infractions or for unrelated ones. Nonetheless, they also retain a formidable 
arsenal of legal and institutional weapons and defences with which to rebut 
complaints and launch reprisals. Some of these are structurally integrated 
defences: a consequence of the system of hierarchical oversight and internal 
policing of judges. The Supreme Court’s journal in 2001, for instance, described a 
case in which a township court sentenced a person to six months in prison under 
section 182(b), for giving false information with intent to cause a public servant to 
use his lawful power to the injury of another person.80 The accused had made 
complaints to higher authorities that the opposing party in a civil case before the 
Yangon Additional Divisional Court had conspired with the judges against him. 
The complaint in this case was brought by an additional divisional judge in a 
township court under the divisional judiciary’s supervision, the presiding judge—
whose future prospects depend upon his relationship with his superior—could 
hardly be expected to come up with anything other than a guilty verdict. 
 
Similarly, in 2007 the Supreme Court convicted an accused for contempt after he 
lodged complaints that three of its judges in Mandalay were taking bribes.81 The 
1926 Contempt of Court Act does not specify what constitutes contempt. The 
question of what it constitutes has been left to judges to decide for themselves. In 
1963 the chief judge warned that “contempt proceedings being summary and a 
very arbitrary method of dealing with an offence should be sparingly instituted 
and… there must be something more than a technical contempt in that there must 
be a substantial contempt which tends… to interfere with the course of justice”.82 
In 1986, the Central Court, citing the ruling in an application to the Chief Court in 
1973, observed that “in contempt of court cases the main thing is not whether or 
not there is ill-intent or whether or not there is the possibility of impact… on the 
court’s verdict [but] if the possibility exists that the judicial process of the case 
                                                        
80 ဦးေအာင္မင္း၊ အမႈ႐ံႈးလို႔ တရားသူႀကီးကို မဟုတ္မမွန္စြပ္စြဲ၍ လိမ္လည္တိုင္တန္းသူအား တရားသူႀကီးက ျပန္လည္တရားစြဲဆိုရာ ျပစ္မႈ 
ထင္ရွားလို႔ ေထာင္က်ရရွာေပါ႔၊ တရားေရးဂ်ာနယ၊္ အတြဲ (၁) အမွတ္ (၁၁) (၂၀၀၁) ၊ စာ ၅၆-၅၈။ [U Aung Min, “A Lying 
Complainant Who Falsely Accused a Judge on Losing a Case Imprisoned for His Crime Upon the 
Judge Counter-Suing,” Judicial Journal 1.11 (2001): 56-58.]  
81 ေဒၚသန္းသန္းလြင္၊ လက္ေထာက္ၫႊန္ၾကားေရးမွဴး၊ တရားမတရားစီရင္ေရးဌာန၊ မႏၱေလး ႏွင့္ ဦးသိန္းၾကည္ (ခ) မိုဟာမက္မူဆာ၊ ၂၀၀၇ မတစ 
(႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၁၂။ [Daw Than Than Lwin, Assistant Director, Civil Justice Department, Mandalay v. U 
Thein Kyi (a) Mohamed Muser, 2007 MLR (SC) 112.]  
82 Thakin Myo Nyunt v. Thakin Pu, 1963 BLR (CC) 728, at 735. 
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might be perverted… then an offence has been committed”.83 But in 1992 the 
Supreme Court greatly widened the ambit of contempt by ruling that any “writing, 
speech or behaviour so as to create an inferior opinion of the court or judge; or 
constituting interference in the legal uprightness of the court; or amounting to 
interference in the decision of the court… and any actions blocking, obstructing or 
interfering with a legally issued order, summons, warrant, etc., that the court has 
confirmed are acts of contempt of court”.84  
 
In the 2007 case mentioned above, the Supreme Court found that the complaint 
was written “so as to damage the reputation of the Supreme Court, which is 
supervising each and every court, and to cause trouble for the judiciary” because 
he was dissatisfied with the outcome of his case.85 In effect, the court held that the 
higher the position of a judge, the more likely that a complaint against a judge will 
constitute systemic criticism. Since superior courts supervise inferior ones, by 
criticising a superior court the complainant is also criticising the hierarchy of 
courts that it oversees. The problem with this construction, recalling the contents 
of the last chapter, is that the complainant should avoid systemic criticism. The 
causes of injustice are, according to the official narrative, the result of individual 
failings and moral weaknesses, not institutional defects. For a complaint against a 
judge to be “truthful” it should be specific and individualised. But a complaint 
against a senior judge cannot be individualised, because he is responsible for 
supervising a hierarchy of subordinates, and therefore any criticism against him 
constitutes a systemic critique. In other words, a complainant cannot but make an 
institutionally oriented complaint against a judge at a higher level. The possibility 
of individualising the complaint so that it is “truthful” simply does not exist.  
 
An ordinary citizen may unintentionally find himself up on a charge of contempt 
once in his lifetime, but for lawyers who are representing complainants in cases of 
the sort discussed in this chapter it is an occupational hazard. The very first item 
                                                        
83 “တရားရံုးမ်ားအား မထီမဲ့ျမင္ျပဳလုပ္သည့္အမႈမ်ားတြင္ မေကာင္းေသာ စိတ္ေစတနာရွိမရွိဟူေသာအခ်က္သည္လည္းေကာင္း၊ xxx တရားရံုး၏ 
စီရင္ဆံုးျဖတ္မႈကို ထိခိုက္ႏိုင္ဖြယ္ရာရွိမရွိသည္လည္းေကာင္း အဓိကမဟုတ္ဘဲ အမႈႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ တရားစီရင္ေရးလမ္းေၾကာင္း တိမ္းေစာင္း 
ႏိုင္ဖြယ္ရာေၾကာင္း ေပၚေပါက္လွ်င္ xxx ျပစ္မႈက်ဴးလြန္ရာေရာက္သည္”။ ေဒၚေအးၾကည ္ႏွင့္ ဦးဝင္းေသာင္ ပါ ၄၊ ၁၉၈၆ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၈၇။ ၉၁။ 
[Daw Aye Kyi v. U Win Thaung & 3, 1986 BLR (CC) 87, at 91.] 
84 “တရားရံုး (သို႔မဟုတ္) တရားသူႀကီးကို အထင္အျမင္ ေသးသိမ္ေစႏိုင္ေသာ (သို႔မဟုတ္) တရားရံုး၏ တရားေျဖာင့္မွန္ေရးကို အေႏွာင့္အယွက္ 
ျဖစ္ေစေသာ (သို႔တည္းမဟုတ္) တရားရံုး၏ အဆံုးအျဖတ္ကို ဝင္ေရာက္စြက္ဖက္ရာေရာက္ေသာ အေရးအသား၊ အေျပာအဆို၊ အျပဳအမူမ်ား 
ျပဳလုပ္ျခင္း xxx တို႔သည္လည္းေကာင္း၊ တရားရံုးက တရားသျဖင့္ ထုတ္ဆင့္ေသာ အမိန္႔စာ၊ ဆင့္စာ၊ ဝရမ္းစာ စသည္တို႔ကို အတည္ျပဳရာ၌ 
အေႏွာင့္အယွက္ အကာအကြယ္ အတားအဆီးျပဳလုပ္ျခင္းတို ႔သည္လည္းေကာင္း တရားရံုးကို မထီမဲ့ျမင္ျပဳမႈမ်ားျဖစ္သည္။” ဦးေမာင္ေမာင္ ပါ ၂ ႏွင့္ 
ေဒၚၾကဴစိန္ ပါ ၃၊ ၁၉၉၂ မတစ (ရံုးခ်ဳပ)္ ၁၀၂။ ၁၀၅။ [U Maung Maung & Another v. Daw Kyu Sein & 2, 1992 MLR 
(SC) 102, at 105.] 
85 “တရားရံုးအသီးသီးကို ႀကီးၾကပ္ကြပ္ကဲလ်က္ရွိသည့္ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၏ ဂုဏ္သိကၡာကို ထိခုိက္ေစၿပီး တရားစီရင္ေရးကို အေႏွာင့္အယွက္ျဖစ္ေစ”။ 
ေဒၚသန္းသန္းလြင္၊ ၁၁၆။ (Daw Than Than Lwin, at 116.)  
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on the code of conduct for lawyers appearing before court is a warning not to 
engage in any behaviour that may constitute contempt.86 A court that has 
convicted a lawyer for contempt, or for any other purported infraction, must 
notify the Supreme Court in order that it take proceedings against them to 
suspend or revoke their licences.87 The Supreme Court gazette contains orders 
disbarring lawyers for various real, fabricated or imagined infractions against 
them: in 2006 for making a submission written in a manner disrespectful of a 
judge; in 2004 after a conviction under the Unlawful Associations Act; in 2002 
for submitting a false complaint; in 2001 for tutoring witnesses on how to testify; 
again in 2001, due to a conviction under the Emergency Provisions Act; in 1999 
for contempt, and so on.88  
 
One young activist lawyer named Ko Phoe Phyu received four years in prison in 
2009 under section 6 of the 1988 Organisation Law, for having set up an 
unregistered lawyers’ group with six colleagues, which the judge described as 
having as its stated objective the defence of justice and human rights through 
legal means, but in fact having as its purpose the making of seditious statements 
in the courts.89 Although he walked from jail the following year, within a week he 
got a letter notifying him that the Supreme Court had taken back his licence to 
practice.90 Other lawyers report similar experiences. U Aye Myint was one among 
a number of lawyers who lost his licence for collaborating with the ILO on forced 
                                                        
86 တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ေရွ႕ေနမ်ားေကာင္စီ၊ ေရွ႕ေနေရွ႕ရပ္မ်ား၏ က်င့္ဝတ္သိကၡာမ်ား၊ တာဝန္မ်ားႏွင့္ အခြင့္အေရးမ်ား၊ တတိယအႀကိမ္ (ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရံုး၊ ၂၀၀၁) စာ ၈။ [Bar Council, Lawyers’ Code of Conduct, Responsibilities and Rights, 3rd ed. 
(Yangon: Office of the Attorney General, 2001) 8.]  
87 The notification requirement is stipulated in တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ စာအမွတ္ ၇၄/၅၇/ရန (၉၃) ၊ ၁၉၉၃ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၆ ရက္။ 
[Supreme Court Letter No. 74/57/YaNa (93), 6 May 1993.] 
88 တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၅၅၅/၁၂၃-ရန (၂၀၀၆) ၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္။ [Supreme Court Letter No. 
555/123-YaNa (2006), 11 Oct. 2006.] တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၅၀၄/ရန (အထတ) ၂၀၀၄၊ ၂၀၀၄ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၆ ရက္။ 
[Supreme Court Letter No. 504/YaNa (A-HtaTa) 2004, 26 Aug. 2004.] တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၇၈၁/၁၆-ရန 
(၂၀၀၂) ၊ ၂၀၀၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၉ ရက္။ [Supreme Court Letter No. 781/16-YaNa (2002), 9 Oct. 2002.] 
တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၇၆၅/၇၂-ရန (၂၀၀၁) ၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၂၄ ရက္။ [Supreme Court Letter No. 765/72-YaNa 
(2001), 24 July 2001.] တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၈၄၇/၄၉-ရန (၉၈) ၊ ၂၀၀၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၇ ရက္။ [Supreme Court Letter 
No. 847/49-YaNa (98), 17 Aug. 2001.] တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၁၃/၉၉၊ ၁၉၉၉ ခုႏွစ၊္ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၁၁ ရက္။ (Supreme 
Court Order No. 13/99, 11 Feb. 1999.) In 1995, the court issued a circular to lawyers, notifying them 
of the sorts of language that would land them in trouble, including assertions that a Supreme Court 
judge had not examined a case properly, that a divisional court ruling clearly violated the law, and 
that “the divisional judge in making his final ruling gave his order either because he corruptly took a 
lot of bribes, because of the unlawful pressure applied by some person whom he feared or for some 
other reasons”. (“တိုင္းတရားသူႀကီး အေနျဖင့္ အၿပီးသတ္ စီရင္ခ်က္ခ်မွတ္ရာ၌ အဂတိတရား ျဖစ္သည့္ ေငြမ်ားမ်ား လာဘ္စားခဲ့၍ 
လည္းေကာင္း၊ မိမိ ေၾကာက္ရသူ တစ္ဦးဦး၏ မတရားခိုင္းေစခ်က္အရ လည္းေကာင္း၊ အျခား အေၾကာင္းမ်ားေၾကာင့္လည္းေကာင္း 
အမိန္႔ခ်မွတခ္ဲ့ျခင္းသည္”။) တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္စာအမွတ္ ၂၅၈/၁၅-ရန (၉၅) ၊ ၁၉၉၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၂ ရက္။ [Supreme Court Letter No. 
258/15-YaNa (95), 22 Mar. 1995.] 
89 ဒုရဲမွဴးၾကဴသင္း ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ရန္ႏိုင္ေအာင္ (ခ) ဖိုးျဖဴ၊ ၂၀၀၉၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၅၀၇၊ မေကြးၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏစွ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၇ ရက္၊ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဝင္းျမင္။့ [Police Captain Kyu Thin v. Maung Yan Naing Aung (a) Phoe 
Phyu, 2009 Criminal Case No. 507, Magway Township Court, 17 Mar. 2009, Township Judge 
(Special Power) Win Myint.] 
90 ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းတရားရုံး စာအမွတ္ ၈၅၄/၃-၇၃/၂၀၁၀၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၁ ရက္။ (Yangon Divisional Court Letter No. 
854/3-73/2010, 11 Mar. 2010.)  
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labour cases.91 Aye Myint in 2005 received seven years in jail under the 
Emergency Provisions Act for spreading “false” news about army confiscation of 
pastureland.92 Thanks to ILO pressure he walked from prison, but the Supreme 
Court likewise revoked his licence.93 Neither lawyer was offered a chance to make 
a defence, despite legal provisions to the contrary.94 
 
Seasoned activist lawyers U Aung Thein and U Khin Maung Shein in 2008 were 
representing a group of defendants accused over the protests of the year before—
the topic of the next chapter—one of whom verbally informed the court that as 
they “no longer had faith in the judiciary” they wished to withdraw the power of 
attorney given to the two lawyers.95 The judge instructed that the reason for 
withdrawal of power of attorney be put in writing and submitted through the 
attorneys. When they followed her instruction, she accused the lawyers 
themselves of making up the statement that the defendants had lost faith in the 
judiciary, and lodged a complaint against them for contempt. Neither lawyer was 
invited to a hearing. Aung Thein said he learned that he had been sentenced to 
four months in prison while at home one day after the application against him 
and his colleague had been lodged. Neither lawyer had an opportunity to see the 
verdict prior to imprisonment. After release, each received a perfunctory notice 
informing him that his licence to practice had been revoked.96 In another case 
arising out of the 2007 protests, a court charged two young lawyers with 
intentional insult to a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding under section 
228 of the Penal Code, because their clients turned their backs on the judge. One 
of the lawyers served six months, the other fled abroad.97  
 
In November 2011, Aung Thein, Khin Maung Shein and fourteen other 
deregistered lawyers submitted a petition to the country’s new president, asking 
                                                        
91 Aye Myint had already once received a death sentence and a subsequent reprieve due to his 
connections with the ILO, and had been released from prison earlier in the same year that he was 
again charged, as discussed in Horsey 110-16.  
92 ဒုရဲအုပ္ဝင္သြင္ဦး ႏွင့္ ေအးျမင္၊့ ၂၀၀၅၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၉၆၀၊ ဒိုက္ဦးၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၅ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၃၁ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ ္
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးျမဟန္။ [Sub Inspector Win Thwin Oo v. Aye Myint, 2005 Criminal Case No. 
960, Daik-U Township Court, 31 Oct. 2005, Township Judge (Special Power) U Mya Han.] 
93 တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၀/၂၀၀၆၊ ၂၀၀၆ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၂ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 40/2006, 12 May 
2006.) 
94 Bar Council Act, No. 38/1926, section 12(3). Legal Practitioners Act, No. 18/1879, section 14. 
95 “တရားစီရင္ေရးကို မယံုၾကည္ေတာ့” ၊ ေဒၚေနာ္သန္းသန္းေအး ႏွင့္ ဦေအာင္သိန္း ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအေထြေထြေလွ်ာက္လႊာ အမွတ္ 
၉၉၊ တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္၊ ရန္ကနု္၊ ေလွ်ာက္ထားခံရသူ (၂) ၏ ထုေခ်တင္ျပေလွ်ာက္ထားလႊာ၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၁။ (Daw Naw 
Than Than Aye v. U Aung Thein & Another, 2008 Criminal Miscellaneous Revision Application No. 
99, Supreme Court, Yangon, 2 respondents’ rebuttal submission, 6 Nov. 2008: 1.) 
96 တရားရုံးခ်ဳပ္ အမိန္႔အမွတ္ ၄၆/၂၀၀၉၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၅ ရက္။ (Supreme Court Order No. 46/2009, 15 May 
2009.)  
97 Personal Statement from Saw Kyaw Kyaw Min, n.d. 
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that the revocation of their licences be reviewed.98 The lawyers hope that 
changing political conditions might mean that they will have a second chance to 
again practice in the courts. After a member of the new national legislature took 
the matter up in a sitting, the government indicated in a written reply that it 
would consider reissuing licences on a case-by-case basis.99  
 
The disbarred lawyers are not the only persons seeking second chances. The new 
legislative committee on legal affairs, to which I referred at the start of the 
chapter, told journalists in December that out of a hundred complaints received 
of wrongdoing in court proceedings, it had found clear evidence to support the 
allegations in sixty-nine cases, and had sent its findings to the courts for 
review.100 In the legislature on 24 April 2012 one member estimated that some 
eighty per cent of allegations brought against judges had been found to be true.101 
The language marks a change from previously, when officials described people as 
complaining because they lost cases, not because of genuine grievances.102 And, 
because in the system as police the movement of a file from a legislative 
committee to a court is the movement of a file along an administrative continuum 
between hierarchically organised agencies, the judiciary will probably be reluctant 
not to concur with most of the committee’s findings. In other words, this 
movement of case files from the new legislature to the courts and administrative 
agencies may again be an example of how the system works to the advantage of 
some persons sometimes, for pragmatic rather than normative reasons. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the criminal juridical system in Myanmar, or 
rather, the larger apparatus of which it is a part, is animated by concern with 
complaints, and complainants, as an essentially administrative problem. 
Although complainants may exercise certain entitlements to complain, no body of 
norms exists within the framework of the law-and-order state to which 
complainants can bind their claims, which would compel an addressee to 
                                                        
98 ႏိုင္ငံေရးအက်ဥ္းက်သူမ်ား၏ အသက္ေမြးဝမ္းေၾကာင္းလိုင္စင္ ရုပ္သိမ္းခံရျခင္းကိစၥ၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၄ ရက္။ (The Matter of 
The Revocation of Political Convicts’ Professional Licences, 4 Nov. 2011.) 
99 လႊတ္ေတာ္႐ံုး၊ အမ်ဳိးသားလႊတ္ေတာ္ဌာန၊ စာအမွတ္ ၁၂/အမ (စည္းေဝး-၁) ၂/၂၀၁၂-၁၆၁(၃) ၊ ၂၀၁၂ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဧၿပီလ ၂၄ ရက္။ 
[Department of the Amyotha Hluttaw, Office of the Hluttaw, Letter No. 12/A-Ma (SiWe-1) 2/2012-
161(3), 24 Apr. 2012.] 
100 Soe Than Lynn, “Committee Assessing Old Cases for Bias.” 
101 တရားသူႀကီးမ်ားအေပၚတြင္ ျပည္သူလူထု တိုင္ၾကားမႈ ၇၇ မႈရွိခဲ့ကာ တိုင္ၾကားမႈ၏ ၈၀ ရာခိုင္ႏႈန္းမွာ မွန္ကန္မႈရွိခဲ့ၿပီး အေရးယူမႈေလ်ာ့ရဲျခင္း 
အေပၚ ေဝဖန္မႈမ်ားရွိေန။ (“Criticism of lenient action taken over 80 per cent of true public complaints 
brought against judges in 77 cases.”) 
102 See for example, Thein Win Nyo, “Justice Department Evaluates Public Complaints,” Myanmar 
Times 16-22 Apr. 2007, 26 July 2008 <http://themyanmartimes.net>.  
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intervene. Whether or not a complaint is addressed, and the manner in which it is 
addressed, is a matter of administrative discretion. Equally, whether or not a 
complainant is subject to reprisals for the making of the complaint depends upon 
the decisions made by officials concerned, often at the local level, sometimes 
higher up, according to circumstances.  
 
I suggested that we think about complainants as belonging to two broad 
categories: supplicants and citizens. Supplicants appeal within the lexical 
boundaries assigned them, following what Scott has described as the theatrical 
imperatives of the public transcript, producing “a more or less credible 
performance, speaking the lines and making the gestures” that she knows are 
expected of her.103 A citizen-complainant declines to do this, and makes a 
complaint based on claims that are grounded in norms. Sometimes, people make 
assertive complaints because they do not anticipate success, but nonetheless feel 
compelled to put their grievances on record, or to make a political statement 
through complaint.  
 
A person who for whatever reason lodges a complaint based on a presumption of 
innate rights that are not in fact recognised by the system does not necessarily 
forfeit her claim, but is on the face of it less likely to succeed, and may run a 
greater risk of being subject to reprisals. In the last part of the chapter, I 
examined and described some cases and circumstances under which reprisals 
occur, including in the form of public rebuttals, through legal reprisals, such as 
counter-criminal complaints, and non-legal reprisals, such as threats of physical 
violence and the committing of violence. Although officials have many means of 
reprisal, that they sometimes go to significant lengths to intimidate and silence 
complainants illustrates that although the coercive powers of state personnel are 
extensive, complaint can be efficacious in drawing attention to wrongdoing, and 
can and does result in administrative or legal action. Because police emphasises 
orderliness, personnel who become liabilities through bad behaviour or foolish 
practices are liable to suffer sanctions as a consequence, as a lesson to themselves 
and as a warning to others.  
 
The Benthamite ideologues of history wrote mechanisms for restraints on the 
police and courts into India’s criminal codes out of concern for the utility of the 
system, not out of respect for natural rights, which Bentham famously decried as 
                                                        
103 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 4. 
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“nonsense upon stilts”.104 After independence, these restraints were 
supplemented by a nascent regime of substantive rights, but following 1962 the 
new regime moved to delimit these rights, and eroded some procedural defences, 
while others it extinguished.  
 
In the contemporary period, the state in Myanmar encourages the making of 
complaints through what remain essentially administrative mechanisms. Some 
complaints succeed. Some officials go to jail. Some wrongly imprisoned people 
walk free. Indeed, because the system works according to administrative ideals, it 
may perform certain tasks better than a system in which the judiciary is 
functionally separate from other parts of the state apparatus, and in which 
adherence to principles for adjudication may take precedence over 
implementation of policy and promptitude in sentencing. Measured solely by the 
old platitude “justice delayed, justice denied”, for instance, we would be forced to 
conclude that Myanmar’s courts are superior in their delivery of case outcomes 
than those in many parts of India, which sometimes take decades to adjudicate on 
the most mundane criminal affairs.105 But nothing in the relative efficiency in 
disposal of cases in Myanmar implies the existence of a rule of law. What it does 
show is that pragmatic discourses can, to an extent, limit the arbitrary exercise of 
power, and protect people, or at least some categories of persons, from its worst 
excesses; however, the manner in which those protections are afforded are, as in 
other aspects of the system’s operations, essentially discretionary. Again in this 
respect, the system reinforces its essentially oppositional character to the rule of 
law: receipt and redress of complaint is a question of good management, not of 
inherent rights to complain, nor of any inherent obligation to act on complaint.  
  
  
                                                        
104 Bentham, vol. 2, 501. 




PROTESTORS, CROSSING THE THRESHOLD 
 
All public assemblies that power holders have not themselves organised or 
endorsed pose some kind of latent political threat to the dominant group. In a 
democratic system, public assemblies are part of the political process. The ruling 
group is obliged to accommodate them and not, on the whole, to resort to 
needlessly coercive methods in dealing with them. But the political symbolism of 
an authoritarian system carries with, as Scott has written, an implicit assumption 
that subordinates gather only when authorised.1 Where they do otherwise, they 
act unlawfully.  
 
In this chapter, I explore what animates the criminal juridical system of Myanmar 
in response to unauthorised public assembly as a crossing of thresholds. 
Specifically, I explore the problem with reference to the protests of 2007, in which 
participants crossed thresholds thrice.  
 
First, the protestors crossed the threshold from authorised activity, in the form of 
complaint, as discussed in the last chapter, to unauthorised activity, in the form of 
assembly. I examine how the threshold they crossed was demarcated in the 
official narrative on the protests, and how it was demarcated juridically. I 
compare events in August and September 2007 to two earlier episodes of large-
scale historic protest under military rule, in 1974 and 1988. I argue that across 
these three periods the narrative of criminalisation has remained similar and that, 
to borrow from Charles Tilly, the repertoire of protest has remained somewhat 
uniform.2 However, as against the consistency in the performance of protestors 
and the narrative of criminalisation, the juridical response to unauthorised 
assembly, and specifically, the juridical act of criminalisation, has not remained 
consistent, and actually has ceased to be juridical at all. Instead, protest has been 
criminalised through administrative decision, promulgated in private and, in 
2007, announced somewhat furtively.  
 
                                                        
1 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance 61. 
2 Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics Ser., eds. 
Mark Beissinger, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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Second, the protestors in 2007 also inadvertently crossed over a threshold into 
what Agamben describes as a “zone of anomie” which is neither fully inside nor 
outside the juridical order, but is a zone in which legal determinations are 
deactivated.3 In Myanmar during 2007 this zone was realised through two 
temporary, ambiguous institutions, which I here describe as the gang and the 
camp. The gang refers to the Swanarshin, a group of imprecise identity that 
officials used to police, detain and disperse demonstrators. This gang was a new 
phenomenon in Myanmar. It was not an auxiliary force, like some other 
paramilitary security groups, past and present. Rather, it was a proxy that 
enabled the movement of people into spaces where juridical personnel could 
detain and investigate them—which I designate, reading Agamben, as “the 
camp”—without ordinary rules of the criminal juridical system applying. 
Protestors held in the camp were suspended in an anomalous zone: a zone 
patrolled by policemen and other officers of the state, but in which the usual 
procedures for arrest and detention ceased to apply.  
 
Third, having crossed into the zone of anomie, protestors generally crossed the 
threshold back into the ordinary juridical realm either by signing promissory 
notes that they would not commit more offences or by going to court. Although 
the former method meant that the person walked free, because the promissory 
notes also lacked certainty a person could not be sure that she might not be 
arrested and charged with an offence. Where the persons passed through the 
juridical system, far from denying the gang and the camp, the courts admitted 
and absorbed their manifold ambiguities and illegalities. Performing an 
administrative function in a continuum of activity, the judicial role was not to 
determine guilt or innocence—which had already been determined in a sorting 
process within the camp itself—but to pull the accused back into the juridical 
realm.  
 
The handling of the 2007 protests, I argue in closing, is indicative of the 
functioning of the criminal juridical system in Myanmar as police, and signals the 
eliminating of an autonomous political role for the judiciary in response to 
unauthorised assembly. Historically, the records of courtroom trials shaped 
official narrative of counter-protest and counter-insurgency, as historian Maitrii 
                                                        
3 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago & London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005) 23, 50.  
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Aung-Thwin has shown in his study of rebellion narratives during the 1930s.4 In 
2007, the opposite applied: the official narrative preceded the criminal juridical 
process. The system as police required only of the courts that they read the 
narrative into each case of an accused demonstrator or instigator. The judiciary 
thereby in effect endorsed the extrajuridical treatment of detainees that preceded 
trial, but also enabled the possibility of the detainees’ return to the ordinary 
system, in contrast to some countries, such as Sri Lanka, where large numbers of 
people pulled across juridical thresholds have never returned.  
 
The contents of this chapter are based on a variety of case records, news reports 
and other materials collected during research conducted from 2008 to 2011, as 
well as some collected in the course of events during 2007.5  
Unauthorised public assembly 
In this section I examine how assembly is unauthorised, and more precisely, how 
it is criminalised, in two parts, each concerned with three episodes of large-scale 
public gatherings, the first in 1974, the second in 1988 and the third in 2007. In 
the first part, I consider how the official narrative criminalises protest.6 I track the 
movement of the narrative from one episode to the next. In the second, I go from 
the narrative of criminalisation to the moment of criminalisation, which is to say, 
the point at which assembly is formally prohibited through a juridical act and a 
                                                        
4 Aung-Thwin, The Return of the Galon King: History, Law and Rebellion in Colonial Burma. 
5 For this chapter, I examined a variety of case documents of the same types as in previous chapters, 
pertaining to a total of eighty cases before twenty-eight courts at various levels. As in chapter four, 
the figure does not include those cases cited from the official law reports. It also does not include 
any cases already cited in previous chapters. Supplementary secondary material includes comments 
and analysis by persons familiar with the cases and reports from state and non-state media from 
both inside and outside the country. I also have drawn on some confidential documents concerning 
the use of civilian gangs to attack and disperse protestors. As most of the cases cited in this chapter 
have already been publicised or pertain to political activists or others who seek publicity for their 
cases, I have for the most part cited them directly. 
6 I am here concerned with the criminalising narrative of protest, not with the actual events as 
recorded by eyewitnesses and documentalists. For a comprehensive account of the 1974 protests, 
see Andrew Selth, Death of a Hero: The U Thant Disturbances in Burma, December 1974, Australia-
Asia Papers No. 49, ed. Russell Trood (Brisbane: Griffith University, 1989). On 1988, see Bertil 
Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (London & Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990). No 
comprehensive monograph of 2007 has yet been written; however, the events were extensively 
documented in a variety of advocacy groups’ reports, including: Human Rights Watch, Crackdown: 
Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007). Asian 
Legal Resource Centre, Saffron Revolution Imprisoned, Law Demented (Hong Kong: Asian Legal 
Resource Centre, 2008). Human Rights Documentation Unit, Bullets in the Alms Bowl: An Analysis 
of the Brutal SPDC Suppression of the September 2007 Saffron Revolution (National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma, 2008). Academic writings include: Richard Horsey, “The 
Dramatic Events of 2007 in Myanmar: Domestic and International Implications,” Dictatorship, 
Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, eds. Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Canberra: ANU E-
Press, 2008) 13-28. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Challenging the Authoritarian State: Buddhist Monks and 
Peaceful Protests in Burma,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 32.1 (2008): 125-44. Stephen 
McCarthy, “Overturning the Alms Bowl: The Price of Survival and the Consequences for Political 
Legitimacy in Burma,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 62.3 (2008): 298-314. 
Publications with accounts of all three events include Charney and Seekins. 
 238 
public announcement of that act. I show how both in the narrative of 
criminalisation and in the act of criminalisation the behaviour of the state 
apparatus in response to unauthorised assembly over the three episodes became 
increasingly administrative in character. In fact, not only was the criminalising of 
protest no longer juridical, but also in 2007 the public announcement of the 
criminalising act ceased to be truly public.  
 
To begin with 1974, in December of that year the United Nations returned the 
body of its deceased former Secretary General, U Thant, to Rangoon for last rites. 
Students snatched the body and took it to a university campus, where members of 
the public and some of the Buddhist clergy, the Sangha, soon joined them. The 
Council of Ministers later presented a summary of findings on the events as 
follows: 
What happened was that as U Thant passed away on 25-11-74, from the time that it was 
put forward that his remains would be brought to Rangoon, the Rangoon Division 
People’s Council coordinated with U Thant’s younger brother U Khant and in 
accordance with his wishes arranged that the remains could be kept at the Kyaikkasan 
Ground before obsequies, and the relevant people’s councils discussed all aspects of the 
funeral affairs with concerned departments. Although the Rangoon Division People’s 
Council assisted in all aspects, students, Sangha and some troublemakers forcibly stole 
U Thant’s remains on the day of the obsequies, 5-12-74, and took them to the university 
campus. A group of troublemakers, students and Sangha even designated the university 
campus as a liberated area. Acting in the manner of a rival government, they shouted 
slogans, gave speeches, distributed documents and generated disturbances for the 
removal of the state authorities whom the working people had elected to office. 
Although a place was prepared for the obsequies of U Thant’s remains in the 
Kandawmin Park in accordance with the wishes of U Khant and U Thant’s family, at       
1 p.m. on 8-12-74 a group of troublemakers opposed the wishes of the majority and 
entombed the remains on the university campus. Therefore, at 2 a.m. on 11-12-74 
People’s Police under direction of the Rangoon Division People’s Council, carrying only 
tear gas canister-firing guns to use as necessary were sent in and cleared the university 
campus. The Defence Services were sent not far behind as back up to be used only 
depending on circumstances. It could be clarified that apart from the firing of tear gas 
canisters, there was no firing. There was no bloodshed. The people found on the 
university campus were taken and held for questioning.7  
                                                        
7 “ျဖစ္ရပ္မွာ ဦးသန္႔သည္ ၂၅-၁၁-၇၄ ရက္ေန႔မွာ ကြယ္လြန္ေၾကာင္းႏွင့္ ရန္ကုန္သို႔ ရုပ္ကလာပ္ကို သယ္ယူမည္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း တင္ျပသည့္အခ်ိန္က 
စၿပီး ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီအေနႏွင့္ ဦးသန္႔၏ညီ ဦးခန္႔ႏွင့္တိုင္ပင္ ညိႇႏိႈင္းၿပီး ယင္း၏ဆႏၵအရ မသၿဂဳႋဟ္မီ က်ဳိကၠဆံကြင္းတြင္ 
ထားရွိႏိုင္ရန္မွအစ စ်ာပနကိစၥ အဝဝကို သက္ဆိုင္ရာ ျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီမ်ားက ဌာနဆိုင္ရာမ်ားႏွင့္ ေဆြးေႏြးေဆာင္ရြက ္ေပးခဲ့ပါသည္။ ယင္းသို႔ 
ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီက အဖက္ဖက္မွ ကူညီေဆာင္ရြက္ေပးခဲ့ေသာ္လည္း ေက်ာင္းသား၊ သံဃာႏွင့္ ဆူပူလိုသူအခ်ဳိ႕သည္ ဦးသန္႔၏ 
ရုပ္ကလာပ္ကို သၿဂဳႋဟ္မည့္ ၅-၁၂-၇၄ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ အဓမၼလုယူၿပီး တကၠသိုလ္နယ္ေျမသို႔ ယူေဆာင္သြားၾကပါသည္။ ဆူပူလိုသူ ေက်ာင္းသားႏွင့္ 
သံဃာတစုသည္ တကၠသိုလ္ နယ္ေျမကို လြတ္ေျမာက္သည့္ နယ္ေျမဟုပင္ သတ္မွတ္ခဲ့ပါသည္။ စင္ၿပိဳင္အစိုးရသေဘာလည္း ျပဳလုပ္လာၾကၿပီး 
လုပ္သားျပည္သူမ်ားက ေရြးခ်ယ္ တင္ေျမႇာက္ထားသည့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အာဏာပိုင္အဖြ႔ဲအစည္းမ်ားကို ျဖဳတ္ခ်ေရးအတြက္ ေႂကြးေၾကာ္သံမ်ား 
ေႂကြးေၾကာ္ျခင္း၊ ေဟာေျပာျခင္း၊ စာရြက္စာတန္းမ်ား ျဖန္႔ေဝျခင္းႏွင့္ ဆူပူလုပ္ရွားမႈမ်ားကို ျပဳလုပ္လာၾကပါသည္။ ဦးခန္႔ႏွင့္ ဦးသန္႔တို႔၏ မိသားစု 
ဆႏၵႏွင့္အညီ ကန္ေတာ္မင္ ပန္းျခံတြင္ ဦးသန္႔၏ ရုပ္ကလာပ္ကို သၿဂဳႋဟ္ရန္ ေျမေနရာစီစဥ္ေပးေသာ္လည္း ဂ-၁၂-၇၄ ရက္ေန႔ ေန႔လည္ ၁ နာရီ 
အခ်ိန္တြင္ ဆူပူလိုသူတစုသည္ အမ်ား၏ဆႏၵကို ဆန္႔က်င္ၿပီး တကၠသိုလ္နယ္ေျမတြင္ ဂူသြင္းသၿဂဳႋဟ္လိုက္ၾကသည္။ ထို႔ေၾကာင့္ ၁၁-၁၂-၇၄ 
ရက္ေန႔နံနက္ ၂ နာရီအခ်ိန္တြင္ ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီက ဦးစီးၿပီး ျပည္သူ႔ရဲမ်ားကို လိုအပ္လွ်င္ အသံုးျပဳရန္ မ်က္ရည္ယိုဗံုးပစ္သည့္ 
ေသနတ္ကိုသာ ယူေစၿပီး တကၠသိုလ္နယ္ေျမအတြင္းသို႔ ဝင္ေရာက္ရွင္းလင္း ေစခဲ့ပါသည္။ အေရးအေၾကာင္းေပၚမွသာ တပ္မေတာ္ကို 
အသံုးျပဳႏိုင္ရန္အတြက္ ထပ္ခ်ပ္မကြာလိုက္ပါေစခဲ့ပါသည္။ မ်က္ရည္ယိုဗံုး ပစ္ရသည္ကလြဲၿပီး မည္သည့္ ပစ္ခတ္မႈမွ်မရွိပဲ ရွင္းလင္းႏိုင္ခဲ ့ပါသည္။ 
ေသြးထြက္သံယိုမႈ မရွိခဲ့ပါ။ တကၠသိုလ္နယ္ေျမအတြင္း ေတြ႔ရွိသည့္လူမ်ားကို ေမးျမန္းစစ္ေဆးရန္ေခၚယူထိန္းသိမ္းခဲ့ပါသည္။” ျပည္ေထာင္စု 
ဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ ပထမအႀကိမ္ ျပည္သူ႔လႊတ္ေတာ္၏ ေဆာင္ရြက္ခ်က္မ်ား အက်ဥ္းခ်ဳပ၊္ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ျပည္သူ႔လႊတ္ေတာ္႐ံုး၊ 
ခုႏွစ္မပါ) စာ ၂၄၆။ [Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Digest of Undertakings 
of the First Pyithu Hluttaw (Rangoon: Pyithu Hluttaw Office, n.d.), 246.]  
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I have cited this passage at length because it contains a template for how 
successive regimes in Myanmar have sought to describe both the character of 
protest, and the character of the official response to protest. The protestors 
engage in violent and unruly action. The government authorities respond with 
care to ensure that problems do not get worse. They encourage those who have 
been caught up in the events by accident to come forth. They try to identify and 
isolate instigators, both individuals and underground organisations responsible 
for the spread of protests.8 And, they use restraint and minimal force to re-secure 
control. 
 
These features are again present in the official descriptions of events in 1988, 
when people around the country rose up in protest at the multitudinous failures 
of the one-party socialist regime. However, whereas government accounts of 
events in 1974 acknowledged that the protest had a political quality, official 
accounts of 1988 downplayed and obscured this quality, concentrating instead on 
the role of instigators and the spread of violence: 
On 15 March 1988, Yangon Institute of Technology students gathered and shouted 
[slogans and speeches] and also destroyed school furniture. Furthermore, since they 
posed a danger to the school authorities, schools were temporarily closed. On March 
16, due to external political instigations, students spreading the disturbances to Yangon 
University (Main) marched from Yangon University (Main) to Yangon University 
(Hlaing Campus). The students reached a place near the White Bridge when People’s 
Police Force personnel dispersed and contained the assembly. Furthermore, 154 male 
and female students involved in the disturbance were held for interrogation and it was 
observed that there were no deaths. However, because of those preventive measures, 
politicians stoked the flames to increase the intensity of the disturbances.9  
  
The narrative establishes the pedigree of the protestors from the beginning, 
denying them a political programme. They march around destroying things that 
are useful for their own education: things that are public property, the material 
stuff of the state. They threaten the school authorities: state officials, 
representatives of the ruling party. They do everything in an anarchic and aimless 
                                                        
8 As stated in ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ စာ ၂၇၆။ (Government of the Socialist Republic of 
the Union of Burma 276.) 
9 “၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္ မတ္လ (၁၅) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ စက္မႈတကၠသိုလ္ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားသည္ ေက်ာင္းဝင္းအတြင္း၌ ဆူပူေအာ္ဟစ္ၾကၿပီး ေက်ာင္းသံုး 
ပရိေဘာဂမ်ားကိုလည္း ဖ်က္ဆီးခဲ့ၾကသည္။ ထို႔ျပင္ ေက်ာင္းအာဏာပိုင္တို႔ကို အႏၱရာယ္ျပဳလာသည့္အတြက္ ေက်ာင္းမ်ားေခတၱပိတ္ခဲ့ရသည္။ 
မတ္လ (၁၆) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ျပင္ပႏိုင္ငံေရးပေယာဂမ်ား ပါဝင္ပတ္သက္လာမႈေၾကာင့္ဆူပူမႈမွာ ရန္ကုန္တကၠသိုလ္ (ပင္မ) သို႔ ကူးစက္သြားရာ 
ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားသည္ ရန္ကုန္တကၠသိုလ္ (ပင္မ) မွ ရန္ကုန္တကၠသိုလ္ (လိႈင္နယ္ေျမ) သို႔ ခ်ီတက္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားတံတားျဖဴအနီးသို႔ 
အေရာက္တြင္ ျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားက လူစုခဲြထိန္းသိမ္းခဲ့ရသည္။ ထို႔ျပင္ ဆူပူမႈတြင္ ပါဝင္ေသာ ေက်ာင္းသား/ေက်ာင္းသူ (၁၅၄) ေယာက္ကို 
စိစစ္ထိန္းသိမ္းခဲ့ရၿပီး ေသဆံုးသူ မရွိေၾကာင္း ေတြ႔ရသည္။ သို႔ေသာ္ ယင္းသို႔ ထိန္းသိမ္းတားဆီးခဲ့ရျခင္းမ်ားကိုအေၾကာင္းျပဳ၍ ႏိုင္ငံေရးသမားမ်ားက 
ဆူပူမႈအရွိန္တက္ေအာင္ မီးထိုးေပးခဲ့ၾကသည္။” ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ တပ္မေတာ္သမိုင္း ၁၉၇၄-၁၉၈၈၊ တပ္မေတာ္သမိုင္း၊ 
ဆဌမတဲြ (ရန္ကုန္၊ စစ္သမိုင္းျပတိုက္ႏွင့္ တပ္မေတာ္ေမာ္ကြန္းတိုက္မွဴးရုံး) စာ ၃၄၆။ [Government of the Union of Myanmar, 
Defence Services History, 1974-1988, Defence Services History, vol. 6 (Yangon: Military History 
Museum & Office of the Defence Services Archives, n.d.) 346.]  
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way. They are not so much a movement as they are a contagion. Indeed, the word 
used to describe the “spreading” of disturbances in this passage is the same as 
that used to describe the spread of an infectious disease—a term found in official 
narratives denigrating political movements since the colonial period, as Guha has 
discussed in his study of peasant uprisings in India.10 The idiom of protest as 
disease conveys a mood of irrationality, a type of madness that gives the whole 
event its virulent, uncontrollable quality. 
 
As in 1974, the public transcript of events in 1988 sets out how the authorities 
operated with minimum force but despite their best efforts, saboteurs and other 
troublemakers spread the unrest elsewhere. In 1974 the government was at pains 
to characterise violence around the city as incidental to the events on campus. To 
suggest that the two were connected would imply that the political complaints of 
the protestors had wider appeal, which of course they did—Andrew Selth from 
personal observation estimated that at times up to 100,000 people were present 
on and around campus.11 In 1988, because the government characterised the 
demonstrators as lacking any authentic political consciousness of their own, it 
could also blame them directly for the spread of violence:  
On 21 June 1988, Yangon University (Main) students and Institute of Medicine (1) 
students went out from the university compound and joined with people desirous of 
violent disturbances. Then that group committed violent attacks, arson and went to the 
point of murders in Sanchaung, Kamayut, Hlaing, Mayangone and Insein townships. 
People’s Police Force personnel peacefully and without arms dispersed around 5,000 
students and persons desirous of violent disturbances who were marching to the 
Myenigone side of Sanchaung Township, for the purpose of stopping them from going 
into town. However, violent parties threw stones at the Sanchaung People’s Police 
Station, and making efforts to force their way in through strength of numbers, gave rise 
to pitched combat with sticks and knives between the people desirous of violence and 
the People’s Police Force personnel. However, since the People’s Police Force personnel 
did not resort to firing, the violent brawlers took advantage and entered and destroyed 
the police station, stabbing and striking with sticks and knives the People’s Police Force 
personnel whom they captured, and wickedly committing murder.... Thus, for the 
protection of the lives and property of its parents, the people, and for the sake of the 
rule of law [taya-ubade-somoye], the Defence Services came to the assistance of the 
People’s Police Force personnel.12  
                                                        
10 Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India 220-22. 
11 Selth, Death of a Hero 16.  
12 “၁၉၈၈ ခုႏွစ္ ဇြန္လ (၂၁) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ရန္ကုန္တကၠသိုလ္ (ပင္မ) ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားႏွင့္ ေဆးတကၠသိုလ္ (၁) ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားသည္ 
တကၠသိုလ္ဝင္း အတြင္းမွအျပင္သို႔ ထြက္လာၿပီး အၾကမ္းဖက္ဆူပူလိုသူမ်ားႏွင့္ ပူးေပါင္းခဲ့ၾကသည္။ ထိုေနာက္အုပ္စုဖဲြ႔ကာ စမ္းေခ်ာင္း၊ ကမာရြတ္၊ 
လႈိင္၊ မရမ္းကုန္းႏွင့္ အင္းစီန္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္မ်ားတြင္ အၾကမ္းဖက္တိုက္ခိုက္ျခင္း၊ မီး႐ိႈ႕ဖ်က္ဆီးျခင္း၊ သတ္ျဖတ္ျခင္းမ်ားအထိ က်ဴးလြန္လာခဲ့ၾကသည္။ 
စမ္းေခ်ာင္းၿမိဳ႕နယ္၊ ေျမနီကုန္းဘက္သို႔ ခ်ီတက္လာေသာ ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားႏွင့္ အၾကမ္းဖက္ဆူပူလိုသူအင္းအား (၅၀၀၀) ခန္႔အား ၿမိဳ႕တြင္းသို႔ 
မဝင္ေရာက္ႏိငု္ေရးအတြက္ ျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားက လက္နက္မဲ့ျဖင့္ ေအးခ်မ္းစြာ လူစုခဲြခဲ့ပါသည္။ သို႔ေသာ္လည္း အၾကမ္းဖက္သူမ်ားက 
စမ္းေခ်ာင္းျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲစခန္းအား ခဲမ်ားျဖင့္ ပစ္ေပါက္ျခင္း၊ လူအင္အားျဖင့္ ဝင္ေရာက္စီးနင္းရန္ ႀကိဳးစားျခင္းျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့ရာ အၾကမ္းဖက္လုိ 
သူမ်ားႏွင္ ့ျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားအၾကား တုတ္၊ ဓားမ်ားျဖင့္အျပန္အလွန္ထိုးခုတ္၊ တိုက္ခိုက္မႈမ်ားျဖစ္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ သို႔ေသာ္လည္း 
ျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားက ပစ္ခတ္ျခင္းမျပဳလုပ္သည့္အတြက္ အၾကမ္းဖက္ဆူပူသူမ်ားမွ အခြင့္ေကာင္းယူ၍ ရဲစခန္းအတြင္း ဝင္ေရာက္ဖ်က္ဆီးျခင္း၊ 
ဖမ္းဆီးမိသူျပည္သူ ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားအား တုတ္၊ ဓားမ်ားျဖင့္ထိုးခုတ္၊ သတ္ျဖတ္ျခင္းမ်ားကို ဆိုးဝါးစြာ ျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ xxx သို႔ျဖစ္၍ 
တပ္မေတာ္သည္ မိဘျပည္သူမ်ား၏ အသက္အိုးအိမ္စည္းစိမ္ကို ကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္ေရးႏွင့္ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးတို႔အတြက္ 
ျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္မ်ားအား အကူအညီေပးေဆာင္ရြက္ခဲ့ရသည္။” ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ တပ္မေတာ္သမိုင္း၊ စာ ၃၅၀။ 
(Government of the Union of Myanmar, Defence Services History 350.) In this passage the term I 
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Here, as the violence of demonstrators becomes more and more outrageous, the 
restraint of the police and other officials becomes more and more extraordinary, 
even to the point of declining to defend their own lives. It is only at this stage that 
the army is at last obligated to enter the fray, when no alternative remains.  
 
The limited repertoire of official response to protest returned with variations in 
August 2007, when small protests began in response to sudden unannounced 
increases in fuel prices: 
Advance information was received that internal and external destructionists not 
wishing to see the national government’s successfully implemented undertakings, and 
with the sole aim of taking power, have set down and are carrying out a 3-point strategy 
for the downfall of the national government, namely: endeavoring to destroy the 
National Convention; working for the emergence of a popular uprising like the 88 
crisis; and, undertaking of all types of opposition activism within the law. On August 15 
the internal and external destructionists, taking advantage of the rise in motor fuel 
prices as a means to their ends, began making incitements among the people for the 
success of the 3-point strategy.13  
 
In official accounts of 1974, the frontline protestors had unacceptable political 
demands. In 1988 they were the pawns of political manipulators behind the 
scenes. In 2007, the first protestors onto the streets—many of them veterans of 
the 1988 campaign—had the worst qualities of both types from the earlier 
periods. They were political manipulators and opportunists, bent on national 
destruction, with unacceptable demands. They had political thoughts and 
strategies, but their project lacked legitimacy. It aimed only at the taking of power 
and was inherently destructive, even though, ironically, it was framed so as to be 
“within the law”. In other words, although the demonstrators had been careful 
not to commit criminal offences, the system mobilised against them explicitly and 
exclusively as police, as a series of administrative actions aimed at securing law 
and order, ngyeinwut-pibyaye, in the face of the threats posed by unauthorised 
assembly. Police operated irrespective of whether or not any specifically legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
have translated as “violent parties” (အၾကမ္းဖက္သူမ်ား) is very close to the word used in Burmese for 
“terrorists” (အၾကမ္းဖက္သမားမ်ား). In the official narrative, the latter term is also sometimes translated as 
“destructionists”, which is how I have translated it in the following passage. 
13 “ႏိငု္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၏ ေအာင္ျမင္စြာအေကာင္အထည္ေဖာ ္ေဆာင္ရြက္ႏိုင္မႈမ်ားအေပၚ မလိုလားမ႐ႈဆိတ္ေသာ၊ ၎တို႔အာဏာရရွိေရးကိုသာ ေရွး႐ႈ 
လုပ္ေဆာင္ေနေသာ ျပည္တြင္းျပည္ပအဖ်က္သမားမ်ားသည ္အမ်ဳိးသားညီလာခံႀကီး ေအာင္ျမင္မႈမရွိေအာင္၊ ပ်က္ျပားေအာင ္ႀကိဳးပမ္း 
ေဆာင္ရြက္ေရး၊ ၈၈ အေရးအခင္းကဲ့သို႔ လူထုအံုႂကြမႈျဖစ္ေပၚေအာင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ေရးႏွင္ ့ဥပေဒအတြင္း ဆန္႔က်င္လႈပ္ရွားမႈမ်ဳိးစံ ုျပဳလုပ္ေရးဟူသည့္ 
မဟာဗ်ဴဟာ (၃) ရပ္ခ်မွတ္၍ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရျပဳတ္က်ေစရန ္စီမံေဆာင္ရြက္လုပ္ေဆာင္လ်က္ရွိေၾကာင္း သတင္းမ်ားႀကိဳတင္ရရွိခဲ့သည္။ ျပည္တြင္း 
ျပည္ပအဖ်က္သမားမ်ားသည ္ၾသဂုတ္ ၁၅ ရက္မွစ၍ စက္သံုးဆီေစ်းႏႈန္းျမင့္တက္လာမႈအေပၚ အခြင့္ေကာင္းယူ ခုတံုးလုပ္ၿပီး ၎တို႔၏ မဟာဗ်ဴဟာ 
(၃) ရပ ္ေအာင္ျမင္ေအာင ္ျပည္သူလူထုအတြင္း ေသြးထိုးလႈံ႕ေဆာ္မႈမ်ား လုပ္ေဆာင္လာၾကသည္။” ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တည္ၿငိမ္ေရးႏွင္ ့လံုျခံဳေရးကို 
ထိခိုက္ပ်က္ျပားေစရန္ႏွင္ ့အမ်ဳိးသားညီလာခ ံပ်က္ျပားေစရန ္ဆႏၵျပေသြးထိုးလႈံ႕ေဆာ္ခဲ့ၾကသူမ်ားအား သက္ဆိုင္ရာက ေခၚယူထိန္းသိမ္း၊ 
ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၆။ (“Relevant Persons Take into Custody Agitators Protesting So 
as to Damage State Stability and Security and Destroy the National Convention,” Myanma Alin 22 
Aug. 2007: 16.) 
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offence had been committed, which is a question of subsidiary importance for a 
system animated by concern for the maintenance of law and order. 
 
During 2007, the catalytic incident for large protests of September was a melee 
between monks and security forces, which state media described as follows: 
It is learned that as information was received that some Sangha from some monasteries 
in Pakokku town, Magway Division were going to protest, responsible persons went at 
2 p.m. on September 5 to keep matters under control; however, the Sangha rejected 
their supplications and bearing placards with the title of the Sangha Samaggi walked in 
protest along Bogyoke Road, shouting slogans for the release of arrested protestors and 
for reduction of commodity prices; that although the responsible persons and the 
Township Sangha Nayaka Committee Chair, Sayadaw U Tejobhasa, again earnestly 
forbade them, the Sangha refused, and because they pushed over and past the 
Township Sangha Nayaka Chair Sayadaw and protested [further], the Sayadaw and 
public were in possible danger and so the responsible persons fired three rounds from 
small arms skywards, frightening the crowd to disperse, at which time around 100 
protesting Sangha fled.14  
 
The article continues that the following day officials toured monasteries in the 
area in an effort to prevent further disturbances, but around fifty monks threw 
stones at their vehicles and tried to roll them over. The monks allegedly trapped 
the officials inside a monastery and demanded that the township chairman be 
brought out to them; when the officials refused to comply, the protesting monks 
burned the vehicles.  
 
Here again is the scenario of authorities showing restraint in the face of 
provocative unauthorised assembly. As in previous years, the official narrative 
denied that any monks or citizens had been harmed in the course of these events, 
despite the reports of foreign news broadcasters to the contrary. The state media 
blamed the National League for Democracy for sending false news abroad that 
soldiers had attacked and beaten monks, resulting in the death of one.15  
                                                        
14 “မေကြးတိုင္း၊ ပခုကၠဴၿမိဳ႕ရွိ ေက်ာင္းတိုက္အခ်ဳိ႕မွ သံဃာအခ်ဳိ႕ လွည့္လည္ဆႏၵျပမည္ဟု သတင္းမ်ားရရွိသျဖင့္တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားက စက္တင္ဘာ ၅ 
ရက္ မြန္းလဲြ ၂ နာရီတြင္ သြားေရာက္ေလွ်ာက္ထားထိန္းသိမ္းခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ သို႔ရာတြင္ သံဃာမ်ားက ေလွ်ာက္ထားထိန္းသိမ္းမႈကို လက္မခံဘဲ ဆႏၵျပ 
အဖမ္းခံရသူမ်ား လႊတ္ေပးေရးႏွင့္ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းက်ဆင္းေရး ေႂကြးေၾကာ္ဆႏၵျပၿပီး သံဃာ့သမဂၢီေခါင္းစီးပါ ဆို္င္းဘုတ္မ်ားကို ကိုင္ေဆာင၍္ 
ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္လမ္းအတိုင္း လမ္းေလွ်ာက္ဆႏၵျပခဲ့ၾကေၾကာင္း၊ သက္ဆိုင္ရာတာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားႏွင့္ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္သံဃနာယကဥကၠ႒ဆရာေတာ္ 
ဦးေတေဇာဘာသတုိ႔က ထပ္မံ ေမတၱာရပ္ခံတားျမစ္ေသာ္လည္း ဆႏၵျပသံဃာမ်ားက လက္မခံဘဲ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္သံဃနာယကဥကၠ႒ ဆရာေတာ္အား 
တြန္းလွဲျဖတ္ေက်ာ္ဆႏၵျပခဲ့ၾကသျဖင့္ ဆရာေတာ္ႀကီးႏွင့္ အမ်ားျပည္သူအတြက္ အႏၱရာယ္ရွိလာႏိုင္ေသာေၾကာင့္ သက္ဆိုင္ရာတာဝန္ရွိသူတို႔က 
လက္နက္ငယ္ျဖင့္ သံုးခ်က္မိုးေပၚေထာင္ ပစ္ေဖာက္၍ ေျခာက္လွန္႔လူစုခဲြခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ ထိုအခါ ဆႏၵျပသံဃာ ၁၀၀ ခန္႔မွာ လူစုကြဲ ထြက္ေျပး 
သြားခဲ့ေၾကာင္း သိရွိရသည္။” ျပည္ပဆန္႔က်င္ဘက္ အဖဲြ႔မ်ားက ျပည္တြင္းဆန္႔က်င္ဘက္အဖြ႔ဲမ်ားထံ ဆူပူအံုႂကြမႈျဖစ္ေပၚရန္ ၫႊန္ၾကားပံ့ပိုးေန၊ 
ျပည္သူမ်ားအေနျဖင့္ တည္ၿငိမ္ေအးခ်မ္းမႈႏွင့္ မိမတိို႔အက်ဳိးစီးပြား ထိခိုက္ပ်က္ျပားေစရန္ လုပ္ေဆာင္လာမႈကို လက္မခံဘဲ ကာကြယ္တားဆီး 
သြားၾကရန္ လုိလားလ်က္ရွိ၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၇ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၆။ (“External Opposition Groups 
Instructing, Aiding Internal Opposition Groups for Emergence of Unrest; the People Reject and 
Need to Defend against Actions Aimed at Damaging Peace, Stability and Public Welfare,” Myanma 
Alin 7 Sept. 2007: 16.)  
15 ၿမိဳ႕နယ္အခ်ဳိ႕၌ ျဖစ္ေပၚခဲ့သည့္ လူတစ္ဦးစ၊ ႏွစ္ဦးစ၏ ဆႏၵျပလႈံ႕ေဆာ္သတင္းမ်ားကို ျပည္ပအသံလႊင့္ဌာနမ်ားပံုႀကီးခ်ဲ႕ထုတ္လႊင့္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ 
၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၈ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၆။ (“Foreign Broadcasting Agencies Broadcasting Exaggerated 




The explicit reference to the banner of the Sangha Samaggi also is important as a 
signifier of intention to upset law and order. It indicates that the monks were 
allegedly representing themselves as part of a group that the military regime 
banned in 1990 in response to the last widespread anti-military religious 
boycott.16 In fact, the Sangha Samaggi emerged in 1919 as part of the anticolonial 
struggle and as such was from its inception political.17 By representing themselves 
as members of Sangha Samaggi—as the official narrative alleges—the monks were 
challenging both the stability of the state and taya-ubade-somoye as law and 
order, in much the same way as had their predecessors struggling for national 
independence. By pushing over and past the Sangha Nayaka Committee township 
chair, the monk who served as the official link between religion and state in the 
locality, the embodiment of the nexus between religious and secular authority, 
they were challenging the state’s insistence on the primacy of its authority, on its 
right to set down rules for the maintenance of religious discipline.  
 
Once this point on the threshold was crossed, the official narrative moved quickly 
from characterisations of simple defiance into seemingly widespread, random 
violence. Monks allegedly started leading mobs to attack government buildings, 
as in this account of events in Sittwe, in the west: 
Some protestors, including around six monks, who were carrying sticks and knives 
forced themselves onto and assaulted responsible persons who were peacefully 
resolving matters.... While endeavoring to obtain control, responsible persons were 
able to take into custody one of the violent persons.... [But] as the situation was such 
that the protestors posed a violent danger, in order to control them, the crowd was 
dispersed at half past 3 p.m. by the firing of tear gas canisters and shooting skywards to 
frighten. However, at 4 p.m. around 50 monks again marched in protest along 
Minbagyi Road with around 100 people behind them on the left and right sides. That 
protest group reached the [Rakhine] State Peace and Development Council Office on 
Meyu Road where shouting demands for the release of the arrested person, they forced 
open the gate of the office compound; and some protestors climbing atop the brick wall 
fired slingshots and threw rocks. Although the responsible persons shouted for them 
not to commit violence, the protestors paid no heed and as the situation had reached 
the point that they had come en masse into the compound and would [continue to] be 
violent, the crowd was again dispersed by firing tear gas canisters and shooting 
skywards…. In the course of the protest, nine police force personnel suffered injuries 
from slingshots, rocks and sticks. However, due to the great resolve of the responsible 
persons to handle the situation gently, it is learned that not a single protesting Sangha 
was injured, that not a single Sangha was taken into custody, and not a single 
protesting individual was injured.18 
                                                        
16 ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမ ႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕အမိန္႔ အမွတ္ ၆/၉၀၊ ၁၉၉၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၂၀ ရက္။ (State Law and 
Order Restoration Council Order No. 6/90, 20 Oct. 1990.) 
17 ဦးေလးေမာင၊္ ျမန္မာ့ ႏိုင္ငံေရးသမိုင္း၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ စာေပဗိမာန္ပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၇၃) စာ ၁၇၇။	  [U Lay Maung, A Political History of 
Burma (Rangoon: Sarpay Beikman Press, 1973) 177.] 
18 “ဆႏၵျပသူမ်ားအနက္မ ွတုတ္၊ ဓားကိုင္ေဆာင္ထားသည္ ့သံဃာေျခာက္ပါးခန္႔ အပါအဝင္ ဆႏၵျပသူအခ်ဳိ႕သည္ ေအးေဆးစြာ တားဆီးေဖ်ာင္းဖ်သ ူ
တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားအား အတင္းဝင္ေရာက္ရိုက္ႏွက္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ xxx တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားက ႀကိဳးပမ္းထနိ္းသိမ္းစဥ ္အၾကမ္းဖက္သူမ်ားထဲမွ တစ္ဦးကိုဖမ္းဆီး 
ထိန္းသိမ္းႏိုင္ခဲ့သည္။ xxx ထိုကဲ့သို႔ ဆႏၵျပသူမ်ားမ ွအၾကမ္းဖက္အႏၱရာယ္ျပဳလာသည့္အတြက္ အေျခအေနကို ထိန္းသိမ္းႏိုင္ရန ္မ်က္ရည္ယိုဗံုးပစ္၍ 
 244 
 
With the monks at the forefront of events in September 2007, the official 
narrative also relied on an old cleavage between so-called genuine and impostor 
monks. Having subdued the protests, officials alleged that they found women 
sleeping in monks’ quarters, along with pornography, weapons and a variety of 
other inappropriate items.19 Pictures of some of these they displayed to a visiting 
UN official.20 Criminal actions against “bogus monks” reportedly continued into 
the following year.21 Thus, consistent with the moralizing narratives directed 
against young women who complain too much and young men who die in 
custody, the political monk is officially also the womanising monk, the drug-
addicted monk, the immoral monk, and in short, the fake monk.  
 
The official narrative having criminalised the unauthorised public assembly, the 
next step for each regime, in 1974, 1988 and again in 2007 was to declare the 
assembly unlawful, to prohibit people from gathering through the promulgation 
of a juridical order, publicly announced, accompanied by threats of consequences 
for anyone defying the order. The procedure as followed in 1974 is set out in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
လည္းေကာင္း၊ ေသနတ္ကို မိုးေပၚေထာင္ေျခာက္လွန္႔ပစ္ခတ္၍လည္းေကာင္း လူစုခဲြခဲ့သျဖင္ ့ညေန ၃ နာရီခဲြခန္႔တြင္ လူစုကြဲသြားခဲ့သည္။ သို႔ေသာ္ 
ညေန ၄ နာရီခြဲခန္႔တြင္ သံဃာ ၅၀ ခန္႔မွာ မင္းဘာႀကီးလမ္းအတိုင္း ထပ္မံစီတန္းလမ္းေလွ်ာက္ဆႏၵျပလာခဲ့ၿပီး ေဘးဝဲယာႏွင့္ ေနာက္ဘက္မွ လူ ၁၀၀ 
ခန္႔ ပါဝင္လာခဲ့သည္။ ၎ဆႏၵျပအဖြ႔ဲသည္ ေမယုလမ္းေပၚရွိ ျပည္နယ္ေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရးႏငွ္ ့ဖြံ႔ၿဖိဳးေရးေကာင္စီရံုးသို႔ ေရာက္ရွိလာၿပီး 
ဖမ္းထားသူအား လႊတ္ေပးရန္ဟု ေအာ္ဟစ္ေတာင္းဆိုကာ ၎ရံုးဝင္းတံခါးအား အတင္းတြန္းဖြင့္ျခင္း၊ အခ်ဳိ႕ဆႏၵျပသူမ်ားက အုတ္တံတိုင္းေပၚ 
ေက်ာ္တက္၍ ေလးခြႏွင့္ ပစ္ျခင္း၊ ခဲမ်ားျဖင့္ပစ္ေပါက္ျခင္းမ်ား ျပဳလုပ္ခဲ့ၾကသည္။ တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားက ထိုသို႔အၾကမ္းဖက္ျခင္းမျပဳရန္ ေအာ္ဟစ္ေျပာဆိ ု
ေဖ်ာင္းဖ် တားဆီးခဲ့ေသာ္လည္း ဆႏၵျပသူမ်ားက နာခံျခင္းမရွိဘဲ လူအုပ္ျဖင့္ ရံုးဝင္းအတြင္း ဝင္ေရာက္အၾကမ္းဖက္မည့္အေျခအေနသို႔ ေရာက္ရွ ိ
လာသည့္အတြက္ ထပ္မံ၍ မ်က္ရည္ယိုဗံုးပစ္ၿပီး ေသနတ္မိုးေပၚေထာင္ေဖာက္ကာ လူစုခဲြခဲ့ရျပန္သည္။ xxx ထိုဆႏၵျပျဖစ္စဥ္တြင္ ဆႏၵျပသူမ်ား၏ 
ေလးခြ၊ ခဲ၊ တုတ္မ်ားျဖင္ ့ပစ္ေပါက္တိုက္ခိုုက္မႈမ်ားေၾကာင္ ့ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္ ကိုးဦး ထပ္မံဒဏ္ရာရရွိခဲ့သည္။ သို႔ေသာ္ တာဝန္ရွိသူမ်ားက 
သေဘာထားႀကီးစြာ အသာတၾကည္ ထိန္းသိမ္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈမ်ားေၾကာင္ ့ဆႏၵျပသံဃာေတာ္တစ္ပါးမွ် ထိခိုက္ဒဏ္ရာရရွိျခင္းမရွိေၾကာင္း၊ 
သံဃာေတာ္တစ္ပါးကိုမွ် ဖမ္းဆီးထိန္းသိမ္းျခင္း မရွိေၾကာင္းႏွင္ ့ဆႏၵျပလူပုဂၢိဳလ္တစ္ဦးတစ္ေယာက္မွ် ထိခိုက္ဒဏ္ရာရရွိျခင္းမရွိေၾကာင္း သိရသည္။” 
သံဃာအတုအေယာင္မ်ား၏ စည္းရံုး လႈံ႕ေဆာ္မႈေၾကာင့္ ပခုကၠဴ၌ဆႏၵျပအၾကမ္းဖက္မႈျဖစ္၊ ေသြးထိုးလႈံ႕ေဆာ္မႈမ်ားေၾကာင့္ စစ္ေတြၿမိဳ႕တြင္လည္း 
သံဃာေတာ္မ်ား လမ္းေလွ်ာက္ဆႏၵျပ၊ ရန္ကုန္ၿမိဳ႕တြင္လည္း သံဃာအေယာင္ေဆာင္မ်ားေၾကာင္ ့သံဃာအခ်ဳိ႕ စီတန္းလမ္းေလွ်ာက္ခဲ့၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ 
၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၉ ရက္၊ စာ ၉။ (“The Violent Protest at Pakokku Occurred Due to the Machinations 
of Impostor Sangha; Due to Incitements, Sangha Also Walk in Protest in Sittwe; Due to Impostor 
Sangha, in Yangon Too Some Sangha Marched,” Myanma Alin 19 Sept. 2007: 9.)  
19 သံဃာေတာ္မ်ားအေနျဖင့္ ျမတ္စြာဘုရား၏ဝိနည္းေတာ္၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္သံဃမဟာနာယကအဖြ႔ဲကထုတ္ျပန္ထားသည့္ စည္းမ်ဥ္းစည္းကမ္း၊ 
ၫႊန္ၾကားလႊာမ်ားႏွင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ဥပေဒ စသည့္ ဥပေဒ (၃) ရပ္ကို လိုက္နာေဆာင္ရြက္ရမည္ျဖစ္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ     
၇ ရက္၊ စာ ၃။ (“Sangha Must Follow 3 [Sets of] Laws, the Vinaya of the Noble Lord [Buddha], the Rules 
and Directives Issued by the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, and the State Law, Etc.,” 
Myanma Alin 7 Oct. 2007: 3.) The description in this article closely resembles those from earlier 
periods of “agitation” by monks. See for instance the editorial of the Working People’s Daily 26 Oct. 
1990, in the Burma Press Summary, Oct. 1990; and, news reports of monks’ protests against a new 
law to require the carrying of registration documents in the Working People’s Daily of April and 
May 1965.  
20 Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Human Rights Situations That Require the Council’s Attention: Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (United Nations Human 
Rights Council, 2007), 18. 
21 See for instance, ရဟန္းသာမေဏအတုအေယာင္မ်ား၊ သာမေဏသာရုပၸမျဖစ္ေသာ ရဟန္းသာမေဏမ်ားႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ 
အေရးယူေဆာင္ ရြက္သြားေရးႏွင့္စပ္လ်ဥ္းၿပီး စစ္ေတြၿမိဳ႕၌ သာသနာေရးဆိုင္ရာမ်ား ေလွ်ာက္ထား၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ          
၂၀ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၃။ (“Action Being Taken in Connection with Bogus Monks and Novices, and with Regards 
to Un-Ordained Monks and Novices and Religious Matters in Sittwe Supplicated,” Myanma Alin 20 
Aug. 2008: 13.)  
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ministerial report on the violence that broke out around Rangoon after the 
crushing of protests at the university: 
Violent disturbances unrelated to the funeral [of U Thant] broke out. Starting with the 
arson of Hino trucks in Kamayut Township, there were simultaneous destructive 
disturbances in a total of 13 townships in Rangoon Division. Although the Rangoon 
Division People’s Council promulgated section 144, since it was not possible to bring 
the situation under control with the People’s Police Force, the assistance of the Defence 
Services was requested. Although the Defence Services gave assistance, since violent 
agitators were trying to create anarchic conditions, the Council of Ministers submitted 
to the Council of State that a state of emergency be declared. In accordance with article 
76 of the Constitution, the Council of State designated Rangoon Division as an area 
under military administration.22 
 
In this account, state authorities acted to criminalise the protests in a clear 
sequence. First, they made an attempt at reestablishing control through the 
extant law, under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This section, which 
I discuss more below, authorises special measures for judges to issue orders 
prohibiting assemblies and other activities, in order to avert disturbances. 
Second, the civilian authorities called the army to assist in the face of these special 
circumstances and deal with those who did not disperse. Third, when these 
measures failed, they followed a constitutional procedure to bring in military 
administration.  
 
Events in 1988 were much more protracted and widespread than in 1974. The 
official measures followed a similar sequence, but were less clear-cut. In June the 
executive committee of the Rangoon Division People’s Council issued an order 
under section 144. Over the next month, state media announced the imposing and 
withdrawal of section-144 orders in various townships around the country. On 
July 22 a new order imposed emergency military administration on Prome.23 On 
August 3 the government made a further proclamation of military administration 
to cover Rangoon.24 Six days later, in response to massive demonstrations on 
August 8, the military administration imposed a curfew and ban on assemblies or 
                                                        
22 “စ်ာပနႏွင့္ မပတ္သက္သည့္ ဆူပူအၾကမ္းဖက္မႈမ်ား ျဖစ္ပြားလာပါသည္။ ကမာရြတ္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တြင္ ဟီးႏိုးကားမ်ားကို စတင္ဖ်က္ဆီးမီး႐ႈိ႕ၿပီး 
ရန္ကုန္တိုင္း အတြင္းရွိ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ေပါင္း ၁၃ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တြင္ ဆူပူဖ်က္ဆီးမီး႐ႈိ႕မႈမ်ား တၿပိဳင္တည္းလို ျပဳမူလာၾကပါသည္။ ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီက 
ပုဒ္မ ၁၄၄ ကို ထုတ္ျပန္ခဲ့ေသာ္လည္း ျပည္သူ႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲႏွင့္ ႏွိမ္နင္းထိန္းသိမ္းႏိုင္ဖြယ္ရာ မရွိသည့္ အေျခအေနျဖစ္ေပၚလာသည့္အတြက္ တပ္မေတာ္၏ 
အကူအညီကိုပင္ ေတာင္းယူခဲ့ရပါသည္။ တပ္မေတာ္က ကူညီထိန္းသိမ္းေပးေသာ္လည္း အၾကမ္းဖက္သူမ်ားသည္ မင္းမဲ့အေျခအေနမ်ဳိးျဖစ္ေအာင္ 
ဖန္တီးလာၾကသည့္ အတြက္ ဝန္ႀကီးအဖဲြ႔သည္ အေရးေပၚအေျခအေနေၾကျငာေပးရန္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေကာင္စီကို တင္ျပခဲ့ပါသည္။ ဖြ႔ဲစည္းပံုအေျခခံ 
ဥပေဒပုဒ္မ ၇၆ အရ ႏိငု္ငံေတာ္ ေကာင္စီက ရန္ကုန္တိုင္းကို စစ္အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရး ေဒသအျဖစ္ သတ္မွတ္ခဲ့ရပါသည္။” ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတ 
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ စာ ၂၄၆-၄၇။ (Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma 246-47.) 
23 Council of State Proclamation No. 2/88, 22 July 1988. Burma Press Summary, July 1988: 19.  
24 Council of State Proclamation No. 5/88, 3 Aug. 1988. Burma Press Summary, Aug. 1988: 7. The 
proclamation again stipulated the townships covered, and authorised the continuance of the 
ordinary judiciary in its work alongside provisions for the holding of summary trials under military 
auspices. Unlike the section-144 orders, the military administration orders were issued to remain in 
effect until otherwise announced.  
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speechmaking.25 By the end of the month authorities rolled back these measures, 
but in September, the new military regime declared martial law, imposed a 
nationwide curfew, banned assemblies, ordered strike camps to be shut down, 
and took action against protestors through the establishment of military 
tribunals.26 
 
The size of protest in 2007 was much smaller than in 1988, and the ruling regime 
held much more coercive power than its predecessor. The state had the means to 
put down the protests through section-144 orders and straightforward policing 
actions. Yet the official response to the protests was more ambiguous than 
previously. This ambiguity is striking, given not only the regime’s superior 
capacity to halt the events when compared with 1974 and 1988, but also given its 
statements through the media that it knew of a plan to overthrow the 
government. That it knew of such a plan implies that it had in place a counter-
plan. Nonetheless, this counter-plan did not include a clear procedure for the 
criminalising of the protests through juridical actions publicly announced in the 
manner of its predecessors.  
 
According to Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, then Special Rapporteur on human rights in 
Myanmar who visited the country not long after the events, officials informed him 
that they had responded to the protests as follows: 
Curfew N 144, under the Code of Criminal Procedure was announced according to the 
existing law by the Yangon Division Commissioner himself. The Order N 1/2007 was 
announced at 8.45 p.m. on 25 September which was made known to the public from      
9 p.m. through the towns overnight by thirty-three cars through loud-speakers, 
advertised on boards at public places and broadcasted by the City FM Radio and 
advertised in newspapers and journals… the Curfew Order was lifted step by step….27 
 
Contrary to this account, the print media does not appear to have referred to 
section 144 until October 5, ten days after the order took effect.28 Even then, the 
news reports did not consist of any announcement, mentioning the order only in 
                                                        
25 Rangoon Command, Military Administration Order No. 6/88, 9 Aug. 1988. Burma Press 
Summary, Aug. (2) 1988: 2. 
26 ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမ ႈ တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕အမိန္႔ အမွတ္ ၃-၄/၈၉၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇြန္လ ၂၇ ရက္၊ ဇူလုိင္လ ၂၀ ရက္။ (State Law and 
Order Restoration Council Order Nos. 3 & 4/89, 27 June & 20 July 1989.) ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈ 
တည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕မာရွယ္ေလာအမိန္႔ အမွတ္ ၂/၈၉၊ ၁၉၈၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလုိင္လ ၁၈ ရက္။ (State Law and Order Restoration 
Council Martial Law Order No. 2/89, 18 July 1989.) 
27 Quotation of a government statement in Pinheiro 26.  
28 A foreign ministry briefing to diplomats and representatives of international agencies on 
September 27 did mention section 144, but details of the briefing do not appear to have been 
published. The briefing paper also contained no details of the order issued under the section other 
than that it applied in the Yangon municipality and Mandalay District. Statement by His Excellency 
U Maung Myint, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myanmar at the Briefing Notes 
on Current and Truth Situation [sic] of Myanmar, Naypyitaw, 27 Sept. 2007, 4.  
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passing. The first formal government statement on October 4 also made no 
reference to section-144 orders or other legal measures.29 Contemporaneous 
eyewitness reports did describe vehicles driving through the affected townships 
declaring the curfew with loudspeakers, and council officials and Union Solidarity 
and Development Association personnel invoking section 144 when instructing 
people to stay indoors.30 Others indicated that military and police force personnel 
in subsequent days warned people by loudspeaker to disperse in accordance with 
section 144 or be fired upon.31 In short, announcements that section 144 had 
come into effect were for the most part issued orally and inexactly. 
 
Does the legal frame for the crackdown on protest matter? Most accounts of 
events in 2007 seem to assume that it does not. Scholarly articles and researchers’ 
reports refer to section 144 infrequently. Where they cite it, they sometimes 
mistake it for a provision of the Penal Code. That writers who are knowledgeable 
about Myanmar and interested in events of 2007 have shown little interest in the 
terms imposed through criminal procedure for the policing and punishment of 
protestors is indicative of how far the criminal juridical system had by this time 
disappeared from both public and scholarly view. Despite this disappearance, the 
legal frame—and in 2007, the invoking of section 144 in particular—matters, 
because even where the state apparatus does not feel bound or constrained by the 
contents of laws, if it announces an intention to follow, approximately, the 
contents and lines of procedure, it still gives some assurance of certainty in its 
administrative handling of those persons whom it detains and processes, an 
assurance that is missing in the absence of such an announcement.  
  
What is section 144? The section gives formal authority to officials to declare an 
assembly explicitly unlawful and take steps to prevent its continuance or 
reoccurrence.32 The moment of explicit criminalisation is the moment that an 
                                                        
29 ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရအဖြဲ႕ေၾကညာခ်က္အမွတ္ ၁/၂၀၀၇၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၄ ရက္။ (Government of the 
Union of Myanmar Announcement No. 1/2007, 4 Oct. 2007.)  
30 ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေအာင ္ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ဝင္း ပါ ၁၄ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၆၅၊ ရန္ကင္းၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၄ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ 
တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဌးေဌး။ [Police Captain Myint Aung v. Kyaw Win and 13, 2008 Criminal Case 
No. 265, Yankin Township Court, 24 Nov. 2008, Township Judge (Special Power) Htay Htay.] 
Human Rights Watch, Crackdown 45. 
31 Human Rights Watch, Crackdown 58, 65. 
32 Section 144 is lengthy. Its key sections for the purposes of this discussion are as follows: “(1) In 
cases where, in the opinion of a [Magistrate] there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this 
section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written 
order stating the material facts of the case and served in manner provided by section 134, direct any 
person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession 
or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or 
tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to 
any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the 
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order is passed under section 144. Before the section is invoked, individual acts by 
members of an assembly may be criminal acts, and the assembly can have a latent 
criminal quality under section 141 if its object is to commit crime. But after 
section 144 is invoked, the assembly regarding which it has been invoked is 
explicitly unlawful in accordance with the terms set down in the order, and failure 
to comply with these terms constitutes a breach of section 188 of the Penal Code.  
 
Missing from the reportage on the containment of protest in Myanmar during 
2007 is that a section-144 order is in its original construction, as still found in 
extant statutory procedure, not an executive order but a judicial one. 
Furthermore, because an order under section 144 permits the use of exceptional 
powers in order to deal with an urgent situation, in passing such an order, a judge 
is obliged to comply with certain procedures, which underscore the order’s 
juridical quality. Paragraph 394 of the Courts Manual addresses two of these. The 
first is that because a section 144 proceeding is judicial, it is open to appeal and 
revision. Superior courts have power to review a section-144 order in accordance 
with section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code to “call for and examine the 
record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court”.33 Therefore, the 
court order is supposed to set out the reasons for the court’s decision, on the basis 
of an enquiry into the facts. Indeed, in 1948 the High Court ruled that a section-
144 order not setting out the material facts of a case was invalid.34 Additionally, 
any person affected by the order is entitled to the full text of the order and is 
further entitled to go to the court that issued the order, or a higher court, to 
submit that it be revised or rescinded.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray…. (3) An order under this section may be directed to a 
particular individual or to the public generally. (4) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or 
on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section by 
himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by his predecessor in office. (5) Where such an 
application is received, the Magistrate shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing 
before him either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order and, if the Magistrate 
rejects the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing his reasons for so doing….” 
33 See Thakin Ba Thaung v. King-Emperor, 12 Ran. 283. In a 1961 ruling, the Supreme Court of 
India found with regards to section 144(4), which at that time was identical to the sub-section as it 
still appears in the law of Myanmar, that the point of this section was to enable a member of the 
public affected by an order under the section “to seek, by making an application, exemption from 
complaince with the order or to seek a modification of the order”. Babulal Parate v. State of 
Maharashtra & Others, 3 SCR (1961) 423, at 430. 
34 Directors of the Sooratee Bara Bazaar Company, Limited v. Union of Burma, 1948 BLR (HC) 
365. In the 1961 Supreme Court of India ruling cited in the preceding footnote, the court held that 
some kind of enquiry by the magistrate had to precede issuance of the order, even though the 
section did not mention it expressely, since, “It would not be possible for the magistrate to set out 
the facts [of the case as required in subsection (1)] unless he makes an enquiry or unless he is 
satisfied about the facts from personal knowledge or on a report made to him which he prima facie 
accepts as correct”. Babulal Parate, at 432. 
 249 
The second, related point made in the Courts Manual is that a section-144 order is 
issued in the manner of a summons as per section 134. This means that a person 
subject to the order must be notified formally in writing of its terms. If adequate 
steps are not taken to notify the person, the order does not stand. In the case of an 
order regarding the general public, paragraph 394 of the manual stipulates that 
copies of the order “must be posted at such place or places as may be fittest for 
conveying the information… to the public”.  
 
The executive’s takeover of judicial authority to issue orders under section 144 
removed the possibility that the courts might intervene to review or postpone an 
order. However, in 1974 and 1988 the executive still used the available media 
channels to publicise the orders fully, and as prominently and widely as possible. 
But in 2007, neither the precise contents of the orders nor the issuing authorities 
appear to have been made known in full or in writing. In 2007, in contrast to 1974 
and 1988, the publicity of the section-144 orders seems to have been deliberately 
minimal. The authorities manifestly did not use the full state media resources to 
make the text of the orders known widely, or completely. Whereas in 1974 and 
1988 the executive openly and precisely asserted its authority—leaving aside 
questions of the manner in which it actually exercised that authority—in 2007 it 
did so covertly and imprecisely. 
 
The disappearance of the judiciary from the criminal juridical response to 
unauthorised assembly is signified both by its disappearance since 1974 from the 
procedure to impose section 144, and in 2007 by the disappearance of the section-
144 order itself.35 The two critical elements of the section-144 order are that it is 
promulgated judicially and announced publicly. Where the promulgating of a 
section-144 order is done administratively and without some effort to maximise 
publicity, as was the case in 2007, it becomes an essentially discretionary act, one 
                                                        
35 The removal of authority from the judiciary to promulgate section-144 orders seems to have come 
with the change in government of 1974. When during June 1967 section 144 was imposed in 
response to intercommunal violence in Rangoon, the announcement on the front page of the daily 
newspapers indicated that the issuing authority was Ba Maung, District Magistrate, Rangoon 
(Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1/Ka/67) “Sec 144 Promulgated,” Working People’s Daily 28 June 
1967: 1. According to Myint Zan, who heard the announcement issued repeatedly on the radio, the 
contents were read out precisely, including the word for “signed” preceding the judge’s name, thus 
earning him the title “Pone Ba Maung”. By contrast, in 1974 the issuing authority in the 
announcement on the front page was Thein Aung, Chairman, Division People’s Council, Rangoon 
Division. “Order Issued Under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” Guardian (daily) 12 
Dec. 1974: 1. In 1988, the announcement was issued as Rangoon Division People’s Council 
Executive Committee Order No 1/88, 21 June 1988. Burma Press Summary, June 1988: 4. The 
council modified and lifted the order in two subsequent orders during July, both of which the state 
media announced. Rangoon Division People’s Council Executive Committee Order No. 2/88, 1 July 
1988; and, No. 3/88, 9 July 1988. Burma Press Summary, July 1988: 15. 
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in which not only the terms of promulgation but also the manner in which it is 
announced are left entirely up to the executive authorities to decide. In 2007 this 
act signalled that whatever followed by way of a response to the protests also 
would be outside an explicit juridical frame.  
The gang, the camp 
In the days and weeks before the 2007 protests reached their crescendo, residents 
of Yangon observed Dyna trucks—which in Myanmar are converted for public 
transport—parked near junctions and at other key strategic points around the 
city, with groups of men lounging in or around them. Because the trucks are 
ubiquitous, they perhaps did not immediately attract attention from many 
passers-by. One person told me that he had tried to board one, thinking it was 
running on his homeward route. When he saw a pile of wooden sticks in the back 
and one of the men inside told him to go away he realised his mistake and 
followed the instruction quickly.  
 
The Dynas and the gangs of men that they carried throughout this time did not 
appear for the first time in September 2007. They had been used to break up 
smaller unauthorised assemblies over the course of the year. Some relatives of 
persons abducted as they were on their way to pray for the release of political 
prisoners in May, a campaign to which I referred in the last chapter, wrote to the 
United Nations to describe how, 
On Tuesday, 15 May 2007… 29 of our wives, husbands, children, nephews, nieces, 
younger brothers and sisters… were forcibly and illegally taken into custody in violation 
of universal human rights and not in compliance with domestic law by an unidentified 
group of so-called “Pyithu Swanarshin” at the Insein-Sule 45 Bus Terminus at the end 
of Station Street, Sawbwagyigone…. They are currently being held at an unknown 
location.36  
 
The letter precisely identifies the ambiguity of the gang, in that it is 
simultaneously nameable and yet its members are unidentifiable. Although it has 
a name, the Pyithu Swanarshin, or generally just Swanarshin—which translates 
loosely as “masters of force”—what, in fact, is it?37 Of whom does it consist? How 
                                                        
36 “၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္ ေမလ (၁၅) ရက္ အဂၤါေန႔တြင္ xxx ကၽြန္ေတာ္၊ ကၽြန္မတို႔၏ ဇနီး၊ ခင္ပြန္း၊ သားသမီး၊ တူ၊ တူမ၊ ညီငယ္၊ ညီမငယ္ (၂၉) ဦးတို႔သည္ 
xxx ေစာ္ဘြားႀကီးကုန္းရပ္ကြက္ ဘူတာရံုလမ္းထိပ္ရွိ အင္းစိန္-ဆူေလး (၄၅) ကားဂိတ္တြင္ အမည္မသိလူတစ္စုျဖစ္ေသာ “ျပည္သူ႕စြမ္းအားရွင”္ 
ဆိုသူတို႔၏ အျပည္ျပည္ဆိုင္ရာလူအခြင့္အေရးကို ခ်ဳိးေဖာက္ကာ ျပည္တြင္းဥပေဒႏွင့္ညီၫြတ္မႈမရွိေသာ အတင္းအက်ပ္ျပဳမတရားဖမ္းဆီး 
ထိန္းသိမ္းျခင္းကို ခံခဲ့ရပါသည္။ xxx (သူတို႔ကို) အမည္မသိေနရာ၌ ခ်ဳပ္ေႏွာင္ထားလ်က္ရွိၾကပါသည္။” Copy of transcribed letter on 
file.  
37 “Swan-ar” is force, or more precisely, energetic, physical force. The suffix “-shin” denotes 
someone who possesses something or has mastery over it, as in the owner of a physical object, like a 
house owner, a house-shin (အိမ္ရငွ)္ or a quality, like a patron or benefactor, literally a benefaction-
shin (ေက်းဇူးရွင)္; a scholar, a wisdom-shin (ပညာရွင)္, or a cetana-shin, a possessor of cetana. See 
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does it exist? And why does it exist? In this section I explore these questions with 
reference to events in 2007 and their aftermath.  
 
The government acknowledged that some type of new unofficial civilian security 
force was operating alongside official bodies in 2006. According to one research 
report, it was first set up in 2005 to “provide strength in a time of emergency”.38 
However, the earliest direct reference to the group by a senior official in the state 
media that I have seen was in a press conference on 3 November 2006, when the 
police chief, Khin Yi, said that a group called “Swanarshin” was involved in 
making an arrest, adding that,  
For our nation’s security and so as to constantly obtain information about [possible] 
destructive attacks, Swanarshin are joining with police force personnel at train stations, 
bus terminals, ports, airports, incoming and outgoing roads and so on, and at all these 
places are working continuously day and night on searches and investigations.39 
 
Although assembled journalists would have known of the group’s existence from 
their own sources, the police chief’s direct reference to it seems to have been 
novel for them also, since one asked him to explain the meaning of “Swanarshin”. 
He replied that,  
The meaning of Swanarshin is that our country’s people are the country’s “masters of 
force”. They are our country’s strength. For this reason, when sorting out all of our 
country’s affairs, we are drawing upon and using this mighty force, this people’s 
strength. Now, in the various tasks that we are carrying out for the rule of law [taya-
ubade-somoye], regional peace and tranquillity and so on, fire fighters, Red Cross 
members, PDC members and the rest are lending assistance of their own volition 
[cetana] without a penny in payment, and as these individuals are a mighty force, the 
state chose and designated the word Swanarshin with which to honour and refer to 
them.40 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
further, Cheesman, “Legitimising the Union of Myanmar through Primary School Textbooks,”    
129-30, 35-36. I prefer the term “master” to “possessor” of force to describe the Swanarshin because 
I think it better conveys a sense of the fascist character of the group, in the literal and original sense 
of the term “fasces”, the gang members being the bearers of rods representing sovereign power, here 
with which to assault people.  
38 The White Shirts: How the USDA Will Become the New Face of Burma’s Dictatorship (Mae 
Sariang: Network for Democracy and Development, 2006), 53.  
39 “ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ႏိုင္ငံအတြက္ လံုျခံဳေရးန႔ဲ ေဖာက္ခြဲဖ်က္ဆီးေရးသတင္းမ်ားစဥ္ဆက္မျပတ္ ရယူေနတာျဖစ္တဲ့အတြက္ေၾကာင့္ ဘူတာေတြ၊ 
ကားဂိတ္ေတြ၊ ေရဆိပ္ေတြ၊ ေလဆိပ္ေတြ၊ ဝင္လမ္းေတြ၊ ထြက္လမ္းေတြစသည္ျဖင့္ ဒီေနရာေတြအားလံုးမွာ ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲဝင္ေတြဟာ စြမ္းအားရွင္ေတြန႔ဲ 
ေပါင္းစပ္ၿပီးေတာ့ ေန႔ညမျပတ္ ရွာေဖြစစ္ေဆးျခင္းေတြကို ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ေန႔ည ေတာက္ေလွ်ာက္လုပ္ေနတာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။” ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အေနျဖင့္ 
ျပည္ပရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွံမႈေတြ က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔အခြင့္အေရးေပးၿပီးေခၚေဆာင္၊ စာ ၁၂ (“The State Has Given Ample Opportunity 
to Bring in External Investments,” 12.) 
40 “စြမ္းအားရွင္ဆိုတဲ့ အဓိပၸာယ္ကေတာ့ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ တိုင္းျပည္မွာ ျပည္သူျပည္သားေတြဟာ တိုင္းျပည္ရဲ႕ စြမ္းအားရွင္ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ တိုင္းျပည္ရဲ႕ 
အားပဲျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အဲဒီေၾကာင့္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔က တိုင္းျပည္ရဲ႕အေရးအရာကိစၥေတြအားလံုးကို ေျဖရွင္းတဲ့အခါမွာ အဲဒီစြမ္းအားေတြ၊ 
အဲဒီျပည္သူေတြရဲ႕ အားေတြကို ယူၿပီးေတာ့၊ အသံုးခ်ၿပီးေတာ့ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ ေဆာင္ရြက္ရတာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အခု ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ လက္ရွိ 
ေဆာင္ရြက္ေနတဲ့ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရး၊ ရပ္ရြာေအးခ်မ္းသာယာေရး စတဲ့လုပ္ငန္းအရပ္ရပ္ကို ေဆာင္ရြက္တဲ့အခါမွာ မီးသတ္တို႔၊ ၾကက္ေျခနီတို႔၊ 
ရယကတို႔စသည္ျဖင့္ အဲဒီပုဂ ၢိဳလ္ေတြဟာ လစာရိကၡာတစ္ျပားတစ္ခ်ပ္မွ မရဘဲန႔ဲ သီျခားေစတနာအေလ်ာက္ကူညီေပးေနတဲ့ 
စြမ္းအားမ်ားျဖစ္တဲ့အတြက္ေၾကာင့္ ဒီပုဂၢိဳလ္မ်ားကို စြမ္းအားရွင္လို႔ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္က စာလံုးေရြးခ်ယ္သတ္မွတ္ၿပီးေတာ့ ဂုဏ္ျပဳေခၚေဝၚျခင္းျဖစ္ပါတယ္။” 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အေနျဖင့္ ျပည္ပရင္းႏွီးျမႇဳပ္ႏွမံႈေတြ က်ယ္က်ယ္ျပန္႔ျပန္႔ အခြင့္အေရးေပးၿပီးေခၚေဆာင္၊ စာ ၁၃။ (“The State Has Given 
Ample Opportunity to Bring in External Investments,” 13.) 
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Khin Yi’s conflating of the gang with the fire brigade and Red Cross, agencies 
called upon to contribute to routine security tasks, conceals the distinctive 
purpose of the Swanarshin. Those other bodies are permanent, official groups 
with large memberships whom the state aims to tap into at times of emergency. 
By contrast, the gang is unofficial, situation-specific and poorly defined. Khin Yi 
does not announce the gang; he simply acknowledges that one day it was there.41 
Recognition of the gang follows from its presence at the site of an arrest. It is not 
inaugurated or proclaimed in advance of its factual existence. In short, the gang 
operates in the open but without any precise frame of reference for people who 
see it do its work or who become its targets. 
 
The ambiguous quality of the Swanarshin is manifest in the difficulty of writing 
about it. The gang to me seems to defy tense, voice and person. Was it one gang or 
many? Here I choose to write in the singular, as the manner in which it operated 
and in which officials like Khin Yi referred to it suggest the existence of a project 
for the creation of an entity going by this name; however, the manner of the 
gang’s operations equally invites us to think about it as a multitude of isolated, 
loosely connected entities. Who was responsible for the gang? Apparently, it was 
part of a project organised out of the centre, a project intimately connected to 
sovereign power, but at any given moment, which official or institution was 
responsible for what part of the gang’s activities is obscure, and so far as I am 
aware, no individual or agency ever claimed ownership of it. Therefore, when 
writing about the gang I have chosen to use passive voice deliberately, because the 
precise origins of the gang and the persons behind it remain unknown, and 
because the denial of agency was somehow integral to the gang’s character and 
activities.42 Finally, is the gang an institution of the past or present? Just as one 
day it was there, another day apparently it was not. The disappearance of the gang 
at some point, or over some time, following the events of 2007 was as ambiguous 
as its appearance. Thus, although I write in this chapter of the gang in past tense, 
I do so not because of evidence to prove that it does not exist, only the absence of 
anything to prove that it does.  
 
                                                        
41 “Diels, the head of the Gestapo, could declare, ‘Neither an order nor an instruction exists for the 
origin of the [concentration] camps: they were not instituted; one day they were there’….” Agamben, 
Homo Sacer 169. 
42 On an analogous problem of “unnameability” in the dynamics of the state and exercise of political 
power in Thailand, see Tyrell Haberkorn, “States of Transgression: Politics, Violence and Agrarian 
Transformation in Northern Thailand,” PhD diss., Cornell University, 2007, ch. 5, 6. 
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The Swanarshin was a new phenomenon in Myanmar. We must distinguish it not 
only from existing state agencies, but also from the militia forces that came before 
it. When in the 1950s the government tried to organise proliferating armed 
groups into paramilitary levies—which I mentioned briefly in chapter two—its 
objective was to secure some control over parts of the country where it had none. 
It aimed to bring irregular forces under some kind of centralised control, however 
tenuous. When in the 1960s the government armed and organised villagers into 
people’s militia, it did so under the official guidance of the military with a view to 
bringing more citizens into the fight against insurgents. In these and other 
instances in subsequent periods, the problem facing the state was one of capacity. 
Its purpose was to rally people and weaponry to its defence, and over time to 
integrate and formalise its authority over them.  
 
The role of the Swanarshin in 2006-07 was the opposite of paramilitary groups 
from earlier episodes. Its role, apparently, was to dis-integrate and in-formalise 
state authority at a time when state security forces were otherwise fully integrated 
and formalised, and also at a time when their resources and scale were 
formidable. No problem of capacity existed for which the gang could have been 
justified as an auxiliary. Nor did the gang serve any conventional security purpose 
that could supplement the work in which official agencies are already engaged. 
Therefore, the Swanarshin was not an auxiliary, but a proxy. Its function was not 
to supplement existing agencies at all, not to lend assistance, but to be a 
substitute. Its function was to play the role of the police or military in their stead, 
and to do so in a manner that was detached from the ordinary rules and 
procedures that apply to those official agencies. In other words, the gang went 
beyond the simple eliminating of bases for the rule of law through maintenance of 
law and order with which I have been concerned throughout these chapters, and 
constituted a repudiation of the rules on which the system as police routinely 
operates.  
 
Although the Swanarshin was not analogous to any group in Myanmar or Burma 
before it, it does bear comparison with some clandestine right-wing forces set up 
in other parts of Southeast Asia during the last half-century, such as vigilante 
groups under the Marcos and Suharto dictatorships in the Philippines and 
Indonesia, and the Red Gaurs, the Krathing Daeng, which operated in Thailand 
during the 1970s. The Red Gaurs were organised under an officer of the Internal 
Security Operations Command to work closely with the police force: men with no 
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ideological commitments, lured by promises of money, alcohol and sex.43 Ben 
Anderson described the Red Gaurs as hooligans who were given “a quasi-
sociological respectability by journalists and academics who have identified them 
simply as vocational school students”.44 Wire services and human rights 
investigators in 2007 also wrongly characterised the Swanarshin as some kind of 
pro-government militia, when in fact it lacked any of the qualities of a military 
force, and was not “pro-” government but “of” government, in the sense that its 
genesis was somewhere within the state apparatus. And as in the case of the Red 
Gaurs, the confusion about the identity and origins of the Swanarshin presumably 
was purposeful. If eyewitnesses and journalists could not clearly identify the gang, 
then how could they tell with any degree of certainty what had or had not 
happened? The unidentifiability of the gang corresponded with its deniability.  
 
At the time of the protests in 2007, recruitment to the Swanarshin seems to have 
been a responsibility mainly of local administrators. Lacking precise instructions, 
given the deliberately ambiguous character of the gang, these administrators 
performed this task inconsistently. But the men whom they recruited seem to 
have belonged to two broad categories: one, a cadre of members who routinely 
worked with the administrators, police officers and other officials; and the other, 
hired muscle recruited for a short time with the promise of some money, food and 
alcohol. The cadre seems to have consisted of men motivated by personal 
interests, and of conscripts. The former type included criminals who could 
ingratiate themselves with policemen and local government officials, and get 
protection and contacts through membership. The latter type seems to have 
consisted of small businessmen who depend upon local officials for licences to 
operate, and who could ill-afford to decline a request to sign up. Some probably 
also did so willingly, knowing that they would later be able to call upon officials 
for small favours of the sort necessary to run a business in Myanmar.  
 
For its part, the muscle is easily found anywhere in a country where large 
numbers of able-bodied men daily search for any work that they can find. 
According to one reported testimony of a man recruited in the days before the 
protests, a local criminal whom he had known when he was also stealing for a 
                                                        
43 Katherine A. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the Village 
Scout Movement in Thailand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) 106. 
44 Ben Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup,” 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9.3 (1977): 19.  
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living had offered him the work by misleading him into thinking that they would 
join a police force vice operation in the suburbs:  
On 23-9-2007, Bosu (a) Kyimyindaing/Thein Zaw said to me, “If your work is no good, 
will you come with us? You’ll get a net daily wage of 3,000 Kyat.” When I said, “What 
will I have to do?” Bosu said, “We’ll go with the police in Insein Township and North 
Okkalapa Township and make arrests at bootlegging shops and places inhabited by bad 
women.” He said, “So that the police don’t mistake you [for someone frequenting the 
premises] we’ll give you an armband.” … I went with Bosu (a) Kyimyindaing. I saw 
many others like me when I arrived at riot Police Battalion 3 at around 11 p.m. on 23-9-
2007. From 23-9-2007 to 25-9-2007 we did nothing. They fed us regularly and gave a 
good amount of alcohol in the afternoon. At about 8 a.m. on the 26th, an officer from 
Police Battalion 1 ordered us to line up. He told us, roughly a hundred in number, 
“Comrades, now it is necessary for your unit to participate actively and loyally together 
with we police in crushing an enemy.”45 
 
The testimony continued that once they boarded trucks each man received a 
bamboo stick and when they arrived at the city centre the police directed them to 
assault protestors. The trucks then conveyed detained people to undisclosed 
locations under control of the police or military. Contemporaneous state news 
reports gave voice to the ambiguity of this process, often describing persons not 
as having been arrested by any identifiable agency but as having been “brought, 
held, questioned and investigated”.46 Those responsible for the abductions were 
“people not desirous of disturbances”.47 When cases against abducted persons 
came to court, some of their abductors, members of the gang’s cadre, appeared as 
witnesses. One who identified himself explicitly as Swanarshin when asked by the 
defendant whether he came to make an arrest of his own accord or in conjunction 
with the police replied that: 
[Prosecution witness:] We did not arrest. We just rendered assistance.  
To whom did you render assistance?—With a mind to avert a disturbance, we rendered 
assistance. I acted as a member of the public, to avert a disturbance, to avoid disruption 
of the thoroughfare.48 
                                                        
45 “၂၃-၉-၂၀၀၇ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ဘိုးစူး (ခ) ၾကည့္ျမင္တိုင္ (ခ) သိန္းေဇာ္ဆိုသူမွ ကၽြန္ေတာ့္ကို မင္းအလုပ္မေကာင္းရင္ ငါတို႔န႔ဲလိုက္မလား၊ တေန႔ကို 
စားရိတ္ၿငိမ္း ၃၀၀၀ က်ပ္ရမည္ဟု ေျပာပါသည္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ဘာလုပ္ရမလဲဟု ေျပာေသာအခါ ၎ဘိုးစူး xxx မွ ငါတို႔ အင္းစိန္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ႏွင့္ 
ေျမာက္ဥကၠလာပၿမိဳ႕နယ္တို႔တြင္ အရက္ပုန္းေရာင္းမည့္ဆိုင္ႏွင့္ မေကာင္းသည့္မိန္းမမ်ား ေနထိုင္ရာကို ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲေတြန႔ဲဝင္ေရာက္ဖမ္းဆီးမယ္ဟု 
ေျပာၾကားၿပီး မင္းကိုလည္း တို႔ရဲေတြ လူမမွားေစရန္ လက္ပတ္တခုေပးထားမည္ဟု ေျပာပါသည္။ xxx ကၽြန္ေတာ္ ဘိုးဆူး (ခ) ၾကည့္ျမင္တိုင္တို႔န႔ဲ 
လုိက္သြားပါသည္။ ၂၃-၉-၂၀၀၇ ည ၁၁ နာရီအခ်ိန္ခန္႔တြင္ လံုထိန္းရဲတပ္ရင္း (၃) တြင္ ကၽြန္ေတာ္ကဲ့သို႔ လူမ်ားစြာေရာက္ေနသည္ကို 
ေတြ႕ရွိပါသည္။ ၂၃-၉-၂၀၀၇ မွ ၂၅-၉-၂၀၀၇ ထိ ဘာမွ်မလုပ္ရပါ။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ကို အခ်ိန္တန္ ထမင္းေကၽြး၊ ညေနအရက္တိုက္ ေကာင္းေကာင္း 
ထားၿပီး၊ ၂၆ ရက္ေန႔ နံနက္ ၈ နာရီအခ်ိန္ခန္႔တြင္ ရဲတပ္ရင္း (၁) မွ ရဲအရာရွိမွ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ကို လူတန္းစီၿပီး မိန္႔ခြန္းေျပာပါသည္။ ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ 
လူတရာခန္႔ေလာက္ကို ရဲေဘာ္တို႔ အခု ကၽြန္ေတာ္တို႔ ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲ ေတြႏွင့္အတူ တပ္ဖြ႔ဲမွ ရန္သူကို ေခ်မႈန္းရာတြင္ တက္တက္ႂကြႂကြ သစၥာရွိစြာ 
ပါဝင္ၾကဖို႔ ေျပာဆို xxx။” ျပည္သူအမ်ား သိၾကေစရန္ သူခိုးတဦး၏ သက္ေသခံခ်က္၊ (The Witness Testimony of a Thief for 
People’s Information) Burma Update, PDC/NCUB, 274, 29 Nov. 2007. 
46 “ေခၚယူထိန္းသိမ္းေမးျမန္းစစ္ေဆး”။ 
47 “ဆူပူလႈပ္ရွားမႈကို မလိုလားေသာ ျပည္သူလူထု”။ 
48 “က်ေနာ္တို႔က ဖမ္းတာမဟုတ္ပါ။ ကူညီေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္းသာျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ဘယ္သူကိုကူညီေဆာင္ရြက္တာလဲဆိုလွ်င္ ဆူပူမႈမျဖစ္ေစလိုေသာ 
စိတ္ျဖင့္ ကူညီေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ျပည္သူတေယာက္အေနျဖင့္ ဆူပူမႈမျဖစ္ေစရန္ သြားေရးလာေရးခက္ခဲမႈျဖစ္ေစရန္ ေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္း 
ျဖစ္ပါသည္။” ရဲအုပ္စိုးႏိုင္ ႏွင့္ ဦးအုန္းသန္း၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၂၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဦးခင္ေမာင္ျမင္၏့ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၄၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၇ ရက္။ (Inspector Soe Naing v. U Ohn Than, 2008 Criminal 
Case No. 12, Yangon Western District Court, Testimony of U Khin Maung Myint, Prosecution 
Witness No. 4, 7 Feb. 2008.)  
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Eyewitnesses with camera phones and other small recording devices captured this 
manner of “rendering assistance”, and websites broadcast it worldwide. Footage 
from August 25, for instance, shows a group of unidentified men snatching at the 
limbs of Htin Kyaw, an activist who had led protests on economic issues earlier in 
the year. They carry him to an idling Dyna truck on the side of a crowded 
downtown street, which speeds off into heavy traffic as a small crowd of onlookers 
gathers. When Htin Kyaw’s case came to court, one of the gang members 
testified.49 According to his testimony, he and another man “took hold of him [the 
defendant] between us and brought him to the [township council] office…. I saw 
that he was then taken by car to the military regional office”.50 Beginning the 
cross-examination, the defence attorney picked up on the manner of his client’s 
abduction both during the protest in February and again in August: 
The Pansodan Police Station is on Konzedan Road in the vicinity of Theindawgyi 
[where the protest occurred] and the [township council] office is opposite bus stop 105 
on Mahabandoola Road.—Correct. 
Although the police station is on Konzedan Road, on each of these days not a single 
uniformed police officer was present.—I don’t know. 
Do you know that if there is a demonstration like that, [by law] it must be halted either 
by an on-duty police officer or judge?—I don’t know.  
On the day[s] during the time when Ko Htin Kyaw demonstrated, neither a judge nor 
on-duty police officer from the police station was present.—Police Officer Myint Swe 
and Station Commander U Kyaw Tint were present.  
On 22-2-07 Police Captain Myint Swe and Station Commander U Kyaw Tint did not 
make the arrest. Only civilians were involved.—Incorrect.  
Who arrested Ko Htin Kyaw?—As I have testified, Station Commander U Kyaw Tint 
and Township Officer U Myint Swe made the arrest…. 
On 25-8-07 the people who arrested Ko Htin Kyaw were people in civvies from the 
military region [command].—No, Ko Min Min and I made the arrest. 
You are not police service personnel and therefore you have no authority to arrest.—I 
don’t know.51 
                                                        
49 The witness is not identified explicitly as a Swanarshin member. His profession is recorded as 
“trader” (ကုန္သည္). The contents of his testimony indicate that he was operating under the 
instructions of the Papedan Township council but was not a government official. 
50 “ေဘးတဖက္တခ်က္ညႇပ္၍ မယကရံုးဘက္သို႔ ေခၚခဲ့ပါသည္။ xxx ၎အား ကားျဖင့္ စစ္ေဒသရံုးသို႔ေခၚေဆာင္သြားေၾကာင္းေတြ႔ပါသည္။” 
ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ထင္ေက်ာ ္(ခ) ေက်ာ္ထင၊္ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၆၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဦးေမာင္ေမာင္ေထြး၏ 
ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၀ ရက္၊ စာ ၂။ [Police Captain Myint Swe v. Htin Kyaw 
(a) Kyaw Htin, 2008 Criminal Case No. 16, Yangon Western District Court, Testimony of U Maung 
Maung Htwe, Prosecution Witness No. 2, 20 Mar. 2008: 2.] 
51 “သိမ္ေတာ္ႀကီးအနီးပတ္ဝန္းက်င္တြင္ ကုန္ေစ်းတန္းလမ္းတြင္ ပန္းဘဲတန္းရဲစခန္းရွိၿပီး မဟာဗႏၶဳလလမ္း ၁၀၅ မွတ္တိုင္ႏွင့္ မ်က္ေစာင္းထိုးတြင္ 
မယကရံုးရွိသည္ဆိုက မွန္ပါသည္။ အခ်င္းျဖစ္ေန႔မ်ားတြင္ ကုန္ေစ်းတန္းလမ္းတြင္ ရဲစခန္းရွိေသာ္လည္း ရဲယူနီေဖာင္းဝတ္ျဖင့္ တဦးတေယာက္မွ် 
မရွိခဲ့ဆိုက မသိပါ။ ထိုကဲ့သို႔ ဆႏၵျပခဲ့လွ်င္ တာဝန္ရွိသူရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲမွဴးမွေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း၊ တရားသူႀကီးမွေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း တားဆီးခဲ့ရမည္ကို 
သိသလားဆိုပါက က်ေနာ္မသိပါ။ ထိုေန႔က ကိုထင္ေက်ာ္ဆႏၵျပစဥ္အခ်ိန္က မည္သည့္တရားသူႀကီးေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း၊ ရဲစခန္းမွ တာဝန္ရွိသူ 
ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲမွဴးေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း မရွိဆိုက ရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြႏွင့္ စခန္းမွဴးဦးေက်ာ္တင့္တို႔ရွိပါသည္။ ၂၂-၂-၀၇ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြႏွင့္ စခန္းမွဴး 
ဦးေက်ာ္တင့္တို႔မွ ဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့ျခင္းမရွိပဲ အရပ္သူအရပ္သားမ်ားကသာ ဝိုင္းဝန္းဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့ျခင္းဆိုက မဟုတ္ပါ။ ကိုထင္ေက်ာအ္ား မည္သူဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့လဲ 
ဆိုက က်ေနာ့္အဓိကထြက္ဆိုခဲ့သည့္အတိုင္း စခန္းမွဴးဦးေက်ာ္တင့္ႏွင့္ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္မွဴး ဦးျမင့္ေဆြတို႔မွ ဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ xxx ၂၅-၈-၀၇ 
ရက္ေန႔က ကိုထင္ေက်ာ္အားဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့သူမ်ားမွာ စစ္ေဒသမွ အရပ္အဝတ္အစားႏွင့္ လူမ်ားျဖစ္သည္ဆိုက မဟုတ္ပါ။ က်ေနာ္ႏွင့္ ကိုမင္းမင္းမွ 
ဖမ္းဆီးခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ က်ေနာ္တို႔မွ တာဝန္ရွိရဲဝန္ထမ္းမ်ား မဟုတ္၍ ဖမ္းဆီးပိုင္ခြင့္မရွိဆိုက မသိပါ။” ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ထင္ေက်ာ ္(ခ) 
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At night, in a more familiar and longstanding practice, unidentified men moved 
from the streets and into people’s houses. The Special Rapporteur on human 
rights in Myanmar estimated that, “Between 3,000 and 4,000 people were 
arrested in September and October…. Most of the arrests took place during the 
crackdown on the demonstrations and the night raids carried out by the security 
forces and non law enforcement officials….”52 One person whom officials took 
away during a night raid was Daw Win Mya Mya, an organiser of the National 
League for Democracy in Mandalay. According to her brother,  
A group of about 10 Mandalay Division Police in civvies along with the Ward PDC 
arrived at our house at 12 p.m. They said that they wanted to see Daw Win Mya Mya, 
that they had some things to ask her. Daw Win Mya Mya asked, “If that’s so, are you 
taking me to prison? Where are you taking me?” They said that they didn’t know.53  
 
Although Win Mya Mya’s brother identified the group of officials as policemen, 
the men removing people from houses at night did not ordinarily make 
themselves known. They declined to give answers when pressed on their 
identities. According to a famous comedian, Par Par Lay, men came to take from 
his house in Mandalay on the night of September. When asked by a radio 
interviewer as to who took him, he said,  
My sister-in-law, who was at my house, asked that, saying, “Which agency are you 
from? Tell us, on what matter are you taking him? What’re your names?” “You don’t 
need to know,” they said. They spoke like that and we went. There was another person 
in the car, with his face covered. I don’t know who.54 
 
As in the case of persons snatched from the streets, someone taken from her 
house had no idea how long she would be gone, where she would be going, or how 
she would be treated. In Win Mya Mya’s case, the police took her on September 
28. The radio station broadcast her brother’s interview the following day. The 
police did not bring charges against her and four colleagues until almost a year 
later.55 When the cases came to court, the police recorded the date of arrest of all 
                                                                                                                                                        
ေက်ာ္ထင၊္ ဦးေမာင္ေမာင္ေထြး၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ စာ ၂-၄။ [Police Captain Myint Swe v. Htin Kyaw (a) Kyaw Htin, 
Testimony of U Maung Maung Htwe: 2-4.]  
52 Pinheiro 13. 
53 “မႏၱေလးတိုင္းရဲအဖဲြ႔ ၁၀ ဦးေလာက္က အရပ္ဝတ္န႔ဲေပါ႔ ည ၁၂ နာရီမွာ ရဝတန႔ဲအတူ အိမ္ေရာက္လာပါတယ္၊ ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမကို ေတြ႔ခ်င္ပါတယ္၊ 
ေမးျမန္းစရာရွိလို႔ပါလို႔ ေျပာတယ္။ ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမကလည္း အဲဒါဆိုလို႔ရွိရင္ေတာ့ ေထာင္ေခၚသြားမွာလား၊ ဘယ္ကို ေခၚသြားမွာလဲလို႔ ေမးတယ္။ 
သူတို႔က အဲဒါေတာ့ သူတို႔ မသိပါဘူးလို႔ ေျပာသြားတယ္။” မႏၱေလးတိုင္း စည္းရံုးေရးမွဴး ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမ ေနအိမ္တြင္လာေရာက္ ဖမ္းဆီးခံရ၊ 
(Mandalay Division Organizing Executive Daw Win Mya Mya Arrested at Home), VOA, 29 Sept. 
2007.  
54 “အဲဒါ က်ေနာ့္အိမ္က က်ေနာ့္ ခယ္မေရာေမးတယ္။ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ဘယ္အဖဲြ႔ကလဲ၊ ဘာကိစၥန႔ဲ ေခၚတာလဲ ေျပာပါဦး၊ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ နာမည္ 
ဘယ္လိုေခၚလဲဆိုတာ။ ခင္ဗ်ားတို႔ သိစရာမလိုဘူးတဲ့၊ အဲဒီလိုေျပာသြားတယ္။ ကားေပၚမွာလည္း မ်က္ႏွာစည္းထားတဲ့လူတေယာက္ပါတယ္။ 
သူ႔ကိုလည္း က်ေနာ္မသိဘူး။” မၾကာခင္က ျပန္လြတ္လာတဲ့ လူရႊင္ေတာ္ ဦးပါပါေလးန႔ဲ ဆက္သြယ္ေမးျမန္ခ်က္၊ (Interview with 
Comedian U Par Par Lay Who Was Recently Released), VOA, 1 Nov. 2007.  
55 All four cases decided on 24 October 2008 in the Aungmyay-thazan Township Court, Additional 
Township Judge (Special Power) Daw Baby presiding: ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင့္ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမ ပါ ၅ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ 
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five persons as 15 August 2008. Lawyers for the accused cross-examined 
investigating policemen in court about the gap: 
Do you know that U Kan Htun was arrested on 6-10-07 and Daw Win Mya Mya on 28-
9-07?—I don’t know.  
Do you know that the date recorded for the arrest of the two accused in the current case 
as brought before the court is 15-8-08?—I don’t know how the investigation was 
conducted. 
Do you know that in almost 1 year since arrest no bond or bail was given?—I don’t 
know how the investigation was conducted.56 
 
The period between the date that the police removed Win Mya Mya from her 
house and the date recorded as the date of her arrest I designate, drawing on 
Agamben, as “the camp”.57 This camp was not an explicit space, but an anomalous 
one into which people could be forcibly disappeared. Unlike in some other Asian 
countries, such as Sri Lanka in the late 1980s and Nepal in the early 2000s, in 
Myanmar these disappearances were not permanent, for systemic reasons that I 
will explain in the remainder of this chapter.58  
 
Since the camp is neither a specific place nor institution, physically it can be 
located anywhere. In 2007, it encompassed both conventional detention facilities 
and non-conventional ones. Officials locked up hundreds of people in prisons, but 
without following ordinary procedures for record keeping. Other detainees they 
variously held at an interrogation centre, called Kyaikkasan; at a technical 
institute; and, at a police battalion camp, which is not a police station under the 
                                                                                                                                                        
၆၀၅၊ ေအာင္ေျမသာစံၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၂၄ ရက္၊ တြဲဖက္ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး (အထူးအာဏာ) ေဒၚေဘဘီ။ 
(Police Captain Win Myint v. Daw Win Mya Mya & 4, 2008 Criminal Case No. 605.) ဒုရဲမွဴးသိုက္ၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ 
ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမ ပါ ၂ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၀၈။ (Police Captain Thaik Nyunt v. Daw Win Mya Mya & Another, 
2008 Criminal Case No. 608.) ဒုရဲမွဴးသိုက္ၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမ ပါ ၃ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၀၉။ (Police Captain 
Thaik Nyunt v. Daw Win Mya Mya and 2, 2008 Criminal Case No. 609.) ဒုရဲမွဴးသိုက္ၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ဦးသန္းလြင္    ပါ 
၃၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၁၀။ (Police Captain Thaik Nyunt v. U Than Lwin and 2, 2008 Criminal Case 
No. 610.)  
56 “ဦးကံထြန္းအား (၆-၁၀-၂၀၀၇) ေန႔တြင္၎ ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမအား (၂၈-၉-၀၇) တြင္၎ ဖမ္းတားသည္ကို သိပါသလားဆိုက မသိပါ။ ယခုအမႈတြင္ 
ရံုးေရွ႕စြပ္စြဲခံရသူ (၂) ဦးအား (၁၅-၈-၀၈) ေန႔တြင္ ဖမ္းထားသည္ဟု ေဖာ္ျပထားသည္ကို သိလားဆိုက အမႈစစ္လုပ္ငန္းျဖစ္၍ မသိပါ။ (၁) ႏွစ္နီးပါး 
ဖမ္းထားၿပီး ခံဝန္လုပ္ၿပီး အာမခံေပးထားျခင္းမရွိသည္ကို သိလားဆိုက အမႈစစ္လုပ္ငန္းျဖစ္၍ မသိပါ။” ဒုရဲမွဴးသိုက္ၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚဝင္းျမျမ ပါ ၂ ၊ 
၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၀၈၊ ေအာင္ေျမသာစံၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ရဲအုပ္ဘိုေအး၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁ ရက္၊ စာ ၃။ (Police Captain Thaik Nyunt v. Daw Win Mya Mya and Another, 2008 
Criminal Case No. 608, Aungmyay-thazan Township Court, Testimony of Inspector Bo Aye, 
Prosecution Witness No. 2, 1 Sept. 2008: 3.)  
57 Agamben, Homo Sacer, ch. 7. 
58 On Sri Lanka see, for example, Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary 
Removal and Disappearance of Certain Persons (All Island) (Appointed by Her Excellency, the 
President of Sri Lanka, by Warrant No.: SP/6/N/214/97, dated 30 Apr. 1998, 2001). Moon Jeong-
ho and Bruce Van Voorhis, An Exceptional Collapse of the Rule of Law: Told through Stories by 
Families of the Disappeared in Sri Lanka (Hong Kong: Asian Legal Resource Centre & Asian Human 
Rights Commission, 2004). On Nepal see, for example, Asian Legal Resource Centre and Advocacy 
Forum, “Missing and Maimed: Case Studies of Forced Disappearances and Torture Committed by 
the Nepalese Security Forces,” Article 2 3.6 (2004): 15-53. Conflict-Related Disappearances in 
Bardiya District [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Nepal), 
2008]. 
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terms of criminal procedure and therefore also not an official place of detention. 
A woman released from detention at the technical institute described it as follows:  
They brought us to the Insein teaching school, and put us in this school. I saw people 
being beaten there, people with head wounds, with broken limbs, this type of thing. We 
were famished and were prohibited from bathing. They didn’t feed us. In the room, 
there were over 150 women and there was a room to one side for disposal of excrement; 
we just had to dispose of it in there. As time went on the excrement stank and it was 
unbearable.59  
 
Some detainees the camp’s guardians moved from place to place, underscoring 
the quality of the camp as a body of practices rather than a specific location. For 
example, a university student missing from her family for over six weeks said that 
she was first kept at Kyaikkasan, then sent to Insein Prison, then sent back to 
Kyaikkasan, and then to Police Battalion 3 before finally being released.60 The 
famous comedian Zarganar, who was freed but charged later, as described below, 
said that he was first kept at the Aungthapyay interrogation camp, then after a 
week sent to Insein, where he was first put in the dog kennels, and then in one of 
the buildings.61 In each person’s case, the locus of the camp was the detainee 
himself: the camp was wherever the person was suspended.  
 
To ask questions of the camp was pointless. The mother of a 17-year-old detainee 
watched some men take her son on October 10. She waited until the end of the 
month to get some news. Special Branch police officers came to the house and 
told the family that he was being kept at Insein Prison, and that they could send 
food and other items to him, although they would not be allowed to meet him: 
They came to arrest him at home, took him from home. Of course, they said that they’d 
take him for about three days. They said that after they’d take him we’d hear from 
them. But we didn’t hear anything. Now they say, “We’ll permit you to bring things [to 
him]. Of course we permit you to bring things. Come.”62  
 
The mother said that when delivering food to her child she asked, 
                                                        
59 “သမိးတို႔ကိုေခၚသြားတဲ့ အင္းစိန္ သင္တန္းေက်ာင္းမွာ၊ အဲဒီသင္တန္းေက်ာင္းမွာ သမီးတို႔ကို ထားတယ္။ အဲဒီမွာ ရိုက္ႏွက္ခံထားရတဲ့ 
သူေတြလည္းေတြ႔ရတယ္။ ေခါင္းကဲြတဲ့ သူေတြလည္း ကြဲတယ္၊ လက္က်ဳိးေနတဲ့သူေတြလည္း က်ဳိးေနတယ္ အဲဒီလိုမ်ဳိး ေတြ႔ရတယ္။ 
ထမင္းသံုးနပ္ငတ္တယ္၊ ေရကလည္း လံုးဝခ်ဳိးခြင့္မေပးဘူး။ ထမင္း မကၽြးဘူး၊ အခန္းထဲမွာ အမ်ဳိးသမီး ၁၅၀ ေက်ာ္ကို အညစ္အေၾကး 
စြန္႔လို႔ရွိရင္လည္း အဲဒီေဘးဖက္မွာ အခန္းတခန္းရွိတယ္၊ အဲဒီအခန္းမွာပဲ အညစ္အေၾကးစြန္႔ရတယ္။ ၾကာလာတဲ့အခါက်ေတာ့ 
အညစ္အေၾကးေတြက နံလာၿပီးေတာ့ ေနလို႔မရဘူး ျဖစ္လာတယ္။” ထိန္းသိမ္းခံေနရသူေတြရဲ႕ အေျခအေနဆိုးေတြကို လြတ္ေျမာက္လာသူ 
တေယာက္က ျပန္လည္ေျပာျပ၊ (A Released Person Recounts Detainees’ Bad Conditions), VOA, 8 Oct. 2007.  
60 ဖမ္းဆီးခံရၿပီး သတင္းေပ်ာက္လူေပ်ာက္ျဖစ္ေနေသာ မေအးျမင့္ျမတ္ ျပန္လည္လြတ္ေျမာက္၊ (Ma Aye Myint Myat Who 
Disappeared After Arrest Released), VOA, 27 Nov. 2007.  
61 လူရႊင္ေတာ္ ဇာဂနာရဲ႕ ေထာင္တြင္းအေတြ႔အၾကံဳအေၾကာင္း ဆက္သြယ္ေမးျမန္းခ်က္၊ (Interview With Comedian Zarganar 
About His Experiences in Prison), VOA, 18 Oct. 2007. 
62 “အိမ္မွာပဲ လာဖမ္းသြားတာပါ၊ အိမ္ကေနၿပီးေတာ့ ေခၚသြားတာပါ။ သူတို႔ေျပာတုန္းကေတာ့ (၃) ရက္ေလာက္ဆိုၿပီး ေခၚသြားတာေပါ႔။ 
ေခၚသြားၿပီးေတာ့ အေၾကာင္းၾကားမယ္လို႔ ေျပာတယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့္ အေၾကာင္းမၾကားဘူး၊ အခုက်မွ သူတို႔က ပစၥည္းေတြဘာေတြ ပို႔ခြင့္ျပဳမယ္လို႔ 
ေျပာတယ္၊ ပို႔ခြင့္ျပဳတယ္ေပါ႔၊ လာပို႔ပါလို႔ ေျပာတယ္။” အင္းစိန္ေထာင္မွာ ဖမ္းဆီးခံထားရတဲ့ ကိုရဲျမတ္ဟိန္းရဲ႕မိခင္န႔ဲ ဆက္သြယ္ေမးျမန္းခ်က္၊ 
(Interview With Mother of Ko Ye Myat Hein, Detained in Insein Prison), VOA, 1 Nov. 2007.  
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“Will it be long? Has he been sentenced?” They said, “He hasn’t been charged. They 
haven’t yet sentenced him. There’s no charge.” Then we asked, “If he hasn’t been 
charged will he be released? Why is he being detained?”63  
 
This account captures the essence of the camp. The persons taking the boy away 
said that they would be in contact in about three days. The statement is 
completely mystifying, as it has no basis in any law. Why three days? Taken 
where? Taken for what reason? Inside the camp, such questions ceased to have 
any significance. Nor did asking them elicit answers. The family was forced to 
wait until the camp’s guardians chose to provide them with some information. 
What else could they do? In the camp, the body of entitlements to which a person 
in Myanmar might make claims under other circumstances was deactivated. Nor 
did “information” given have to be true. Since those policing the camp were not 
obliged to say anything at all, they were not obliged to tell the truth. As in the case 
of police telling their victims of torture that everything will be alright if the 
detainee would just confess, they could say anything they wished to satisfy the 
questions of an anxious relative, knowing full well that it did not matter whether 
their answers were correct or not. In the abovementioned case, contrary to what 
his mother was told, the 17-year-old boy was in fact charged with six other 
students and subsequently jailed for sedition.64 Relatives of other disappeared 
persons who went to inquire after them at jails were told that they were not 
inside, only to learn later that the opposite was true, sometimes from persons who 
had just been freed. For instance, a released detainee told the mother of a 
pregnant woman that her daughter was confined in the prison, despite the 
authorities stating otherwise. When the mother took items for her daughter on 
the advice of the released woman, the officials refused to accept them. Fearful 
that her daughter might be sent from the prison to some other place where the 
family would have no chance of contact, the mother did not press the matter.65 
 
                                                        
63 “ၾကာမွာလား၊ ျပစ္ဒဏ္ခ်မွာလားလုိ႔ေမးေတာ့ သူတို႔က အျပစ္မရွိပါဘူးတဲ့၊ သူတို႔ကို ျပစ္ဒဏ္ေတာ့ မခ်ေသးပါဘူးတဲ့၊ အျပစ္မရွိပါဘူးတဲ့၊ အဲဒါန႔ဲ 
က်မတို႔က အျပစ္မရွိလို႔ရွိရင္ ျပန္လြတ္လုိက္ပါလားလို႔၊ ဘာျဖစ္လို႔ ဖမ္းဆီးထားတာလဲလို႔ က်မတို႔ကေတာ့ ေမးလိုက္ပါတယ္။” အင္းစိန္ေထာင္မွာ 
ဖမ္းဆီးခံထားရတဲ့ ကိုရဲျမတ္ဟိန္းရဲ႕မိခင္န႔ဲ ဆက္သြယ္ေမးျမန္းခ်က္၊ (Interview With Mother of Ko Ye Myat Hein, 
Detained in Insein Prison).  
64 ရဲအုပ္ေက်ာ္သာဦး ႏွင့္ စည္သူေမာင္ ပါ ၇၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၉၊ ရန္ကုန္ေနာက္ပိုင္းခရုငိ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရီလ ၂၇ ရက္၊ 
ေန႔စဥ္မွတ္တမ္း၊ ဒုတိယခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ျမင့္စိုး။ (Inspector Kyaw Tha Oo v. Sithu Maung and 6, 2008 Criminal 
Case No. 9, Yangon Western District Court, Daily Diary, 27 Feb. 2008, Deputy District Judge Myint 
Soe.)  
65 အထိန္းသိမ္းခံေနရသူ ကိုယ္ဝန္ေဆာင္ သမီးငယ္ႏွင့္ ေတြ႔ခြင့္မရဟု မိခင္က ေျပာၾကား၊ (A Mother Tells That She Cannot Get 
Permission to Meet With Her Pregnant Detainee Young Daughter), VOA, 28 Oct. 2007. 
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Many detainees left the camp in a manner that was as ambiguous as the way that 
they went in, through the signing of vague assurances that they would obey the 
law in the future. According to the state media,  
Up to October 4, 2093 persons had been arrested, brought and questioned in 
accordance with law for assembling in defiance of section 144. It was found on 
investigation that among them are persons who were involved in the disturbances, 
persons who followed and lent support, and persons who unknowingly went along with 
the assemblies. News is received that as the unknowing persons are also violators of the 
law, up to today 692 have been released by way of a pledge.66  
 
The contents of this short news report suggest that the purpose of suspending 
people in the camps was to sort them administratively into categories: 
ringleaders, followers, and the clueless. It also implies that although everyone in 
these categories was guilty of a crime, those in the third category, at least, could 
be released on signing one of the pledges. What were these pledges? A copy of one 
that I obtained, which may or may not be representative, contains no reference to 
any section of law. It is not consistent with any of the conventional forms for 
release of detainees found in the Police Manual or with the provisions of existing 
criminal procedure. Under these, a detainee is either released without condition 
or through the posting of a bond, which is forfeit if the detainee fails to comply 
with the terms of release. The wording of the document is at once ambiguous and 
menacing, the detainee signing to the effect that: 
I acknowledge that I am aware that if I commit the same type of offence in the future, I 
will be subject to action in accordance with the law. I was arrested because of an 
offence. I am being released because the state has leniency. I pledge that if summoned, 
I will come at all times.67  
 
One person released on an assurance was Zarganar, whom I mentioned above, 
and whom authorities held from September 25 to October 17. In June 2008, 
police officers arrested him after he repeatedly spoke to the media about 
conditions in the delta following the cyclone that swept through there in May of 
that year. They subsequently charged him for offences in connection with the 
2007 protests. When his lawyer pointed out that he had been released without 
                                                        
66 “ပုဒ္မ ၁၄၄ ကို ဖီဆန္ကာ လူစုလူေဝး ျပဳလုပ္လာသျဖင့္ ဥပေဒအရ ဖမ္းဆီးေခၚေဆာင္ေမးျမန္းျခင္းကို ေဆာင္ရြက္ရရာ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ (၄) 
ရက္ေန႔အထိ စုစုေပါင္းဖမ္းဆီးခံရသူ ၂၀၉၃ ဦးရွိပါသည္။ ၎တို႔အနက္ ဆူပူမႈပါဝင္သူ၊ လုိက္လံအားေပးသူႏွင့္ မသိနားမလည္သျဖင့္ 
လူစုလူေဝးႏွင့္အတူ လုိက္ပါမိသူမ်ား ပါဝင္ေၾကာင္း စစ္ေဆးေတြ႔ရွိသည္။ မသိနားမလည္ သူမ်ားမွာလည္း ဥပေဒကို ေဖာက္ဖ်က္မိသူမ်ား 
ျဖစ္ေသာေၾကာင့္ ကတိခံဝန္ခ်က္ျဖင့္ ျပန္လည္ေစလႊတ္ေပးခဲ့ရာ ယေန႔အထိ ၆၉၂ ဦး ရွိၿပီျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း သတင္းရရွိသည္။” ပုဒ္မ ၁၄၄ ကို ဖီဆန္ကာ 
လူစုလူေဝး ျပဳလုပ္သျဖင့္ ဖမ္းဆီးေခၚေဆာင္ေမးျမန္းျခင္း ခံရသူမ်ားအနက္ ၆၉၂ ဦးအား ကတိခံဝန္ခ်က္ျဖင့္ ျပန္လည္ေစလႊတ္၊ ျမန္မာ့အလင္း၊ 
၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၅ ရက္၊ စာ ၁၇။ (“692 Persons among Those Arrested, Brought and Questioned for 
Assembling in Defiance of Section 144 Released by Way of Pledge,” Myanma Alin 5 Oct. 2007: 17.)  
67 “ကၽြႏု္ပ္သည္ ေနာက္တြင္ အလားတူ ျပစ္မႈမ်ဳိးက်ဴးလြန္ခဲ့ပါက ဥပေဒအရ အေရးယူျခင္းခံရမည္ကို သိရွိပါေၾကာင္း ဝန္ခံပါသည္။ အျပစ္ရွိလို႔ 
ဖမ္းတာပါ။ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္က သနားညႇာတာလို႔ ျပန္လႊတ္ေပးတာပါ။ ေခၚလွ်င္အခ်ိန္မေရြးလာပါမည္ဟု ဝန္ခံကတိျပဳပါသည္။” Copy of 
document on file. I cannot confirm the authenticity of this document; however, its contents are 
broadly consistent with descriptions of such documents given by persons who were forced to sign 
them, or who were shown them and refused to sign but were later released anyway.  
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charge in 2007, the police officer bringing the case indicated that he had been 
released after he had signed an assurance that he would comply with the law, 
having committed offences for which he could be prosecuted.68 Since he had 
failed to comply with his assurance, the police were now bringing those charges 
against him also, the policeman explained.  
 
Although policemen could use a breached assurance to justify subsequent 
prosecution, compliance with an assurance did not guarantee non-prosecution. 
Khin Sanda Win was released on an assurance on October 25 after being detained 
from September 29. However, on November 1 two police officers came to her 
house and informed her that their station had opened a case against her. The next 
day she went to court and the police lodged a charge under the Arms Act, which 
the prosecution changed to attempt to endanger life, under section 336/511. On 
November 26, the police station commander testified in court as a prosecution 
witness. In cross-examination, the defence lawyer asked, 
Do you know that… among 22 detained students [held together], Ma Khin Sanda Win 
was one of two students released on 25-10-07, and that there is a record that she was 
released into the guardianship of her parents?—I know that she was released. 
Is it that the Kyauktada Police Station has brought a case against Ma Khin Sanda Win 
who was released, the security forces having found her not at fault?—Our police station 
brought the charge simply because of a crime [having been committed].69  
 
I find the use of the possessive in the policeman’s reply striking, because it 
introduces a degree of agency that is absent from the prior stages of Khin Sanda 
Win’s detention. It marks a lexical break from what has come before that seems to 
signal the movement of the defendant back from the camp and into the juridical 
system proper. The policeman is simultaneously indicating that he knows, and is 
prepared to speak on, what he and his men have done; but, that whatever 
happened before is of no relevance to him. His police station works in the normal 
criminal juridical realm, where crimes are investigated, suspects arrested and 
charges laid in accordance with law. The gang, the camp and anything associated 
                                                        
68 ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ သူရ (ခ) ဇာဂနာ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၇၆၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရိုင္တရားရုံး၊ ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၄ ရက္။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Thura (a) Zarganar, 2008 
Criminal Case No.76, Yangon Western District Court, Testimony of Police Major Ye Nyunt, 
Prosecution Witness No. 1, 14 Aug. 2008.]  
69 “ထိန္းသိမ္းထားေသာ ေက်ာင္းသားေက်ာင္းသူ (၂၂) ဦးရွိသူအနက္မွ (၂၅-၁၀-၀၇) ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ျပန္လႊတ္ေပးလိုက္ေသာ ေက်ာင္းသား 
ေက်ာင္းသူ (၂) ဦးအနက္ မခင္စႏၵာဝင္း ပါဝင္ၿပီး၊ မိဘအုပ္ထိန္းသူထံ ျပန္လည္အပ္ႏွံေပးသည့္မွတ္တမ္းရွိသည္ကို သိပါသလားဆိုလွ်င္ ျပန္လႊတ္ 
ေပးခဲ့ေၾကာင္းကိုေတာ့ သိပါသည္။ လံုျခံဳေရးတပ္မွ အျပစ္မရွိ၍ ျပန္လႊတ္ေပးလိုက္ေသာ မခင္စႏၵာဝင္းကို ေက်ာက္တံတားရဲစခန္းမွ အမႈျဖင့္ 
တရားစြဲဆိုျခင္းျဖစ္သလားဆိုလွ်င္ က်ေနာ္တို႔ရဲတပ္ဖြ႔ဲစခန္းအေန႔ျဖင့္ ျပစ္မႈေၾကာင္းအရ စြဲဆိုခဲ့ျခင္းသာျဖစ္ပါသည္။”။ ရဲအုပ္စုိးႏိုင ္ႏွင့္ မခင္စႏၵာဝင္း၊ 
၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၅၂၅၊ ေက်ာက္တံတားၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ရဲအုပ္စုိးႏိုင၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၂၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၄။ (Inspector Soe Naing v. Ma Khin Sanda Win, 2007 Criminal Case No. 525, 
Kyauktada Township Court, Testimony of Inspector Soe Naing, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 26 Nov. 
2007: 4.)  
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with them do not belong to that world and are of no significance, even when, as in 
this case, they are entirely significant, since without them the case against the 
accused would not exist. In other words, the moment that ‘his’ station entered 
into the process was the moment of actual criminalisation of this specific accused. 
Her prosecution signalled her restoration to the juridical process, the restoration 
of her legal personhood. And it is with this process, and the role of the courts in it, 
that the next section of this chapter is concerned.  
The hearing, the sentence 
One key feature of the criminal juridical system as police that I have described 
throughout this study is that because it is operating as a continuum of 
administrative activity, it can in certain circumstances admit and acknowledge 
extrajuridical activities by juridical agencies that have as their purpose the 
eliminating of disorder, the maintenance of law and order through taya-ubade-
somoye. In chapter four, I explained how in cases of police torture to obtain 
confession, and in cases against public enemies, the courts function not as a check 
on extrajuridical behaviour but to situate it in a judicial frame and in so doing, to 
neutralise any illegality involved. The criminal juridical procedure, and 
specifically the trial in court, is not distinct from other parts of the administrative 
processing of the accused; rather, it is integral to the processing of the accused—
through the trial, the administrative process is finalised, the status of the 
defendant established and the police or other officials absolved of responsibility 
for what has gone on before.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2007 protests, in the aftermath of the gang and the camp, 
the courtroom hearing—enclosed but otherwise conducted according to ordinary 
law, as described in chapter four—inserted the extrajuridical into the juridical 
order. Its purpose was not to try the accused but to pull her back over the 
threshold from the anomalous zone in which she has been suspended, and into 
the ordinary criminal juridical realm. It reactivated the “juridical” not as a means 
to make sense of the extrajuridical, but so as to cancel it out. It did not inquire 
after the contents of the gang or the camp—only a handful of defence lawyers 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to do this—since that was not the purpose of trial. Its 
purpose, rather, was to admit whatever ambiguities preceded the appearance of 
the person in court, to impose a sentence and to consign the accused to the penal 
system proper.  
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Take, for instance, the case of three men convicted for having harboured a fugitive 
monk, in which the court heard testimony based on a record from “an 
interrogator in the joint group” investigating the case.70 The identity of the 
interrogator or composition of the joint group is not made clear in the court 
records. The defence attorney took up this and other ambiguous aspects of the 
case in cross-examination: 
You have been a policeman for about 30 years and know that a record taken before 
police is inadmissible [as evidence in court]....—I am coming to testify as per the duty 
assigned to me from above.  
Where “above”?—Our Special Branch officer, whose name I am not authorised to 
reveal…. 
U Obasa [the fleeing monk] has committed what offence?—He participated and 
demonstrated in the September 2007 events.  
In what way did he participate in the said demonstration?—He marched with tens of 
thousands of people.  
Aside from U Obasa being among the many monks who participated, were there other 
offences?—No.  
So far as you know, is there a police or court action or warrant pending against U Obasa 
from which he is absconding?—There is no proclamation that he is an absconder.71 
  
Practically every aspect of this testimony evokes ambiguity in the identifying, 
detaining and charging of the accused. The persons responsible for ordering that 
the policeman bring the case and those involved in the investigation cannot be 
identified. The fugitive monk’s alleged offence is itself elusive, since a notice for 
his arrest has not been issued and the policeman can say no more than that he 
marched with thousands of his peers. This admission effectively defeats the 
prosecution case, since without a declaration that the monk was wanted by the 
police the accused could not have known that they were committing an offence, 
even if they had harboured him. But, as the purpose of the hearing was to record 
testimonies and assign sentences, not to deliberate upon the facts, it made no 
difference to the finding of guilt.  
 
  
                                                        
70 “ပူးေပါင္းအဖြ႔ဲတြင္ စစ္ေၾကာပါဝင္သူတဦး”။  
71 “က်ေနာ့္ရဲလုပ္သက္မွာ ႏွစ္ေပါင္း (၃၀) ခန္႔ရွိပါသည္။ ရဲေရွ႕အစစ္ခံခ်က္ သက္ေသခံမဝင္ေၾကာင္း က်ေနာ္သိသည္၊ က်ေနာ္သ့ေဘာႏွင့္မဟုတ္ပါ 
ဆိုလွ်င္ အထက္မွ တာဝန္ေပးခ်က္အရ လာေရာက္ထြက္ဆိုျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ အထက္ဆိုသည္မွာမည္သည္ကိုဆိုလိုသလဲဆိုလွ်င္ က်ေနာ္တို႔ 
သတင္းတပ္ဖြ႔ဲမွ အရာရွိကို ဆိုလိုပါသည္။ အမည္ကိုေျပာခြင့္မရွိပါ။ xxx ဦးၾသဘာသသည္ မည္သည့္ျပစ္မႈက်ဴးလြန္သလဲဆိုလွ်င္ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္ 
စက္တင္ဘာအေရးအခင္းတြင္ ဆႏၵျပပါဝင္ျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ အဆိုပါဆႏၵျပပြဲတြင္မည္မွ်ပါဝင္သလဲဆိုလွ်င္ လူေသာင္းႏွင့္ခ်ီပါသည္။ သံဃာ 
အမ်ားအျပားပါဝင္သည္ ဦးၾသဘာသတြင္ အျခားျပစ္မႈရွိသလားဆိုလွ်င္ မရွိပါ။ က်ေနာ္သိသမွ် ဦးၾသဘာသကို ရဲစခန္းႏွင့္ တရားရံုးက 
အေရးယူထားျခင္း၊ ဝရမ္းထုတ္ျခင္း၊ ဝရမ္းေျပးျဖစ္ေနသလားဆိုလွ်င္ တရားခံေျပး၊ ဝရမ္းေျပးအျဖစ္ေၾကညာထားျခင္းမရွိပါ။” ဒုရဲမွဴးမ်ဳိးသန္႔ ႏွင့္ 
ေက်ာ္ဝင္းေခ် ပါ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၅၆၊ ဒဂံုၿမိဳ႕သစ္ (ေတာင္ပိုင္း) ၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ရဲအုပ္ဆန္းလြင္၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလို 
သက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခႏုွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၆ ရက္၊ စာ ၅-၆။ [Police Captain Myo Thant v. Kyaw Win Chay and 2, 
2008 Criminal Case No. 356, New Dagon (Southern) Township Court, Testimony of Inspector Hsan 
Lwin, Prosecution Witness No. 2, 26 Mar. 2008: 5-6.] 
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The lack of evidence against persons accused over events in 2007 speaks to the 
courts’ administrative role in these cases. Special Branch brought charges against 
Ma Honey Oo on allegations that she led protestors in Yangon on September 25 
and 26, set up a new student union with a group of friends the month before, and 
contacted overseas news media. All of the alleged charges it based upon “reliable 
information”. But as cross-examination revealed, the nature of that reliable 
information and the persons who gave it could not be disclosed in court: 
Are the persons who gave the reliable information on the list of witnesses [submitted to 
the court for examination]?—They have not been submitted as witnesses.  
Can you submit documentary proof regarding your testimony of communications [by 
the accused] with abroad?—I have no documentary proof to submit.  
Can you submit documentary proof of the student union of which you testified, 
together with the membership of the group?—I cannot.  
You cannot submit proof of the student union and furthermore you have stated but 
have no proof that Ma Honey Oo was involved in the student union in the course of 
which she committed acts to disrupt law and order [ngyeinwut-pibyaye] of which you 
have accused her.—It is as per the information received.72 
 
Any statement uttered by the police officer in the case against the criminalised 
protestor is invested with authenticity. The tyranny of the “information received” 
is that it can neither be proven nor refuted. It belongs to a different plane, 
independent from the authority of the court and everyone in it. Even the police 
officer bringing the case is just the vehicle for this authority, bearing it with him 
into court but not having any possession over it.  
 
Whereas Honey Oo fought the charges against her on the basis that she was not a 
participant in the protests and student group as the police alleged, some 
defendants used the hearings against them to celebrate the events for which they 
were allegedly criminally responsible. Like the cases against citizen-complainants 
that I described in chapter six, in which the accused used the court process to 
revalidate their original positions, these “defence” statements raise ontological 
problems about the nature of the alleged offence that go to the criminalisation of 
                                                        
72 “အာမခံသတင္းေပးဆိုသူမ်ားအား သက္ေသစာရင္း ကၽြန္ေတာ္တင္ျပထားသလားဟုဆိုပါက သက္ေသအျဖစ္တင္ျပထားျခင္းမရွိပါ။ ျပည္ပႏွင့္ 
ဆက္သြယ္လွ်က္ရွိေၾကာင္း က်ေနာ္၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္ႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ စာရြက္စာတမ္းအေထာက္အထားတင္ျပႏိုင္ပါသလားဟုဆိုလွ်င္ 
ကၽြန္ေတာ့္အေနျဖင့္ စာရြက္စာတမ္းအေထာက္အထားတင္ျပႏုိင္ျခင္းမရွိပါ။ ေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢဖြ႔ဲစည္းေၾကာင္း ကၽြန္ေတာ္မွထြက္ဆိုထားရာ 
ေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢဖြ႔ဲစည္းသည့္ စာရြက္စာတမ္းအေထာက္အထားႏွင့္အဖြ႔ဲအစည္းတြင္ ပါဝင္သူမ်ားအား ျပဳစုတင္ျပႏိုင္သလားဟုဆိုပါက 
မတင္ျပႏိုင္ပါ။ ေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢဖြ႔ဲစည္းေၾကာင္း အေထာက္အထားအားမတင္ျပႏုိင္သည့္အျပင္ ေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢ၌ ဟနန္ီဦးပါဝင္သည္ဟုဆိုကာ 
၎ပါဝင္မႈသည္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္းဝပ္ပိျပားေရးျပဳမူသည့္ အျပဳအမူဟု ကၽြန္ေတာ္မွ အေထာက္အထားမရွိဘဲ စြပ္စဲြေနသည္ဟုဆိုပါက 
ရရွိသတင္းခ်က္မ်ားအရျဖစ္ပါသည္။” ရဲအုပ္လွသိန္း ႏွင့္ မဟန္နီဦး (ခ) ဟန္န၊ီ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၀၊ ရန္ကုန္အေရွ႕ပိုင္းခရိငုတ္ရားရုံး၊ 
ဒုရဲအုပ္စိုးမိုးေအာင၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၁၉ ရက္၊ စာ ၃။ [Inspector Hla Thein v. Ma 
Honey Oo (a) Honey, 2008 Criminal Case No. 30, Yangon Eastern District Court, Testimony of Sub 
Inspector Soe Moe Aung, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 19 Mar. 2008: 3.] 
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protest itself. For instance, in the case of Kyaw Ko Ko, a member of the All Burma 
Students Union, the judge recorded that, 
Defendant-1 Kyaw Ko Ko… said in testifying that on 25-9-07 having marched along 
Shwedagon Pagoda Road towards the city, on reaching Sule Pagoda Road and the side 
of the town hall while the crowd was flying the fighting peacock flag he climbed atop a 
dais and gave a speech… that he said in the speech he was an All Burma Students 
Union leader and that the students had seen the people’s difficulties and that they 
stood for the people; that the students had not given up and had resisted government 
that had persecuted the people from one era to the next; that he urged the majority of 
students to fall in behind the Sangha in the current events in order to peacefully send 
metta [loving kindness], to join the battle to confront oppression without fear, and to 
raise the fighting peacock flag to the heights; that regarding student organisations, the 
All Burma Students Union had been formed in 1936 and that it had been for the 
purpose of working for national liberation, democracy and peace; that among those 
principles none called for efforts so as to shut down the government machinery; that 
there were multiple instances of successive governments having time upon time tried to 
bring a halt to the student union; that under imperialist rule and evil fascist rule too the 
student union had been a political force that had unflaggingly participated in the 
struggle for liberation; [and] that it was also an organisation actively participating in 
the national democratic struggle of the present period….73 
 
This testimony challenges the notion that the acts of protest in which the 
defendant engaged were criminal acts at all. The accused does not deny 
involvement in the protests; he rejoices in it. What he denies is that this 
involvement constitutes a crime. Similarly, other defendants challenged police 
officers’ assertions that in marching on the road chanting verses of metta—loving-
kindness—the monkhood or Sangha committed an offence. U Gambhira, a monk 
accused of being a ringleader of the protests, like Kyaw Ko Ko made no attempt to 
deny that he had done the things of which he stood accused, but insisted 
throughout that what he had done broke neither secular nor religious law: 
  
                                                        
73 “ခံျပ-၁ ေက်ာ္ကိုကို xxx က ထြက္ဆိုရာတြင္ ၂၅-၉-၀၇ ရက္ေန႔တြင္ ေရႊတိဂံုဘုရားလမ္းအတိုင္း ၿမိဳ႕ထဲသို႔ခ်ီတက္လာခဲ့ၿပီး ဆူးေလဘုရားလမ္းႏွင့္ 
ၿမိဳ႕ေတာ္ခန္းမေဘးသို႔ ေရာက္သည့္အခါ ၎တို႔လူစုသည္ ခြပ္ေဒါင္းအလံကို လႊင့္ထူကာ ခံုေပၚသို႔တက္၍ တရားေဟာခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ xxx ၎သည ္ဗမာ 
ႏိုင္ငံလံုးဆိုင္ရာေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားသမဂၢ၏ေခါင္းေဆာင္ဟုေျပာဆိုခဲ့ၿပီး ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားသည ္ျပည္သူမ်ားအခက္ၾကံဳလာခဲ့ပါက ျပည္သူ 
အမ်ားအတြက္ ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားက ရပ္တည္လာခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ ျပည္သူကိုေခတ္အဆက္ဆက္ကႏွိပ္စက္ခဲ့ေသာ အစိုးရအေပၚ ေက်ာင္းသားမ်ားက 
ေခါင္းငံု႕မခံဘဲ ေတာ္လွန္ခဲ့ေၾကာင္း ယခုအေရးတြင္သံဃာမ်ားေနာက္မွေအးခ်မ္းစြာေမတၱာပို႕ၾကရန္၊ ေၾကာက္စိတ္မေမြးဘဲ ဖိႏွိပ္မႈကိ ုရင္ဆိုင္တိုက္ပဲြ 
ဝင္ၾကရန္ႏွင္ ့ခြပ္ေဒါင္းအလံကို အျမင့္ဆံုးသို႕လႊင့္တင္ၾကရန္ ေက်ာင္းသားအမ်ားစုကိ ုတိုက္တြန္းခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ ေက်ာင္းသားအဖြ႔ဲအစည္းႏွင့္ပတ္သက္၍ 
ေျပာဆိုသည္မွာ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံလံုးဆိုင္ရာေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢအဖြဲ႕ကိ ု၁၉၃၆ ခုႏွစ္ကတည္းကစတင္ဖြဲ႕စည္းခဲ့ၿပီး အမ်ိဳးသားလြတ္လပ္ေရးဒီမိုကေရစ ီ
အေရးႏွင္ ့ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေရးတို႔ကိ ုေဆာင္ရြက္ရန္ ရည္ရြယ္ဖြ႔ဲစည္းခဲ့ေၾကာင္း၊ ထိုရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္မူဝါဒမ်ားတြင ္မည္သည့္အစိုးရယႏၱရားကိုမွ် ရပ္တန္႔ေအာင ္
ႀကိဳးစားအားထုတ္ခဲ့ျခင္းမရွိေၾကာင္း၊ အစိုးရအဆက္ဆက္က ေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢ၏တည္ရွိမႈကို အႀကိမ္ႀကိမ္ရပ္တန္႔ေအာင္ႀကိဳးစားခဲ့ေသာ 
သာဓကမ်ားရွိေၾကာင္း၊ ေက်ာင္းသားသမဂၢသည ္နယ္ခ်ဲ႕ကိုလိုနီစံနစ္ႏွင့္ ဖက္ဆစ္စံနစ္ဆိုးေအာက္မွ လြတ္ေျမာက္ရန္ ႀကိဳးပမ္းရာတြင္လည္း 
မပ်က္မကြက္ ပါဝင္ခဲ့ေသာ ႏိုင္ငံေရးအင္အားစုတရပ္ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း၊ လက္ရွိေခတ္ကာလ၏ အမ်ိဳးသားဒီမိုကေရစီအေရးႀကိဳးပမ္းရာတြင္လည္း 
တက္ႂကြစြာပါဝင္ လႈပ္ရွားခဲ့ေသာ အသင္းအဖြဲ႕တခုျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း xxx ထြက္ဆိုတင္ျပခဲ့သည္ကိုေတြ႔ရွိရသည္။” ဒုရဲအုပ္သိန္းႏိုင္ ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ကိကုို (ခ) 
ရာဟု (ခ) ကေလာ္ဒီ၊ ၂၀၁၀၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၉၃၊ ေက်ာက္တံတားၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၁၀ ျပည့္ႏွစ္၊ ေမလ ၁၁ ရက္၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး 
(အထူးအာဏာ) ဦးေစာဝင္း၊ စာ ၅-၆။ [Sub Inspector Thein Naing v. Kyaw Ko Ko (a) Rahu (a) Klordi, 2010 
Criminal Case No. 93, Kyauktada Township Court, 11 May 2010, Township Judge (Special Power) U 
Saw Win: 5-6.] 
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As we acted in accordance with the Vinaya rules, our Sangha have done no wrong. In 
going in procession reciting verses to send metta, [we were thinking that] in order to 
resolve all the crises that have arisen in the country, only by solving the political 
difficulties will everything else be resolved. We Sangha acted only on matters within the 
rules set for Sangha in order that the hatred, rancour and doubt between the current 
power-holders, the SPDC dictators, and democratic forces might be settled…. The 
sending of metta is not unrest. In keeping with the meaning of the Metta Sutta, with 
the peace of metta-dhamma, we simply endeavoured for peace for ourselves and our 
environs.74  
 
Lay defendants also contested charges brought against them for engaging in 
routine religious practices, which according to the police in the context of the 
protests were criminal acts. The police complaint against Thet Zaw, a sports 
journal editor who had previously been given clemency in a case of high treason, 
was that he had on two consecutive days purchased twenty rice packets and 
brought them to the eastern walkway of the Shwedagon Pagoda for distribution to 
monks. According to the Special Branch, this act of bringing alms to the most 
revered Buddhist site in the country constituted an attempt to insult religion. The 
defence attorney asked if it was not habitual for Buddhists to feed monks. The 
policeman replied that according to tradition, providing food to monks should be 
done straightforwardly, implying that in this case the circumstances under which 
the accused fed the monks constituted an offence. The lawyer argued further that 
the act of the monks walking on the street chanting verses did not constitute a 
protest at all. When the police officer rejected his assertion, the lawyer went to the 
meaning of the word for “protest” in Burmese, sanda-pya, which is literally to 
display one’s opinion or desire. A protest, he argued, would necessarily entail 
some demand, whereas the monks simply walking on the street to spread metta 
did not constitute such an act. Again the police officer rejected the argument, but 
he refused to be drawn into what for him would have been a pointless debate 
about the semantics of protest.75  
                                                        
74 “ဝိနည္းဓမၼကံ၊ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းအရ လုပ္ေဆာင္ခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္ၿပီး မိမိတို႔ သံဃာမ်ားအျပစ္မရွိပါ။ ေမတၱာပို႔စီတန္း လွည့္လည္ရြတ္ဖတ္ျခင္းသည္ 
တိုင္းျပည္၌ ျဖစ္ေပၚေနေသာ အေျခအေနအက်ပ္အတည္းမ်ားကို အလံုးစံုေျပလည္သြားေစရန္ ႏိုင္ငံေရးျပႆနာျဖင့္ ေျဖရွင္းမွသာ အလံုးစံု 
ေျပလည္သြားမည္ ျဖစ္ေလသည္။ လက္ရွိအာဏာရ နအဖ စစ္အာဏာရွင္တို႔ႏွင့္ ဒီမိုကေရစီအင္အားစုမ်ားၾကားျဖစ္ေပၚေနေသာ အမုန္းတရား၊ 
အာဃာတတရား၊ သံသယမ်ားႏွင့္ အခ်င္းခ်င္း မေျပလည္မႈမ်ားကို ေျပလည္ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းသြားၾကပါေစျခင္းအက်ဳိးငွာ မိမိတို႔ သံဃာေတာ္မ်ားမွာ 
သံဃာလုပ္ငန္းလုပ္နည္းမ်ား အတြင္းမွ လုပ္ေဆာင္ႏိုင္ေသာကိစၥမ်ားကိုသာ လုပ္ခဲ့ၾကပါသည္။ xxx ေမတၱာပို႔သျခင္းသည္ ဆူပူအံုႂကြျခင္းမဟုတ္၊ 
ေမတၱာသုတ္ေတာ္အနက္အဓိပၸါယ္အရ ေမတၱာဓမၼၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းမႈတို႔ျဖင့္ မိမိႏွင့္ မိမိ၏ ပတဝ္န္းက်င္ထိ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းေစေအာင္ ေဆာင္ရြက္အား 
ထုတ္ၾကျခင္းသာ ျဖစ္သည္။” ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ဂမၻီရ (ခ) စေႏၵာဘာသ (ခ) ညီညီလြင္ (ခ) လႈိင္ဘြား ပါ ၁၁၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၆၅၊ 
အလံုၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ သီးသန္႔တရားရံုး၊ ခံုရံုးအမွတ္ ၁၆၅/၂၀၀၈၊ တရားခံမ်ားအတြက္ အၿပီးသတ္ေလွ်ာက္လဲခ်က္၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၉ 
ရက္၊ စာ ၅။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Gambhira (a) Candobhasa (a) Nyi Nyi Lwin (a) Hlaing Bwa & 
10, 2008 Criminal Case No. 165, Ahlone Township Court, Special Court, Tribunal No. 165/2008, 
Closing Submission for the defence, 19 Nov. 2008: 5.] The Metta Sutta is the discourse of metta 
delivered by the historical Buddha, Gautama. Metta-dhamma is the natural law of metta. The 
Vinaya is the branch of the Buddhist canon that sets down the code of conduct for adherents.  
75 ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ သူရ (ခ) ဇာဂနာ ပါ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၇၇၊ ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရိုင္တရားရုံး၊ ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသအမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၄ ရက္။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Thura (a) Zarganar and 
Another, 2008 Criminal Case No.77, Yangon Western District Court, Testimony of Police Major Ye 
Nyunt, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 14 Aug. 2008.]  
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Similarly, the hearings of cases against people who marched in August turned on 
the alleged illegality of walking on the road because petrol prices had drastically 
increased. The court recorded the cross-examination of a police officer who 
deposed in one of these hearings as follows: 
[Prosecution witness:] On 25-8-07 Ko Min Thu led 30 people to demonstrate around 
wards of Mogoke about the increased price of fuel, and while demonstrating presented 
a letter written by himself to U Kyi Maung, manager of the MPPE government petrol 
station in Aungnan Ward, for the price of fuel to be reduced to its original level. 
The price of fuel did in fact increase.—The price of fuel increased as per the 
government’s designation.  
So then this was just a presentation for the authorities to know of [the effects of] the 
increased price of fuel.—Incorrect. It was just a protest march to damage the national 
government by assembling to demonstrate about the increased price of fuel.76 
 
In the trial of Htin Kyaw for sedition, following his arrest in August, which I 
described above, the complainant policeman also had difficulty in identifying 
what in his protest had constituted a threat to the state: 
On that day, there was no damage to public property.—Correct.  
He only conducted a solo demonstration.—Correct. [But] if it went on for a while, more 
could have come. If it were not contained in time, a crowd would have come.  
That is merely your presumption. In fact, a crowd did not come.—It’s not a point of 
view. It was a location where a crowd could come…. 
The writing [on the placard] concerned only commodity prices. There was no seditious 
content.—The writing “Don’t raise commodity prices” is seditious usage.77  
 
As in the case of Min Thu, Htin Kyaw’s attorney explored the idea that making a 
demonstration about rising commodity prices could somehow constitute a crime 
against the state. Cross-examining a civilian witness he asked, 
                                                        
76 “၂၅-၈-၀၇ ေန႔တြင္ ကိုမင္းသူဦးစီးလူ (၃၀) ဦးသည္ ေလာင္စာဆီေစ်းႏႈန္းျမင့္တက္ခဲ့ျခင္းကိုအေၾကာင္းျပ၍ မိုးကုတ္ၿမိဳ႕အတြင္း ရပ္ကြက္မ်ားသို႔ 
လွည့္လည္ဆႏၵျပကာ ေအာင္နန္းရပ္ရွိ အမ္ပီပီအီး အစိုးရဓာတ္ဆီဆိုင္မန္ေနဂ်ာ ဦးၾကည္ေမာင္ထံသို႔ ၎ကိုယ္တိုင္ေရးသားထားေသာ ေလာင္စာဆီ 
ေစ်းႏႈန္းမူလအတိုင္း (သို႔) ေလွ်ာ့္ေပးရန္စာအား ေပးအပ္ခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။ ေလာင္စာေစ်းႏႈန္းအမွန္တကယ္တက္ခဲ့သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ အစိုးရ၏ 
သတ္မွတ္ခ်က္အရ ေလာင္စာဆီေစ်းႏႈန္းျမင့္တက္ခဲ့ပါသည္။ ထိုကဲ့သို႔ ေလာင္စာဆီေစ်းႏႈန္းျမင့္တက္ခဲ့ျခင္းအား အာဏာပိုင္လူႀကီးမ်ား သိသာရန္ 
တင္ျပျခင္းသာ ျဖစ္သည္ဆိုလွ်င္ မမွန္ပါ။ ေလာင္စာဆီေစ်းႏႈန္းျမင့္တက္ျခင္းကိုအေၾကာင္းျပၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရအား အပ်က္အဆီးျဖစ္ေစရန ္ 
လူစုေဝးၿပီး လမ္းေလွ်ာက္ဆႏၵျပတင္ျပခဲ့ျခင္းသာျဖစ္ပါသည္။” ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင္ ့ႏွင့္ မင္းသ ူ(ခ) ကိုဦး၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၀၆၊ 
ေအာင္ေျမသာစံၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင္၏့ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၂ ရက္၊ စာ ၄-၅။ 
[Police Captain Win Myint v. Min Thu (a) Ko Oo, 2008 Criminal Case No. 606, Aungmyay-thazan 
Township Court, Testimony of Police Captain Win Myint, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 22 Aug. 2008: 
4-5.] The police were unable or unconcerned to submit as evidence the letter that the accused 
allegedly gave to the MPPE manager. 
77 “ထိုေန႔က ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ပိုင္ပစၥည္းမ်ားပ်က္စီးမႈမရွိခဲ့ဟုဆိုက မွန္ပါသည္။ xxx ၎တဦးတည္းသာ ဆႏၵေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့ျခင္းသာဆိုက မွန္ပါသည္။ 
အခ်ိန္ကာလ ၾကာလာလွ်င္ေတာ့ပါလာႏိုင္ပါသည္။ အခ်ိန္မွီမထိန္းသိမ္းခဲ့ပါက လူစုလူေဝးပါလာမည္ျဖစ္ပါသည။္ ယင္းေျဖဆိုခ်က္မွာ 
ထင္ျမင္ခ်က္သာျဖစ္ၿပီး အမွန္တကယ္လူစုလူေဝးပါလာခဲ့ျခင္းမရွိဆိုက ထင္ျမင္ခ်က္မဟုတ္ပါ။ လူစုလူေဝးပါလာႏိုင္ေသာ အေနအထားရွိပါသည္။ 
xxx စာသားမ်ားမွာ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းႏွင့္ပတ္သက္ေသာ စာသာမ်ားသာျဖစ္ၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အေပၚ အၾကည္ညိဳပ်က္ေစေသာ စာသားမ်ားမပါဆိုက 
ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းတက္ေအာင္ မလုပ္န႔ဲဟူေသာစာသားမွာ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရကို အၾကည္ညိဳပ်က္ေအာင္ ဖ်က္စီးေသာ အသံုးႏႈန္းမ်ားျဖစ္ပါသည္။” 
ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ထင္ေက်ာ ္(ခ) ေက်ာ္ထင၊္ ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြ၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၀ ရက္၊        
စာ ၂-၃။ [Police Captain Myint Swe v. Htin Kyaw (a) Kyaw Htin, Testimony of Police Captain Myint 
Swe, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 20 Mar. 2008: 2-3.] 
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From the time of 1988 to the present time of 2008, commodity prices have risen.—
Correct. 
Among rising commodity prices, food prices have risen.—Correct.  
Ko Htin Kyaw and party demonstrated for the lowering of commodity prices and 24-
hour electricity.—Correct.  
So commodity prices are rising and therefore it was [simply] a demonstration that 
commodity prices are rising.—Although they demonstrated [about this], on account of 
the placards they were holding and slogan shouting it was seditious. It also upset 
national peace and stability and alarmed the public too. 
In the writing “Lower commodity prices”, “24-hour electricity” there is not a single 
seditious word.—Incorrect. It was seditious because it could cause unrest.78  
 
If this witness struggled to explain what in the alleged offence constituted sedition 
he was by no means alone. At least one police officer admitted under cross-
examination that although he was investigating cases of sedition, which under 
section 124A of the Penal Code constitutes an offence of anyone who “by words… 
by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise brings or attempts to bring into 
hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards [the 
Government]”, he himself did not exactly understand what sedition means.79 And 
why should he? Since, unlike his counterparts in earlier periods he had no explicit 
narrative on sedition through which to interpret and explain the case, all he could 
do was acknowledge that a person towards whom sovereign cetana had been 
withdrawn was liable to have committed the offence. In other words, Htin Kyaw’s 
seditious behaviour was consequent to his loss of entitlements to make legal 
claims. His sedition was determined administratively. The question of what 
constituted sedition ceased to have any meaning for the purposes of criminal 
inquiry and trial. Only to the defence lawyer did a legal definition of sedition 
matter.  
 
Because the trials of accused persons were usually enclosed, police officers could 
depart freely from the public transcript on the protests without fear of being seen 
to contradict the official narrative. One striking way in which they did this was in 
                                                        
78 “၁၉၈၈ အခ်ိန္ကာလႏွင့္ ယခု ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္အခ်ိန္ကာလတြင္ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းမ်ားတက္လာသည္ဆိုက မွန္ပါသည္။ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းတက္ရာတြင္၊ 
စားေသာက္ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းမ်ားျမင့္တက္ခဲ့သည္ဆိုက မွန္ပါသည္။ ကိုထင္ေက်ာ္တို႔မွ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းက်ဆင္းေရး၊ မီး ၂၄ နာရီရရွိေရးမ်ားေတာင္းဆို 
ဆႏၵေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့ျခင္းျဖစ္သည္ဆိုက မွန္ပါသည္။ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းမ်ားတက္ေန၍ ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္းမ်ားတက္ေၾကာင္း ဆႏၵေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့ျခင္းဆိုက ဆႏၵ 
ေဖာ္ထုတ္ခဲ့သည္ဆိုေသာ္လည္း ဆိုင္းဘုတ္မ်ားကိုင္ေဆာင္၍ ေႂကြးေၾကာ္ခဲ့ျခင္းေၾကာင့္ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရအားအၾကည္ညိဳပ်က္ေစပါသည္။ 
ကုန္ေစ်းႏႈန္း က်ဆင္ေရး မီး ၂၄ နာရီရရွိေရးစာသားမ်ားမွာ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရအားအၾကည္ညိဳပ်က္ေစေသာ စကားလံုးမ်ားတလံုးမွ်မပါဆိုက 
မဟုတ္ပါ။ ဆူပူအံုႂကြမႈကို ျဖစ္ေပၚေစႏိုင္ၿပီး ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရအားအၾကည္ညိဳပ်က္ေစပါသည္။” ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ထင္ေက်ာ ္(ခ) ေက်ာ္ထင၊္ 
ဦးသိန္းဟန၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၀ ရက္၊ စာ ၂။ [Police Captain Myint Swe v. 
Htin Kyaw (a) Kyaw Htin, Testimony of U Thein Han, Prosecution Witness No. 3, 20 Mar. 2008: 
2.] 
79 ရဲအုပ္လွသိန္း ႏွင့္ မဟန္နီဦး (ခ) ဟန္န၊ီ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၁၊ ရဲအုပ္လွသိန္း၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ ဒုရဲအုပ္စိုးမိုးေအာင၏္ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ ၂၄ ရက္၊ စာ ၃။ [Inspector Hla Thein v. Ma Honey Oo (a) Honey, 
2008 Criminal Case No. 31, Testimony of Sub Inspector Soe Moe Aung, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 
19 Mar. 2008: 3.] 
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their portrayals of the rallies. Contrary to the official public portrayals of 
marauding, bogus monks and their dangerous supporters, police officers’ 
accounts in court records that I have read give an impression of organised, calm 
and non-violent gatherings, in which demonstrators were at pains to avoid 
confrontations with state officials.80 A Special Branch officer, for instance, 
testified how demonstrators grabbed him as he was preparing to take 
photographs of monks assembling for a march in the north of the country.81 When 
they found his police identity card, which he conveniently had on his person, 
instead of assaulting or abusing him they instead took him to a nearby monastery. 
The monks released him shortly afterwards and returned to him his telephone 
and camera undamaged. He went back to his detachment and rotated duties with 
a different officer. Another Special Branch officer who was responsible for many 
prosecutions of demonstrators in 2007 admitted that he had been unable to 
collect evidence to show that monks had committed violence during the 
protests.82 He also accepted that monks walking on the street and chanting verses 
to send metta did not do anything to tarnish the Buddhist religion. A counterpart 
from Mandalay similarly agreed that in the area where he had been on duty, no 
                                                        
80 Policemen in court also gave different estimates of the protestors’ numbers from those put out 
officially. The government on September 27 told diplomats and staff of international organisations 
that only around 5000 monks had been involved. In October, it estimated to a visiting United 
Nations official that about two per cent of the 500,000 monks in the country had participated, that 
is, about 10,000, and that most of these were bogus monks. “UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy 
Mr Gambari Pays Courtesy Calls on Head of State Senior General Than Shwe and Acting Prime 
Minister Secretary-1 Lt-Gen Thein Sein,” New Light of Myanmar 6 Oct. 2007: 5. However, a Special 
Branch officer bringing charges against eleven monks and civilians who allegedly masterminded the 
demonstrations recorded in his submission to a special closed-door tribunal that on September 24 
alone some 15,000 monks had marched past the headquarters of the National League for 
Democracy, while on the same day some 5,000 to 6,000 had assembled at the eastern walkway of 
the Shwedagon Pagoda; and that on September 22, over 3,000 monks had marched in Mandalay, 
and around 1,500 again two days later. ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ဂမၻီရ (ခ) စေႏၵာဘာသ (ခ) ညီညီလြင္ (ခ) လႈိင္ဘြား ပါ ၁၁၊ 
ေလွ်ာက္ထားစြဲဆိုမႈ၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၁၈ ရက္။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Gambhira (a) Candobhasa (a) Nyi 
Nyi Lwin (a) Hlaing Bwa & 10, Prosecution Submission, 18 Aug. 2008.] Nor were the major cities 
the only places where Special Branch officers witnessed and reported large numbers of monks on 
the streets. In Kyaukpadaung, a small northern town, an officer witnessed a rally on September 25 
in which he estimated around 800 monks from eight separate monasteries and 35 nuns 
participated. ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင္ ့ႏွင့္ ဝင္းေရႊ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၁၂၊ ေအာင္ေျမသာစံၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဒုရဲအုပ္ေက်ာ္ေဌး၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၃၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁ ရက္။ (Police Captain Win Myint v. Win Shwe, 2008 
Criminal Case No. 612, Aungmyay-thazan Township Court, Testimony of Sub Inspector Kyaw Htay, 
Prosecution Witness No. 3, 1 Sept. 2008.) The day before, his counterparts in nearby Mogoke 
recorded the number of monks marching at over 1,000. ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင္ ့ႏွင့္ မင္းသ ူ(ခ) ကိုဦး၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ 
၆၀၆၊ ေအာင္ေျမသာစံၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင္၏့ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၂ ရက္။ [Police 
Captain Win Myint v. Min Thu (a) Ko Oo, 2008 Criminal Case No. 606, Aungmyay-thazan 
Township Court, Testimony of Police Captain Win Myint, Prosecution Witness No. 1, 22 Aug. 
2008.] 
81 ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင္ ့ႏွင့္ ဝင္းေရႊ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၆၁၂၊ ေအာင္ေျမသာစံၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ဒုရဲအုပ္ကိုကိုႏိုင္၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ 
တရားလိုသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၂၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ၾသဂုတ္လ ၂၉ ရက္။ (Police Captain Win Myint v. Win Shwe, 2008 
Criminal Case No. 612, Aungmyay-thazan Township Court, Testimony of Sub Inspector Ko Ko 
Naing, Prosecution Witness No. 2, 29 Aug. 2008.) 
82 ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ သူရ (ခ) ဇာဂနာ ပါ ၂၊ ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္။ [Police Major Ye Nyunt v. Thura (a) Zaganar & 
Another, Testimony of Police Major Ye Nyunt.] 
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monks had done or said anything that imperilled their religion.83 Nor do any 
among the police officers’ statements or other court records that I have read 
describe demonstrating monks, or those being prosecuted, as bogus.  
 
Sentencing of persons accused over the 2007 protests occurred in two broad 
phases. In the first phase, in the lead up to and during the protests, the police 
brought accused persons to courts that handed down sentences with 
extraordinary efficiency. For example, Min Aung, a defendant who allegedly led a 
march in Rakhine State on September 19 returned from Yangon to his home in 
Thandwe on October 13, and policemen arrested him there on the same day. For 
three days, they kept him at the district station, where the Special Branch and 
military intelligence interrogated him. They then brought him to court, where a 
judge sentenced him on October 17.84 A lawyer lodged an appeal on his behalf. 
The state court upheld the verdict but reduced the sentence on October 24.85 The 
entire process from date of arrest to revision of sentence took under a fortnight.  
 
In Sittwe, a court sentenced Aung Soe on the same day as Min Aung, October 17, 
after the police came for him on October 3.86 The records show that army 
intelligence and the Special Branch interrogated him on October 4, and he was 
remanded in custody on October 10. Similarly, policemen in the north arrested 
Ko Thiha on September 7 and charged him with sedition and under section 
505(b) for upsetting public tranquillity by virtue of his having come to collect 
some documents at a photocopy shop for distribution at demonstrations. On 
September 14 they brought him to court. A judge heard the case in a single day. 
On September 17, even before the protests for which he was allegedly collecting 
materials had reached their climax, the judge sentenced Thiha to twenty-two 
                                                        
83 ရဲမွဴးရဲၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ဂမၻီရ (ခ) စေႏၵာဘာသ (ခ) ညီညီလြင္ (ခ) လႈိင္ဘြား ပါ ၁၁၊ တရားခံမ်ားအတြက္ အၿပီးသတ္ေလွ်ာက္လဲခ်က္၊ စာ ၄။ [Police 
Major Ye Nyunt v. Gambhira (a) Candobhasa (a) Nyi Nyi Lwin (a) Hlaing Bwa & 10, Closing 
Submission for the defence: 4.] U Gambhira also got out of jail in the 13 January 2012 amnesty but 
shortly after authorities threatened him with rearrest for refusing to comply with orders from the 
supreme council of the monkhood to vacate his monastery, which had been sealed off following the 
2007 protests. “U Gambhira Not Only Commits Offences but Also Insults National-Level Sangha 
Organization after His Release from Prison,” New Light of Myanmar 19 Feb. 2012, 24 Feb. 2012 
<http://www.myanmar.com/newspaper/nlm/>.  
84 ဒုရဲအုပ္စံေရႊသိန္း ႏွင့္ မင္းေအာင၊္ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၈-၂၉၊ သံတြဲခရိုင္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ၊္ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၇ ရက္၊ 
ခရိုင္တရားသူႀကီး ေသာင္းတင။္ (Sub Inspector San Shwe Thein v. Min Aung, 2007 Criminal Case Nos. 28-29, 
Thandwe District Court, 17 Oct. 2007, District Judge Thaung Tin.) 
85 မင္းေအာင ္ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ၊္ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈဆိုင္ရာအယူခံ မႈအမွတ္ ၃၂-၃၃၊ ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၂၄ ရက္၊ ျပည္နယ္တရားသူႀကီး စန္းလြင္။ (Min Aung v. Union of Myanmar, 2007 Criminal 
Appellate Case Nos. 32-33, Rakhine State Court, 24 Oct. 2007, State Judge San Lwin.) 
86 ဒုရဲအုပ္ျမေမာင္ ႏငွ့္ ေအာင္စိုး၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၄၀၉-၁၁၊ စစ္ေတြၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၁၇ ရက္။ (Sub 
Inspector Mya Maung v. Aung Soe, 2007 Criminal Case Nos. 1409-11, Sittwe Township Court, 17 
Oct. 2007.) The judge’s stamp on the retranscribed verdicts is illegible.  
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years in prison.87 In the end, he served over four years and four months for those 
photocopies, being among the hundreds of persons released under an amnesty on 
13 January 2012, along with many others whose cases I have described in this 
chapter.  
 
In the second phase of sentencing, many cases against persons detained without 
charge or trial or whose cases had languished in the courts suddenly proceeded in 
unison. Courts handed down a series of verdicts in October and November 2008, 
after repeated postponements or long delays in coming to court. Many cases in 
this phase were against groups of protestors, bundled together and tried a dozen 
or more at a time for omnibus offences. For example, the police charged fourteen 
people in a single case for causing hurt to public servants, endangering life, 
obscenity and abetment.88 Out of the 14, only two were visible in the photographs 
of demonstrators that police officers submitted as evidence; notwithstanding, the 
judge sentenced all of them to over three years in jail.  
 
Fourteen activists of the 88 Generation Students group also appeared in court to 
hear verdicts in November 2008. The police spread charges against them over 
facsimile cases, and duplicated charges under the same laws, so the court could 
impose penalties that cumulatively would vastly exceed the maximum sentences 
that they could otherwise have been given. They also charged the activists in 
connection with a range of purported crimes going back over a number of years. 
Four convictions under the Electronic Transactions Law related to events of a 
single day in 2005. Each carried a 15-year jail term.89 A further charge under the 
Organisation Law added another five years.90 This brought the minimum total 
period of imprisonment for each of these accused from courts of first instance to 
sixty-five years. At least nine of them faced other charges under the 1962 Printers 
and Publishers Law, three on two counts, together with prominent activist Min 
                                                        
87 ဒုရဲမွဴးဝင္းျမင့္ ႏွင့္ ကိုသီဟ၊ ၂၀၀၇၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၃၄၊ မႏၱေလးခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္၊ စက္တင္ဘာလ ၁၇ ရက္၊ ခရိုင္တရားသူႀကီး 
ဝင္းေဌး။ (Police Captain Win Myint v. Ko Thiha, 2007 Criminal Case No. 134, Mandalay District 
Court, 17 Sept. 2007, District Judge Win Htay.)  
88 Sections 332, 334, 294 and 114. ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေအာင ္ႏွင့္ ေက်ာ္ဝင္း ပါ ၁၄။ (Police Captain Myint Aung v. Kyaw 
Win & 13.) 
89 ဒုတိယရဲမွဴးႀကီး ေဇာ္မင္းေအာင ္ႏွင့္ မင္းေဇယ် ပါ ၁၄ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၉၀၊ ၉၁၊ ၉၂၊ ၉၃၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ 
ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္၊ သီးသန္႔ခံုရံုး (အင္းစိန္ၿမိဳ႕) ၊ ဦးေသာင္းၫြန္႔ (ဥကၠ႒) ၊ ဦးလွျမင္။့ [Police Lieutenant Colonel Zaw Min 
Aung v. Min Zeya & 13, 2008 Criminal Case Nos. 90, 91, 92, 93, Yangon Northern District Court, 11 
Nov. 2008, Special Tribunal (Insein), U Thaung Nyunt (Chairman), U Hla Myint.] 
90 ဒုတိယရဲမွဴးႀကီး ေဇာ္မင္းေအာင ္ႏွင့္ မင္းေဇယ် ပါ ၁၄ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၁၉၊ ရန္ကုန္ေျမာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ 
ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္၊ သီးသန္႔ခံုရံုး (အင္းစိန္ၿမိဳ႕) ၊ ဦးေသာင္းၫြန္႔ (ဥကၠ႒) ၊ ဦးလွျမင္။့ [Police Lieutenant Colonel Zaw Min 
Aung v. Min Zeya & 13, 2008 Criminal Case No. 119, Yangon Northern District Court, 11 Nov. 2008, 
Special Tribunal (Insein), U Thaung Nyunt (Chairman), U Hla Myint.] 
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Ko Naing and a number of other persons.91 Meanwhile, the same senior police 
officer who brought the five charges against the fourteen accused in Yangon 
brought duplicate charges against Min Ko Naing and eight other defendants at a 
court in the delta. Not only were the charges duplicates, but also the court process 
ran parallel, with a special bench of two judges hearing the cases, and the court 
handing down identical sentences on the same day as its counterpart in the 
commercial capital.92  
 
In each of these cases, the point of reference for sentencing was not the contents 
of the hearing, but the prior criminalisation of the accused. Its purpose was not to 
affirm guilt, which was already taken for granted, but to signify definitively the 
end of the camp, and the beginning of punishment. At the moment of sentencing 
the accused finally became legal persons again, brought from the juridical 
system’s threshold back to its bosom. Returned to jail, they were not the same 
persons as before. The sentencing completed a process, a particular procedure of 
bringing the accused back across the threshold from the anomalous zone into 
which they had been thrust, and restoring to them the entitlements that they had 
hitherto lost. Once this process was completed, and the exemplary and deterrent 
quality of the sentences themselves had been demonstrated, the system as police 
could proceed to do with the accused as its personnel saw fit. In most cases, this 
meant scattering the protester convicts into prisons all across the country, until 
the end of 2011 and early 2012, when the pragmatism of a new political moment 
enabled the release of most, as I have mentioned above. 
  
                                                        
91 ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေအာင ္ႏွင့္ မင္းကိုႏုိင္ (ခ) ေပၚဦးထြန္း ပါ ၉ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၉၀၊ ေဒါပံုၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး 
(အထူးအာဏာ) ေအာင္စိုးတင္။့ [Police Captain Myint Aung v. Min Ko Naing (a) Paw Oo Htun & 8, 2008 
Criminal Case No. 390, Dawpon Township Court, Township Judge (Special Power) Aung Soe Tint.] 
ဒုရဲမွဴးျမင့္ေအာင ္ႏွင့္ မင္းကိုႏုိင္ (ခ) ေပၚဦးထြန္း ပါ ၂၁ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၃၉၁၊ ေဒါပံုၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး၊ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္တရားသူႀကီး 
(အထူးအာဏာ) ေအာင္စိုးတင္။့ [Police Captain Myint Aung v. Min Ko Naing (a) Paw Oo Htun & 20, 2008 
Criminal Case No. 391, Dawpon Township Court, Township Judge (Special Power) Aung Soe Tint.]  
92 ဒုတိယရဲမွဴးႀကီး ေဇာ္မင္းေအာင ္ႏွင့္ မင္းကိုႏိုင္ (ခ) ေပၚဦးထြန္း ပါ ၉ ၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၂၇၊ ၂၈၊ ၂၉၊ ၃၀၊ ၃၁၊ မအူပင္ခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ 
၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ႏိုဝင္ဘာလ ၁၁ ရက္၊ ခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ခင္ေမာင္ထြန္း (ဥကၠ႒) ၊ ဒုတိယခရုိင္တရားသူႀကီး ထိန္မင္း။ [Police Lieutenant 
Colonel Zaw Min Aung v. Min Ko Naing (a) Paw Oo Htun & 8, 2008 Criminal Case Nos. 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, Ma-ubin District Court, 11 Nov. 2008, District Judge Khin Maung Htun (Chairman), Deputy 
District Judge Htein Min.] 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored what animates the criminal juridical system of 
Myanmar in response to unauthorised assembly. I compared the criminalising 
narrative and criminalising actions taken in response to the unauthorised 
assemblies in 1974 and 1988 as against those in 2007. In 1974 and 1988 the 
protests were met with overt police and then army involvement, which 
inaugurated periods of martial law. In many respects, the immediate response to 
these demonstrations followed the basic principles laid down for the containment 
of unauthorised public assembly during the colonial period. In each, a juridical 
frame was placed around a violent, militarised response to public assembly, 
although in these events the juridical frame was in fact not a juridical frame at all 
but an administrative one.  
 
In 2007 the juridical response to unauthorised assembly differed from what had 
come before. The moment of criminalisation was itself imprecise, and what 
followed it, even more so. The defining features of the response to the protests 
that year were the gang and the camp. Although acting as a proxy security force, 
the gang—consisting of thugs cruising the streets in Dyna vans—had an altogether 
different quality from the police force, military or fire brigade. The gang defies, or 
rather, defied, ready categorisation and description. Inherently ambiguous, it 
generated uncertainty about what was happening and who was involved. Through 
the gang, not only could the character of unauthorised assembly be suppressed, 
but also the act of suppressing assembly itself could be denied.  
 
The gang transmitted people in its custody to its anomalous counterpart, the 
camp. The manner in which protestors and persons accused of instigating 
protests were taken and held in the camp signalled the existence of a place where 
the normal order of things—“normal” in the sense of empirical regularity, not 
normative legal order—was suspended. The locus of the camp was the detainee 
herself: wherever she was suspended on the juridical system’s threshold, neither 
fully inside nor outside its ambit, constituted the camp’s domain. Juridical 
personnel patrolled the camp and processed detainees without reference to 
ordinary practices, weeding out instigators and troublemakers from other 
detained persons, releasing the latter and pulling the former with them back 
across the threshold into the courtroom.  
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To restore alleged criminal offenders suspended in that zone to the juridical 
system, officials used the courts. Hearings were administrative, and generally 
held in secret. They could admit contradictions of—and deviations from—the 
official narrative, since their contents would not be known publicly and since they 
had no bearing on the sentences imposed. Detainees released on personal 
assurances fared relatively better than those sent to court, but because of the 
ambiguous quality of their assurances, in some cases they found that they had not 
departed fully from the anomalous zone at all, and that they could yet again be 
detained and possibly charged for earlier alleged offences.  
 
Whereas the gang and the camp constituted a novel development for Myanmar in 
the management of protest, the work of the civilian courts in response to the 
protests of 2007 in certain respects represented their farthest departure from that 
of their progenitors. In cases of unauthorised assembly during the colonial period, 
officials were obliged to invent narratives of criminal opposition to empire and 
insert these into special trials that bypassed ordinary procedure but could still be 
couched in the rhetoric of rule of law. The one-party state and successor military 
regime in 1974 and 1988 resorted to military law and panels of soldiers for the 
trial and conviction of accused persons. In 2007, no distinct moment of 
criminalisation occurred, and no soldiers were required to hear cases personally. 
The civilian courts functioned as clearing houses for alleged ringleaders brought 
across the threshold from the camp. They asked no questions and invented no 
narratives, adopting those narratives that the police brought with them, along 
with the accused persons themselves. No narratives were required of the courts, 
and none were forthcoming. The imperative to maintain law and order sufficed 
for everyone involved.  
 
The linkage between the gang and sovereign power, and through sovereign power 
its anchorage to the criminal juridical system, was essential to the movement of 
protestors back and forth across the system’s threshold. Only through its genetic 
relationship to sovereign power was the gang itself not criminalised. In fact, the 
gang in September 2007 embodied sovereign power in Myanmar more perfectly 
than any other institution at that moment, policing the threshold between the 
juridical and extrajuridical unmediated, freed from any of the constraints placed 
upon conventional agents of the criminal juridical system—the naked 
manifestation of the sovereign will to defend the state’s specific order.  
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The zone of anomie that the gang patrolled and from which people in Myanmar 
were brought back into the juridical system through the hearing and sentence was 
in certain respects how Agamben has described the anomalous zone, as I noted at 
the beginning of this chapter: neither fully inside nor outside the juridical order, 
but rather, a zone in which the juridical and extrajuridical are blurred. The 
ambiguity that inhered to events in 2007, from the moment of criminalisation to 
the sentencing of persons accused over the protests, was by no means incidental. 
It was indicative of how the system as police functions as a continuum of 
administrative activity, not only across institutions but also across the threshold 
between the juridical and extrajuridical. Because the system has as its paramount 
responsibility the maintenance of law and order, and because nothing in this 
responsibility invites or obliges adherence to norms secured juridically, it could in 
2007 move people in and out of this anomalous zone as necessary to secure the 
state’s pragmatic goals.  
 
From my study of Myanmar, however, I do not agree with Agamben that what 
happens in a place of detention within the zone of anomie depends only “on the 
civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign”.93 The 
zone might be outside the ordinary juridical order, but the decisions that the 
temporary police-sovereigns make are informed by their perceptions of what can 
and cannot be done in the rest of the system. The relationships that the policeman 
has to other persons and parts of the system are what place constraints on his 
exercise of sovereign power, in contrast to the gang. The power of the policeman 
as sovereign, be it in the camp or in the torture chamber, is not absolute. In 
Myanmar during 2007, the guardians of the camp made informed decisions 
concerning the lives and liberties of persons in their custody with expectations 
that they could move them back across the extrajuridical threshold and into the 
system proper according to a timeframe and circumstances of their choice. 
Consequently, they made very different decisions from the police-sovereigns in 
places where no such expectations exist, like those who patrolled the anomalous 
zone into which tens of thousands of Sri Lankans were permanently disappeared 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to which I have referred above. Only by being at 
the threshold of the juridical and extrajuridical could detainees in Myanmar be 
brought back into the normal criminal juridical system, when officials policing the 
anomalous zone were ready to return them. This systemic arrangement accounts 
in part, I think, for why in Myanmar although the incidence of custodial abuses is 
                                                        
93 Agamben, Homo Sacer 174. 
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high, the incidence of extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearance is—outside 
the civil war zones—low when compared with some other countries in Asia, as I 
have discussed elsewhere.94 
 
At the end of 2011, the new legislature in Myanmar for the first time in almost 
half a century passed a law to authorise assembly other than that organised by 
government officials themselves. The new Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law, 
No. 15/2011 has in its preamble the stated purpose of authorising public 
assemblies that do not upset state security, the rule of law—taya-ubade-somoye, 
and community peace and tranquillity.95 For this purpose, the law in its section 4 
requires anyone wishing to obtain authorisation for an assembly to submit to the 
relevant police station the intended purpose, date, place and time of the planned 
assembly; details of the contents of any speeches or chants; the personal details of 
the applicant and those of all organisers and persons who will speak at the event; 
estimated numbers of persons to attend the assembly; and, if the assembly has 
been decided upon by an organisation, evidence of a resolution or something to 
this effect. The applicant also must undertake to guarantee that the assembly will 
abide by the terms of the law and any other terms in the authorisation notice.  
 
Min Lwin Oo, an expatriate Burmese lawyer, has pointed out that the new law, far 
from granting a right to assemble, adds another layer of more onerous provisions 
on top of what already exist in the colonial-era 1945 Police Act, which still 
remains in force, wherein the police have the power to require an assembly to 
obtain a licence if in their opinion it is liable to upset law and order.96 Thus, far 
from providing any guarantees of free assembly, the new law constitutes a new 
and explicit statement of the law-and-order idea, consonant with the reframing of 
rights as entitlements, exercised subject to the approval of sovereign power, 
mediated through the system as police.  
 
It remains to be seen how the new law for authorising assembly will work in 
practice—at time of writing it was not yet enforceable. Police stations assigned the 
task of reviewing and approving applications are awaiting the drafting of an 
accompanying set of regulations. Meantime, one station in downtown Yangon was 
prosecuting seven persons under the Penal Code for having assembled “without 
                                                        
94 Cheesman, “Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?” 611-12. 
95 ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းစြာစုေဝးခြင့္ႏွင့္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းစြာစီတန္းလွည့္လည္ခြင့္ဆိုင္ရာဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၅/၂၀၁၁။  
96 မင္းလြင္ဦး၊ ၂၀၁၁ လြတ္လပ္စြာစုေဝးဆႏၵျပခြင့္ဥပေဒန႔ဲ ၁၉၄၅ ရဲအက္ဥပေဒ၊ ပံုႏွိပ္ထုတ္ေဝျခင္း မျပဳ (၂၀၁၁) ။ [Min Lwin Oo, “The 
2011 Free Assembly Law and the 1945 Police Act,” unpublished paper (2011).] 
 278 
any authorisation” on 27 October 2011 to draw attention to the illegal confiscation 
of their farmlands.97 Among the slogans that according to the investigating police 
they called out without prior authorisation: “The people’s legislature, our 
legislature—give meaning to the people’s rights.”98 
 
 
                                                        
97 “ခြင့္ျပဳမိန္႔တစ္စံုတစ္ရာမရွိဘဲ”။ ရဲအုပ္စိုးဝင္း ႏွင့္ ဦးဖိုးျဖဴ (ခ) ဦးရန္ႏိုင္ေအာင္ ပါ ၇၊ ၂၀၁၁၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၅၃၊ ဗိုလ္တေထာင္ 
ၿမိဳ႕နယတ္ရားရုံး။ [Inspector Soe Win v. U Phoe Phyu (a) U Yan Naing Aung & 6, 2011 Criminal Case No. 
153, Botataung Township Court.] 
98 “ျပည္သူ႔လႊတ္ေတာ္၊ ဒို႔လႊတ္ေတာ္—ျပည္သူ႔အခြင့္အေရးေဖာ္ေဆာင္ေပး”။ ပထမသတင္းေပး တိုင္တန္းခ်က္၊ ဗိုလ္တေထာင္ရဲစခန္း၊ (ပ) အမွတ္ 
၁၄၉/၂၀၁၁၊ ၂၀၁၁ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေအာက္တိုဘာလ ၂၇ ရက္။ [First Information Report (Pa) No. 149/2011, Botataung 






I began this study by asking what animates the criminal juridical system of 
Myanmar. Concentrating on “the rule of law” as an animating idea and set of 
practices I argued in the introductory chapter that the rule of law is invoked with 
regularity in this system because it is conflated with law and order. I objected to 
this usage because the two are not synonyms. Whereas the rule of law has a 
general and normative character, law and order is essentially particular and 
pragmatic. Law and order is, I suggested, an opposing principle of government to 
the rule of law, and therefore a system animated essentially by this principle 
cannot be a rule-of-law system; however, through study of such a system, we can 
usefully interrogate the concept of the rule of law itself. Therefore, I proposed to 
study what animates the criminal juridical system of Myanmar so as to better 
understand empirically the nature of that system, and conceptually, the nature of 
that opposition.  
 
In the study’s introduction, I pointed out that the conflating of the rule of law and 
law and order in Myanmar is a remarkable semantic feat, since unlike in English, 
in which reference in both to “law” suggests some kind of complementarity, in 
Burmese “law”, taya-ubade, does not inhere lexically to “law and order” at all. 
Rather, the latter term, ngyeinwut-pibyaye, suggests a condition—still, flattened, 
quietened—that although not directly related to law is evocative of the notion of 
police: not the police, but police in the sense of what Foucault has described a “set 
of means by which the state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in 
good order”.1 Or, as Blackstone put it in his commentaries over two centuries ago, 
“public police” is “the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby 
the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to 
conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety… and to be decent, 
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations”.2 Replace the word 
“kingdom” in Blackstone’s description with “union” and we have a mission 
statement for at least the last two decades of government in Myanmar.  
                                                        
1 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population 313. 
2 Cited in Neocleous, “Policing and Pin-Making,” 431.  
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The police project as “rule of law” is all the more remarkable when we bear in 
mind that historically states in continental Europe developed the institutional 
model of the rule-of-law state, the rechtsstaat, as a replacement for the 
polizeistaat, the police state. The shift towards the rule of law took authority from 
administrative organs and moved it into judicial organs—not so as to replicate 
administrative behaviour in a judicial setting, not to have the judiciary function as 
police, but to enable authority to be exercised in fundamentally different ways: in 
juridical rather than administrative ways. The point of the shift was, as Gianluigi 
Palombella has pointed out, that a form of government in which the state “was 
entitled to apply any discretional decision to the life of citizens in order to define 
their well-being” would be replaced by one in which the state “related to its 
subjects only by submitting itself to the law”.3 What I have shown in this study of 
Myanmar is that by contrast, the state has moved in its practices firmly towards 
more discretionary authority over the lives of subjects, which is to say, towards 
police, while at the same time pointing rhetorically in the opposite direction, 
which is to say, towards the “rule of law”.  
 
The conflating of law and order with the rule of law in the criminal juridical 
system of Myanmar accounts, at least in part, for a variety of other practices that 
would appear to contradict the normative contents of the rule of law, but that are 
consonant with the pragmatic qualities of law and order. Among these, the 
criminal juridical system as police is realised most explicitly, I argued in chapter 
four, in cases heard against public enemies. The public enemy is intrinsic to the 
maintenance of law and order as a principle of government. Therefore, the system 
recognises and acts upon the public enemy automatically, even though it does not 
have any singular specific formula for the identifying and declaring of enemies. 
Paradoxically, the public enemy is on the one hand anyone charged with 
anything, and on the other, a paradigmatic category of wrongdoer. The public 
enemy’s crime is nothing other than her refusal to be bound to conform to the 
rules of propriety established by the sovereign power. Her offence is her refusal to 
be inoffensive, her unwillingness to remain, as Blackstone put it, at her station. 
 
I discussed the working of the criminal juridical system as marketplace in chapter 
five. Although the system does not set out written procedures for the buying and 
                                                        
3 Gianluigi Palombella, “The Rule of Law as an Institutional Ideal,” Rule of Law and Democracy: 
Inquiries into Internal and External Issues, eds. Leonardo Morlino and Gianluigi Palombella, 
International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology Ser. (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2010) 11. 
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selling of cases, where moneymaking practices contribute to the maintenance of 
order, they are permitted and also encouraged. Whereas the systematic departure 
of judicial personnel from the contents of law as the basis for adjudication would 
be incompatible with a system operating according to the principle of the rule of 
law, no such incompatibility exists where the system operates according to the 
principle of law and order. In the latter type of system, personnel can—and in 
Myanmar should—profit from their positions contingent upon them performing 
their tasks in an orderly and compliant fashion. Routine departures from the 
contents of law are not merely tolerated but are, in some cases, necessary in order 
to ensure that personnel fulfill these overriding responsibilities.  
 
All of these practices fall, in official discourse, under the rubric of the rule of law. 
It is pretty obvious that irrespective of whether we adhere to a formal or 
substantive conception of the rule of law, the system in Myanmar does not satisfy 
minimum requirements for the rule of law. This much is clear enough. Had the 
question with which I began been whether or not the criminal juridical system in 
Myanmar is a rule-of-law system it would not, I think, have taken a study of any 
length to respond in the negative.4 But the problem with which I began was not 
one of measurement of the system against criteria by which to locate it on some 
kind of sliding scale indicating more or less rule of law of the sort that I described 
in chapter one—from rule of law to rule by law, to not rule of law—but a more 
open question of what animates the system. I have tried to argue that what 
animates the criminal juridical system of Myanmar is not a concept situated on a 
rule-of-law continuum, differing from the rule of law by degree rather than kind, 
but an opposing principle for the organisation of government to the rule of law, 
namely, law and order, a principle whereby rules lack normative generality, the 
contents of norms and their application are incongruent, and the treatment of 
persons subject to those rules is unequal.  
 
The conflating of the rule of law with the opposing principle of law and order in 
the criminal juridical system in Myanmar, both in lexicon and praxis, brings us 
back to Tamanaha’s assertion which I cited in the introduction, that the rule of 
law is the preeminent legitimating ideal in the world today, despite a lack of 
agreement on precisely what it means. Taken as a plain fact that governments, 
political activists and advocacy groups around the world use terms meaning “rule 
                                                        
4 I in fact answered that question in Cheesman, “Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?” 
597-613. 
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of law” with regularity, and we have cause to agree. But if these terms and their 
usages are probed, explored and unpacked through empirical study of the sort 
that I have undertaken here, what really are they telling us? How many of these 
terms—and the ways in which they are used—in fact signal different concepts to 
those understood by theorists of the rule of law?  
 
Whereas Tamanaha argues that the reasons that heads of governments around 
the world articulate support for the rule of law vary, it strikes me that what they 
are articulating is probably at greater variance than the reasons for articulating it, 
and that the “apparent unanimity in support of the rule of law” of which 
Tamanaha speaks is neither as apparent nor as unanimous as he makes it out to 
be.5 Of course, not everywhere is the rule of law conflated with its opposition, as I 
have argued is the case in Myanmar; however, the rule of law does everywhere 
become embedded in local ideas, language and practices and take on meanings 
that adhere to those settings. Daniel Lev once pointed out that the Indonesian 
term for the rule of law, negara hukum, may well have had its origins in a 
European rule-of-law idea—the rechtsstaat—but once imported and adapted, it 
became an Indonesian idea.6 That is to say, the idea itself changed through the 
political behaviour and usages of Indonesians. Understanding “rule of law” in 
Indonesia demands sensitivity to the peculiarities of negara hukum. A template 
for its assessment according to some formal criteria will not suffice, and will 
probably only end up obscuring more than it reveals.  
 
I wrote in chapter one that I agree with Carl Schmitt that the “rule of law” is an 
empty manner of speaking if it does not receive its actual sense through a certain 
opposition. In this respect, study of equivalent terms for ngyeinwut-pibyaye in 
Asian languages could help us locate more suitable and precise terminology in 
English with which to have productive debate about both ideas and practices that 
stand in opposition to the rule of law, as well as to have a more meaningful 
comparative discussion about rule-of-law issues in Asia. This approach to 
understanding political concepts through opposing concepts and their local 
expressions is not, I would argue, merely an opportunity for intellectual game 
playing, and nor is it some kind of parochial linguistic determinism. By tracking 
                                                        
5 Tamanaha 4. 
6 Daniel S. Lev, “Between State and Society: Professional Lawyers and Reform in Indonesia,” 
Making Indonesia, eds. Daniel S. Lev and Ruth T. McVey, Studies on Southeast Asia Ser. (Ithaca, 
NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1996) 148. For some comments on negara hukum 
apropos Lev see Nadirsyah Hosen, “Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law in Indonesia,” 
Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality, eds. Victor V. Ramraj and Arun K. 
Thiruvengadam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 274-76. 
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institutionalised terms like “rule of law” and “law and order” through official 
narratives, court records and other texts, researchers can follow strands of 
meaning, and unpick them from the contents of institutions into which they are 
interwoven, in order to make greater sense both of the concepts themselves and of 
the systems of which they are part, as I have tried to do in this study.  
 
Some researchers, like Michael Connors, have usefully begun to talk about the 
persistent decisionism and exceptionalism of Thailand as contrasting sharply 
both in terms of ideas and practices with the rule of law.7 David Streckfuss 
characterises Thailand’s juridical and political systems as bound by 
“indeterminate concepts”, among which he includes a term today commonly 
associated with the idea of law and order, khwam sa-ngop riap roi, or “peace and 
order”.8 This analogous expression to ngyeinwut-pibyaye is iterated constantly at 
moments of perceived danger to the state’s specific order in Thailand, such as in 
the stream of public announcements that followed the 2006 military coup. Any 
serious study about rule-of-law ideas and practices in Thailand, it seems to me, 
would have to take khwam sa-ngop riap roi into account. 
 
Nor is the problem of vocabulary simply one of semantics, as I have endeavoured 
to show throughout this study of Myanmar, and as has Streckfuss in his own 
work. That the Thai prime minister in 2003 could through a series of directives 
enable the killing with impunity of probably thousands of persons merely reputed 
to have committed narcotics offences speaks to the relevance of applying a law-
and-order frame to studies of how juridical institutions work in Thailand.9 
Although political opponents of the government blamed the prime minister 
personally for the killings, only through a system of police—one in which a 
continuum of administrative activity across the state apparatus translated his 
orders into brutal action—could the killings actually have been possible. Indeed, 
in a law-and-order system of the sort that exists in Thailand it may from time to 
time be more internally logical to shoot people in their houses and cars than to 
arrest them and put them on trial.  
 
                                                        
7 Michael Connors, “Liberalism, Authoritarianism and the Politics of Decisionism in Thailand,” 
Pacific Review 22.3 (2009): 355-73. 
8 ความสงบเรียบรอย David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and Lèse-
Majesté, Rethinking Southeast Asia Ser., ed. Duncan McCargo (London & New York: Routledge, 
2011) 115. Some translators prefer “peace and orderliness”.  
9 For instance, see Nick Cheesman, “Murder as Public Policy in Thailand,” Article 2 2.3 (2003): 29-
38. 
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In opposition to the official narrative of khwam sa-ngop riap roi, the rule of law 
remains an animating idea for political and social activism in Thailand, and it is 
in the contrast between police practices for maintenance of the state’s specific 
order on the one hand and the rule of law as a motivator for political action on the 
other that the distinction between “peace and order” and the rule of law is 
sharpest. Studying the work of Thai cause lawyers, Frank Munger has suggested 
that the practical meaning of the rule of law for these persons lies in its 
possibilities to open political space.10 His observation goes to the value of the rule 
of law as a mobilising idea for political resistance and change across Asia today. It 
accounts for why despite the predominance of taya-ubade-somoye as law and 
order in the public transcript in Myanmar the rule of law has retained its 
resonance for political and social activists, lawyers, citizen complainants and 
others. People mobilise around the rule of law as an essentially normative 
concept, for political purposes. In the process, they re-create its meaning, 
independent from the dominant law-and-order narrative. They retrieve the rule of 
law from the law-and-order politics of the state, sometimes by going along with 
the idea as officially expressed, but for their own objectives; sometimes investing 
it with new meanings, meanings that apply to taya-ubade-somoye as a 
distinctively Burmese rule of law, in the same way that negara hukum is 
peculiarly Indonesian.  
 
This last point recalls the distinction between the supplicant and the citizen-
complainant that I made in chapter six. Whereas the supplicant attempts to 
model her complaint according to the notion of taya-ubade-somoye as law and 
order, the citizen reclaims the notion as rule of law. That is to say, the distinction 
between these two types of complainant is the conceptual opposition between 
order and law, between the pragmatic frame of the former and the normative 
frame of the latter, between rules that are merely expedient and rules that are 
binding irrespective of circumstances. The complaint of the citizen, even where 
apparently adopting and echoing the contents of the public transcript, in fact 
challenges it fundamentally by insisting on a juridical approach for the addressing 
of complaint, not the administrative one that is on offer. In the process, the 
challenge becomes a political challenge, since it rejects the extant institutional 
arrangements for the receipt of complaint, even when having recourse to them. 
Any political process that leads toward rule of law in practice depends upon a 
                                                        
10 Frank Munger, “Globalization, Investing in Law, and the Careers of Lawyers for Social Causes: 
Taking on Rights in Thailand,” New York Law School Review 53 (2008-09): 747. 
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distinction being made between the normative and pragmatic form of complaint. 
All complaints in some way challenge the authority of the state, no matter how 
subtly. But not all complaints contribute to a struggle for rule of law. 
 
It is this linkage between norms and political discourse that some scholars appear 
to overlook when they insist that the normative contents of the rule of law are, in 
the words of José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, “a figment of the 
imagination of jurists”.11 The normative contents of the rule of law are not a 
figment because they are made real not by jurists, but through political 
participation and public dialogue, which link an ideal universe of the rule of law 
to the factual reality of a specific time and place. This participation and dialogue 
are grounded in, and reinforce, the idea of political equality. Political equality as a 
feature of discourse on, in and around the criminal juridical system in Myanmar 
is not only a response to the fact of inequality that people experience daily, but 
also a response to the ideal of inequality that is inherent in law and order as a 
principle of government, as a solo protestor, U Ohn Than, eloquently explained in 
a courtroom testimony during 2007:  
How I understand the rule of law is that all law applies equally and uniformly to 
everyone in a country, from beggar to president alike. A judicial system whereby a law 
is used against one person one way and another person another way cannot implement 
the rule of law. Moreover, it has reached the point of furthering the un-rule of law. In 
other words, law has become but a means for meddling and abuse of power by the 
ruling elite.12 
 
The insistence on political equality that is implicit in demands for the rule of law 
like those of Ohn Than, as against the essential inequality of law and order, is part 
of what gives the rule of law its flavour of universality and its relevance to specific 
settings, issues and cases. It is what binds local expressions of political 
participation to larger debates that transcend specific conditions. And it is this 
synthesis of the universal and the local that makes the rule of law such a 
                                                        
11 José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, Introduction, Democracy and the Rule of Law, eds. 
José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy Ser. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 1. 
12 “တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးဆိုသည္မွာ တရားဥပေဒတိုင္းအား ႏိုင္ငံအတြင္းရွိ သူေတာင္းစားမွ သမၼတႀကီးအထိ တေျပးညီလႊမ္းမိုးျခင္းကို 
ဆိုလုိသည္ဟု က်ေနာ္နားလည္ပါသည္။ ဥပေဒတရပ္သည္ တဦးတေယာက္အေပၚတြင္တမ်ဳိး၊ အျခားတဦးတေယာက္အေပၚတမ်ဳိး 
က်င့္သံုးေနရသည္ဆိုပါက ၎တရားစီးရင္ေရးစနစ္သည္ တရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးေဆာင္ရြက္ျခင္း မျဖစ္ႏိုင္ပါ။ ၎အျပင္ 
မတရားဥပေဒစိုးမိုးေရးေဆာင္ရြက္အား ေပးရာေရာက္ပါသည္။ တနည္းအားျဖင့္ တရားဥပေဒကို အပု္ခ်ဳပ္သူလူတန္းစားတစုက 
အာဏာအလြဲသံုးစားျပဳလ်က္ စြက္ဖက္အသံုးခ်ျခင္းသာ ျဖစ္ႏုိင္ပါသည္။” ရဲအုပ္စိုးႏိုင္ ႏွင့္ ဦးအုန္းသန္း၊ ၂၀၀၈၊ ျပစ္မႈႀကီး မႈအမွတ္ ၁၂၊ 
ရန္ကုန္အေနာက္ပိုင္းခရိုငတ္ရားရုံး၊ ဦးအုန္းသန္း၏ ထြက္ဆိုခ်က္၊ တရားခံသက္ေသ အမွတ္ ၁၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ ေဖေဖာ္ဝါရလီ ၂၀ ရက္။ 
(Inspector Soe Naing v. U Ohn Than, 2008 Criminal Case No. 12, Yangon Western District Court, 
Testimony of U Ohn Than, Defence Witness No. 1, 20 Feb. 2008.) For details of the case see 
Cheesman, “Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?” 604-09. Ohn Than was among 
those persons released from prison on 13 January 2012 under an amnesty order.  
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persistent and powerful animating idea for political activism around the world, 
yet in each place in unique and original ways.  
 
So, although I write against Maravall and Przeworski in defence of the normative 
contents of the rule of law, I do so out of a shared concern for its political value, 
not out of reverence for the concept in a pristine originary form of the sort to 
which they object when they refer to the figments of jurists’ imaginations. Joseph 
Raz, for instance, opened his well-known essay on the rule of law and its virtue by 
bemoaning that the doctrine in contemporary usage bears “little or no relation to 
the one it originally designated”.13 I see no grounds for this assertion. The rule of 
law has no unique, original designation. Nobody invented the rule of law. It 
emerged from historically complex struggles for political power, and continues to 
evolve through those struggles today. Edward Thompson understood this much 
when he wrote his now famous exposition on the topic, declaring that “the rule of 
law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the 
citizen from power’s all intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human 
good”.14 This statement is sometimes picked up and quoted as if it constitutes an 
unproblematic endorsement of the rule of law.15 The contents of Thompson’s 
monograph make plain that nothing could be further from the truth. His is a rule 
of law bound to the historical, cultural and social conditions from which it 
emerged, and specifically, to prolonged resistance against decisive economic and 
legal inequality. It is a rule of law that remains rooted in a deep understanding of 
the specific circumstances from which it has come, while also taking on general, 
universal qualities through which it becomes politically compelling.  
 
In one of many critiques that followed the publication of Whigs and Hunters, 
Morton Horwitz railed against Thompson’s appreciation for the rule of law, 
describing the rule of law as “a conservative doctrine” that enables the shrewd, 
calculating and wealthy “to manipulate its forms to their advantage”.16 Whether 
or not this argument can be made of England, America or Australia, I do not 
believe that it can be made of most parts of Asia today. The rule-of-law idea in 
Asia is not a conservative doctrine but a radical one, a doctrine that goes to the 
radix, or roots, of political power. It is an idea that challenges fundamentally the 
                                                        
13 Raz 210. 
14 Thompson 266. 
15 For example, Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 24. Upham 283. 
16 Morton J. Horwitz, “The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?” Yale Law Journal 86.3 
(1977): 566. 
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manner in which power has been, and continues to be exercised throughout the 
region. In Myanmar or Thailand, Cambodia or the Philippines, the shrewd, 
calculating and wealthy enjoy their advantages over other people for want of the 
rule of law, not because of it. Although equality and rights of political 
participation are endorsed in constitutions and other framework documents 
convenient for the purpose of managing complex modern societies, they are not 
endorsed in reality. I am not here pointing to the obvious gap, or gulf, between 
equality as an ideal and inequality as fact. I am referring instead to the gap, or 
perhaps contradiction, between the ideal of equality expressed in formal 
documents, and the ideal of inequality on which the exercise of power is still 
actually premised.  
 
The rule of law depends, in my conception, on an ideal of mutual recognition and 
respect, upon which general rules can be based, with which people can act to 
protect their interests by legal means. A rule-of-law society is not one of sovereign 
cetana-dispensers and grateful subordinates, nor does it consist of form of 
government in which fear is the source of political order, in which discussion is 
somehow inimical to the popular will. Rather, it is a community of people living in 
what the Indian polymath and constitutionalist Bhim Rao Ambedkar once 
described as “a mode of associated living” through active communication.17 As 
Habermas has pointed out, the rule of law cannot succeed as a project for the 
effective governing of society unless it is based on the ideal of reciprocated 
granting of liberties among members of a political community.18 It is this prior, 
integral feature of the rule of law as political struggle and political recognition 
that strikes me as missing from accounts of the concept by theorists, and this 
feature that also makes empirical research on the rule of law, and on its opposing 
concepts, of continued importance.  
 
These remarks lead me to conclude this study with the thought that Habermas 
was right to insist upon an internal relation between the rule of law and 
democracy.19 If we mean by democracy any political system organised on the 
                                                        
17 B. R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste,” The Essential Writings of B. R. Ambedkar, ed. Valerian 
Rodrigues (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) 276. For a discussion of this idea of 
Ambedkar with comparison to the thinking and teaching of the Danish folk schools’ founder N. F. S. 
Grundtvig, see Basil Fernando, Demoralization and Hope: Creating the Social Foundation for 
Sustaining Democracy (Hong Kong: Asian Human Rights Commission, 2000). 
18 Habermas 457. 
19 Jürgen Habermas, “On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy,” The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, eds. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998) 253-64. 
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general principle of equality among members of a community in which people 
have normatively secured rights and opportunities to participate in political and 
social debate—a conjoint communicated experience based on an attitude of 
respect for other members of the community is how Ambedkar put it—then I do 
not see how it can be any other way.20 The rule of law is, after all, not a product. It 
is not a commodity that can be manufactured and delivered by experts, nor an 
object that can be measured by carefully calibrated technology. Ultimately, it 
constitutes a set of practices that together depend upon the extent to which 
people in society are capable of thinking of one another as fellow citizens, as 
peers, and communicating among themselves about shared ideas for mutual 
betterment. To go back to where I began this study, the rule of law must be 
understood both as social outcome and as social input: as a justificatory process, a 
sum of its ends and its means.  
 
To reiterate, the rule of law’s essence is at once juridical and political. Ultimately, 
it is this admixture of qualities that accounts for its persistence in the language of 
resistance to power, as well as in the rhetoric of power-holders. The rule of law 
has a symbolic value that exceeds the sum of its elements in lists of formal 
criteria. It defies attempts to confine it to a particular doctrine, time or place 
because it appeals to the global and the local, and invests political struggle with 
the significance of both. Its merit rests in its being at once deeply contextual and 
profoundly universal: contextual, because the rule of law signifies the prospects 
for change to local institutions and practices, the prospects for escape from the 
past and the prospects for a different future; universal, because it signifies a 
common struggle for equality, in the absence of which the rule of law would never 
have emerged either as an idea or practice anywhere.  
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Political History of Burma. Rangoon: Sarpay Beikman Press, 1973.) 
လယ္သမားအခြင့္အေရးကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္သူမ်ားကြန္ယက္။ လယ္ယာေျမအဓမၼသိမ္းယူမႈမ်ားႏွင့္ ေအာင္ပြဲ 
အပိုင္းအစမ်ား၊။ လယ္သမားအခြင့္အေရးကာကြယ္ေစာင့္ေရွာက္သူမ်ားကြန္ယက္၊ ၂၀၁၁? ။ 
(Farmers’ Rights Defenders Network. Expropriations of Farmlands and 
Partial Victories. Farmers’ Rights Defenders Network, 2011?)  
လွၾကည္၊ ပုသိမ္။ အဓမၼေစခိုင္းလို႔ လူတစ္ဦးေသဆံုးသြားရေၾကာင္း ျပည္ပအသံလႊင့္ဌာနတို႔က မွားယြင္းစြာ 
ေၾကညာခဲ့တဲ့ ပုသိမ္ၿမိဳ႕က ျဖစ္ရပ္မွန္ လူေသဆံုးမႈ။ ႐ႈေထာင့္မႈခင္းသတင္း၊ ၂၀၀၉ ခုႏွစ္၊ ဇူလိုင္လ ၁၃ 
ရက္၊ စာ ၄။ (Hla Kyi, Pathein. “The True Story of a Death in Pathein Town 
That Foreign Radio Stations Wrongly Announced Was Caused by 
Unlawful Force.” Shutaunt Crime News 13 July 2009: 4.) 
သန္းေဖျမင့္၊ ဦး။ ၆၂-၆၇ သမိုင္းဝင္မွတ္တမ္းမ်ား။ ရန္ကုန္၊ စုေပါင္းစာေပ၊ ၁၉၆၈။ (Than Pe Myint, U. 
Historical Records, 62-67. Rangoon: Subaung Press, 1968.) 
သိန္းလႈိင္၊ ဦး ႏွင့္ ေဒါက္တာ ေဒၚခင္လွွဟန္၊ ျပဳစု။ ျမန္မာ့ႏိုင္ငံေရးစနစ္ေျပာင္းကာလ (၁၉၆၂-၁၉၇၄)။ 
တတိယတြဲ။ ရန္ကုန္၊ တက ၠသိုလ္မ်ားပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၉၃။ [Thein Hlaing, U, and Dr Daw 
Khin Hla Han, eds. A Period of Change to Myanmar’s Political System 
(1962-1974). Vol. 3. Yangon: Universities Press, 1993.] 
ေအာင္ႀကီး၊ သခင္။ လူသားတို႔အခြင့္အေရးအတြက္ (၄၁) မ်က္ႏွာစာတမ္းေပါင္းခ်ဳပ္။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ဦးၾကည္ဟန္ 
(အေထြေထြအတြင္းေရးမွဴး) ျပည္ေထာင္စုအမ်ဳိးသားမ်ားဒီမိုကေရစီပါတီ၊ ၁၉၉၀။ (Aung Gyi, 
Thakin. “The 41-Page Treatise and Collected Writings for Humans’ 
Rights.” Yangon: U Kyi Han, General Secretary, Union Nationals 
Democracy Party, 1990.)  
ေအာင္ျမင့္ဦး၊ ေဒါက္တာ။ ဘာသာစကားသုေတသန။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ဓူဝစာေပ၊ ၂၀၁၀။ (Aung Myint Oo, Dr. 
Linguistic Research. Yangon: Duwa Press, 2010.) 
ေအာင္သန္းထြန္း။ ေခတ္ေလးေခတ္ ျမန္မာ့တရားဥပေဒ။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ကေလာင္ပ်ံစာအုပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၆၈။ (Aung 
Than Tun. Four Eras of Burmese Law. Rangoon: Kalaungpyan Press, 
1968.)  
---။ လူတိုင္းအဖို ႔ ဥပေဒဗဟုသုတ။ ပုဂံစာအုပ္တုိက္၊ ၁၉၇၀။ (Aung Than Tun. Law General 
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ကိုခင္ေမာင္ ႏွင့္ မအုန္း ပါ ၃။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၅၇၂။ [Ko Khin Maung v. Ma Ohn & 2. 1966 
BLR (CC) 572.] 
ကိုေမွး ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၉၄ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၄၉။ [Ko Hmei v. Union of 
Myanmar. 1994 MLR (SC) 149.]  
ကိုသိန္းဝင္း ပါ ၂  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၂၆။ [Ko 
Thein Win & Another v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1981 
BLR (CC) 126.]  
ခ်စ္လႈိင္၊ ထြန္းဝိုင္း၊ သိန္းေအာင္ ပါ ၂၂  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၅၈ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္) ၅၈၂။ 
[Chit Hlaing, Htun Waing, Thein Aung & 19 v. Union of Burma. 1958 
BLR (HC) 582.] 
ေစာဘိုးၾကဴး ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၇ မတစ (အထူး) ၄၅။ [Saw Bogyu v. Union of 
Burma. 1967 BLR (SCCAC) 45.]  
တန္ဂ်ဳပ္စိန္ (ခ) ေရာင္စိန္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီး။ ၁၉၅၈ မတစ 
(လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) ၁၉၂။ [Tanjup Singh (?) (a) Yaung Sein v. Minister of Home 
Affairs, Government of the Union of Burma. 1958 BLR (SC) 192.] 
ေဒၚစီစီ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၄ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၈၇၇။ [Daw Si Si v. Union of Burma. 
1964 BLR (CC) 877.] 
ေဒၚသန္းသန္းလြင္၊ လက္ေထာက္ၫႊန္ၾကားေရးမွဴး၊ တရားမတရားစီရင္ေရးဌာန၊ မႏၱေလး ႏွင့္ ဦးသိန္းၾကည္ (ခ) 
မိုဟာမက္မူဆာ။ ၂၀၀၇ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၁၂။ [Daw Than Than Lwin, Assistant 
Director, Civil Justice Department, Mandalay v. U Thein Kyi (a) 
Mohamed Muser. 2007 MLR (SC) 112.]  
ေဒၚေအးၾကည္ ႏွင့္ ဦးဝင္းေသာင္ ပါ ၄။ ၁၉၈၆ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၈၇။ [Daw Aye Kyi v. U Win Thaung & 
3. 1986 BLR (CC) 87.] 
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ေဒၚေအးတင္ ႏွင့္ မိတၳီလာခ႐ိုင္ေဒသျပည္သူ႔ တရား႐ုံးအယူခံအဖြဲ႔ပါ ၂။ ၁၉၇၁ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၇။ [Daw Aye 
Tin v. Meikhtila District Area People’s Court Appeal Court & Another. 
1971 BLR (CC) 17.] 
ပတၱီးဘဲလူး ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၅၁။ [Pattibelu v. Union of Burma. 
1966 BLR (SCCAC) 51.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးကံသိန္း။ ၁၉၈၇ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၂။ [Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma v. U Kan Thein. 1987 BLR (CC) 22.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးေက်ာ္ရင္။  ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၆၆။ [Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma v. U Kyaw Yin. 1981 BLR (CC) 66.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးေအာင္ႀကီး ပါ ၂။  ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၃၉။ [Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma v. U Aung Gyi & Another. 1980 BLR (CC) 
39.]  
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ထြန္းစိန္။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၄၂၅။ [Union of Burma v. 
Maung Htun Sein. 1966 BLR (CC) 1425.]  
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ေရႊ (ခ) ေမာင္ေရွ၊ ေမာင္ထြန္းရွင္။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၁၆။ [Union of 
Burma v. Maung Shwe (a) Maung She & Maung Htun Shin. 1966 BLR 
(CC) 616.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ဦးဘလွ ပါ ၄။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၄၃၇။ [Union of Burma v. U Ba 
Hla & 3. 1966 BLR (CC) 1437.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ (ေဒၚ႐ႈခင္) ႏွင့္ ေမာင္ျမ (ခ) ျမဦး ပါ ၃။ ၁၉၇၁ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၃၁။ [Union of 
Burma (Daw Shu Khin) v. Maung Mya (a) Mya Oo & 2. 1971 BLR (CC) 
31.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ (ေဒါက္တာျပည္စိုး) ႏွင့္ ေဒၚတင္တင္။ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၀၇၅။ [Union of 
Burma (Dr Pyi Soe) v. Daw Tin Tin. 1965 BLR (CC) 1075.]  
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ မာဒင ္(ခ) ၾကည္လြင္။ ၁၉၉၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၂၉။ [Union of 
Myanmar v. Mardin (a) Kyi Lwin. 1996 MLR (SC) 129.]  
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ဦးရဲေနာင္ ပါ ၂။ ၁၉၉၁ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၃။ [Union of Myanmar v. 
U Ye Naung & Another. 1991 MLR (SC) 63.] 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ / တိုးရီ ႏွင့္ တိုးရီ / ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။  ၁၉၉၂ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၈။ 
[Union of Myanmar/Toe Yi v. Toe Yi/Union of Myanmar. 1992 MLR (SC) 
28.]  
ဘီ႐ွဳး (ခ) မက်င္ႏု ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ။ ၁၉၅၃ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္) ၁၁၀။ [Bishu (a) Ma Kyin 
Nu v. Union of Burma. 1953 BLR (HC) 110.]  
မခင္ျမင့္ (ခ) မခင္ၫႊန္႔ၾကည္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၇၀ မတစ (အထူး) ၁။ [Ma Khin Myint 
(a) Ma Khin Nyunt Kyi v. Union of Burma. 1970 BLR (SCCAC) 1.]  
ေမာင္ကို ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (အထူး) ၁၁။ [Maung Ko v. Union of Burma. 
1965 BLR (SCCAC) 11.] 
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ေမာငက္ိုးနီ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။  ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၇။ [Maung Ko Ni 
v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1980 BLR (CC) 7] 
ေမာင္ေက်ာ္တင့္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၄၁။ [Maung Kyaw Tint v. 
Union of Burma. 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 41.]  
ေမာင္ေက်ာ္ေအး ပါ ၇  ႏွင့္ ေတာင္ငူခ႐ိုင္ဝန္မင္းပါ ၂။ ၁၉၅၇ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) ၄၉။ [Maung Kyaw 
Aye & 6 v. Taunggoo District Commissioner & Another. 1957 BLR (SC) 
49.]  
ေမာင္ခ်စ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၇၂ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၀။ [Maung Chit v. Union of Burma. 
1972 BLR (CC) 20.] 
ေမာင္ခ်စ္ေထြး ပါ ၄  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၇ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၉။ [Maung Chit Htwe & 3 
v. Union of Burma. 1967 BLR (CC) 69.] 
ေမာင္ခ်စ္လႈိင္ ပါ ၇  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၁၄၂။ [Maung Chit Hlaing & 
6 v. Union of Burma. 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 142.] 
ေမာင္ေစာေဖ ပါ ၃  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၅၇။ [Maung Saw Hpe & 2 v. 
Union of Burma. 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 57.]  
ေမာင္စံသိန္း (ခ) ေမာင္သိန္းေဇာ/္ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ/ေမာင္စံသိန္း (ခ) 
ေမာင္သိန္းေဇာ္။  ၁၉၆၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၈။ [Maung San Thein (a) Maung Thein 
Zaw/Union of Burma v. Union of Burma/ Maung San Thein (a) Maung 
Thein Zaw. 1969 BLR (CC) 28.] 
ေမာင္စိုးစိုးေအာင္ ႏွင့္ ေဒၚျမင့္ျမင့္ခင္ ပါ ၃။ ၁၉၈၃ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၉၀။ [Maung Soe Soe Aung v. Daw 
Myint Myint Khin & 2. 1983 BLR (CC) 90.] 
ေမာင္စိုးျမင့္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။  ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၈။ [Maung Soe 
Myint v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1981 BLR (CC) 28] 
ေမာင္စိုးျမင့္ (ခ) ရာရွစ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၈၂ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၉။ 
[Maung Soe Myint (a) Rashid v. Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma. 1982 BLR (CC) 19.]  
ေမာင္တင္ေမာင္ ပါ ၈  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၂၂။ [Maung Tin Maung & 
7 v. Union of Burma. 1969 BLR (CC) 222.]  
ေမာင္တင္လွ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၇ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၂၀။ [Maung Tin Hla v. Union of 
Burma. 1967 BLR (CC) 620.]  
ေမာင္တင္ေအး ႏွင့္ ခရုိင္ဝန္၊ ပခုကၠဴၿမိဳ႕ပါ ၁။ ၁၉၅၇ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) ၁၇။ [Maung Tin Aye v. 
District Commissioner, Pakokku & One. 1957 BLR (SC) 17.] 
ေမာင္တင့္ေဆြ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။  ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၀။ [Maung Tint 
Swe v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1980 BLR (CC) 20]  
ေမာငထ္ြန္းတင္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။  ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၈၅။ [Maung Tun Tin v. Union 
of Burma. 1965 BLR (CC) 185] 
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ေမာငပ္န္းဇံု ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) ၁၅။ [Maung Pan Zone v. 
Union of Burma. 1960 BLR (SC) 15.]  
ေမာင္မႈံ ပါ ၃  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၀၃။ [Maung 
Hmon & 2 v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1981 BLR (CC) 
103.]  
ေမာငသ္န္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။  ၁၉၇၃ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၂၄။ [Maung Than v. Union of 
Burma. 1973 BLR (CC) 24] 
ေမာင္သန္းဝင္း (ခ) တင္ေအာင္ ပါ ၃  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၈ မတစ (အထူး) ၆၁။ [Maung 
Than Win (a) Tin Aung & 2 v. Union of Burma. 1968 BLR (SCCAC) 61.] 
ေမာင္သိန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။  ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၅၈။ [Maung Thein v. Union of 
Burma. 1966 BLR (CC) 158] 
ေမာင္ေအာင္ေဌးျမင့္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၃၉၇။ [Maung Aung Htay 
Myint v. Union of Burma. 1965 BLR (CC) 397.]  
မစၥတာ အာ(ရ္)၊ အက(္စ္)။ ဘြန္း ပါ ၃  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၆ မတစ (အထူး) ၇၁။ [Mister  
R. S. Bun & 2 v. Union of Burma. 1966 BLR (SCCAC) 65.]  
ယိုဘြန္ဝွက္ (ခ) ကက္နက္ဝွက္လာ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္အစိုးရ၊ ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာန 
အတြင္းဝန္ႏွင့္ အျခားသူမ်ား။ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) ၁၇၅။ [Yoe Bun Hwei (a) Kek 
Nek Hwei La v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the 
Union of Burma & Others. 1960 BLR (SC) 175.]  
လင္ေခြးယား (ခ) ေရာင္အိပ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ထဲေရးဌာနဝန္ႀကီး။ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) ၁၈၉။ [Lim Hkwei 
Ya (a) Yaun Ei v. Minister of Home Affairs. 1960 BLR (SC) 189.] 
သိန္းေဌး (ခ) ခရု၊ အငယ္ေလး (ခ) အုန္းေက်ာ္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ႏွင့္ ခရု (ခ) သိန္းေဌး ပါ ၂။ ၁၉၉၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၇၇။ [Thein Htay (a) Khayu / 
Ange Le (a) Ohn Kyaw v. Union of Myanmar, Union of Myanmar v. 
Khayu (a) Thein Htay & Another. 1999 MLR (SC) 77.] 
ဦးေက်ာ္ထင္ ပါ ၉  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၈၂ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၃။ [U Kyaw 
Htin & 8 v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1982 BLR (CC) 3.] 
ဦးစံျမင့္ (ခ) ဦးစံညြန္႔ (ခ) ရွင္အဂၢစံသ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ (ဦးသန္းျမင့္)။ 
၁၉၈၁ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၃။ [U San Myint (a) U San Nyunt (a) Shin Aggasantha v. 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (U Than Myint). 1981 BLR (CC) 
23.]  
ဦးစိန္ထြန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။  ၁၉၈၀ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၃။ [U Sein Tun v. 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1980 BLR (CC) 13] 
ဦးတင္ေငြ၊ ေဒၚျမျမဝင္း (ခ) ေဒၚသန္းဝင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၂၀၀၆ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၁။ [U Tin 
Ngwe, Daw Mya Mya Win (a) Daw Than Win v. Union of Myanmar. 
2006 MLR (SC) 1.] 
ဦးတင္ေမာင္ဟန္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၇၅ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၄၀။ [U Tin 
Maung Han v. Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1975 BLR (CC) 
40.] 
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ဦးထြန္းေအာင္၊ ဦးထြန္းသိန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၇၀ မတစ (႐ံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၉၀။ [U Htun Aung & 
U Htun Thein v. Union of Burma. 1970 BLR (CC) 190.] 
ဦးမာမြတ္ (ခ) ဦးေမာင္ႀကီး ႏွင့္ ၁။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂။ ဦးဘထြန္း။ ၁၉၈၂ 
မတစ (ဗဟို) ၅၄။ [U Mahmud (a) U Maung Gyi v. 1. Socialist Republic of the 
Union of Burma, 2. U Ba Htun. 1982 BLR (CC) 54.]  
ဦးမင္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၇၇ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၂၂။ [U Min v. Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma. 1977 BLR (CC) 22] 
ဦးေမာင္ေမာင္ ပါ ၂  ႏွင့္ ေဒၚၾကဴစိန္ ပါ ၃။ ၁၉၉၂ မတစ (ရံုးခ်ဳပ္) ၁၀၂။ [U Maung Maung & Another 
v. Daw Kyu Sein & 2. 1992 MLR (SC) 102.] 
ဦးျမင့္သိန္း ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၉၉ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) ၆၆။ [U Myint Thein v. Union of 
Myanmar. 1999 MLR (SC) 66.] 
ဦးဝင္း ပါ ၂  ႏွင့္ ၁။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္၊ ၂။ ဦးအုန္းခင္ (ခ) ဦးရွမ္းေလး။ ၁၉၈၁ 
မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၁၅။ [U Win & Another v. 1. Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma, 2. U Ohn Khin (a) U Shan Lay. 1981 BLR (CC) 115.]  
ဦးဝင္းေဖ  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ျပည္ထဲေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာနအတြင္းဝန္။ ၁၉၅၇ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္ခ်ဳပ္) 
၃၂။ [U Win Pe v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of Burma. 
1957 BLR (SC) 32.]  
ဦးဝင္းဟန္ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္။ ၁၉၇၅ မတစ (ဗဟို) ၁၀၁။ [U Win Han v. 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 1975 BLR (CC) 101.] 
ဦးေအာင္စိန္ ပါ ၃  ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ။ ၁၉၆၀ မတစ (လႊတ္ေတာ္) ၉၁။ [U Aung Thein & 2 v. 
Union of Burma. 1960 BLR (HC) 91.] 
ဦးေအာင္ၫြန္႔ ႏွင့္ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံ (နယ္ပိုင္ရာဇဝတ္တရားသူႀကီး၊ တာခ်ီလိတ္)။ ၁၉၆၅ မတစ (႐ုံးခ်ဳပ္) 
၅၇၈။ [U Aung Nyunt v. Union of Burma (Sub-Divisional Magistrate, 





Arms Act, India Act No. 11/1878 
Bar Council Act, India Act No. 38/26 
Burma Immigration (Emergency Provisions) Act, No. 31/47 
Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947 
Contempt of Court Act, India Act No. 12/26 
Control of Imports and Exports (Temporary) Act, No. 56/47 
Code of Criminal Procedure, India Act No. 5/1898 
Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 21/58 
Evidence Act, India Act No. 1/1872 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, No. 44/47 
Gambling Act, No. 1/1899 
Legal Practitioners Act, India Act No. 18/1879 
Penal Code, India Act No. 45/1860 
Police Act, No. 6/45 
Prisons Act, India Act No. 9/1894 
Public Order (Preservation) Act, No. 16/1947 
Special Judges Act, No. 9/1946 
Towns Act, No. 3/07 
Union Citizenship Act, No. 4/1982 
Union Judiciary Act, No. 8/1948 
Unlawful Associations Act, India Act No. 14/08 
Village Act, No. 6/1907 
 
ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းစြာစုေဝးခြင့္ႏွင့္ ၿငိမ္းခ်မ္းစြာစီတန္းလွည့္လည္ခြင့္ဆိုင္ရာ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၅/၂၀၁၁ (Peaceful 
Assembly and Procession Law, No. 15/2011)  
ဆိုရွယ္လစ္စီးပြားေရးစနစ္တည္ေဆာက္မႈအတြက္ လုပ္ပိုင္ခြင့္မ်ားအပ္ႏွင္းသည့္ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၈/၆၅။ (Law 
Conferring Authorisations for the Building of a Socialist Economic 
System, No. 8/65)  
တရားစီရင္ေရး ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂/၈၈ (Judiciary Law, No. 2/88) 
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တရားစီရင္ေရး ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၅/၂၀၀၀ (Judiciary Law, No. 5/2000) 
တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ ေရွ႕ေနမ်ားေကာင္စီ အက္ဥပေဒကို ျပင္ဆင္သည့္ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂၂/၈၉ (Bar Council Act 
Amending Law, No. 22/89) 
ပံုႏွိပ္သူမ်ားႏွင့္ ထုတ္ေဝသူမ်ား မွတ္ပံုတင္ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂၆/၆၂ (Printers and Publishers Law, No. 
26/62) 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုဆိုရွယ္လစ္သမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒ၊ ၁၉၇၄ ခုႏွစ္ (Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1974) 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုတရားစီရင္ေရး ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂၀/၂၀၀၀ (Union Judiciary Law, No. 20/2010) 
ျပည္ေထာင္စုသမၼတျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ဖြဲ႕စည္းပံုအေျခခံဥပေဒ၊ ၂၀၀၈ ခုႏွစ္ (Constitution of the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008) 
ျပည္သူ႔ေကာင္စီ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ဂ/၇၄ (People’s Council Law, No. 8/74) 
ျပည္သူ ႔တရားသူႀကီးအဖဲြ႕ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၃/၇၄ (Council of People’s Justices Law, No. 13/74) 
ဘာသာရပ္သင္ ကိုယ္ပိုင္သင္တန္း ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၆/၈၄ (Tuition Law, No. 6/84) 
မူးယစ္ေဆးဝါးႏွင့္ စိတ္ကိုေျပာင္းလဲေစေသာ ေဆးဝါမ်ားဆိုင္ရာ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁/၉၃ (Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Law, No. 1/93) 
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံသား ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂/၈၂ (Citizenship Law, No. 2/82) 
ရုပ္ျမင္သံၾကားႏွင့္ဗီဒီယို ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၈/၉၆ (Television and Video Law, No. 8/96) 
အဂတိလိုက္စားမႈတားျမစ္ေရး အက္ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၆၇/၄၈ (Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 
67/48) 
အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံး ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၅/၆၂ (Special Criminal Courts Law, No. 15/62) 
အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒကို ျပင္သည့္ ဥပေဒ အမွတ္ ၁၁/၆၄ (Special Criminal Courts Law 
Amending Law, No. 11/64) 
အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒကို ျပင္သည့္ ဥပေဒ အမွတ္ ၃၄/၆၃ (Special Criminal Courts Law 
Amending Law, No. 34/63.) 
အထူးရာဇဝတ္႐ုံးဥပေဒကို ႐ုပ္သိမ္းသည့္ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၈/၇၄ (Special Criminal Courts Law 
Repealing Law, No. 8/74) 
အေရးေပၚစီမံမႈ (ယာယီျပင္ဆင္ခ်က္) အက္ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၂၆/၅၈ [Emergency Provisions 
(Temporary Amendment) Act, No. 26/58] 
အေရးေပၚစီမံမႈ အက္ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၁၇/၅၀ (Emergency Provisions Act, No. 17/50) 
အသင္းအဖြဲ႕မ်ားဖြဲ႕စည္းျခင္းဆိုင္ရာ ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၆/၈၈ (Organisation Law, No. 6/88) 
အီလက္ထေရာနစ္ ဆက္သြယ္ေဆာင္ရြက္ေရး ဥပေဒ၊ အမွတ္ ၅/၂၀၀၄ (Electronic Transactions Law, 
No. 5/2004) 
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Official manuals and compilations 
Government of Burma. The Abridged Law Manual for Sub-Inspectors of Police, 
Burma. Rangoon: Supdt., Govt. Printing & Stationery, Burma, 1926.  
---. The Burma Police Manual. 5th ed. Vol. 1, 2. Rangoon: Supdt., Govt. Printing & 
Stationery, 1940. 
Supreme Court. Courts Manual. 4th ed. Vol. 1. Yangon: Supreme Court, 1999. (In 
English and Burmese.) 
တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္။ တရားစီရင္ေရးဆိုင္ရာ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းမ်ား၊ အမိန္႔မ်ား၊ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္ အမွာစာမ်ား (၁၉၈၈ 
မွ ၁၉၉၇)။ ရန္ကုန္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၉၈။ [Supreme Court. Procedures, Orders, 
Instructions and Memoranda Concerning the Judiciary (1988 to 1997). 
Yangon: Supreme Court, 1998.] 
---။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ ျပန္တမ္း။ အတြဲ (၁၁) - (၂၇) ။ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၉၄-၂၀၁၀။ 
(Supreme Court. Union of Myanmar Supreme Court Gazette. Vol. 11-27. 
Supreme Court, 1994-2010.) (Published fortnightly.) 
---။ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္းမ်ား၊ အမိန္႔မ်ား၊ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္ အမွာစာမ်ား (၁၉၉၈-၂၀၀၁)။ ပထမတဲြ၊ 
တတိယတြဲ။ ရန္ကုန္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၂၀၀၂။ [Supreme Court. Instructions, Orders, 
Instructions and Memoranda (1993 to 1997). Vol. 1, 3. Yangon: Supreme 
Court, 2002.] 
---။ အမိန္ ႔မ်ား၊ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ားႏွင့္ အမွာစာမ်ား (၁၉၉၃ မွ ၁၉၉၇)။ အတဲြ (၃) တြဲ။ ရန္ကုန္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ 
၁၉၉၈။ [Supreme Court. Orders, Instructions and Memoranda (1993 to 
1997). 3 vols. Yangon: Supreme Court, 1998.] 
တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ေရွ႕ေနမ်ားေကာင္စီ။ ေရွ႕ေနေရွ႕ရပ္မ်ား၏ က်င့္ဝတ္သိကၡာမ်ား၊ တာဝန္မ်ားႏွင့္ အခြင့္အေရးမ်ား။ 
တတိယအႀကိမ္။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရံုး၊ ၂၀၀၁။ (Bar Council. Lawyers’ Code of 
Conduct, Responsibilities and Rights. 3rd ed. Yangon: Office of the 
Attorney General, 2001.)  
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေကာင္စီရံုး။ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေကာင္စီရံုးက ထုတ္ျပန္သည့္ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ား။ အတဲြ (၁) - (၂)။ ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေကာင္စီရံုး၊ ၁၉၈၁၊ ၁၉၈၂။ (Office of the Council of State. Instructions 
issued by the Office of the Council of State. Vol. 1, 2. Rangoon: Office of 
the Council of State, 1981, 1982.) 
---။ ဝန္ထမ္းစည္းကမ္းထိန္းသိမ္းေရးလက္စြဲ။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ေကာင္စီရံုး၊ ၁၉၈၅။ (Office of the 
Council of State. Civil Servants Maintenance of Discipline Manual. 
Rangoon: Office of the Council of State, 1985.) 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕ရံုး။ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕၏ 
ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ား။ အတဲြ (၃)။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕ရံုး၊ ၁၉၉၀။ 
(Office of the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Instructions of the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council. Vol. 3. Yangon: Office of the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council, 1990.) 
---။ ၿမိဳ႕နယ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႔မ်ား၏ လုပ္ငန္းတာဝန္မ်ားႏွင့္ လုပ္ငန္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈစနစ္။ ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ၿငိမ္ဝပ္ပိျပားမႈတည္ေဆာက္ေရးအဖဲြ႕ရံုး၊ ၁၉၈၉။ (Office of the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council. Township Law and Order Restoration 
Councils’ Responsibilities and Work Regimen. Yangon: Office of the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council, 1989.) 
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ႏိုင္ငံေတာ္တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္။ တရားစီရင္ေရးလမ္းညႊန္ တရားရံုးမ်ားည ႊန္ၾကားလႊာလက္စဲြ (၁၉၄၆-၁၉၇၀)။ ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ဗဟိုပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၇၀။ [Chief Court. Manual of Courts General Letters (1946-
1970). Rangoon: Central Publishing House, 1970.] 
---။ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ ညႊန္ၾကားလႊာမ်ား (၁၉၆၂-၁၉၆၉)။ ရန္ကုန္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္၊ ၁၉၆၉။ [Chief Court. Chief 
Court General Letters (1962-1969). Rangoon: Chief Court, 1969.] 
ျပည္သူ႔တရားသူႀကီးအဖဲြ႕။ ျပည္သူ႔တရားသူႀကီးအဖဲြ႕က ထုတ္ျပန္သည့္ ညႊန္ၾကားခ်က္မ်ား (၁၉၇၄-၁၉၈၈)။ 
ရန္ကုန္၊ တရားရံုးခ်ဳပ္ပံုႏွိပ္တိုက္၊ ၁၉၈၉။ [Council of People’s Justices. Instructions 
Issued by the Council of People’s Justices (1974-1988). Rangoon: Supreme 
Court Press, 1989.] 
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံရဲတပ္ဖြဲ႕ဌာနခ်ဳပ္။ ျပည္ေထာင္စုျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံေတာ္ ရဲလက္စြဲ။ ပထမတဲြ၊ ဒုတိယတြဲ။ ရန္ကုန္၊ 
ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံရဲတပ္ဖြဲ႕ဌာနခ်ဳပ္။၊ ၂၀၀၀။ (Myanmar Police Force Headquarters. Union 
of Myanmar Police Manual. Vol. 1, 2. Yangon: Myanmar Police Force 
Headquarters, 2000.) 
ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရံုး။ ဥပေဒမ်ား၊ နည္းဥပေဒမ်ား၊ အမိန္႔မ်ားႏွင့္ ေၾကညာခ်က္မ်ား။ ေရွ႕ေနခ်ဳပ္ရံုး၊ ၁၉၈၉-၂၀၁၀။ 
(Office of the Attorney General. Laws, Rules, Orders and Announcements. 
Office of the Attorney General, 1989-2010.) (Published annually.) 
 
Print, online & broadcast media 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Burmese Service 
Burma Press Summary (synopsis of news in Working People’s Daily, in English) 
Burma Update (online news sheet, in English and Burmese) 
Myanmar Times (newspaper, in English and Burmese) 
New Light of Myanmar (newspaper, in English) 
New Mandala (website, in English) 
Voice of America (VOA), Burmese Service  
Weekly Eleven (news periodical, in Burmese) 
Working People’s Daily (newspaper, in English) 
တရားေရးဂ်ာနယ္ (Judicial Journal, periodical, in Burmese and English) 
ျမန္မာ့အလင္း (Myanma Alin, newspaper, in Burmese) 
ေရွ႕သို႔ (Forward, periodical, in Burmese) 
ဧရာဝတ ီ (The Irrawaddy, website, in Burmese and English)  
 
